


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THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

BY R. A. ALGER

SECRETARY OF WAR, MARCH 5, 1897
TO AUGUST 1, 1899

WITH MAPS



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October, 1901.

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED
TO THE
AMERICAN SOLDIER AND SAILOR



PREFACE

IT has not been my purpose in the preparation of the manuscript of this book to write a full history of the war with Spain; on the contrary, it has been to place on record some of the prominent facts connected with the organization, equipment, and movements of the army, together with the administration of the War Department, with the hope that such statement will serve a useful purpose as an example, should another crisis of the same kind occur.

The statements in this volume are based upon either my own knowledge or upon the official reports, verbal and written, made during my incumbency of the office of Secretary of War. The descriptions of the fights of Las Guasimas, Caney, San Juan, and Manila are based upon official documents, conversation with participants, and letters from officers high in authority received since the war. A personal visit to the battlefield of San Juan in the spring of 1899 has been of much service, making that field of operations somewhat familiar to me.

PREFACE

It has been my good fortune to have placed at my disposal the complete files of the correspondence received by and issued from the headquarters of the 5th Corps during the entire Santiago campaign. Many of these despatches are now published for the first time, and throw an interesting light on the history of the army which accomplished so much and which virtually ended the war with Spain.

An account of the Santiago army and the movements of the land forces in Cuba would not have been complete without a discussion of the relations between Admiral Sampson and General Shafter. The documents quoted in the chapter devoted to that matter should remove a great deal of misapprehension.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank numerous government officials and personal friends, in and out of the military service, for having materially aided me in the collection of data on various matters not coming under my direct observation.

Should war ever again come upon this country and find it so totally unprepared as it was in 1898, I hope that those who have been so profuse in their criticisms, and eager to discover faults, may have the patriotism and pride of country to rise above personalities, and, instead of striving to tear down, may endeavor to strengthen the hands of those upon whom the burden may fall and whose only hope of reward is that

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satisfaction which comes from the consciousness of having labored honestly and unremittingly to serve a government whose flag has never yet known defeat.

A large, elegant handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Robert H. Taylor". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent initial "R" and a long, sweeping tail.

DETROIT MICHIGAN, 1901.

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CHAPTER I

THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1898

THE thoughtful observer of public events during the years 1895-97 need hardly be reminded that both the Cleveland and the McKinley administrations sought by every honorable means to avoid complications with Spain, though protesting against the conditions prevalent in Cuba. Deplorable as those conditions were, and shocking as was their effect upon the enlightened and humane mind, neither Mr. Cleveland nor Mr. McKinley seemed to feel that this country should, because of them, plunge into war. The conservative and responsible men at the head of the nation's affairs were profoundly averse to war, although they encountered, in holding to this course, the growing opposition of public sentiment throughout the country. As the year 1896 drew to a close this opposition became formidable.*

* The Republican platform, as read and adopted at the St. Louis Convention, June 18, 1896, was as follows :

" We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battles of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression (applause), and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty. The government of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or the lives of resident Amer-

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Even conservative newspapers began to complain, not wholly without a semblance of warrant, that the government was leaning to the wrong side in its effort to stand exactly straight, and to hint that the navy had been converted into a police force for Spain's benefit. Denunciations of eminent Senators who advocated peace took on the quality of violence; indeed, towards the close of Mr. Cleveland's administration sympathy with the insurgent Cubans had become the popular test of human kindness, and protest against war the unanswerable proof of unchristian indifference. President McKinley, therefore, inherited not only the problem itself—a problem which had been steadily intensifying for years—but a popular demand for intervention which had attained serious proportions and could be resisted only with extreme difficulty. Nevertheless, quite apart from the ideas entertained by the people generally, the facts, as they were made known to the President and his Cabinet, contained material enough for profound anxiety. It was only too evident that a state of absolute barbarity existed in Cuba, and that inhuman cruelties were of daily and contrived occurrence.

President Cleveland had unfalteringly persisted up to the last hour of his term in the policy he had adopted two years previously. Apparently his purpose was to transfer the situation to his successor free from all embarrassments. The fact remains that the state of

ican citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island. (Applause.)”

And on this same question the Democratic Convention of 1896 thus expressed itself :

“ We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence.”

THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1898

affairs could not have been more embarrassing if he had repeatedly modified his course between the spring of 1895 and March 4, 1897. It was, in fact, inherently intolerable, and it had been made needlessly painful and distressing by a policy on the part of Spain which had provoked the bitterest and deepest resentment of the American people.

Negotiations, with a view to ameliorating conditions in Cuba, were inaugurated as soon as our envoy, General Stewart L. Woodford, reached Madrid. The President and his Cabinet were, one and all, sincerely anxious to avert war, and to that end they labored in genuine harmony, although some felt that an issue which should be at once honorable and peaceful was impossible. The President's honest and persistent effort to avoid or avert war justly entitles him to the gratitude of the American people.

Our negotiations at Madrid were encouraged, but they led to no result. A point was yielded here, another there. The diplomatic atmosphere was one of apparent friendship and conciliation, but the efforts were fruitless of practical results. It seems, however, to be characteristic of the Spaniard, as typified by his government, that, whereas he is always fruitful of alluring promise, he is invariably barren of performance.

The months dragged slowly on—months marked by honest and unselfish effort on the part of the administration, alternately darkened and illumined by Madrid's varying moods. It was obvious that Spain had grown weary of the disheartening and futile struggle in Cuba, and that she lacked either the power or the will to terminate it. It was equally obvious

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that the United States could not postpone indefinitely the discharge of its responsibilities to civilization and to itself. The difficulty consisted in discovering a common ground upon which the countries could meet without sacrifice of material interests, moral obligations, or the pride of either. That discovery was never made. But the failure was not caused by any languor in the search—on our part, at least—and up to the very last, even after the destruction of the battle-ship *Maine*, there were those who believed that war could be averted.

Every one who followed the events of 1897 will remember that at last the administration demanded the recall of Weyler and a revocation of his reconcentrado edict. It is common knowledge also that Weyler was recalled, the edict revoked, and Captain-General Blanco sent to Havana, charged with the task of reorganizing the government of the island upon a basis of autonomy. It is difficult to say how far the proposed measures would have fulfilled the necessities of the situation. There is reason to believe, however, that it met the plans and wishes of the Autonomist party. No one can say with certainty that it would have failed, for it was never subjected to the test. The destruction of the *Maine* swept away forever this attempted adjustment.

Our people, awed by the suddenness and horror of the tragedy, awaited in silence the result of an investigation. It was the dignified self-control of a people accustomed to hear before it strikes. It was the calm of intense repression. The report of the Naval Board that the *Maine* had been destroyed by an explosion from the outside was followed by

THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1898

Senator Proctor's speech in the Senate Chamber—that deliberate, dispassionate, but thoroughly convincing presentation of the Cuban horrors as he had seen them for himself. As the Senator spoke the most zealous optimist felt his hopes falling from him and saw at last the vision of the coming cataclysm. The sun had set upon the day of polite palaver and futile effort. Even those who had tried to deceive themselves after the destruction of the *Maine* abandoned the endeavor then and there.

It became apparent to the American people that the arts of diplomacy had been vainly exerted, and that Spain could no longer be tolerated by the United States as a neighbor in the West Indies. The time for debate had passed—the time for action had come.

CHAPTER II

UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

AMERICANS have not forgotten—they are not likely to forget—the splendid spectacle of the country's response to the government's ultimatum upon Spain which inevitably resulted in war. It was spontaneous and practically universal; it was sincere and enthusiastic. One realized that thirty-three years of peace had made no change in the American character. More than 100,000 veterans of the Civil War—wearers of the blue and wearers of the gray—pleaded for an opportunity to serve the re-established Union. The sons of those who fought under Grant and Lee showed that the soldierly and patriotic spirit of their sires had lost nothing in intensity by the lapse of years.

If Congress inspired the nation by its unanimous vote for the war fund, the country in its turn gave the whole world a picture of patriotic earnestness such as has seldom thrilled the hearts of brave and honorable men.

Thousands of men offered to enlist before the formal declaration of hostilities. War was declared April 21, 1898.* Under authority of act of Congress, on

* On this day Minister Woodford was given his passports at Madrid. The formal declaration of war by Congress occurred April 25th; but that act also stated that "war has existed since the 21st day of April."

UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

April 23d the President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers. Within twenty-four hours the nation was aflame. Tenders of service came by the hundreds of thousands. It is safe to say that a million men offered themselves where 125,000 had been called. It is equally safe to add that the administration was as overwhelmed by offers to meet the second call, issued May 25, 1898, for 75,000 men. It was the apotheosis of patriotism.

On the 1st of April our standing army consisted of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, distributed over the entire country. This force may be classified as follows:

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men</i>
General Officers and Staff Corps	532	2,026
Cavalry	437	6,047
Artillery	288	4,486
Infantry	886	12,828
Miscellaneous	653
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Total	2,143	26,040

Here was the nucleus about which we had to gather the great army of 1898; and this was the organization with which we were to muster in, equip, organize, and mobilize not only the 125,000 volunteers called for on April 23d, but the subsequent levies, aggregating, with the regular army, approximately 275,000 men. The governmental machinery was altogether inadequate to immediately meet the emergency. It had, during thirty years, been called upon only to plan for and meet the requirements of the regular army in time of peace, and naturally enough had become quite fixed in the narrow grooves of peace. However, the officers at the head of the various bureaus met, as

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fully as was possible in the existing environment, the crisis, and their zeal, devotion, and professional ability entitle them to the grateful admiration of the people. Under the circumstances they worked wonders, and I deem it a high privilege that I am here permitted to pay this just tribute to them and their assistants.* And I desire to especially mention my very able and conscientious Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable George D. Meiklejohn, to whom too much praise cannot be given.

In order to understand the problem thoroughly, it will be necessary for the reader to acquaint himself with the details of the military situation on and up to April 23d.

On March 9th Congress appropriated "for national defence" the sum of \$50,000,000. No part of this sum was available for offensive purposes—even for offensive preparation. The fund, though placed at the President's disposal, remained only an appropriation "for national defence," and he confined the employment of it literally within that limitation. Under this interpretation of the act, it was, of course, permissible to hasten the work upon our coast fortifications, the plans for which had been formulated by the Endicott Board of 1885 and duly sanctioned by Congress at that time. Allotments were made, therefore, out of the \$50,000,000 fund to the Ordnance, Engineer, Quartermaster, Medical and Signal corps, as follows: Ordnance, (about) \$10,000,000; Engineer, \$5,500,000; Quartermaster, \$500,000; Medical, \$20,000; Signal, \$226,400.

* The Inspector-General, Brigadier-General Breckinridge, was commissioned a major-general of volunteers by the President, and did not serve in his department during the war.

UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

All of this was for purposes of coast defence—guns, mountings, emplacements, transportation, etc.—not a cent was used outside of the limits fixed by Congress. There was no disturbance of the status of peace before the declaration of war.

Meanwhile the War Department had been able to do nothing in the way of accumulating material for offensive war—for the emergency which, after the destruction of the *Maine*, was regarded by the country at large as inevitable. Every arsenal in the country, and every private establishment capable of turning out guns, carriages, powder, ammunition, etc., was working up to its full capacity, day and night, for coast defence; but the War Department could not purchase or even contract for any of the material so soon to be needed for the new army. None of the bureaus had on hand reserve supplies. Being unable to increase its stock, each had produced only enough for the immediate, every-day needs of the regular establishment on a peace basis.

When the declaration of war finally came, the Ordnance and Engineer corps, thanks to the allowance made from the \$50,000,000 fund, were in full working order, and had already accomplished much towards the national defence. Regular troops had been moved to the coast and put in camps at various points, including Chickamauga. Within a very few days after the formal opening of hostilities, 1,535 torpedoes and mines, together with the electrical appliances necessary for their immediate operation, which had been provided from the National Defence Fund, were placed in various harbors; and the Signal Corps had been increased to the proportions needed for

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an effective and complete system of "fire control" in the forts.

It is unnecessary to say that the condition of the coast defences was far from what it should have been, notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of the Ordnance and Engineer corps between March 9th and April 23d. The truth is that, whereas the Endicott Board of 1885 provided for a thorough system of armament and fortification, Congress, which had sanctioned the plan, supported it so feebly with appropriations that the work had gone on at a snail's pace, and, in 1898, nearly thirteen years after its adoption, relatively little progress had been made.

To illustrate: The plan required an expenditure of \$100,000,000 for the construction and emplacement of the following guns: 8-inch, 98; 10-inch, 194; 12-inch, 204; 12-inch mortars, 1,037; rapid-fire, 829; making a total of 2,362 guns and mortars. On the 1st of April, 1898, only these had been emplaced: 8-inch, 9; 10-inch, 44; 12-inch, 10; 12-inch mortars, 88; rapid-fire, none.

Thus, out of the 2,362 pieces of ordnance contemplated in the project of 1885, only 151 were in position April 1, 1898.* In thirteen years Congress had appropriated for this great national work less than one-fourth of the sum required for its completion. The War Department had expended the amounts which through successive administrations had been

* There were completed, however, April 1, 1898:

<i>8-inch</i>	<i>10-inch</i>	<i>12-inch</i>	<i>12-inch mortars</i>	<i>rapid-fire</i>
88	91	46	70	none

But owing to the fact that the manufacture of carriages had not kept pace with the manufacture of guns, only 151 of these pieces of ordnance were ready for immediate use.

UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

placed at its disposal, but could do no more. It was also straitened in the matter of ammunition. For the 8-inch guns there were only twelve rounds each; for the 10-inch, twenty rounds; for the 12-inch, fifteen rounds, and for the mortars, ten. With the belated aid derived from the \$50,000,000 fund, the Ordnance and Engineer corps accomplished remarkable results, but, at the best, those results were sadly inadequate. Dilatory and grudging legislation had borne its fruit.

In comparison with the other bureaus of the War Department, however, the Ordnance, Engineer, and Signal corps had been favored. They, at least, enjoyed an opportunity for effort, and had the means of utilizing that opportunity for a month and a half. On the other hand, the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical departments, up to April 23d, had been denied even the privilege of endeavor. Not one of these, under the President's interpretation of the term "national defence," had been permitted to take a step outside the ordinary routine; they could not either procure or order anything in the way of equipment—clothing, tentage, harness, commissary stores, medical and hospital supplies, camp furniture, and other material. Because of this, absolutely nothing had been added to the ordinary supply as it existed March 9, 1898.

The emergency confronted us before we had been able to move to meet it.

The personnel of the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical corps, numerically, was almost as inadequate as the material. On April 23d there were only 22 trained commissary officers in the service.

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In the Quartermaster Department the number of officers was limited by law to 57. Congress allowed 192 medical officers, but when war came only 179 were ready for active service. On this point the Surgeon-General made the following statement to the War Investigation Commission :

“The number of medical officers, 192, allowed by law to the army is inadequate in time of peace. This number includes 15 assistant surgeons authorized by the act approved May 12, 1898. Later in May there were 13 vacancies; 6 officers were engaged in administrative duties in the office of the Surgeon-General and in the superintendence of the library and the Army Medical Museum; 11 were on duty at medical-supply depots and as chief surgeons of military departments; 1 at the United States Soldiers' Home, Washington, D. C.; 56 at general hospitals and at garrisoned posts; 1 as colonel of a volunteer regiment; while 4 were disabled. One hundred officers were thus left for field service, 5 of whom were placed on duty as chief surgeons of army corps, 36 as brigade surgeons of volunteers, and 59 as regimental surgeons and assistants with the regular troops. The insufficiency of the last-mentioned number was made up by the assignment of medical men under contract.”

It should be added that the hospital corps consisted of 723 men—a mere handful. There were many medicines that could be purchased at once in the open market, but a great number of articles indispensable to an effective service in camp or field could not be so readily obtained. Medical chests and apparatus, surgical instruments, hospital tents and furniture, “first-aid packets,”* etc., had to be ordered and manufactured.

* A small envelope carried upon the soldier's person, containing antiseptic compresses and bandages for immediate use in emergency, pending the arrival of the surgeon.

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In one respect alone was the War Department able to make immediate response to at least a part of the sudden demands upon it. Including those already in the hands of the regular soldiers, there were 53,508 .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifles, and 14,895 .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen carbines. This supply, however, was barely sufficient to meet the requirements of the increased regular army. Nothing was left for the volunteers except .45-caliber Springfield rifles, of which there were 265,895. For these weapons, and for the 7,893 .45-caliber Springfield carbines, also in our arsenal, there was no smokeless-powder ammunition, nor was any immediately obtainable. The government did not manufacture the article. Its supply was drawn from the only establishments in the country making it—Peyton & Co., the Duponts, and Laflin & Rand, of which firms one was situated on the Pacific coast and the other two in the East. From the supply thus obtained the United States arsenal at Philadelphia was then turning out .30-caliber ammunition at the rate of 50,000 rounds per diem, but the remainder of the output was taken by the Navy Department, and, as we could not, after the inauguration of hostilities, draw upon Europe, there was no smokeless powder for the volunteer-army .45-caliber weapons. This constituted a serious drawback, as was illustrated in the Santiago campaign.

The situation can be summarized in a few words: The War Department had, on April 23d, accomplished some little extra work on the coast defences; it had ready for use enough .30-caliber rifles to arm the 33,000 men added to the regular army, and enough

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.45-caliber Springfields for the volunteers, but that was all. There was in the supply bureaus absolutely nothing for the troops included in the first call, and for the other troops provided for during the last days of April, nor for the additional forces created between the 10th and 25th of May, aggregating 249,000 men, exclusive of the regular army in its original status. If the wording of the act of Congress had permitted the War Department to make use of some portion of the \$50,000,000 for offensive preparations, much could have been accomplished between March 9th and April 23d in the way of getting ready for the impending conflict.

CHAPTER III

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

ON the 1st of April, 1898, the twenty-five regiments of infantry and the ten regiments of cavalry, all of minimum strength—less than sixty to the company—were scattered over the United States from the Canadian border to the Mexican frontier. The heavy-artillery regiments were on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, and the light-artillery batteries were stationed at various posts in the North, South, East, and West. Few of these regiments were intact. Detached companies and troops were quartered at different posts at greater or less distances from their regimental headquarters.

Fortunately there was no law forbidding immediate mobilization. On the 15th of April, therefore, all of the regulars that could be spared from their stations were sent to New Orleans, Tampa, Mobile, or Chickamauga. Major-General John R. Brooke was assigned to Chickamauga, Brigadier-General William R. Shafter to New Orleans, Brigadier-General J. J. Copping to Mobile, and Brigadier-General J. F. Wade to Tampa. The mobilization was effected at the South in order that the troops should be near Cuba in the event of immediate need. Moreover, it was considered desirable to acclimatize the men, as far as possible, preparatory to operations in a semi-tropical country.

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A great part of the regular army was, therefore, either mobilized or in process of mobilization when, on April 21st, the American minister at Madrid was given his passport by the Spanish government. The severance of diplomatic relations, under the circumstances then existing, was rightfully interpreted by Congress as tantamount to a declaration of war. On the day following, April 22d, in anticipation of a formal declaration of war, Congress authorized the President to temporarily increase the army of the United States in case of war by calls for volunteers. Four days later, April 26th, the day after the formal opening of hostilities, Congress provided for the increase of the regulars to the maximum strength. The army of 1898 was organized under the provisions of these two laws of April 22d and 26th, and that of May 11th, which provided for thirteen volunteer regiments possessing special qualifications.

The act of April 26, 1898, increasing the regular army to approximately 61,000, also provided for a three-battalion formation and the development of companies of infantry to 106 men. This law did not augment the number of regiments of the regulars, but the number of enlisted men. Enlistments were made with the same care as in time of peace, although 216,000 volunteers were entering the service at the same time. The 29,521 men* newly enlisted in the regular army up to June 30, 1898, were chosen from a total number of 127,798 applicants. Thus, 98,277, or 77 per cent., were rejected. This was accomplished despite the fact that about one-fifth of the regular

* The maximum strength of the regular army on a war footing was not reached until some time later.

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army officers had been given appointments or assigned to commands of volunteers—a serious obstruction to the machinery of recruitment.

Within a week subsequent to the enactment of this law (April 26th), the War Department was engaged in the simultaneous preparation of three large armies for operation in foreign countries, separated from the United States by distances ranging from 100 to 7,000 miles, and from each other by half the circumference of the earth.

The act of April 22d, authorizing the President to temporarily increase the military establishment in time of war by calls for volunteers, at the same time empowered the Secretary of War to recruit from the nation at large companies, troops, battalions, or regiments possessing special qualifications, not to exceed 3,000 men in all. Under this authority were created the three volunteer cavalry regiments. The officers of these regiments were, by the law, selected and commissioned by the Secretary and not by the President. Colonel Leonard Wood, Colonel Jay L. Torry, and Colonel Melvin Grigsby were respectively appointed to command them. On the 11th day of May, Congress also empowered the Secretary of War to organize a volunteer brigade of engineers, to consist of not more than three regiments, and to aggregate not more than 3,500 men. The officers of these regiments were appointed, under the law, by the President, with the consent of the Senate, and under such rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the Secretary of War. The same act authorized the organization of an additional volunteer force of not exceeding 10,000 enlisted men possessing immunity from the diseases incident

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to tropical climates. For these so-called immune regiments the officers were to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The first call for troops—125,000 men—was issued on April 23d. This levy was apportioned by law among the States according to population, and was confined first to the militia thereof, where such organizations existed, and then to the citizens at large. The War Department was at once overwhelmed by tenders of service from every section of the country and every State in the Union. Numerous protests against this policy of limitation were received. Veterans of the Civil War—Federals and Confederates alike—were especially insistent. The applications were as universal as they were enthusiastic. The question was, not what States would be called upon for troops, but how many of the thousands of men applying could be accepted?

The War Department favored the recognition of the State militia. Considerations of justice required that those men whose enthusiasm had inspired their entrance into State military organizations should, when the crisis occurred, be given the first opportunity for active service. For this reason it was thought that they were entitled to preference above others who were eager to enter the service. The governors of the several States were therefore informed that members of the State militia would be the first mustered. The War Department especially enjoined the State governors to inform the members of the militia that enlistment must be entirely voluntary, and not through any feelings of *esprit de corps* or compulsion. This instruction was given to relieve from any reflection

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upon their patriotism or courage those who could not leave their homes except at great sacrifice.

On the 25th of May the President issued the second call for volunteers—75,000 men. Events proved that these additional troops were not needed, as 136,000 volunteers did not leave the United States. Still this great force, of course known to the Spanish government, must have had its influence in bringing about so speedy a conclusion of the war.

The number of men furnished by the several States under the first and second calls, including the sixteen regiments with special qualifications recruited at large, is given in the following table:

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Men</i>
General officers and staff	1,010	1,329
Alabama	141	3,061
Arkansas	91	1,934
California	186	4,441
Colorado	49	1,076
Connecticut	100	2,436
Delaware	47	969
District of Columbia	49	922
Florida	48	956
Georgia	142	3,389
Idaho	32	644
Illinois	489	10,453
Indiana	260	5,564
Iowa	206	3,354
Kansas	167	3,735
Kentucky	186	4,559
Louisiana	101	2,255
Maine	61	1,444
Maryland	91	1,979
Massachusetts	277	5,515
Michigan	233	5,185
Minnesota	196	4,222
Mississippi	108	2,512
Missouri	271	6,234
Montana	48	976
	4,589	79,144

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	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Men</i>
Brought forward	4,589	79,144
Nebraska	137	3,232
Nevada	15	481
New Hampshire	47	952
New Jersey	184	4,163
New York	705	15,924
North Carolina	145	2,840
North Dakota	27	658
Ohio	485	9,557
Oregon	56	1,182
Pennsylvania	619	11,696
Rhode Island	54	1,170
South Carolina	90	2,060
South Dakota	46	983
Tennessee	187	4,148
Texas	231	5,054
Utah	15	429
Vermont	48	980
Virginia	164	3,709
Washington	60	1,379
West Virginia	88	2,245
Wisconsin	198	4,293
Wyoming	17	446
United States Volunteers	763	16,992
Total	8,970	173,717

Individual enlistments and subsequent appointments brought the totals of volunteers up to:

Officers	10,017	
Men	213,218	
Total	223,235*	

With the calls for volunteers, and the apportionment of the troops among the several States, the muster-in, equipment, and mobilization of the army for the war began. It is hardly necessary to say that the

* This number includes the total number of men furnished by the several States up to November 30, 1898.

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task was neither a simple nor an easy one. The successful accomplishment of this undertaking in such a comparatively brief period is in itself the greatest tribute that could be paid to the officers of the regular army by whom the work was done. This statement applies to the line as well as to the staff.

The governors of each State designated the rendezvous for its allotment. To insure the muster-in of only able-bodied applicants, regular army officers were sent to these State camps. Each volunteer, after enrolment, underwent a thorough physical examination before he was mustered into the service. For each individual soldier was prepared and forwarded to the War Department a description, giving his physical record and history of enlistment.

The Quartermaster Department, immediately after the first call, was confronted with the proposition of assembling at the selected camps—Chickamauga, Tampa, Mobile, and Washington—this vast army from an area exceeding that of the entire continent of Europe. At Camp Thomas and Camp Alger almost every State in the Union was represented by a full regiment of infantry or other organization. Our soldiers did not travel during the war with Spain as they did during the Civil War. In all contracts with the railroads it was expressly stipulated that in the day coaches each soldier should have an entire seat for himself and his equipment, and for over twenty-four hours of travel the troops should occupy sleeping-cars—Pullmans or tourists—three men to a section. Few veterans of the Civil War can recall having travelled during the sixties in any but box, cattle, or on flat cars. Even the horses and mules, in the war with

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Spain, were nearly all shipped in patent palace stock cars.

The arrival of the volunteers from their several States at the camps of instruction quickly demonstrated the fact that so far as equipment was concerned these militiamen were little better than recruits. Not a single regiment was fully ready for the field. They were deficient in regimental equipment of every kind. No less than 100,000 Springfield rifles and carbines were issued to volunteers who had been supposed to be well armed. Very many arrived in camp without uniforms, accoutrements, rifles, or anything, in fact, necessary for active service, except that enthusiasm which is the invariable characteristic of the American volunteer.

With empty military storehouses, the supply departments set to work equipping practically 250,000 men. The two bureaus most involved in this task were, of course, the Ordnance and Quartermaster departments. The Ordnance Department, under the division of labor for a long time obtaining in the army, not only provides the armament of the sea-coast and the weapons of the artillery and enlisted men, but also furnishes to each soldier his equipment.* Many of these articles are of special design and manufacture, and not only could not be purchased in open market, but could not even be manufactured by most establishments. Reliance lay, therefore, almost exclusively upon the government plant—the Rock Island

* One blanket-bag, one pair of blanket-bag shoulder straps, one pair of blanket-bag coat straps; one bayonet scabbard; one cartridge belt; one canteen, one canteen strap; one gun sling; one haversack, one haversack strap; one meat-can, one tin cup, one knife, one fork, and one spoon.

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arsenal. Congress had been repeatedly requested to appropriate the money necessary to equip this plant with special reserve machinery, so that it might be at all times ready to meet any emergency. But this request, so often made, was denied, and the especially designed apparatus for the arsenal had to be purchased, manufactured, and installed before work could begin. On the 1st of April the output at Rock Island arsenal amounted to seventy sets of infantry equipment per diem. When the protocol was signed, on the 12th day of August, it was turning out daily 8,000 complete infantry equipments and 250 cavalry equipments. The record of the Springfield armory is no less creditable, for the daily output of that plant during the same period was increased from 120 to 363 Krag-Jorgensen rifles.

The great supply bureau of the army, however, is the Quartermaster Department. In addition to providing the soldier with uniforms, hats, suits of underwear, blankets, overcoats, rubber ponchos, and various other clothing, each regiment of infantry, squadron of cavalry, and battery of artillery must be supplied with the necessary transportation and field equipment, such as wagons, horses, mules, harness, tents, etc. Here, too, of the manufactured material, the articles were of army standard and unusual design, and could only be furnished by comparatively few establishments in the United States. All of the material needed for the new troops had to be especially manufactured, and, as for the horses and mules, a careful examination and inspection of each animal was necessary, in accordance with the rigid requirements of the military service. Some idea of the work

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of the Quartermaster Bureau can be formed when it is stated that no less than an average of 4,000 pairs of shoes a day were required for the army between the period of April 22d and August 12th. The various articles of equipment furnished by this department alone, during the same time, amounted daily to over 56,000.

In the matter of tents was experienced the greatest difficulty. The supply in the United States, as well as material therefor, was utterly inadequate to meet the demand. The government standard of duck was unobtainable. Every city and establishment in the United States having tents or tent material of any kind was drawn upon. Much thus obtained, although the best that the markets of the country afforded, was naturally not up to the standard, and subsequently caused some inconvenience, but the government exhausted every effort to meet the needs, even going so far as to secure the aid of the force in the national Post-Office Department mail-bag repair-shop.

The same embarrassment was experienced with respect to wagons and to the cloth for khaki uniforms. There was no khaki cloth in the United States, and no establishment familiar with its manufacture. Notwithstanding these conditions and the fact that there were but fifty-seven officers in the Quartermaster Department (and the work of this bureau certainly requires specialized knowledge and experience), at the close of hostilities in August, there had been manufactured or purchased and issued 546,338 blankets, 390,775 blouses, 523,203 trousers, 476,705 campaign hats, 153,167 canvas field uniforms, 782,303 shoes, 588,800 leggings, 622,211 dark-blue flannel shirts, 1,257,002 undershirts, 1,210,682 drawers, 38,963 axes,

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4,888 trumpets, 34,344 camp-kettles, 58,662 mess-pans, 64,980 various kinds of tents, exclusive of shelter tents, 372,379 shelter-tent halves, 16,618 horses, 20,182 mules, 5,179 wagons, 28,012 sets of single harness, and other articles of every kind in like proportion.

The army, volunteer and regular, was organized into eight corps, each corps consisting of three divisions, each division of three brigades, and each brigade of three regiments. These eight corps were thus commanded: First Army Corps, Major-General John R. Brooke, Camp Thomas, Georgia (Chickamauga Park). Second Army Corps, Major-General William M. Graham, Camp Alger (Falls Church), Virginia. Third Army Corps, Major-General James I. Wade, Camp Thomas, Georgia. Fourth Army Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger, Mobile, Alabama (disintegration of this temporary camp began as early as June 2d; sent to Tampa and Fernandina, Florida, and then to Huntsville, Alabama). Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa (Santiago campaign). Sixth Army Corps, Major-General James H. Wilson, Camp Thomas, Georgia (not finally organized); Wilson subsequently commanded first division of First Corps and went to Puerto Rico. Seventh Army Corps, Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Tampa; moved May 31st to Jacksonville, Florida. Eighth Army Corps, Major-General Wesley Merritt, San Francisco and Manila.

In addition to the corps, division, and brigade formations already described, about 12,000 volunteers were distributed on the sea-coast from New Jersey to Maine, and a large number of them instructed in the use of heavy artillery. A part was held as infantry

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supports for sea-coast defence, and large detachments of troops were sent to guard the powder plants.

The War Department has been criticised for assembling so many troops in large camps. The reasons for such action may be stated as follows:

1. The supply bureaus could not establish in each of the forty-five States depots for rationing volunteers during the period required to manufacture and ship equipments for these recruits. Moreover, there were not enough regular army officers in the Quartermaster, Commissary, Medical, and Ordnance departments to detail one of each kind to so many scattered State camps, and regular army officers alone at that time were qualified to do the work.

2. It was desirable to place volunteer regiments in camps with regulars, in order that the former might have the example and instruction that seasoned troops would furnish.

3. It was deemed inadvisable to have volunteer organizations remain in their own States any longer than was absolutely necessary for the mustering-in process, in that home influences tended to retard military discipline.

4. Immediate drill in brigade, division, and corps manœuvres was of the first importance, as the experience of the Civil War had demonstrated. This could be accomplished only in large camps of instruction.

5. Considerations of national moment, which subsequent events proved wise, suggested the brigading of regiments, not from the same State, but from the four great geographical divisions—North, South, East, and West. In this way clannishness and pro-

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vincialism were obliterated, and the result was a homogeneous army.

Here are a few typical brigades organized upon this plan :

First Army Corps.—1st South Carolina, 12th Minnesota, 5th Pennsylvania, forming 1st Brigade, 3d Division.

Second Army Corps.—1st Rhode Island, 2d Tennessee, 3d Missouri, forming 3d Brigade, 2d Division.

Third Army Corps.—1st Maine, 52d Iowa, 1st Mississippi, forming 3d Brigade, 1st Division.

Fourth Army Corps.—2d Georgia, 3d Ohio, 69th New York, forming 2d Brigade, 3d Division.

Seventh Army Corps.—1st North Carolina, 2d Illinois, 2d New Jersey, forming 1st Brigade, 2d Division.

It has been my endeavor to fully and accurately present the condition of the War Department on April 23d, and what was accomplished after the declaration of hostilities, solely with a view to showing the obstacles that had to be overcome, and to illustrate the intelligence, the devotion, and the patient courage of those who overcame them. If, between 1861 and 1898, our resources and our agencies of supply had been increased, the imminence of the emergency in 1898 was correspondingly greater, and the results obtained during the first few months much more important and substantial. The first call for troops at the outbreak of the Civil War came in the same month as the first call for the war with Spain. By the end of May, 1898, we had mustered into service 163,626 new men. At the end of May, 1861, only 16,161 had been mustered in. In August, 1898, we had 274,717 men under arms. In 1861 that number had not been obtained until No-

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venber, three months later. All this took place notwithstanding the fact that after July the emergency of 1898 began to attenuate, whereas, in 1861, it grew in poignancy with every day.

In a little over thirty days practically all of the 125,000 volunteers of the first call had been mustered in, and, together with the available regular troops, were mobilized at Tampa, Mobile, Washington, and Chickamauga Park. On May 25th, less than five weeks after the first call for troops, an expedition sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines. In less than seven weeks an army, 17,000 strong, set out for Santiago—our first invasion, with troops, of a foreign country in half a century.

CHAPTER IV

APPOINTMENTS AND IMPORTUNITIES

THE life of the Secretary of War was not a happy one in those days of active military operations. With over a quarter of a million men in the army, it seemed as if there was hardly a family in the United States that did not have a friend or relative in the service, and that for one reason or another some member from each of these found it necessary to write to, or personally visit, the War Office. Members of Congress, departmental and State officials cannot, as a rule, be denied audience. The office of the Secretary was daily visited by not less than one hundred persons whose business or position entitled them to a personal hearing. So urgent was the pressure that almost the entire day was given up to them. Therefore it became necessary to devote the greater part of the night and Sundays to the consideration of the administrative features of department work. The biographers of Secretary Stanton have testified that his experience was the same; but the population of the country has nearly trebled since the Civil War, and, with the improved means of rapid transportation, every section has been brought within easy communication with the nation's capital. The pressure, therefore, was correspondingly greater than during the early sixties, when there was only the North to be considered.

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Persons of all ages, conditions, politics, and antecedents—Senators, Representatives, national, State, and city officials from every part of the Union—visited the department. Many a disappointed contractor appealed his case to the Secretary, and usually presented his claims for a hearing. There were men with advice as to plans of campaign, and many who came only to express their unsolicited opinion of the military conditions and affairs.

Great and constant was the pressure for appointments. Applicants, by mail and in person, would beg, appeal, and demand commissions. Before breakfast, and even after midnight, they besieged the Secretary's residence with a determination superb in its inflexibility.

Once an applicant for office presented a card in the handwriting of Abraham Lincoln, which read:

"Sec. of War, please see Major ——— of the 6th Md. Regt.,
and give him good arms if possible. A. LINCOLN.

"Oct. 7, 1862."

This note, he claimed, had secured an audience with the Secretary of War in '62, and ought to entitle him to the same consideration in '98. One young seeker came from California to personally press his claim. When his disqualifications were explained to him, he replied, "But, Mr. Secretary, I have come all the way from the Pacific coast for this appointment, and *that* should certainly entitle me to some consideration." Still another applicant based his claims upon the statement that he "was a friend of the Prince of Wales."

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Of all the requests, however, received, perhaps the most unique was that which came from a young lady in Boston. Her note-paper, handwriting, and rhetoric vouched at least for the culture of the writer. Her request was simple and plainly worded. With much unfeigned earnestness she stated her case. The press despatches had announced that the volunteer regiment of which her brother was a member was to leave for Cuba on a fixed date. But the brother's birthday occurred two days after the date assigned for his embarkation. A birthday box of cake, jellies, pies, etc., she said, had been forwarded to him, and would not be received if the regiment left on the date announced. She naïvely asked that the regiment be detained until the sweetmeats arrived, as she was sure it would make no difference to the government, whereas it would be, "Oh, such a disappointment to my brother!"

A majority of the young men seeking commissions in the army were animated by patriotic impulses, and most of them would have been a credit to the service. More than nine-tenths, however, had to be rejected. It became necessary for the President to make some appointments from civil life of second lieutenants in the regular army. These were equitably apportioned among the several States, and each candidate was required to pass a rigid mental and physical examination.

The number of acceptable young men desiring commissions was so great that even minor bodily deficiencies were set up as disqualifications. One enthusiastic youngster knew that he was slightly deficient in weight. When he took his physical examination,

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inquiry developed the fact that he had drunk four quarts of water to increase it. Another candidate—a college student—remained in bed three days “to stretch himself,” as he put it, and he is actually said to have overcome a three-eighths of an inch deficiency in height.

For every man appointed, there were necessarily hundreds disappointed. The successful applicant, of course, withdrew from the uproar of solicitation, but the less fortunate aspirant and his many friends, political and otherwise, condemned the system of appointments, and the Secretary of War, who was generally supposed to have devised its limitations.

There is no feature connected with the conduct of the War Department during the war with Spain so persistently misunderstood and misrepresented as the method of making appointments for the volunteer army. I doubt whether I was more vilified and slandered in any other connection. Yet there were not a dozen commissions issued during the entire Spanish-American War in which I had any personal interest. The appointments were made by the governors of the States and the President, and subsequent events have proved that in most instances the appointments of the latter were made wisely.

The volunteer enlistments were confined to the regimental organizations of the several States. The act of Congress providing for raising volunteers especially stipulated that all line appointments—that is, regimental officers from second lieutenants to colonels inclusive—as well as three regimental surgeons and one chaplain, were to be appointed by the governors of the several States, and the appointment of more

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than one regular officer in any one volunteer regiment was forbidden. In August, 1898, when the strength of the volunteer army reached its maximum limit, there were in the volunteer service 8,785 officers. The officers for the volunteer army appointed by the President numbered, all told, 1,032. Of these, 441 were taken from the regular army, and but 591 from civil life.* Nearly one-fifth of the officers of the regular army were, therefore, given volunteer commissions. This was done at a time when the regular army had been more than doubled in size, and when many details were required for the recruiting service. The scarcity of regimental officers in the regular service, owing to this cause, greatly embarrassed that army.

The War Department requested of Congress authority to issue commissions for active service to retired army officers. This authority Congress denied. From the regular army was taken the maximum number of officers consistent with its efficiency—an efficiency that is the rock upon which this country must build its hope for effective operations during the first few months of any war in which it may be engaged, so long as the militia is organized as it now is.

For a little over a thousand appointments made by the President, as above stated, the number of applications exceeded 25,000. Of the twenty-six major-generals commissioned, nineteen were taken from the regular army, and seven from civil life. Of these seven, all but one were graduates of West Point, and

* These figures are based upon a statement prepared by the Adjutant-General in July, 1899. In a publication from the Adjutant-General's office, bearing date of December 13, 1899, the statement is made that 453 officers of the regular army held commissions in the volunteers.

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all had distinguished themselves in a command of equal rank during the Civil War. One hundred and two brigadier-generals were appointed. Sixty-six were taken from the regular army, promotion in each case being based solely upon the efficiency record and military fitness. Of the thirty-six appointed from civil life, all were graduates of West Point or had seen service during the Civil War or on our Western frontier, and each had proven himself competent to command.

In the general staff* the appointments from the regular army were made with equal care. With scarcely an exception, the chief officer for every one of the departments of the general staff of every corps and division was an officer of the regular army. The list presented to the President for approval was compiled from the efficiency records on file in the office of the Adjutant-General, and the President made his appointments based upon these recommendations.

The appointments from civil life were apportioned among the several States according to population. The War Department required that each applicant should give his age, education, and military experience. An epitomized list by States, giving this information, together with a reference to the persons vouching for the applicant, was prepared in the War Department and laid before the President. Experience proved that, taken as a whole, no better or more loyal body of men ever served their country. There were a few exceptions, but these were the inevitable failures.

* The corps of the Adjutant-General, Inspector-General, Judge-Advocate-General, Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Surgeon-General, Paymaster-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and Chief Signal Officer.

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The appointment of Major-General Shafter to command in what proved to be the greatest expedition and land battles of the war was made upon the recommendation of the major-general commanding the army, and at his request. The choice, as events proved, was an excellent one.

The colonelcies of the three regiments of engineers were given to graduates of West Point and an eminent civil engineer, and in two regiments the lieutenant-colonels, and in the third the senior major, were taken from the regular army. The act authorizing the formation of this brigade forbade the assignment of more than three officers of the regulars to any one of these engineer regiments. The other commissions were issued only after examinations which tested the candidates' fitness for engineering duties, and were accompanied by the recommendations of the colonels of the several regiments.

The officers of the ten "immune" regiments were appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Eight of these regiments were commanded by regular army officers. The other officers were commissioned under the rules for selecting staff appointees from civil life. Four of the regiments were colored, and the first and second lieutenants thereof were obtained by promoting sergeants and corporals, then serving in the regular army, who merited such recognition. Many of the appointments in the six white regiments were likewise given to deserving non-commissioned officers and men of the regular establishment.

Every volunteer regiment, as a part of the quota of any State (that is, among the 200,000 volunteers of

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the first and second calls), had one surgeon and two assistant surgeons, and, by law, these were appointed by the governors of the various States. Only ninety-five surgeons were appointed from civil life. These appointments, together with the 940 contract surgeons employed from June, 1898, to July, 1899, were made upon the recommendation of the Surgeon-General, who assured himself of the candidate's professional qualifications before recommendation.

Not a volunteer officer commissioned by the President was court-martialled during the war.* Of the eighty-seven paymasters commissioned, eighty-six were appointed from civil life. Not a dollar was defaulted, and all accounts have been closed. These eighty-six paymasters were a part of the 591 volunteers commissioned before mentioned. At great risk they took the money to the field with them, and there paid the army. In all the expenditures of every kind, aggregating upward of \$200,000,000, no charge has been made of jobs or favoritism. This statement applies alike to all officers of the volunteer and regular army.

The War Investigation Commission, known as the Dodge Commission, after the examination of many camps and numerous witnesses, stated that "the young civilians who received staff and other appointments in the main discharged their duties in a highly commendable manner." And further—

* The act of March 2, 1899, authorized the organization of 35,000 volunteers to be recruited at large for service in the Philippines. Twenty-five regiments were recruited under this authority. Of the 1,210 officers, 983, or 81 per cent., were reappointments of volunteer officers or men who had served in the Spanish-American War. The remainder were officers and men of the regular army.

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“It is to be noted that the organization of the army indicated a desire on the part of the War Department to place in separate and responsible commands experienced officers of the regular army, and officers from civil life who had received a military education and had experience in the Civil War. The chiefs of the staff departments in the field were selected from a similar class of officers. They took charge of the depots of supplies at the camps and were assigned the most responsible positions. So many officers of the regular army commanded, supplied, and superintended the movement of troops that the service was markedly reduced in its field, line, and staff.

“The rapidity with which commanding officers of corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, and officers of the staff departments have profited by the first six months’ service is shown in the improvements in the new camps, their location, water supply, and sanitary arrangements. The weak spots in the first arrangements for camping troops were soon discovered, and it was learned that with proper system and little expense they could be camped under favorable sanitary conditions. The present camps are models, the hospitals adapted to the comfort and care of the sick, the grounds clean, and the sanitary conditions greatly improved. The troops are now moved with promptness, without friction, and with more rapidity than in the beginning of the war. These improvements have come from experience, and the new army now is far advanced in facilities for feeding, equipping, camping, and transportation.”

The task of organization, however, was attended by still other difficulties. About the 13th of May, while the department was passing through the period of its greatest activity, it was reported in New York City that a Spanish fleet had been seen off Sandy Hook.

The possible appearance of a Spanish fleet on the Atlantic coast was not entirely unexpected. On the 29th of April the Secretary of the Navy had thus written Admiral Sampson :

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“It has of course been suspected that the destination of the four Spanish armored cruisers and torpedo destroyers might be on the Atlantic coast of the United States, probably at the northward, for the purpose of inflicting what injury they could upon our coastwise cities and towns.”

When the rumor of the appearance of the Spanish fleet off New York was made known in Washington, the major-general commanding immediately telegraphed to the chief quartermaster in New York as follows :

“Report at once any information about Spanish war-boats on our coast. Give full information. Hold transports until further orders. Acknowledge.”

A New York regiment was already embarking for Tampa, but the men were taken ashore in great haste and sent South by rail. The alarm quickly spread to every coast town on the Atlantic. It is even reported that in Boston and some of the other cities, towns, and fashionable watering-places on the New England coast, treasures and valuables were moved into the interior for safe-keeping.

The calls made upon the department about this time for immediate rescue from the advancing Spanish fleet were pathetic in their urgency. Telegrams, letters, and statesmen representing the imperilled localities poured into the War Department. They wanted guns everywhere; mines in all the rivers and harbors on the map; and their demands, joined with the tempestuous importunings of the applicants for appointments, lent to that period of the Secretary's life an affliction which it is difficult to find appropriate words to describe. It may be said, how-

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ever, that in a short time the Atlantic coast, owing to the energetic work of the Engineer and Ordnance departments, bristled with defensive artillery, from the relics of the Civil War to the latest products of military science, mounted on carriages of every variety and age. Mines were laid which would have destroyed the combined navies of the world, and for the removal of which a few weeks later the department was again importuned by those who had been only a little while before most insistent for their immediate installation.

The increased army had hardly been organized before the clamor for discharge from the service began. The report of every battle, or death from disease, naturally frightened the friends and relatives of the soldiers who had recently entered the service, and they requested their discharge. These requests were more often from their families or sweethearts than from the soldiers themselves; but they nevertheless came in large numbers, and did not cease with the end of the war. There were instances where relatives or friends of enlisted men came all the way from the Pacific coast to secure the discharge of volunteers on no other grounds than that they were "wanted at home by their mothers." With few exceptions, it was impossible to listen to these appeals, but every conceivable excuse was made to get into the Secretary's presence and urge them personally.

The persistent clamor of the office-seeker, the appeal of those who wished to leave the service, the demands of the sea-coast cities and towns for immediate and impossible protection, and the savage criticism of the military administration, plans of campaign and battle, with the apparently endless lists of short-

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comings and grievances, have left an ineffaceable impress of time and experience upon the weary shoulders of those in authority. One remembers Byron's couplet:

“A man must serve his time to every trade
Save censure—critics all are ready made.”

CHAPTER V

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

THE purely strategic aspects of the war, should war ensue, had received much consideration before the inauguration of hostilities. Even those who were opposed to conflict, and who resorted to every expedient to prevent it, finally realized that war was inevitable, and that it would be the part of wisdom to prepare for the crisis so far as might be done without committing an overt act, or incurring the reproach of deliberate provocation. The government was well within its rights in making any change of station of the regulars, and also in hastening the work on coast and harbor defence—work authorized by Congress years before, and legitimately part of our national scheme of armament.

The information in possession of the War Department showed that Spain had in Cuba more than 80,000 effective regular troops—the remnant of the 214,000 reputed to have been sent to suppress the insurrection. There were, moreover, 20,000 to 30,000 volunteers in Havana, and several thousands of the “Civil Guards” and guerillas, the latter being chiefly negroes. It was also reported that the Spaniards had 183 guns, for the most part concentrated at Havana. As the rainy, or “sickly,” season was due within a month, and was likely to last until the middle of September, it was determined that the wisest course would be to devote the

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summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the volunteers, and to make such harassing incursions into Cuba as might seem to be practicable.

Before entering upon a consideration of the various plans proposed at different times—many of which were subsequently brushed away by the march of events—it should be mentioned that certain expeditions were made into the interior of Cuba and Puerto Rico, having in view the procurement of military information and the delivery to the Cuban insurgent leaders of arms, ammunition, and stores.

During the first days of May, Lieutenant H. H. Whitney, 4th United States Artillery, undertook and carried out successfully a reconnoissance in Puerto Rico. Certain newspapers, with a criminal disregard for his personal safety, to say nothing of the government's plans, took pains, as soon as he had sailed, to publish, with the utmost attention to detail, not only the fact, but the purpose of his mission. The result was, of course, that when the foreign merchantman, with Whitney on board, touched Puerto Rico, she found the Spanish officials awaiting her. The ship was boarded and carefully searched, but the American officer was hard at work in the furnace-room, "stoking" like a professional, and thoroughly disguised in sweat and coal-dust. He landed at last, and, under a different disguise, made a thorough inspection of the southern part of the island. The information thus obtained was of great value to our army when it was disembarked in the latter part of July at Guanica.

During May and June there were three separate expeditions to Cuba which had for their object the

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delivery to the insurgents of supplies and munitions of war. The enterprise known as the "*Gussie expedition*," commanded by Captain J. H. Dorst, of the 4th Cavalry, was the first detachment of United States troops landed on Cuban soil. It sailed from Tampa on the 12th of May, with Companies E and G of the 1st Infantry, under Captain John J. O'Connell, and was convoyed by the gunboats *Wasp* and *Manning*. A landing was effected at Point Abolitas, near Cabanas, some forty miles west of Havana. Within fifteen minutes after disembarkation our force met and repulsed a Spanish regiment (1,200 strong) under Colonel Balboeis, who was killed, together with several of his men. We had no casualties. The second expedition, also under Captain Dorst, left Tampa in the latter part of May. Disembarkation was effected at Port Banes, on the northern coast, almost exactly opposite Santiago, on the southern. Through the agency of this enterprise the insurgents received 7,500 Springfield rifles, 1,300,000 rounds of .45-caliber ammunition, and 20,000 rations. Still another undertaking of the same character sailed from Tampa, on the 21st of June, under command of Lieutenant C. P. Johnson, and consisted of a troop of the 10th (colored) Cavalry and 375 armed Cubans. It took a large quantity of arms, ammunition, commissary, and quartermaster supplies for the insurgents. The expedition was attended by the *Fanita* and *Florida*. An unsuccessful attempt was made to land at Tunas, on the south coast, virtually midway between the eastern and western extremities of the island. The disembarkation was finally effected at Palo Alto, some forty miles distant, where, after a

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spirited engagement, in which we had one man killed and seven wounded, the supplies were put ashore and communication was established with General Gomez.

These preliminary expeditions fulfilled their purpose. They were carried out thoroughly, gallantly, and with the loss of but one life.

When war was declared, a very large proportion of the regular army was at Tampa, to which place General Shafter had been transferred from New Orleans. Soon thereafter he went under orders to Washington to receive instructions, and was at once placed in command of an expedition of about 5,000 men. It was intended at that time to make Tunas, a point on the southern Cuban coast, about seventy miles east of Cienfuegos, the destination. Here General Shafter was to open communication with Gomez, then reported to be operating in that district, ascertain his exact military strength and resources, supply him with such munitions of war as might be necessary, and harass the Spanish forces as far as possible without bringing on a general engagement. The following are the instructions then given General Shafter:

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 29, 1898.

“*Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

“SIR,—The following letter of instructions is sent you for your guidance:

“By authority of the Secretary of War, you are hereby directed to assume command of an expedition composed of Company E, Corps of Engineers; the 9th Cavalry; Light Batteries A and F, 2d Artillery, C and F, 3d Artillery, B and F, 4th Artillery, and D and F, 5th Artillery; the 1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 22d,

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and 24th Infantry, and all necessary quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies; pontoon train, arms, and ammunition sufficient to engage the Spanish troops; with a very limited amount of transportation; and proceed with your expedition from Tampa, Florida, to the south side of Cuba, under convoy of the ships of the United States navy, and land your force, or such portion of it as you may deem advisable, and penetrate far enough into the interior to form a junction, if practicable, with General Gomez's forces. Issue to them all the arms, ammunition, and supplies that may be required, giving them all aid, support, and succor possible. Returning your command to your ships, proceed to the northwest coast of Cuba, communicate with the commanders of our naval ships of fleet, and endeavor to send arms and supplies to the insurgents on that coast, as circumstances may warrant, unless you shall have received satisfactory information that the Spanish fleet has crossed the Atlantic and proceeded to Cuban waters. On receipt of such information, you will move your command to the nearest place of safety on our coast, and relieve your convoys, to enable them to join our fleet. In landing on Cuban soil, you will endeavor to select the most healthful location and avoid exposing your command to the yellow-fever or other epidemics of the island. It is not expected that you will penetrate farther into the interior than to form a junction with General Gomez, to render him all assistance possible; and you are not expected to have your command on the island of Cuba but a few days. This expedition is in the nature of a reconnoissance in force, to give aid and succor to the insurgents, to render the Spanish forces as much injury as possible, and avoiding serious injury to your own command.

"In conducting this enterprise great confidence is placed in your zeal, judicious management, and good judgment. You will report all important information at every opportunity.

"By command of Major-General Miles.

"H. C. CORBIN,

"Adjutant-General."

As is well known, this expedition did not sail, for the reason that the Spanish fleet had been reported

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about that time at the Cape Verde Islands. Portugal's proclamation of neutrality compelled Cervera to leave those islands on the very day upon which General Shafter received his orders. Our next information concerning this fleet was that it had steamed westward, and this left but one logical theory, to wit: that Cervera had in mind the relief of Havana, involving, of course, an attack upon our blockading fleet. Naturally, under the circumstances, the expedition to Tunas was abandoned.

On the 2d of May a conference was held at the Executive Mansion for the purpose of discussing questions of military policy and plans of campaign. Those called in consultation by the President were the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Major-General Commanding, and Admiral Sicard. The result of the conference was a decision to send a force to Cuba with a view to formally investing the city of Havana. In pursuit of this plan, the first expedition was to disembark at Mariel, a point about twenty-six miles west of Havana, where there was a good harbor which would be well adapted to our purpose under reasonably favorable conditions. (The objections to the Tunas enterprise on the south coast did not apply in the case of Mariel, for the blockading fleet could conveniently protect our transports on the voyage from Tampa to that port. There was to be a vanguard sufficiently strong to seize and hold Mariel and occupy its immediate vicinity. For this purpose the whole of the regular army then at Tampa or otherwise available would be used. The plan provided for the establishment at the point mentioned, or near it, of a fortified position to use as a base

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of military operation and a depot of supply. This accomplished, the force could be rapidly increased and Havana deliberately approached. Mariel offered many advantages in addition to its excellent harbor. It had high ground for camping purposes, and an abundance of good water. General Shafter's new instructions were communicated to him thus:

" ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

" WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1898.*

" (Sent 6.07 A.M.)

" *General Wade, commanding troops at Tampa, Fla.*

" With the approval of the Secretary of War, the major-general commanding directs that General Shafter move his command, under protection of navy, and seize and hold Mariel or most important point on north coast of Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped; send abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt.

" H. C. CORBIN,

" Adjutant-General."

Congress was asked for a specific appropriation, and responded with a fund of \$350,000 to be used in connection with "the expeditionary force to Cuba."

While preparations for this new and most important move were under full headway, word came that Cervera's fleet had appeared off the island of Martinique, a few hundred miles southeast of Cuba. This suggested an attempt to relieve Havana, as before stated, and the thought of a possible descent upon our Atlan-

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tic coast. The Secretary of War therefore countermanded, on the 13th of May, the orders previously issued looking to a landing at Mariel. Six days later, through the agency of an American telegraph company, the government was apprised of the entry into Santiago Harbor of Cervera's fleet. Ten days afterwards, on the 29th, the fact was confirmed by Admiral Schley, then cruising in search of the Spaniards. This definite information concerning the whereabouts of Cervera compelled the Government to lay aside all the plans that had been considered or formulated up to that time.*

During this period numerous conferences were held at the Executive Mansion for the purpose of considering plans of campaign. Besides the Secretary of War the President frequently called other members of the Cabinet and General Miles. The first consideration was, of course, the Santiago expedition; the capture of Puerto Rico was likewise discussed, but this movement was regarded as of secondary importance. The Secretary of War directed General Miles to formulate a scheme of operation based upon the plans discussed at these conferences. In obedience to these instructions he submitted the following:

* Says Count von Moltke, in his *Franco-German War*:

“ It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a prolonged period and carried out in every point. The first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the result. Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.”

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“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 26, 1898.*

“*The honorable the Secretary of War.*

“SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following :

“As you are aware, the available force of the regular army, numbering some 17,000 men, has been ready for the field from the day that the government decided to take war measures against the Spanish government, and, as it will be remembered, my first purpose was to form a junction with Gomez’s troops on the south coast of Cuba, in Santa Clara province. This movement was delayed, as the navy reported that it could not well furnish the convoys and desired all of their available ships to meet the Spanish fleet. When it was reported that the Spanish fleet had returned to Cadiz, transports were gathered in the Gulf to move a portion of the army to Cuba, and are now in readiness for that purpose.

“In view of the fact that the volunteer army is neither equipped nor instructed, or even supplied with ammunition sufficient to fight a battle, I deem it advisable to suggest the use of the available force now on the Gulf in the following manner :

“According to all accounts, the Spanish fleet is divided, a small portion being in Cuban waters and the remainder at Cadiz, on the coast of Spain. If the ships and torpedo-boats under the command of Admiral Cervera have been enclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I suggest that the military forces go at once to the assistance of the navy, and by landing fifteen miles east of Santiago de Cuba, at Daiquiri, move over the low mountains towards Santiago de Cuba, where, by placing the artillery in position, they can command the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and with field and siege guns would be able to destroy the fleet by a plunging fire, or at least assist our navy in entering the harbor, thereby destroying or capturing the Spanish fleet as well as the garrison occupying that vicinity. We can also communicate with General Garcia, who has 8,000 men in Santiago de Cuba province, which would assist in the capture of the garrison. This might be considered the first movement.

“Second, if it shall be found, before the above movements can be accomplished, that the Spanish fleet has escaped from Santiago de Cuba or shall have been captured by our fleet, it would be well, in my judgment, to capture the island of Puerto Rico by

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a combined attack of the army and navy with the least possible delay. Twenty-five thousand men of the army, principally artillery and infantry, with the assistance of the fleet, will, in my judgment, be sufficient to capture that island.

“ While either of these movements is being accomplished, additional arms can be sent to Lieutenant-General Garcia, who can equip 15,000 additional troops, making his army 23,000 men. He now practically has possession of the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba.

“ When either of the two movements above indicated has been accomplished, our troops can occupy the harbors of Bahia de Nipe and Bahia de Banos. (This last-named harbor is now controlled by Garcia's troops.) Also the harbors of Puerto de Bibara, Puerto Padre, Puerto Maniti, Sabana la Mar, but more especially Puerto de Nuevitas, can be occupied. The capture of these ports will have to depend upon circumstances. The occupation of the last named and the railroad to Puerto Principe, one of the principal cities of Cuba, will furnish a most excellent base for the movement of the cavalry and a small force of light artillery in conjunction with the Cuban forces, moving thence west in the province of Santa Clara, where a junction could be made with Gomez's forces. Our forces would then be in possession of at least two-thirds of the island of Cuba, supported by all of the available forces of Garcia and Gomez. By that time our volunteer troops will be equipped and prepared to assume active operations for the complete occupation of the remainder of the island, either landing in the vicinity of Matanzas, Mariel, or Havana, as is deemed most expedient at that time. This, in my judgment, would add to the greatest discomfort of the Spanish forces. It would unite all of the elements against the Spanish forces, with the least exposure to fever, and during the rainy season can best be accomplished of any practicable military operations.

“ We will have a cavalry force much superior to the cavalry on the island, and it can be reinforced at any time it is deemed advisable.

“ Of course our ships, which are necessary to accomplish the objects specified, should at all times have the safe convoy of the ships of the navy. Very respectfully,

“ NELSON A. MILES,
“ Major-General Commanding.”

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“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 27, 1898.*

“ *The honorable the Secretary of War.*

“ SIR,—Referring to my letter of yesterday and to our consultation since, I desire to submit the following :

“ As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations in conjunction with the navy, I think it would be advisable to load the transports at Tampa with a strong force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, and thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they would have the full protection of Admiral Sampson’s fleet until they reach Admiral Schley’s fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the army and navy, capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish fleet at that point.

“ If, before reaching Admiral Schley’s fleet, it shall be found that he has already accomplished the above object, or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I then urge the importance of a combined attack of the army and navy upon Puerto Rico. We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done before it can be reinforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to Puerto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Puerto Rico it is 4,000 miles. The possession of Puerto Rico would be of very great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that might be sent against it.

“ Then we should commence, in my judgment, a movement towards the west by capturing the ports along the northern coast of Cuba, at the eastern end, supplying the insurgents with abundance of arms and munitions of war, and as speedily as possible land our cavalry and sufficient light artillery to enable them to move from the harbor of Puerto de Nuevitas along the line of railroad to Puerto Principe. From that base our cavalry and light artillery, in conjunction with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia and General Gomez, should move west to near Santa Clara.

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These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow-fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished, our volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the army and navy will act in concert and close unison; that it does not divide our navy, and that it will utilize our most available military force in the best way during the time of the year when military operations are most difficult.

“ I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there, and all the forces that can be quickly sent there by rail directly from Havana and Matanzas.

“ If the above plan is approved, troops could be ordered to embark on the transports immediately, and the purpose would be the occupation of Spanish territory, first by moving our troops as speedily as possible to Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Rico, and later to the north coast of Cuba, especially our cavalry, this military occupation to continue until hostilities cease.

“ Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding.”

The “ movement towards the west ” referred to in these letters was General Miles’s own conception. The plan embraced an attempted landing at Puerto de Nuevitas of a large cavalry force, to be moved along the railroad to its terminus at Puerto Principe, and thence over the Cuban roads to Havana, a distance of 345 miles, although the direct course to Havana by sea from Tampa was shorter than to Nuevitas, whence over the route proposed the troops would have been 400 miles distant.

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The plan required, moreover, the capture, as a base of supplies, of the city of Puerto Principe. The most reliable information in the possession of the War Department concerning Cuba indicated that the seizure of this place, so important to the plan, would not have been an easy matter. The collection of *Military Notes on Cuba*, published by the Military Information Division of the War Department, described the defences of Puerto Principe (a city of 25,102 inhabitants, according to the census of 1899) as consisting of fifty-four works, block-houses, and wire entanglements. This book, which the War Department placed at the disposal of every officer, also contains the information that Puerto Principe was the "headquarters of the Spanish troops in the province" of the same name, and that "the town is heavily garrisoned, and is regarded by the Spaniards as a very important place." Moreover, "yellow-fever prevails sometimes."

The general was so taken with this plan, however, that he referred to it again in a third letter, which read thus:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., June 24, 1898.

"*The honorable the Secretary of War.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following:

"With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it is expected we will have several thousand Spanish prisoners, and with the capture of the second objective position, now under consideration, it is expected we will add to the number, making, it is hoped, in the aggregate at least 30,000 prisoners.

"After the capture of the position next after Santiago de Cuba it would be, in my judgment, advisable to take some deep-water harbors on the northern coast of Cuba, which would be available, not only for our army, but also for the navy, as safe ports for our transports, supply-ships, and naval vessels between Key

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West and Puerto Rico. It is also important that we should select some point at which to disembark our mounted troops and light artillery, with which our government is well supplied. We will have in a few weeks upward of 15,000 cavalry. This force, with the light artillery and a small body of infantry, will make a most formidable army corps with which to conduct a campaign in the interior of Cuba.

“ The most available point, it appears to me, would be the harbor of Nuevitas, which has $28\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water. From there the command could move to Puerto Principe, one of the principal cities in the island of Cuba. Using that as a base, it could move through the rolling country, which is reported to be free from yellow-fever, to Moron and Taguayabon, and thence to Villa Clara; or, by a more southern route, from Puerto Principe to Ciego de Avila, thence to Spiritus, and thence to Villa Clara. A road could be built at the rate of five miles per day as that army corps marches; also, we could find two railroad bases between Puerto Principe and Villa Clara.

“ To move the mounted troops over from Florida to Cuba and make this march would undoubtedly consume the time up to nearly the 30th of September.

“ This army corps would also have the assistance of all the available forces of Garcia and Gomez, and would by that time be occupying practically two-thirds of the island of Cuba.

“ If no serious forces were encountered, this army corps could continue its march to the south side of Havana. If a large force of Spanish troops sufficient to check its march were moved to the vicinity of Villa Clara, then the entire army with which we purpose to invade Cuba could be moved between the forces at Villa Clara and Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and defeating them in detail.

“ I make this suggestion as having three advantages: First, we could employ at reasonable compensation such prisoners as desired occupation in road building; second, we could move into the interior of Cuba our large cavalry command without serious molestation; third, we would be operating during the rainy or sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba, practically free from yellow-fever, and at the same time be occupying a large portion of the enemy's territory.

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“ If this proposition does not meet with favor, then, after the capture of Santiago de Cuba and other places to the east, we could move the entire force to the west of Havana and conduct the campaign from the deep harbors on that coast. My judgment, however, is decidedly in favor of the first plan of campaign.

“ Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have upward of 50,000 prisoners, and if we could by judicious, humane treatment use them in a way that would be advantageous to themselves as well as to our interests I think it would be advisable. There would be one great danger in moving them to our own territory and establishing a large camp of prisoners, and that is that they would bring the germs of disease with them and spread them among our own people, as many Americans would have to be employed on the ships and railroads together with the guards necessary to control them. Very respectfully,

“ NELSON A. MILES,
“ Major-General Commanding.”

This plan was so evidently impossible and impracticable as to need little argument to so prove it. But it is, perhaps, well to say that, owing to the want of depth, tortuous character, and length (six miles) of the channel leading to the harbor of Nuevitas, it would have been impossible for vessels drawing more than fifteen feet to come nearer than fifteen miles of the town. This would have necessitated the lightering of the 15,000 or more horses, in addition to the men and supplies, over a distance of fifteen miles. The experience of Shafter's army at Siboney makes unnecessary any remarks on this feature of the plan. Moreover, to ration 15,000 cavalry and 30,000 prisoners (the minimum number here proposed), assuming that it would be possible to force Spanish prisoners to work, would require ninety tons of food a day. Although the experience about Santiago demonstrated that a road could not be constructed in Cuba by our

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own men in the hot and rainy season at the rate of five miles, or even one mile, a day, assuming that roads could be built at the rate of five miles a day, the first day out and back would be a distance of ten miles for the supply-wagons, the next day twenty, the third day thirty, the fourth day forty miles, and so on.

The landing and shipping of ninety tons a day over a road with little rolling stock, from Nuevitas to Puerto Principe, a distance of fifty miles, and thence loading upon wagons and hauling over a newly made road, where the first day out the wagons would have cut the roads hub-deep; the pitching of camps and hospitals every night; striking them each morning, and moving and pitching them again on wet land; taking the sick, or leaving them along the route; the burying of the dead; the suffering of the men during the rainy season; the guarding of the whole line against guerrillas or raiders; and, from a military point of view, putting the entire cavalry force of the United States where, if needed in an emergency, it would have been impossible to have shipped it—there being no seaport where transports could take them aboard, except on lighters—would have been an unnecessary risk and an inexcusable blunder. Besides, the general had known that there were not vessels enough in the Shafter expedition to have taken the cavalry and 15,000 horses and the artillery horses, had they been devoted entirely to their transportation; and when one looks at the proposition, starting on a 350-mile march, through a sparsely settled country, to get to a point for operations three months hence, where we could land under the cover of our battle-ships in a day, coming direct from the

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United States, it is easily discovered how infeasible it is.

If history, as well as our own experience, has proven anything, it has certainly demonstrated what was already known to the War Department before the war with Spain: that operations in the tropics by unacclimated troops during the rainy season are invariably accompanied by epidemics of sickness and great mortality the world over. The proposed employment of Spanish prisoners, exceeding in number our own army of invasion, was highly impracticable; the transportation of food and supplies to an army operating in the enemy's country and hampered by a large number of prisoners, each day more removed from its base of supplies, was both infeasible and impossible; and campaigning in Cuba during the summer months, under such conditions, would have resulted in a disaster which I shudder to contemplate.

This proposition, however, was only one of numerous others which were not approved. Many of the general's proposals were obviously impracticable, and not infrequently absolutely impossible. He recommended the shipment of 12,000 men to Key West, where all drinking-water would have to be brought in tank-ships; with our hands full at Santiago, and not enough troops there, he proposed to send "a battery of artillery and a regiment of infantry," as an expedition to the Isle of Pines, then of no military or strategic importance. He insisted on sending to Cuba, for use with infantry operating in a tropical jungle and over a country impassable to vehicles, his "portable" shields, each weighing 1,000 pounds and each occupying as much room on a transport as a hospital am-

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bulance; he recommended the abandonment of Santiago, after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed, thereby lifting the siege of the city and large garrison, without reaping the fruits of victory then practically in our hands; he wanted 500 marines of the navy placed under his control; he expressed the opinion that a proposed force of 16,452 men, mostly volunteers, was "10,000 more than will be required" for General Merritt's Philippine expedition; and while in Puerto Rico he cabled to the War Department a recommendation that "the manufacture of Springfield rifles, .45-caliber ammunition, all white canvas tentage, and black-leather equipments of every description be discontinued, as they are obsolete and should not be a part of the army equipment." In answer to this last recommendation the following despatch was sent:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 3, 1898.*

"*General Miles, Puerto Rico.*

"As you ought to know, the last calibre .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless-powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I suggest that you get along with what the government has on hand. . . .

"R. A. ALGER,

"Secretary of War."

During the week in which war was declared he recommended that the manufacture of Krag-Jorgensen rifles "be reduced to the minimum, if not entirely suspended," advising at the same time the substitution of another small-arm twice previously rejected by the military experts who had selected the adopted type of gun then in the hands of our regular army. Of the general's numerous disapproved recommenda-

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tions, none demonstrated his lack of judgment more than this. To suddenly change the type of the magazine rifle meant also a change in the machinery and methods of the government armory, where these arms are made. Even if his recommendations in this respect enjoyed the advantage of some reason or excuse, a crisis like the outbreak of a war is not the time to change the type of arms or the machinery for their manufacture.

Moreover, the law making appropriations for the manufacture of arms at the Springfield armory always designates the model of the gun to be fabricated, a fact which the president of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and the officer bearing the highest rank in the army certainly should have known.

It was decided that General Shafter should command the Santiago expedition, otherwise known as the 5th Corps, and after sailing orders had been issued to him, General Miles was directed to organize an expedition to Puerto Rico. Upon the capture of Santiago, which it was then believed would require but a short time, General Shafter and his force were to rendezvous at Nipe and there join the army for Puerto Rico, to be organized by General Miles, who was to command in person both forces when thus united.

It soon developed, however, that General Miles regarded the Puerto Rican movement of greater importance than the expedition to Santiago. On the 6th of June, the day before the 5th Corps was ordered to sail from Tampa, General Miles recommended the abandonment of the movement to Santiago until after the taking of Puerto Rico. He submitted this

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proposition in answer to a despatch asking him how soon he could organize an independent command for the capture of Puerto Rico :

“ TAMPA, FLA., *June 6, 1898.*

“ (Received 8.27 P.M.)

“ *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

“ Believe such a force can be ready as soon as sufficient transports could be gathered for 30,000 volunteers. Will inform you definitely as soon as reports can be received as to exact condition of regiments and batteries. This corps has been organized and equipped in part for that purpose, and I believe it sufficient. I offer the following merely as a suggestion: To leave No. 1 safely guarded. This corps, with the combined assistance of the navy, to take No. 2 first before it can be reinforced. In order to make sure of this, have it followed by 10,000 additional volunteers as quickly as transportation can be secured, utilizing what transports are now engaged, and prize steamers now at Key West, and any Atlantic auxiliary cruisers that can be spared by the navy. Such a force ought to sail in ten days. Leaving sufficient force to hold No. 2, the capture of No. 1 can then be easily accomplished, and the troops then landed at any point that might be thought advisable.

MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding Army.”

Translated into plain English this plan proposed an invasion of Puerto Rico (No. 2), leaving Santiago (No. 1) “safely guarded”—whatever that might mean. The occupation of Puerto Rico having been accomplished, the army then to return to Santiago, leaving a guard behind to take care of No. 2, and promptly crush the Spanish power in Cuba, beginning with Santiago. The impracticability of this proposition is sufficiently apparent to account for the emphatic disapproval of General Miles’s plans made known to him in the following despatch :

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“WAR DEPARTMENT, June 6, 1898.

“Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.

“The President says no. He urges the utmost haste in departure of No. 1, and also of No. 2, as indicated by you, but that No. 1 must be taken first.

R. A. ALGER,

“Secretary of War.”

However, on the evening of June 7th, and after General Shafter had been ordered to sail, General Miles was thus instructed:

“WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898—10 P.M.

“Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.

“As you reported that an expedition to Puerto Rico (with 30,000 troops) can be ready in ten days, you are directed to assemble such troops at once for the purpose. The transports will be ready for you in ten days or sooner, if you can be ready. Acknowledge receipt.”

On the 8th of July, more than thirty days after the orders were issued, General Miles sailed from Charleston with about 4,000 men, touching *en route* at Santiago. Towards the end of the month, the 20th to 28th, the other commands of the expedition which meanwhile had been organized by Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Schwan, embarked from Charleston, Newport News, and Tampa, to join General Miles's army on the Puerto Rican coast.

CHAPTER VI

EMBARKATION AT TAMPA

EVENTS crowded hard upon one another during the month of May. As a result of the uncertain movements of the Spanish fleet, the expedition to Tunas was indefinitely postponed, and when the enemy's squadron finally took refuge in the harbor of Santiago, the proposed movement to Mariel was also necessarily abandoned.

The capture or destruction of Cervera's ships became now of primal importance, taking precedence of any military operation. Within 1,000 miles of Tampa lay these ships—a menace to every plan of campaign involving the ocean transportation of troops, a consuming terror to our Atlantic coast. As already described, the Spanish fleet had been located, May 19th, through the agency of an American telegraph company. There was no doubt as to its presence in the harbor, and with that knowledge came the unrest and anxiety which cancelled every thought and forbade every effort that did not point to Santiago.

As a result of this changed situation, General Shafter received in rapid succession four notable despatches—three were from the Major-General Commanding and one came from the Secretary of War:

EMBARKATION AT TAMPA

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“WASHINGTON, D. C., May 26, 1898.

“Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.

“Be prepared to load on transports 25,000 men, including infantry, four batteries light artillery, eight siege guns, including siege mortars, and one squadron cavalry. The movement of this expedition will depend upon information concerning the Spanish fleet. Should it not be advisable to send this force, then it is expected that all of the transports will be loaded at Tampa for another movement on Cuba. Definite instructions will be sent you later.

MILES,

“Major-General Commanding.”

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“WASHINGTON, D. C., May 29, 1898.

“Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.

“Place on your transports your most effective force of regulars and volunteers, 500 rounds ammunition per man, with a strong force of artillery, siege guns, howitzers, and mortars, with two months' supplies, small number of animals and transportation, and two squadrons of cavalry. Send 5,000 arms and supplies for Cubans. Telegraph when you will be ready to sail with naval convoy.

MILES,

“Major-General Commanding Army.”

“WASHINGTON, D. C., May 30, 1898.

“Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.

“Referring to my telegram of last night, Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo-boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet. Load your transports with effective force of infantry and artillery, both regular, and mortars and two or four field batteries. You can take any dismounted cavalry you desire. Limit the animals to the least number required for artillery and transportation, as it is not expected that you will go but a short distance inland. Your troops should have 500 rounds of ammunition per man if

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possible, two months' supplies, and in addition you can load supplies to last six months. If practicable, take 5,000 rifles with ammunition for insurgents. You can organize your command under Generals Arnold, Burt, Hawkins, Kent, Henry, Lawton, and Chaffee. Have your command embark as rapidly as possible, and telegraph when your expedition will be ready to sail. I leave for Tampa to-night.

MILES,

“Major-General Commanding.”

In the Secretary's despatch of the 31st of May were contained the instructions upon which General Shafter proceeded:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,

“May 31, 1898—2.30 A.M.

“*Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.*

“With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the navy, and move it on to the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your own troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscade or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will co-

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operate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, re-embark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Puerto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service—this with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you sail? By command of Major-General Miles,

“H. C. CORBIN,

“Adjutant-General.”

Unquestionably, Tampa was not adapted to the concentration and the effective handling of the vast quantities of supplies necessary for an army of 25,000 men. Port Tampa has a fine roadstead, with a depth of twenty-one feet in the channel. It was accepted by the board of officers appointed to inquire into its suitability for the despatch of a small force, but it would hardly have been selected for the purposes of the Santiago expedition had so large a force been under consideration at the time. The city of Tampa was approached by only two lines of railroad, both single-track. To make the matter worse, one company, the Plant Line, controlled communications between Tampa and Port Tampa, where the ships lay, and from where the troops must be embarked. Tampa and Port Tampa are nine miles apart. The intervening country is, for the most part, very swampy and sandy. One single-track railroad connects the two places. At the terminus there was but one wharf, and that capable of accommodating not more than nine transports at a time.

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General Humphrey, the chief quartermaster of the 5th Corps, in his testimony before the Dodge Commission, thus described the inadequate railroad and wharfage facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, and the many obstacles to be overcome in so hastily embarking the Santiago expedition:

“It was often difficult to get cars most needed to that place, or to get those that arrived there in position for unloading. This, in part, was owing to there being no card on cars, or other information showing their contents. Bills of lading in but few instances came to hand in time, and invoices not at all. But, all matters considered, I do not see how it was practicable to send them forward at the time shipments were made.

“The loading of the transports was at best difficult, owing to the limited wharf facilities and not having in hand full cargoes, it being necessary to bring transports into the canal to be loaded, and often before loading was completed send them into the harbor, to be brought back at a future time to complete cargo. Again, commissary stores in cars and trains were not in the form of complete rations, and this often necessitated going from car to car and from a car to some car that had come by another train—perhaps days after or before—to supply complete rations so far as possible for embarkation on any one vessel. To this difficulty should be added the lack of sufficient facilities of the railroad yards and the limited facilities for loading afforded by the pier at Port Tampa, and the additional inconvenience and hinderance caused by trains running between Tampa and the head of the pier and the throngs of people they brought. Regularly cars had to be run back to the yards—one and a half or two miles distant—to be replaced by other cars, and a little later these were run back to the yard only partially unloaded and replaced by those first brought there, to again be returned to same point.” *

Major-General Miles, with his staff, reached Tampa,

* The number of freight-cars handled at Tampa by the Quartermaster's Department amounted to 13,239.

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June 1st, in accordance with his despatch to General Shafter of the 30th of May, above quoted. On the same day he reported to the department :

“ Everything is being pushed as rapidly as possible to embark troops at Tampa and Mobile. Men are working night and day.”

On June 2d he telegraphed :

“ The working force at Tampa has been divided into three reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four. Nine ships being loaded at one time.”

On the 4th he again reported :

“ TAMPA, FLA., June 4, 1898.

“ Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

“ Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uniforms; several came without arms, and some without blankets, tents, or camp equipage. The 32d Michigan, which is among the best, came without arms. General Guy V. Henry reports that five regiments under his command are not fit to go into the field. There are over 300 cars loaded with war material along the roads about Tampa. Stores are sent to the quartermaster at Tampa, but the invoices and bills of lading have not been received, so that the officers are obliged to break open seals and hunt from car to car to ascertain whether they contain clothing, grain, balloon material, horse equipments, ammunition, siege guns, commissary stores, etc. Every effort is being made to bring order out of confusion. I request that rigid orders be given requiring the shipping officers to forward in advance complete invoices and bills of lading, with descriptive marks of every package, and the number and description of car in which shipped. To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were side-tracked twenty-five miles from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered yesterday, were needed by several regiments. Also

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the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing, are scattered through hundreds of cars on the side tracks of the railroads. Notwithstanding these difficulties, this expedition will soon be ready to sail.

NELSON A. MILES,

“Major-General Commanding.”

In answer to this despatch was sent the following :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 5, 1898.*

“*Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.*

“Twenty thousand men ought to unload any number of cars and assort contents. There is much criticism about delay of expedition. Better leave a fast ship to bring balance of material needed than delay longer.

R. A. ALGER,

“Secretary of War.”

As shown, ample supplies and munitions had been shipped to Tampa, but in the congestion that followed the increased mobilization of the forces there the bills of lading were either missent or not delivered. This confusion was, in part, owing to the immense amount of mail sent to our troops at Tampa, which, because of the inadequate post-office facilities, it was impossible for the officials to assort and distribute until long after its receipt. Hence the bills of lading were much delayed in reaching their proper destination.

Another report on the situation at Tampa was received from General Miles on the 5th of June, and thus read :

“TAMPA, FLA., *June 5, 1898—12.24 P.M.*

“*The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

“This expedition has been delayed through no fault of any one connected with it. It contains the principal part of the army, which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains fourteen of the best-conditioned

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regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent. are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men had never fired a gun. I request ample protection while on sea for this command from the navy. This enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps, or to immediately organize another and go with it to join this, and capture position No. 2.* Now that the military is about to be used, I believe it should be continued with every energy, making the most judicious disposition of it to accomplish the desired result.

“ MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding Army.”

No answer was sent to this telegram, as General Miles had been explicitly informed by the President, as well as by myself, before he went to Tampa, that he was at liberty to go in command of the Santiago expedition, or to organize the force for the invasion of Puerto Rico. Because of these instructions and the intention intimated in this despatch to accompany the 5th Corps, General Miles's instructions to organize and command the Puerto Rican expedition were purposely withheld until Shafter or Miles should sail. General Miles did not command the Santiago expedition, and that he did not was his own mistake or misfortune. He lost the opportunity to command in the greatest land battle of the war.

In preparing for the various expeditions already described, the government had gradually brought together at Tampa many thousands of troops. The original reconnoissance force of 5,000 for Tunas had been first augmented to 12,000 in preparing for the movement to Mariel, and then again increased to an

* Santiago was designated by the department as No. 1, Puerto Rico as No. 2.

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estimated force of 25,000 for Santiago. When, therefore, an immediate movement to the front became imperative, there seemed to be no alternative for the course pursued. The men were there, the material was there, and the transports were waiting for them. It was easier and safer to embark the expedition at Tampa than to move the army to any other point of departure. Indeed, it would have been disastrous to have attempted any change at that time. Every day was of incalculable importance. Not even an hour could be sacrificed. The work was one of serious difficulty, but this difficulty would have been multiplied tenfold had any other port for embarkation been selected at that late date. The army, or any great part of it, had not been mobilized since the Civil War. The problem was in all respects a new one, and it was presented in a form that aggravated its inherent obstacles. We had at our service at Tampa the main part of the regular army. There were also the Major-General Commanding, General Shafter, Major-Generals Kent, Wheeler, Lawton; Brigadier-Generals Chaffee, Hawkins, Sumner, Young; Brigadier-General Wm. Ludlow, of the Engineer Corps; the Inspector-General of the army, and officers of high rank and demonstrated efficiency, in the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical bureaus, who had been selected with great care and with special reference to their fitness for this peculiar task. And yet, notwithstanding the natural and inherent embarrassments attending the organizing, equipping, and embarkation of that army, General Shafter was ready to sail within eight days after he received his orders. This fact in itself is a high tribute to the energy and ability of the officers in charge.

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As we have seen, General Shafter's orders, directing him to proceed to Santiago, bore date of May 31st. On the 7th of June the following despatch was received at the Navy Department from Admiral Sampson:

"Bombarded forts at Santiago 7.30 to 10 A.M. to-day, June 6th. Have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though stationed 2,000 yards. If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.

"SAMPSON."

Thereupon General Shafter was directed to "sail at once, but with not less than 10,000 men." On the very evening of the receipt of this message—June 7th—the transports started down the bay of Tampa, with not 10,000, but nearly 17,000 men. Shafter was insufficiently supplied with wagons, tentage, even hospital equipment, but the distance to be covered was not great, the fighting force was ready, and the deficiencies could be made good, it was believed by the officers at Tampa, in a very few days. Haste was absolutely imperative. It was a question of striking a sudden blow, and so, perhaps, ending the war in short order, or, by taking time to equip the expedition more fully, possibly to prolong the struggle indefinitely. On the evening of the 7th of June General Shafter was ordered to immediately set sail with what force he had ready. This message was sent him from the Executive Mansion:

"Information from Sampson says he has practically reduced fortifications, and only waits your arrival to occupy Santiago. Time is the essence of the situation. Early departure of first importance."

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During all that night the transports moved down the bay towards the Gulf. But, just at that supreme moment, the phantom Spanish fleet, which, only a few weeks before, had appeared off Sandy Hook and thrown our whole Atlantic coast into a panic, revealed itself a second time with equally unfortunate results. Its presence was announced in these cipher despatches to the Navy Department:

“KEY WEST, *June 8th.*

“Spanish armored cruiser second class and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer seen by *Eagle*, Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Destroy convoy. Details follow. REMEY.”

“KEY WEST, *June 8th.*

“Last cipher just come by *Resolute*, just arrived; was pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order *Indiana* and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More details to follow. REMEY.”

The Secretary of the Navy at once requested the recall of the transports. Just as the last ship was moving out from Port Tampa, General Shafter received the following message:

“Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

R. A. ALGER,
“Secretary of War.”

Later he was furnished with a copy of Admiral Remy's despatches just quoted. He replied:

“Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them before reaching Gulf.”

In this connection General Miles forwarded to the department the following despatches:

EMBARKATION AT TAMPA

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ TAMPA, FLA., *June 9, 1898.*

“ *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

“ Think it would be well to announce that the army got on board transports and started, as they did, yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships. Does not the presence of Spanish war vessels in Cuban waters render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until they are captured, destroyed, or driven away? And, under the circumstances, is it expected that I shall organize expedition No. 2? Arrangements had been partly made before the presence of the Spanish ships was announced.

MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding Army.”

“ TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, FLA.,

“ *June 9, 1898—2.45 P.M.*

“ *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

“ It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advisable for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire navy to convoy it to No. 1, No. 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they now are, and assist the navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here twenty-five good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, guns, revolving cannon and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the army assist the navy in this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe for crossing with the army.

MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding Army.”

He was informed in reply to these messages :

“ WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 9, 1898.*

“ *Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.*

“ The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made ; that expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as

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possible. We are looking for transports, and am satisfied the navy will take care of that problem. Give nothing out.

“ R. A. ALGER,
“ Secretary of War.”

It was subsequently ascertained that the “ghost fleet” reported to Admiral Remy and by him in turn to the Navy Department consisted of the United States vessels *America*, *Scorpion*, and *Supply*. Meanwhile the expedition which had returned to Port Tampa rocked idly in the bay, suffering from the extreme heat and the crowding, and losing a week of immeasurable opportunity at Santiago. If the expedition had been permitted to sail when it was ready, Shafter would have touched Siboney seven days earlier than he did, thus giving him one week more before the rains began.

Reference has already been made to the fact that owing to the peculiar wording of the act of March 9, 1898, appropriating \$50,000,000 “for national defence,” no portion of this fund could properly be used for the purchase or hire of transports until after war was declared. When events made it possible for the War Department to finally enter the market in search of transports, the vessels most available for the purpose had been secured by the navy, as the President held that scouting and other ships could be purchased for the Navy’s use for “national defence” without any violation of the spirit of the act appropriating \$50,000,000. The Quartermaster-General was therefore reduced in his selection almost entirely to freight ships and those engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States. However, with the assistance of a marine expert, thirty-nine vessels were secured, at a cost of over \$7,000,000. Mr. Cramp subsequently

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informed me that the vessels of the Atlantic Transport Line, secured at a cost of \$4,000,000 and afterwards converted into the finest troop-ships in the world, could have been sold, before any improvements had been made on them, at a large advance over the price paid by the United States. These vessels were secured and purchased under the direction of Mr. Frank J. Hecker, Colonel and Quartermaster of Volunteers, Chief of Transportation Division. His appointment in the volunteer army was one of the few made by the President at my request.

The British standard for estimating the carrying capacity of ships was adopted by the officers of the Quartermaster's Department, who were assisted by an officer of the navy detailed for the purpose through the courtesy of Secretary Long. The vessels chartered and purchased, however, were not troop-ships in the proper acceptance of the term, and the English method of assigning one man to each ton and a half of carrying capacity proved far too great. The ships assembled at Tampa were reported to the Quartermaster-General as having a capacity of 25,000 men. The estimate proved excessive, for, after increasing the original fleet to thirty-eight vessels, not including all the water-carriers, steam-barges, and lighters that could be obtained, we were able to transport less than 17,000 men, most of whom were uncomfortably crowded. The expedition sailed, however, on the 14th of June, when the naval authorities thought it safe to furnish an escort.

The following tabular statement gives the details of Shafter's army as finally organized and distributed on the several transports:

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TABULAR STATEMENT OF SHAFTER'S ARMY

Transport.	Designating No.	Troops on Board.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
Alamo.....	6	Headquarters band, and companies C, D, E, and G, 10th U. S. Infantry; companies C and E, Engineer Battalion, and headquarters 2d Infantry Brigade, 1st Division.	33	574
Allegheny.....	17	Headquarters Cavalry Division. Enlisted men caring for horses.	14	80
Aransas.....	27	Loaded with the transportation, etc., of the 3d U. S. Infantry.	2	13
Berkshire.....	9	Light Artillery Battalion and light batteries A and F, 2d U. S. Artillery.	14	268
Breakwater.....	29	3d U. S. Infantry.....	20	467
Cherokee.....	4	12th U. S. Infantry and headquarters and 3 companies 17th U. S. Infantry.	35	852
Comal.....	7	Company I, 7th U. S. Infantry, and light batteries E and K, 1st U. S. Artillery.	10	284
Concho.....	14	Headquarters 2d Infantry Brigade, 2d Division, 4th U. S. Infantry, and 25th U. S. Infantry.	53	1,034
Clinton.....	32	Companies D and B, 2d U. S. Infantry.	2	169
City of Washington.	16	24th U. S. Infantry and 1 battalion 21st U. S. Infantry.	33	751
D. H. Miller.....	19	Companies E, G, and H, 7th U. S. Infantry.	8	280
Iroquois.....	25	Headquarters and companies A, B, C, D, and F, 7th U. S. Infantry; companies C, G, H, and K, 17th U. S. Infantry; headquarters 2d Infantry Division, and headquarters 3d Infantry Brigade, 2d Division.	38	722
Knickerbocker.....	13	Headquarters and 8 companies of 2d Massachusetts Infantry.	32	588
Leona.....	21	8 troops 1st U. S. Cavalry, 8 troops 10th U. S. Cavalry, and headquarters 2d Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division.	51	910
			345	6,992

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TABULAR STATEMENT OF SHAFTER'S ARMY—*Continued*

Transport.	Designating No.	Troops on Board.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
		Brought forward	345	6,992
Manteo	36	2 companies 17th U. S. Infantry and 2 companies 2d Massachusetts Infantry.	10	265
Matteawan	26	20th U. S. Infantry, Troops F and D, 2d U. S. Cavalry, and headquarters Independent Infantry Brigade.	32	734
Miami	1	6th U. S. Infantry and 8 troops 9th U. S. Cavalry.	55	919
Morgan	30	Major Rafferty and Troop C, 2d U. S. Cavalry.	3	69
Olivette	11	Hospital ship	3	35
Orizaba	24	22d U. S. Infantry and batteries G and H, 4th Artillery (Siege Artillery Battalion).	35	622
Rio Grande	22	8 troops of 3d U. S. Cavalry and 8 troops 6th U. S. Cavalry; Balloon Signal detachment, and headquarters 1st Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division.	49	882
San Marcos	18	Companies A, E, F, and H, 2d U. S. Infantry; 16th U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division.	38	1,237
Santiago	2	9th U. S. Infantry; 1 battalion 10th U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Division.	51	739
Saratoga	20	13th U. S. Infantry, headquarters' band, and companies C, D, E, and H, 21st U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 3d Infantry Brigade, 1st Division.	38	635
Segurança	12	1st U. S. Infantry, Balloon Signal detachment.	17	477
		Headquarters 5th Army Corps, staff.	16	
		Officers accompanying the expedition.	5	
Seneca	5	8th U. S. Infantry, 2 companies 2d Massachusetts Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Brigade, 2d Division.	32	656
			729	14,262

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TABULAR STATEMENT OF SHAFTER'S ARMY—*Concluded*

Transport.	Designating No.	Troops on Board.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
		Brought forward	729	14,262
Stillwater	28	Troop A, 2d U. S. Cavalry	3	69
Vigilancia	23	71st New York Infantry	44	954
Yucatan	8	Headquarters, band and companies C, D, G, and B, 2d U. S. Infantry, and 8 troops 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders).	43	773
Total			819	16,058
Cumberland	31	Stevedores.		
Gussie	3	Teamsters and packers.		
Kanawha	34	Water-tender.		
Laura	33	Steam-lighter.		
Stevens	35	Water-tender.		
Whitney	10	Teamsters.		

Also, 2,295 horses and mules.

NOTE.—1st, 3d, 6th, 9th, and 10th United States Cavalry dismounted. First Volunteer Cavalry dismounted. Troops A, C, F, and D, 2d United States Cavalry, mounted.

The question of the disembarkation of troops, animals, and supplies was carefully considered by General Shafter and his staff at Tampa. The entire problem of transportation was of course a new one, and the conditions to be met by the Santiago expedition made the task especially formidable. Under the most propitious circumstances the landing of the army on the Cuban coast would have been difficult. The conditions were most unfavorable, and were aggravated by the inexperience of our army in such matters. After much consultation with Cubans familiar with the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, General Shafter became satisfied, before the expedition left the United States, that the landing would have to be made, in all probability, east of Santiago Harbor,

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and perhaps at either Daiquiri or Siboney. Neither of these places afforded any shelter from the strong trade-winds which blow from the southeast, and produce during the summer a heavy surf on the coral reefs. The only harbor worthy of the name east of Santiago was at Guantanamo, fifty-five miles away—a prohibitory distance. Siboney and Daiquiri were simply open roadsteads with a rocky shore-line. Wharf building was impracticable under these conditions with the limited time that Shafter could spend in landing. The use of a pontoon bridge was obviously impossible, and although the *Alamo* accompanied the expedition with a pontoon train, engineering material, and two companies of engineers, only the detached boats could be used for any purpose.

General Humphrey had an inventory taken of the carrying capacity of the 153 small boats accompanying the transports, as follows:

Name.	No. of Boats.	Men-carrying Capacity.	Name.	No. of Boats.	Men-carrying Capacity.
Alamo	4	80	Morgan	5	75
Allegheny	3	75	Olivette	8	160
Aransas	5	90	Orizaba	6	120
Berkshire	3	75	Rio Grande	5	90
Breakwater	5	75	San Marcos	5	132
Cherokee	6	120	Santiago	4	80
Comal	4	80	Saratoga	5	90
Concho	5	100	Segurança	6	108
Clinton	4	60	Seneca	7	140
City of Washington	4	80	Stillwater	4	50
D. H. Miller	5	100	Vigilancia	6	120
Florida	4	90	Whitney	5	90
Gussie	3	60	Yucatan	6	150
Iroquois	8	160			
Knickerbocker	3	60	Total	153	3,034
Leona	5	84	Steam-lighter		
Manteo	2	35	Laura*	4 00
Matteawan	4	125			
Miami	4	80	Grand total	3,434

* Steam-lighter *Laura* could carry 400 men standing on her deck.

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In addition to these the Quartermaster Department provided for two light-draught steamers, the *Cumberland* and the *Manteo* (carrying 100 stevedores), two steam-lighters, the *Laura* and the *Bessie*, two decked barges, and a sea-going tug, the *Captain Sam*. With all these it was estimated that there would be a carrying capacity of between 3,000 and 3,400 men. The Quartermaster Department, moreover, made a strenuous effort to secure steam-launches to tow the small boats to and from the shore, but, as the Santiago expedition was not finally decided upon until the 31st of May, it was found impossible to obtain launches, although telegraphic correspondence was held with the leading markets throughout the country with that object in view. In this matter General Shafter expected the co-operation of the navy, and has stated, "I had been informed that the boats of the navy were there and would assist in the landing."

On the 31st of May the Secretary of the Navy had written the following letter:

"The Secretary of War.

"SIR,—This department begs leave to inquire what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago.

"While the navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action cannot be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing of the troops, stores, etc. Very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG,

"Secretary."

EMBARKATION AT TAMPA

To this the following reply was sent :

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1898.*

“SIR,—In answer to your inquiry of this date as to what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing troops, etc., I beg to reply that the major-general commanding the expedition will land his own troops. All that is required of the navy is to convoy and protect with the guns of the convoy while the military forces are landed. Very respectfully,

“R. A. ALGER,

“Secretary of War.

“*Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy.*”

Secretary Long, however, cabled the next day to Captain H. C. Taylor, in command of the convoy: “The army will probably ask you to assist the landing with the boats of your convoy, and to cover the attempt with some of your small vessels, which may be done, exercising due caution.”*

The Quartermaster-General knew that every provision had been made that could be made with the limited time and facilities at his disposal. Upon this matter General Humphrey has since stated: “As a result of my experience, I would now recommend for an expedition of the same kind, and about the same size, three sea-going tugs, six steam-launches, four steam-lighters of the *Bessie* class, and four large decked-over lighters;” yet he adds: “Had it not been for the failure of the steam-lighter *Bessie* to join as expected, the desertion of the tug-boat *Captain Sam*, and the loss of a decked-over lighter, the expedition would have been fairly well supplied in that

* Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, p. 487. The assistance of the navy during the landing in Cuba, June 22d and 23d, was of the greatest benefit and most cheerfully given.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

respect, and more satisfactory and expeditious results would have been accomplished."

Reviewing now the events of that summer, I am convinced that, all things considered, the embarkation from Tampa was not a mistake. In the great stress of circumstances under which the expedition sailed, it was inevitable that there should be much confusion and congestion. The fact remains, however, that, one week from the date of the receipt of orders to prepare to sail, Shafter had his men, animals, and supplies on board the transports, and, despite the crowding and the week's delay caused by the report of the "phantom fleet," all arrived off Santiago little the worse for the voyage.

Had the expedition sailed from any other port it is doubtful whether there would have been much less confusion; besides, the transports would have been obliged to cross an open sea hundreds of miles farther, and subject to dispersion by storms or attacks by the ships of the enemy. The expedition from Tampa was a success and unmarred by loss of life or treasure.

CHAPTER VII

SHAFTER DETERMINES TO "MARCH ON SANTIAGO"

FAIR weather and a smooth sea made the voyage to the southern coast of Cuba a pleasant relief from the irksome inactivity aboard the stifling transports in the harbor at Port Tampa. The six days' cruise on the Gulf of Mexico, along the north coast of Cuba, through the Windward Passage, and over the purple waters of the Caribbean Sea, was uneventful. The expedition, however, suffered the loss of a decked-over barge, which broke its hawser at night and drifted away; it also lost the steam-lighter *Bessie*, which broke down as she left Tampa, and the sea-going tug *Captain Sam*, which deserted the first night out. These losses caused General Shafter great embarrassment in landing his supplies.

From the poor maps of Cuba (the only ones obtainable) General Shafter studied, *en route*, the conditions which would confront his army in the campaign. Two Cubans accompanying him, residents of Santiago, who had been educated in the United States, gave much valuable information regarding the country, its coast-line, and the approaches to the city. In his testimony before the War Investigation Commission, General Shafter said that while *en route* to Cuba he devoted some time to reading an account

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of the British expedition of 1741, which landed at Guantanamo with 5,000 men and attempted to take Santiago. The expedition was under Lord Vernon, a friend of Lawrence Washington, and after whom the Mount Vernon estate was named. The British committed the fatal mistake of exhausting the energies of their men in making and repairing roads while advancing from Guantanamo. The command met with but slight opposition from the Spaniards; yet 2,000 "died on their feet" during the march, and when the expedition was finally abandoned, a complete failure, the remnant of the army was still sixteen miles from Santiago and only forty miles from point of starting. Fatigue, exhaustion, and disease had caused greater loss of life to the British force than was sustained by the Americans at Santiago with an army three times its size, in killed, wounded, and from disease. General Shafter has since said that with this example before him he realized that the sole chance of success would lie in the very impetuosity of his attack.

The day before the army reached the vicinity of Santiago, a fast-sailing scout was sent forward bearing a despatch to Admiral Sampson, informing him of the close approach of the army and adding that General Shafter would call upon him and arrange for plans of operation as soon as the transports reached the Cuban coast. The fleet arrived off Guantanamo at eight o'clock on the morning of the 20th of June. No deaths occurred *en route*, or any accidents beyond the loss of the lighters already referred to. The troops were in excellent spirits and condition, and were eager for the conflict.

Two or three hours after the arrival, Captain Chad-

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wick, Admiràl Sampson's chief of staff, boarded the *Segurança*, the headquarters ship, and briefly explained the situation from the naval point of view. He suggested that the assault of the army be upon the Morro at the mouth of the harbor; and then gave directions that the *Segurança* move along the coast south of Santiago Harbor, in order that General Shafter might see the coast-line for himself. The vessel would thus pass in review the several points suggested for the landing to the east and west of the city. When off the harbor entrance, Admiral Sampson came aboard, and they proceeded at once to Aserradero, eighteen miles west of Santiago, for the purpose of conferring with General Garcia, whose command was about three miles inland at Palma. The day previous General Garcia had met Admiral Sampson on board the *New York*, but owing to his susceptibility to sea-sickness he had requested that General Shafter and Admiral Sampson come ashore when the army should arrive and further conferences become necessary.

From General Garcia, General Shafter hoped to secure definite information regarding the strength and position of the Spanish garrison in Santiago, the best landing-place for his army, and the most practicable means of approaching the city. The conference was held in General Rabi's tent, whose detachment (part of General Garcia's command) was located a short distance from Aserradero. Besides General Shafter and Admiral Sampson, Generals Garcia, Rabi, and Castillo were present, together with several staff officers of the military and naval commanders. General Garcia confirmed the opinion already formed by Gen-

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eral Shafter, that Daiquiri was the best place for the landing, though he gave little or no information regarding the approaches to Santiago not already in the general's possession. He said there were 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity; about 5,000 between Daiquiri and that city; and General Castillo stated that the Spanish force near the wharf at Daiquiri was 300; at Siboney, 600; at Aguadores, 150; Justici, 150; and at Sardinero, 100.

After his inspection of the coast from the transport, and the consultation with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and Castillo, General Shafter determined that the movement of his army should be *against the city of Santiago*, and so stated at the conference. He then suggested his plan for the co-operation of the navy and the assistance of the Cubans. General Garcia stated that he considered himself and his command subject to General Shafter's orders, to which the general replied that while he would be glad to have his co-operation, he did not feel that he had authority to direct his movements. Before terminating the conference, a written memorandum of the plan of operations, embodying the subjects discussed, was dictated by General Shafter, and a copy handed to Admiral Sampson's flag-lieutenant, Staunton.

It is surprising, therefore, after General Shafter had proclaimed his intention to march on Santiago, and with this plan of action, reduced to writing, in his possession, that Admiral Sampson should have included, in his official report to the Navy Department, such statements as these:

“On July 4th I received the following despatch from General Shafter:

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“HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS, July 4th.

“Admiral Sampson, Commanding United States Navy Forces.

“Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pando, with 5,000 men, entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their forces. I have demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some wounded prisoners and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and there will be no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will force your way into that harbor, the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men, and I do not wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other—and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you—we shall have them. I ask for an early reply. Very respectfully,

“WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,

“Major-General U. S. V.’

“This despatch shows a complete misapprehension of the circumstances which had to be met.

“On the night of July 4th the *Reina Mercedes* was sunk by the Spaniards in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships, and possibly the smaller ones. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist, and if our smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk, either by the mines or by the fire of the batteries, the harbor would be effectually closed to us. It was essential to the new scheme of attack on this mine field that the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and this was the scheme of action first proposed by General Shafter in his discussion with my chief of staff, who was sent by me to meet General Shafter the day of his arrival. The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbor and explained the situation, stating that it was regarded by us as a movement of primal importance that these points should be carried before any attention was paid to the city. The possession of these points insured the destruction of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy ships in the harbor, and the assault on Admiral Cervera's squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave most cordial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city

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proper, that here (pointing to the entrance) was the key to the situation, and that when we had this we had all. This was repeated in his interview with General Garcia at Aserradero.

"I do not know why a change of plan occurred, unless it was that the troops on being landed advanced themselves so far on the roads towards Santiago before any specific plan of operations had been decided upon that it was found inconvenient to divert them to the other points. I believe that such adherence would have resulted in a much quicker surrender of the Spanish troops, and with much less loss of life excepting possibly to the navy, which would have borne the brunt of attack instead of the army. The urgency, of course, was lessened by the destruction of the fleet on their sortie from the harbor, but the difficulty of entrance remained much the same."

The facts did not warrant Admiral Sampson in casting this reflection upon General Shafter's successful campaign before Santiago; and, in an official report to the War Department, General Shafter thus expresses his surprise and indignation thereat:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
"GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, NEW YORK CITY, *December 24, 1898.*
"*The Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

"SIR,—I desire to invite your attention and the attention of the Secretary of War to the report of Admiral Sampson in reference to operations at Santiago, published in the *Army and Navy Register* of December 3d.

"I cannot permit this to pass without notice, as it is incorrect in all that it states in reference to my assent to the plan which was proposed by the navy, to first attack the forts at the entrance of the harbor, permitting them to enter and take up the mines—a plan of operation that was never contemplated by me, and which, if it had been attempted, would, in my opinion, have resulted most disastrously to my army.

"I also desire to protest emphatically against the statement made by Admiral Sampson that the men of my army advanced them-

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selves on Santiago before any specific plan of operations had been decided upon. The incorrectness of this remark will be shown by the plan of campaign which I made immediately upon the conclusion of my interview with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and other Cuban officers who were present. I had decided, from what I could learn of the coast, that to the eastward of Santiago was the best place to make the landing, and only waited for the interview with General Garcia and his officers to get from them as accurate an idea of the country to be traversed as possible. At that interview I was convinced that Siboney and Daiquiri were the points at which to land, and that the city of Santiago itself was the objective, as that embraced both the city and the fleet of Admiral Cervera. This memorandum was made by Colonel Miley, of my staff, upon my dictation, in the presence of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, and was copied by Captain Staunton, of Admiral Sampson's staff; was fully understood and agreed to, and was carried out to the letter, the navy carrying out the part assigned it of making a feint to the westward of the mouth of the harbor, where Kent's division was sent as though intending to land at Cabanas, and shelling the places indicated to the eastward. With this memorandum in his possession, I cannot understand Admiral Sampson's making the statements that he has in his report. See his order of June 21st, directing the operations of the navy in co-operating with the army in carrying out the plan of campaign I had decided upon the day before.

“ From the high rank of the officer making it, I desire that this my reply, and the memorandum submitted herewith, be placed on file at the War Department, and that a copy of the same, if it meets with the approval of the Secretary, be furnished the Secretary of the Navy.

“ It is true that the navy did, upon meeting me, urge an assault upon the enemy near the mouth of the harbor of Santiago; but in my opinion this was impracticable, and any general fitted to command troops in war would not have adopted the suggestions.

“ The true point of attack was the city of Santiago and the upper end of the bay, and the success that attended this plan is sufficient proof of it. It would have been the height of folly and endangered the safety of the army to have attempted to carry

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out the plan desired by the navy, and it never for one minute met with my approval. Very respectfully,

“WM. R. SHAFTER,
“Major-General U. S. V.”

Accompanying this communication was the following certified plan of action, adopted at the Garcia conference, a copy of which, as already stated, was given to Admiral Sampson's flag-lieutenant:

“NOTES ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL SHAFTER AND GENERAL GARCIA, JUNE 20, 1898.

“About 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity; Spaniards can concentrate at any moment about 4,000 on the west. Proposal made of a feint of 3,000 or 4,000 men at some point west of Santiago de Cuba, and then land expedition at Daiquiri and march on Santiago. Plan proposed for General Castillo to have about 1,000 men at Daiquiri while navy bombards, and will capture escaping Spaniards. General Shafter then proposed a plan that on the morning of the 22d he would have the navy bombard Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and Cabanas, as a feint, and land whole expedition at Daiquiri. About 5,000 Spaniards between city and Daiquiri. General Garcia says Daiquiri is the best base, and General Shafter adopts it. The following numbers were then given by General Castillo: Force at Daiquiri, near wharf, 300 men; at Siboney, 600 men; Aguadores, 150 men; Justici, 150 men; Sardinero, 100 men. It was then decided that General Castillo will take on board the transports 500 men from Aserradero to be landed at Tajababo and joined to his command now there and 500 strong; with this 1,000 men he will be at Daiquiri and assist at landing on the morning of the 22d. General Rabi will, on the 22d, make a demonstration at Cabanas with 500 men, while navy shells. It was then decided by General Garcia to bring his men, about 3,000 or 4,000 strong, from his camp near Palma to Aserradero and be ready to embark on the transports the morning of the 24th, and then be taken to Daiquiri, to join General Shafter. To-morrow (the 21st) navy will make transfer of 500 men to Tajababo, under Gen-

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eral Castillo; 500 men under General Rabi will make demonstration on Cabanas on the morning of the 22d.

“December 9, 1898.

“I certify that the above notes were taken by me during the conference between General Shafter and General Garcia in General Rabi’s tent at Aserradero, Admiral Sampson being present. The admiral’s flag-secretary, Captain Staunton, took a copy of this plan at that time.

J. D. MILEY,

“Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General, U. S. V.”

The intimation contained in the expression of Admiral Sampson that “the troops on being landed advanced themselves” doubtless has reference to the engagement at Las Guasimas on the 24th of June, the incidents leading up to which will be discussed at a later period. This insinuation is as unwarranted as his other statement. Before the engagement of Las Guasimas, on the 22d of June, General Shafter thus wrote Admiral Sampson:

“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANÇA,’ AT SEA, *June 22d.*

“*Admiral Sampson, Commanding U. S. Fleet off Santiago de Cuba.*

“SIR,—I shall commence landing this morning. It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to *Santiago* as rapidly as I can, and take some of my land transportation. The animals are in absolute need of some rest, and for that reason I may not get very far to-day.

“I request you keep in touch during the advance, and be prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along the bluffs or any of the small towns, and to render any assistance necessary. Very respectfully,

“WM. R. SHAFTER,

“Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.”

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"ON BOARD S. S. 'SEGURANÇA,' AT SEA, *June 22, 1898.*
"Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

"SIR,—I desire to express my regret at not having been able to call upon you in person aboard your ship *before starting for Santiago de Cuba.* Very respectfully,

"WM. R. SHAFTER,
"Major-General U. S. V. Commanding."

On the 23d, still before the affair of Las Guasimas, General Shafter directed General Kent to "Move up to the Santiago de Cuba road near the railroad crossing, where you should find a part of the 2d Division (Colonel Wood). Make a strong camp, looking towards Santiago de Cuba." And on the 24th, still before the fight had occurred, he directed General Lawton, then at Siboney, "to take up a strong defensive position a short distance *on the road to Santiago* and hold it until transportation is ready." After once deciding upon his method of attack, on the afternoon of June 20th, every order issued and every movement made by the army proves that Shafter kept that plan steadily in view, and had no thought of modifying it. Every act was deliberate, was in accordance with his design, and followed his specific, written, and verbal instructions. On that same 20th of June Shafter had issued the following order regarding the landing to take place on the 22d, a copy of which was furnished Admiral Sampson:

"HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
"ON BOARD S. S. 'SEGURANÇA,' AT SEA, *June 20, 1898.*
"General Orders No. 18.

"I. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order:

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“First. The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton’s). The Gatling-gun detachment will accompany this division.

“Second. General Bates’s brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps.

“Third. The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler’s).

“Fourth. The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent’s).

“Fifth. The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty’s).

“Sixth. If the enemy, in force, vigorously resist the landing, the light artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion commander and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.

“2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days’ field rations (with coffee ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.

“3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished and until notified they can land.

“4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats, and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in order indicated in par. 1.

“5. The ordnance officer—Second Lieutenant Brooke, 4th Infantry—will put on shore, at once, 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing-line.

“6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy.

“7. Major John W. Dillenback, 2d Artillery, will, in addition to his duties as commander of the light-artillery battalion, act as chief of artillery of the expedition.

“By command of Major-General Shafter,

“E. J. McCLERNAND,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

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The following day, June 21st, was spent in consummating arrangements for the disembarkation of the troops. The sea was rough and the weather squally, hence the transports were somewhat scattered. In accordance with the plan agreed upon at the Garcia conference, and based upon the memorandum furnished him at the time, Admiral Sampson issued the following order:

“The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force landing at Daiquiri. The landing will begin at daylight. Ships stationed to the eastward of Daiquiri will assist in clearing the way for an unopposed landing by flanking out the Spanish forces at that point. Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and block-house at Daiquiri, the *Ensenada los Altares** and *Aguadores*, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the small bay of *Cabanas*, about two and one-half miles to the westward of Santiago, will be shelled by the ships stationed there for that purpose.

“A feint in force of landing at *Cabanas* will be made, about ten of the transports—the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri—remaining during the day or a greater part of the day about two miles to the southward of *Cabanas*, lowering boats and making apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops.

“At the same time, General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, will make a demonstration on the west side of *Cabanas*. The following vessels are assigned to bombard the four points mentioned above. At *Cabanas*, the *Scorpion*, *Vixen*, and *Texas*; at *Aguadores*, the *Eagle* and *Gloucester*; at *Ensenada los Altares*, the *Hornet*, *Helena*, and *Bancroft*; at Daiquiri, the *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Wasp*, and *New Orleans*, the *Detroit* and *Castine* on the western flank, and the *Wasp* and *New Orleans* on the eastern flank.

“All the vessels named will be in their positions at daylight. Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of

* *Siboney*.

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ammunition. The firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from the *New Orleans*.

"At Cabanas, it is probable that after a few minutes, unless the firing is returned, the occasional dropping of shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient; but the semblance of covering a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in at Aguadores and Ensenada los Altares.

"The same rule should prevail at Daiquiri, the point of actual landing. The vessels will, of course, use their artillery until they have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will take care to make the firing deliberate and effective.

"The *Texas* and *Brooklyn* will exchange blockading stations, the *Texas* going inside, to be near Cabanas. The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* will keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The *Indiana* will take the *New Orleans's* position in the blockading line east of Santiago de Cuba, and between the flag-ship *New York* and the shore. This is only a temporary assignment for the *Indiana* to strengthen the blockading line during the landing, and to avoid any possibility of the enemy's breaking through should he attempt to get out of the port.

"The *Suwanee*, *Osceola*, and *Wompatuck* will be prepared to tow boats. Each will be provided with two five or six inch lines, one on each quarter, and each long enough to take in tow a dozen or more boats. These vessels will report at the *New York* at 3 A.M. on June 22d, prepared to take in tow the ships' boats which are to assist in the landing of troops and to convey them to Daiquiri.

"The *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *New York*, and *Indiana* will send all their steam-cutters and all their pulling boats, with the exception of one retained on board each ship, to assist in the landing. The boats will report at the *New York* at 3 A.M. Each boat, whale-boat, and cutter will have three men; each launch, five men; and each steam-cutter its full crew, and an officer for their own management. In addition to these men each boat will carry five men, including one capable of acting as coxswain, to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each steam-launch will be in charge of an officer, who will report to Captain Goodrich.

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"Care will be taken in the selection of boat-keepers and coxswains to take no men who are gun-pointers or who occupy positions of special importance at the batteries. Unnecessary oars and impediments should be removed from the pulling boats for the greater convenience of transportation of troops, but each boat should retain its anchor and chain.

"Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the *St. Louis*, will have, on the part of the navy, general charge of the landing. The *New Orleans* will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival at Daiquiri.

"The attention of the commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon."

By Admiral Sampson's direction, in further execution of the plan agreed upon, 500 Cubans of General Rabi's command were transferred from Aserradero to Tajababo (about three miles east of Daiquiri), to reinforce the 500 men already there under General Castillo. A conference of general officers was held on board Shafter's headquarters ship on the afternoon and evening of the same day, and final arrangements for the landing were discussed and adopted. At day-break the transports containing General Lawton's division assembled at the point agreed upon, and the small boats and launches from the navy and from the transports gathered near the headquarters ship. At about half past nine, after all had been loaded, the navy began firing on Daiquiri and making, simultaneously, feints upon Aguadores, Siboney, and Cabanas. Off Cabanas part of General Kent's division assembled and went through the process of loading

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small boats, as if preparing to land, while the navy shelled the shore, and a small force, under General Rabi, made a demonstration against the settlement. The bombardment of Daiquiri lasted from fifteen to twenty minutes, and then the boats, with Lawton's division, moved towards the shore in tow of the naval launches. For the assistance rendered by the navy in landing his troops, General Shafter at the time repeatedly expressed his appreciation to Admiral Sampson and to the Navy Department. Our troops, as they landed, were met by part of General Castillo's force, which had failed to intercept the Spaniards, who left the vicinity of Daiquiri early in the morning.

The dawn of that eventful day disclosed the heaviest sea that had been experienced since the arrival of the blockading squadron. The entire absence of any save one small wharf made the landing from the boats both difficult and hazardous. The soldiers, laden as they were with haversacks containing three days' rations, belts filled with ammunition, guns, and camp accoutrements, found it difficult to descend from the ships into the small boats and make the landing in the rough surf. One boat capsized, and two soldiers were drowned. These were the only fatalities that attended the landing of the entire army. No provision had been made for getting ashore the horses and mules, because General Shafter knew, before he left Tampa, that on account of the rocky coast, where he expected to disembark, there would be no alternative other than simply putting the animals overboard and swimming them ashore. He knew that in thus landing his animals and supplies he could not re-embark them unless he captured Santiago city and harbor. It was a risk of war which

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circumstances forced upon him, but he took it conscious of the responsibilities involved. The total loss of horses and mules from this crude method amounted to but fifty, including those that died on the transports *en route* to Cuba.

No opposition was met from the Spaniards during the day, and by evening most of General Lawton's division, General Bates's brigade, and one brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division, a total of about 6,000 men, had landed on Cuban soil.

CHAPTER VIII

THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS

SOON after landing General Lawton was informed by General Shafter that there were only about 200 Spanish troops reported at Siboney, and these had retreated on the first firing from the fleet. He was therefore directed to push forward a strong force of about two regiments and occupy the crossing of the railroad at Siboney with the main road to Santiago. General Castillo was suggested for the advance, his men knowing the country thoroughly. If no opposition was encountered, they were to go into camp, intrench, and remain there.

Siboney is about seven miles from Daiquiri and twelve miles from Santiago. At that time a very narrow jungle path was the only connection between the two places. Upon receipt of his instructions, General Lawton immediately proceeded along this trail towards Siboney, with the 1st and 2d brigades of his division, until night closed upon them. He moved out at daylight next morning. At eight o'clock his advance was fired upon from the hills on the right. At the same time it was reported that a column of Spanish troops was crossing the trail in his front. Reinforcements were pushed rapidly forward, and the Spanish column retreated hastily from the trail leading a little to the right of Siboney, in the direction

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of Las Guasimas and Sevilla. General Lawton occupied Siboney (sometimes called Juraguacito) on the morning of the 23d, and at once reported to General Shafter that, as he entered, the town had been abandoned by the Spanish troops, with no attempt at resistance, except a few scattering shots at long range, and that an ambuscade prepared for his advance guard had been discovered. The Spanish force, variously estimated at between 600 and 1,200, was said to have been under General Linares, the senior officer in command of the troops in the province of Santiago.

With the capture of Siboney a good defensive position was occupied, and another available place for landing troops and supplies secured, seven miles nearer Santiago. Several locomotives, with 100 small cars, loaded with steam coal, were also captured. General Lawton reported that the retreat of the Spaniards was so rapid it was impossible to follow with infantry, and that a squadron of cavalry would have enabled him to capture the command. However, some mounted Cubans pursued the rear guard of the Spaniards, and succeeded in capturing several carts. Lieutenant-Colonel Aguirre, of General Castillo's command, accompanied by 120 Cubans, had a skirmish with the Spaniards about two miles west of Siboney. The Cubans were repulsed, losing two killed and nine wounded. Later in the day, reinforced by one of their own regiments, the Cubans renewed the attack, but were again driven back, having seven wounded. One Spaniard was left dead on the field. General Shafter reported the result of these two days' operations in the following despatch to the War Department:

THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS

“DAIQUIRI, CUBA, June 23, 1898.

“*Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

“Had very fine voyage. Lost less than fifty animals, six or eight to-day. Lost more putting them through the surf to land than on transports. Command as healthy as when we left. Eighty men sick. Only deaths two men drowned in landing. Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of San Francisco and covered with dense growth of bushes. Landing at Daiquiri unopposed. All points occupied by Spanish troops heavily bombarded by navy to clear them out. Sent troops towards Santiago and occupied Juraguacito, a naturally strong place, this morning, Spanish troops retreating as soon as our advance was known. Had no mounted troops, or could have captured them, about 600 all told. Railroads from there in. Have cars and engine in possession.

“With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and as many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, including light artillery and greater portion of pack train, probably all of it, with some of the wagons; animals have to be jumped into the water and towed ashore.

“Had consultation with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and Castillo on P.M. of 20th, twenty miles west of Santiago. These officers were unanimously of the opinion that landing should be made east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion. General Garcia promises to join me at Juraguacito to-morrow with between 3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of Santiago by ships of the navy to Juraguacito, and there disembarked. This will give me between 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, and leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santiago from the west.

“General Kent's division is being disembarked this afternoon at Juraguacito and will be continued during the night. The assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and enthusiastically given. Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf. At present want nothing. Weather has been good, no rain on land, and prospects for fair weather.

“SHAFTER,

“Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.”

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General Wheeler and his staff established headquarters in Siboney on the evening of the 23d. As General Wheeler had the rank of major-general, he was the senior officer on land, and to him, therefore, were sent, by General Shafter, the following instructions:

“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANÇA,’

“OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, *June 3, 1898.*

“*The Commanding General, Dismounted Cavalry Division.*

“SIR,—In connection with instructions of yesterday to General Lawton, a copy of which is sent you herewith, the commanding general directs you to send Colonel Wood’s regiment to be added to the force near Juraguacito, with orders to have two or three companies patrol the road to that place from the junction of the main road from Daiquiri to Santiago de Cuba with the railroad. Very respectfully,

“E. J. MCCLERNAND,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

The instructions to General Lawton, already referred to, accompanying this letter, were as follows:

“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANCA,’ AT SEA, *June 22, 1898.*

“*Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., or Senior Officer at the Front.*

“SIR,—The commanding general directs me to say there were only about 200 troops at Juraguacito this morning, and they left at the first discharge. He wishes you to push down a strong force, about two regiments, to occupy the crossing of the railroad at that place with the main road to Santiago de Cuba. I suggest General Castillo as an advance, as his men know the country thoroughly, and a good regiment to back him. If they meet with no opposition, they should go into camp, intrench, and remain there. Very respectfully,

“E. J. MCCLERNAND,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

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It will be noticed that these last instructions are addressed to "Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., or *Senior Officer at the Front*," and provided that, "if they met with no opposition, they should go into camp, intrench, and remain there." Following out these orders, General Wheeler, as "senior officer at the front," placed Colonel Wood's regiment on the Santiago road as a patrol, and during the evening of the 23d, ordered up parts of two other dismounted cavalry regiments of General Young's brigade. That night General Wheeler learned from General Castillo the position and approximate strength of the Spaniards, who were intrenched about three and a half miles west of Siboney, on the main road to Santiago. He had made during the day a personal reconnoissance along the Siboney road, in the direction of Sevilla. General Castillo prepared a map for General Wheeler, giving a full description of the topography of the country, and furnished much information regarding the Spanish troops and their method of fighting. He expressed the belief that, although the Spanish had successfully resisted his attack, they would fall back to Santiago during the night. General Young was present at this conference, and asked permission from General Wheeler to make a reconnoissance in force the next morning. Although General Shafter had given instructions to intrench at Siboney, this was conditional upon meeting no opposition. General Wheeler felt that his orders gave him sufficient latitude, in view of the proximity of the enemy, to determine the position and movements of the Spanish force threatening our advance, and permission was, therefore, given General Young as re-

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quested. General Castillo promised to assist with a force of 800 effective Cubans.

Two approaches led from Siboney towards Santiago, and the position of the enemy, who were intrenched near the place where these two roads converge, about four miles northwest of Siboney. The left or westerly trail was scarcely more than a path over a rough and mountainous country, and was known as the "ridge trail." The other approach, known as the "valley road," was the main trail to Santiago. When the reconnoissance in force was determined upon, during the night of the 23d, General Young directed that Colonel Wood's dismounted volunteer cavalry regiment, consisting of troops A, B, D, E, F, G, K, and L, about 500 strong, should take the ridge trail, while the regular troops A, B, G, and K, of the 1st Cavalry, 244 men, with troops A, B, E, and I, 220 men, of the 10th (colored) Cavalry, should go with him (Young) along the valley road, together with a battery of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. These two trails were at no place over one and a half miles apart. It was agreed that at about half a mile in advance of the enemy's outposts the two simultaneously approaching cavalry detachments should deploy, Colonel Wood's regiment to be thrown out in the jungle on the right, and join on the left of the line formed by the 1st and 10th Cavalry. The regulars, under General Young, were to make a feint on the enemy's front, and hold on hard, while Wood's regiment was to make a *détour*, under a couple of Cuban guides, and attack the Spaniards in flank.

The right column, under General Young, moved out at 5.45. After marching a little over an hour the

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"point," consisting of Captain Mills and two men, discovered the enemy's presence at the place where they had been informed by General Castillo the night before the Spaniards would be found. The enemy had chosen his position well. Where Young halted, a small creek crossed the road, and an open glade of tall guinea-grass extended for several acres in his front. Immediately in his vicinity a strong Spanish outpost had been stationed. About 900 yards to the front and right were the principal works of the enemy, on a steep mountain height, where he was intrenched behind rock forts and barricades. On the right ran a high ridge, with a succession of block-houses. The Spanish trenches were 800 or 900 yards in length, and in form of an obtuse angle, the eastern slope facing the regulars, and the southern slope commanding the approach of both the ridge and valley roads.


Realizing that Colonel Wood could not make as good progress as his own column, General Young purposely delayed his attack, in order that the volunteer cavalry might come up abreast of him before he opened fire. However, he at once began operations to develop the enemy's strength. The preparations were cautiously and deliberately made. A Cuban guide was sent by General Young to warn Wood of the nearness of the enemy; canteens were ordered filled from the small creek, the Hotchkiss guns placed in battery about sixty yards beyond the point where the road crosses the creek, and the position of the Spaniards carefully examined. In the mean time, General Wheeler came up, and approved the plan of attack and the proposed disposition of the troops.

The attack was to be made by the 1st Cavalry, the

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10th to be held in reserve. The 1st Cavalry was deployed in skirmish order in front and to the right of the battery of Hotchkiss guns, B and K on the left, A and G forming the right wing. After a delay of a half-hour the troops began to deploy through the open glade and brush. They had hardly advanced 200 yards when a strong outpost of the enemy, concealed in an old cemetery between the creek and the road, which here ran parallel, fired a volley almost point-blank into troops B and K. In this discharge, and in several volleys which quickly followed, while these two troops were seeking shelter, the squadron commander, Major Bell, with K troop at the time, was wounded, as well as Captain Knox, Lieutenant Byram, and Sergeant-Major Ryan. Four privates were killed. The firing from the outposts and intrenchments of the enemy now became very severe, and General Young ordered Captain Beck's troop (A) to the left, and troops I and B, all of the 10th, to the right of the 1st, the fourth and remaining troop of the 10th being held in support of the Hotchkiss battery.

At only very rare intervals could the enemy be seen, but his firing was both severe and accurate. Nevertheless, the seven troops pushed steadily forward towards the enemy's works, always driving the Spaniards before them. The advance was exceedingly difficult, and made under most trying circumstances. The air was filled with the sharp humming of the Mauser bullets, and the underbrush was so thick that at times the troopers had to cut their way with knives and sabres, occasional wire entanglements adding to the harassing obstacles in the forward movement. The thickness of the jungle made it impossible to keep any



FAC-SIMILE OF MAP, DRAWN BY GENERAL WOOD, OF THE FIGHT AT LAS GUASIMAS

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regular line, and the advance and support were soon intermingled. It was practically a troop-commander's fight, and even an individual trooper's fight, supervision of the single isolated soldiers being almost impossible on account of the dense undergrowth. Throughout this affair, General Young occupied a most exposed position, in plain view of the enemy's intrenchments. Not a soldier went to the rear to assist the wounded; there were no stragglers; and every man, both white and black conducted himself with bravery and great self-control. All advanced towards the common objective, and with much difficulty finally forced their way through the dense thicket and over the rocks covering the steep heights on which the Spaniards were, and from which they precipitately fled upon our approach. Troops A, of the 10th, and B, of the 1st, reached the summit somewhat ahead of the others, but were joined by A, of the 1st, and I and B, of the 10th.

In the mean time, the left column, under Colonel Wood, was moving rapidly over the ridge trail, which, as already stated, was hardly more than a bridle-path, with a dense and almost impenetrable jungle pressing closely on its sides. The difficulties of the advance were much increased by the precipitous and rugged character of the ridges over which the trail ran. Knowing that his march would be long and difficult, Wood led his men swiftly over the trail, at such a smart pace, in fact, that fifty or more of them are reported to have fallen out of the column from heat exhaustion. Colonel Wood had been notified that a few hundred yards on the Siboney side of the trail, in advance of the Spanish outposts, he would find a dead guerilla, killed in

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the action with the Cubans on the previous afternoon. Here Captain Capron's advance, under Sergeant Hamilton Fish, discovered the presence of the enemy, and word was sent back to Wood, who personally moved forward to reconnoitre the Spanish outposts. Satisfying himself of their nearness, he silently deployed five of his eight troops before a shot was fired. Some of these were sent in the jungle of the bushes on the right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, and part in the clearing on the left, under Major Brodie. Before this deployment had been entirely completed, the action opened. Wood soon found that the Spanish line was overlapping his own, and he was compelled to place seven of his eight troops on the firing-line.

The enemy kept up his firing, mostly by volleys, delivered with the precision of a militia company in a prize drill. The singing and shrieking of the Mauser bullets filled the air, and it was a long time before the regiment could find a target upon which to direct its return fire. Notwithstanding the very trying conditions under which these volunteers received their baptism of fire, they pushed fearlessly and steadily forward. The thickness of the jungle and the use of smokeless powder made it impossible to discover the enemy. The regiment was untried; it had had less than three weeks' drill before being shipped to Tampa. It is true these dismounted troops had an advantage over other volunteers in that they were armed with Krag - Jorgensen carbines and smokeless powder, and, in fact, with all the best accoutrements furnished the regulars. But Colonel Wood had done wonders with his raw recruits, in organization, equipment, and discipline. It was Wood's spirit and genius

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that made the regiment what it was.* Colonel Wood's high qualities served him in good stead that hot 24th of June in the Cuban jungle. He was at all times at the front, in the most exposed places, with as little apparent concern as if he were on the streets of Washington. His coolness inspired the admiration of his men, who dubbed him "The Ice-Box."

Wood's two squadrons advanced slowly, forcing the enemy back, and capturing, by a charge across an open glade, an old distillery, from the cover of which the Spanish had been doing much damage to his men, and finally driving the enemy out of his position behind the rocks to his second line of defence on the ridge, but three hundred yards from our line. Soon after, Wood's right extended to the left of the regulars, and both joined in an assault, driving the Spaniards out of their main position behind the rock forts, where they were in large force, and supported by two machine-guns.

The Spaniards were completely routed. They left a large number of their dead upon the field. Our troops occupied the enemy's position, and, had it not been for exhaustion, doubtless would have captured much of the Spanish command. So hasty was the flight of the Spaniards that the road over which they retreated was strewn with abandoned equipment, and ammunition and articles of clothing were found in profusion scattered in and about the trenches.

As soon as General Lawton, at Siboney, heard the

* Wood had won a medal of honor (that prize coveted by every American soldier) for an act of gallantry, fortitude, and heroic physical endurance, during an Indian campaign in the pursuit and capture of Geronimo, which General Lawton at the time pronounced was without an equal in his varied and lengthy military experience.

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firing, he ordered General Chaffee's brigade, which had in the mean time come up that morning from Daiquiri, to proceed at once to General Young's support, if occasion should make this necessary. Finding that he was more heavily engaged than he had anticipated, General Wheeler, before Chaffee arrived, sent the following note to Lawton :

"GENERAL LAWTON,—General Wheeler directs me to say that he is engaged with a bigger force of the enemy than was anticipated, and directs that any forces you may have be sent forward on the Sevilla road as soon as possible.

"W. D. BEACH,

"Captain 3d Cavalry.

"June 24, 8.30 A.M."

General Chaffee's brigade, however, did not reach Las Guasimas until after the engagement was over. A half-hour after the fight had terminated, three troops of the 9th Cavalry arrived and were deployed to the front as outposts. When Chaffee's brigade and part of the other two brigades of Lawton's division arrived, they were sent forward half-way to Sevilla (one and a half miles), and this division remained in advance of the army thereafter.

Our losses were one officer and fifteen men killed; six officers and forty-six men wounded, out of a total attacking force of 964. This small number of dismounted cavalry drove from his position an enemy which has been variously estimated at from 2,000 to 3,000, supported by machine-guns. The Civil Governor of Santiago de Cuba informed General Wheeler and Colonel Wood, after the surrender, that the Spanish force that day amounted to 4,000. General Toral

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told General Wheeler that the Spanish numbered 2,000. Their strength was undoubtedly not less than 2,000. General Wheeler, General Young, and Colonel Wood reported thirty-nine Spanish dead found, the bodies having being thrown into the jungle for concealment. Spies and Cuban refugees afterwards stated that the Spanish dead and wounded were brought into Santiago for six hours that day, while General Toral admitted that the loss of General Rubin's column at Las Guasimas (or Sevilla, as the engagement is known to the Spaniards) was 250. General Young states, in his official report, that the Spanish press in Santiago the next day conceded the loss as seventy-seven killed alone. General Linares, the senior Spanish officer commanding the 4th Corps and the military division of Santiago de Cuba, is reported to have been in command at the engagement, accompanied by Generals Toral, Vara del Rey, and Rubin.

CHAPTER IX

RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS—PREPARING FOR CANEY AND SAN JUAN

THE affair of Las Guasimas served a useful purpose. It drove the enemy off the ground which lay between our army and the Spanish defences in front of Santiago; it gave us a limited but most welcome area of open and well-watered country in which to rest and prepare for the final assault on the city; it proved to the Spaniards, who were greatly dispirited and depressed thereby, that American and Cuban methods of fighting were two distinct and separate propositions; and, in proportion to the discouragement and dismay of the Spaniards, caused by their defeat at Las Guasimas, the American forces were encouraged and inspired. Two squadrons of regular cavalry and two squadrons of volunteer cavalry, all dismounted, had proved their valor equally under most difficult and trying circumstances. An unseen enemy, with a much superior force, in his own country, and intrenched in the position of his choice, had been driven from his rocky fastnesses, completely routed, and forced back to his principal works of defence before Santiago.

The Spanish reported next day, as General Shafter reported it in a despatch to Washington, that "we [the Americans] were beaten, but persisted in fighting, and they were obliged to fall back." In other words,

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the defeated Americans had driven the victorious Spaniards from their position—one of those Castilian contradictions to which the Spanish language lends itself so readily. In an official communication to the War Department, written immediately after the fight, an officer reported: "It is understood that the Spanish object to the American style of fighting, as being a kind to which they were unaccustomed; their criticism being that the 10th (colored) United States Cavalry neither returned the Spanish fire nor retreated when fired upon from heights, but just kept straight on up the hill, then, but not until then, shooting back, so compelling the Spanish to retire."

It is interesting to note the Spanish version of the affair, as given by Lieutenant Müller,* second in command of the naval forces of the province of Santiago de Cuba. He states that on the 22d of June General Rubin, with three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two pieces of artillery, was directed to retreat from Daiquiri, "as the force guarding it could not cope with the ships;" and to take up a position on the heights of Sevilla before daybreak of the 23d. "On the 23d," Lieutenant Müller says, "General Rubin, reinforced with one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and two guns, was attacked in the morning and again in the evening, checking the enemy's advance." (This, of course, was the attack of the Cubans, under General Castillo, already referred to, and not participated in by any American force.) "At daybreak on

* *Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba*, by Lieutenant José Müller y Tejeiro, translated and published by Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department.

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the 24th," continues Lieutenant Müller, "the echelon was reinforced by two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat."

Two days after the engagement General Linares issued the following manifesto:

"General Order of the 4th Army Corps, dated June 26th, at Santiago de Cuba.

"SOLDIERS,—We left the mineral region because I did not wish to sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern and powerful guns.

"The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago.

"The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal conditions.

"Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of success.

"Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels.

"The nation and the army look to us.

"More than 1,000 sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain.

"The other division of this army corps is hastening towards us to reinforce us.

"I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie in the defence of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts of the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of saving the honor of our arms.

"I shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with all, Long live Spain!

LINARES."

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Some timid newspaper men, accompanying General Young and Colonel Wood, became alarmed at the first shot fired at Las Guasimas, and, rushing frantically back to Siboney, before the engagement was over, wrote from the decks of the transports, where they took refuge, imaginary accounts of the fight, which was described as an "ambush" brought on by General Wheeler, in direct violation of General Shafter's instructions. The 71st New York Volunteers was picturesquely described as taking an active part in the fight and conducting itself with great valor. This regiment was not engaged.

As we have already seen, the engagement at Las Guasimas was in no sense an ambushade. General Young deliberately waited twenty minutes before attacking with his column, and Colonel Wood, after learning of the presence of the enemy in the position where he had been informed the Spaniards would be found, deployed five of his troops before a shot was fired. Neither was the engagement brought on in violation of General Shafter's orders. It occurred unexpectedly, to be sure, but under conditions which, when made known to him, commended the affair to his hearty approval and acquiescence. As a matter of fact, he had already issued instructions which General Wheeler very properly regarded as authorizing him to act in the premises. These instructions are quoted in the preceding chapter. Intelligent compliance therewith demanded a reconnoissance in force, and General Wheeler proceeded accordingly.

On the morning of the 24th—the morning of the Las Guasimas affair—General Shafter issued the following order:

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“HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANÇA,’

“OFF DAIQUIRI, June 24th.

“To Division Commanders :

“The Commanding General directs me to say it is impossible to advance on Santiago until means to supply troops can be arranged. Take up strong positions, where you can get water, and make yourselves secure from surprise or attack.

“General Lawton’s division will be in front ; Kent’s near Jura-guacito, where he disembarked ; Wheeler’s near Daiquiri ; Bates’s command where it will be in support of Lawton.

“Very respectfully,

E. J. MCCLERNAND,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

He also directed General Lawton to “take up a strong defensive position *a short distance on the road to Santiago*, and hold it until transportation is ready. Be sure to be convenient to water, and see that your flanks are protected. A battery of artillery will be sent to you as soon as it can be disembarked.” Of course, neither of these orders was received before General Young’s brigade, under General Wheeler’s instructions, moved out to develop the enemy’s position near Sevilla.

As soon as General Shafter heard of the affair of Las Guasimas, he expressed his approval of General Wheeler’s action in the following note :

“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANÇA,’

“OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, June 24th.

“Major-General Wheeler, Commanding Cavalry Division.

“SIR,—The Commanding General directs me to say he is glad to hear such good news, that you are occupying the enemy’s ground. A battery will be sent to you as soon as it can be unloaded ; horses are all off. Will also send you some saddle-horses from artillery. The mounted cavalry will be despatched as fast

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as possible. Kent's division now disembarked at Siboney and ordered to hold themselves in readiness to support you if needed. Navy are firing at the point probably where the railroad crosses the river San Juan. It is likely the enemy are sending reinforcements by rail. Rations will be in Juraguacito to-night, and we will have pack-trains out for you during night—one for each division. Very respectfully,

“ E. J. MCCLERNAND,
“ Assistant Adjutant-General.”

He also sent General Wheeler this letter the next morning :

“ HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
“ ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANÇA,’
“ OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, June 25, 1898.

“ Major-General J. Wheeler, U. S. V., Commanding Cavalry Division, near Sevilla, Cuba.

“ SIR,—Despatch* of 5 P.M. just received. Your news is excellent. Have ordered Bates to repair road to Sevilla at once. One battery of artillery is on the way to you, and will have another battery before to-night. Four troops 2d Cavalry will be gotten to you just as early to-day as possible. Will send them in detachments as ready; also three pack-trains, one for each division, to carry rations to you. The Ordnance Officer with

* “ HALF-MILE BEYOND SEVILLA, June 24, 1898.

“ Adjutant-General 5th Corps.

“ SIR,—I have the honor to report we can see Santiago very plainly from this point, about seven or eight miles distant. The country appears level for six miles this side the city except for heights on the south which extend to within three miles of Santiago, and from which the city can be shelled. These hills now appear deserted. The country is fairly open, a good tract for campaigning over; and it is said to be well watered. The road from this point to Santiago is said to be very good. An engineer force ought to be put to work immediately to repair the road between Juraguacito and Sevilla, as considerable work must be done to make it passable for guns and wagons. Sevilla is abandoned, and General Chaffee will occupy it to-morrow.

“ Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,
“ Major-General Volunteers.”

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another train will get ammunition to you. General Kent with two transports could not be found up to last night. The most of his division is at Juraguacito under General Hawkins. Order it to join you, if you can place it in good position; they are and should be with you. Expect General Garcia's command up to-day, and it will disembark at Juraguacito. Keep your front thoroughly picketed and also your right flank, and well in advance, but do not try any forward movement until further orders. From where you are now, or approximately there, I wish to advance in force, and will not move until all the troops are well in hand.

"I will see you to-day there. Very respectfully,

"W. R. SHAFTER,

"Major-General U. S. V., Commanding."

On the 24th of June, after the engagement, less than a third of General Shafter's army was at Las Guasimas—a fragment of the cavalry division and part of Lawton's division. Bates's independent brigade was at Siboney; all of Sumner's first cavalry brigade was at Daiquiri; all of Kent's division at Siboney, or still on transports off Cabanas; the artillery had not passed beyond Siboney; and Rafferty's squadron of the 2d Cavalry, the only mounted troops in Cuba, had not yet been sent to the front. None of these forces moved forward until specifically directed to do so by General Shafter. I dwell upon these details to show how deliberate was the general's advance on Santiago.

After all the troops had been landed, a greater part of the navy's boats and launches were withdrawn. General Shafter then realized that, with the losses he had sustained through the accidents to the barges and lighters already mentioned, the question of getting sufficient supplies ashore was, indeed, a serious one. On the 24th of June he sent to Washington an

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urgent message for additional barges and lighters. Two days later a large tug, with three barges in tow, left Mobile; a sea-going tug with two additional barges left New Orleans; and two decked barges were despatched from Key West. The lighter *Bessie* was again started from Tampa. All save one of these broke down *en route*, or were wrecked the day after their arrival.

But the loss of the lighters was not the only embarrassment. The continuously heavy surf beating hard upon the sharp coral coast caused the masters of transports, the marine insurance of which the United States did not assume in chartering them, to keep well out at sea, and thereby greatly increased the distance over which the small number of lighters and barges had to pass. It was with the greatest difficulty that General Shafter could get his supplies ashore for the army and the 4,000 Cubans under General Garcia. He had hoped to land ten days' rations and supplies before ordering any forward movement from Sevilla. As it was the season of the year when the West Indian hurricanes prevailed, General Shafter knew that at the first storm the transports would have to go to Guantanamo Bay for anchor, or put to sea—in either event, the vessels would be gone several days until the storm had abated. In the mean time the unloading of ammunition and rations would cease. Moreover, he was compelled to rely entirely on his own supplies, as the country was absolutely devastated, and without any resources whatsoever. It was for these reasons that General Shafter remained aboard his headquarters ship, giving his personal effort and attention to the problem which caused him the greatest anxiety.

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On the 25th of June, by his direction, General Wheeler was given supervisory charge of the army on land, with detailed instructions for placing the several brigades in good camps preparatory to the completion of arrangements for the advance. Advantage was taken of this enforced delay in the forward movement to improve the roads, reconnoitre, and secure as much information as possible regarding the enemy's strength and position. General Wheeler was repeatedly enjoined under no circumstances to make any forward movement until General Shafter could get sufficient supplies ashore.

The day after Las Guasimas, General Chaffee's brigade was pushed one and a half miles beyond Sevilla, with 600 Cubans stationed as outposts, and Bates was ordered to send a detachment from his brigade to work upon the road from Siboney to Sevilla, to make it passable for wagons and artillery. This trail was so narrow that wagons could not pass each other; in some places they could not even pass a mounted man. There was not sufficient time to widen the entire trail, five miles in length, and General Shafter did not wish to fatigue a large number of his men by such work. It became necessary, therefore, to direct that no trains should leave the front after nine in the morning, and that those going out with supplies from Siboney should not start until eleven o'clock.

Some criticism has been made of General Shafter for not pushing the army forward after June 24th, and preventing the enemy from intrenching more strongly on San Juan Ridge. This has been coupled with the charge that no reconnoitring was done during the period following the landing and before the final as-

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sault July 1st. Those who make these criticisms are ignorant of the motives which compelled the general to delay his forward movement, and of the difficulties he had in landing supplies sufficient to render it safe for his army to advance.

During the six days following the engagement at Las Guasimas, which was itself a reconnoissance, and before the attack on Santiago, reconnoitring was constantly in progress, by General Shafter's direction, under Colonel Derby, chief engineer officer, by six staff officers especially selected for the purpose, and by numerous line and field officers. A company of the 9th Infantry made a reconnoissance within a mile of the San Juan River, and patrols were kept constantly moving from the extreme left on the sea with Bates's brigade to the extreme right of the cavalry. The whole area between Sevilla and the Spanish outposts in front of San Juan and El Caney was repeatedly reconnoitred by the officers of General Lawton's division, including General Lawton himself, as well as by General Chaffee, with a company of infantry and some Cubans. These movements extended to Marianage, and even to the Ducrot House. General Bates's officers made a careful reconnoissance from the shore line to the San Juan River, and as far to the right as General Kent's division. The country thus surveyed was carefully plotted by the engineer corps, and daily reports of progress were made to General Shafter.

It must not be forgotten that these operations were conducted under the most difficult circumstances. The denseness of a Cuban jungle can be appreciated only by one who attempts to penetrate it. Every bush that grows in it bears a thorn. Hot and suffocatingly close,

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progress at the best was slow and tedious. A reconnaissance in force was both impossible and unnecessary. The position of the enemy was well known; and while it is doubtless true, as General Shafter knew at the time, that the Spaniards strengthened their position somewhat on San Juan Ridge, he made no effort to prevent their intrenching for fear that, before he was ready, such an attempt would bring on a general engagement, as it undoubtedly would have done.

Ample means were placed at the control of General Wheeler for the employment of spies, to be sent into Santiago. From them, scouting parties, Cuban refugees, and pacificos, much information was obtained regarding the strength and condition of the Spanish forces in Santiago and the fortifications surrounding the place. The inhabitants were reported to be in a state of panic, and daily expecting an attack from our forces, which were said to number 16,000. The Spanish officers circulated the report that their force was 20,000, although General Shafter's informants stated that the garrison did not exceed 12,000, an estimate which agreed with the information obtained from several different sources. The Spanish soldiers and lower classes of citizens were reported as speaking enthusiastically of their coming victories over the Americans. Soldiers and citizens were short of supplies, and Spanish officers had seized all food in the stores of the city. But little meat was to be had, and this was sold at a dollar a pound. It had become necessary to kill young horses for food. The principal and only staple article available was rice, while in the hospitals the supplies consisted of sardines and a bread made from rice flour and starch. Many Spanish sol-

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diers were described as sick with malarial and other fevers, and the *Reina Mercedes*, which had been disabled, had been converted into a hospital-ship.

The fortifications surrounding Santiago were described as consisting of almost continuous intrenchments, especially designed to oppose the advance of cavalry, and located on rising ground for rifle fire. Two lines of barbed-wire running parallel, about three yards apart, completely surrounded the town. Each fence, consisting of seven or eight strands, with wire running diagonally across, formed a meshwork of entanglements. Only six entrances to the city had been left open, and the one road in front of General Shafter's army cut through San Juan Ridge. The two hills on either side of this road commanded it perfectly. On the east and southeast of the town ten block-houses, containing four or five muzzle-loading cannon and a breech-loading gun of large caliber, had been erected on the line of defence. On the northern part of the town no artillery had been placed by the enemy, as it was believed that the Spanish fleet could cover that territory with its guns. A large force had been recently sent to the Morro, and Shafter's informant added that 1,000 marines, with artillery, had been landed from the ships. At Aguadores a stone fort, with numerous cannon in it, was described as splendidly situated, and commanding all the country as far as Santiago. General Shafter also learned that Hobson and his men were in the Mercedes Hospital, and being well cared for. Much valuable information from these sources was likewise secured regarding the defence and strength of the garrison at Caney.

General Shafter had intended to begin his forward

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movement on the 28th of June, and, two days before, ordered Lawton's entire division to move forward about two miles in advance of Sevilla; Kent was brought up from Siboney to that place; and Sumner's brigade of cavalry, as well as the four batteries of light artillery, was ordered to the front. The siege battery troops, acting as infantry, with a small detachment from Sumner's cavalry, were left to guard Daiquiri, while Bates's independent brigade guarded and patrolled Siboney and vicinity. In the mean time Garcia's 3,000 Cubans had been transported from Aserradero to Siboney.

On the 26th of June General Shafter thus wrote Admiral Sampson:

“ON BOARD S. S. ‘SEGURANCA,’

“OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, *June 26th.*

“*Admiral Wm. T. Sampson, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station.*

“SIR,—The last of my men will be on shore to-night, but it will take until Tuesday to get them up to where the advance guard is at this time. In addition to my own force of about 15,000 men, I will have a little over 4,000 Cubans. I mean to advance on the road from Sevilla Wednesday, without fail, towards Santiago.

“I hear the main force is outside of the city and is intrenching itself so as to prevent my reaching the bay south of the city. I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city, the ground in that vicinity being less bushy than that between the bay and the San Juan River; making my main attack from the north-east and east. If I can get the enemy in my front and the city at my back, I can very soon make them surrender, or drive them towards the Morro. You will hear my guns, of course, and can tell about where the action is taking place. I will be obliged if you can prevent any reinforcements crossing the railroad at Aguadores, but without destroying the bridge, as I may need it.

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"I wish to express to you again the many obligations the army is under for your assistance.

"I have not, as yet, as much forage or rations ashore as I would like to have, but cannot delay for them any longer. Staff officers will continue putting off stores; and if you will let Captain Goodrich continue to help you will greatly assist in the campaign. I think I should have ten days' full rations and forage on shore, so as to cover accidents by storm or rough weather. To-day I have not more than half that amount; but now that the men and animals are out of the way, I think these stores can be discharged faster. Very respectfully yours,

"WM. R. SHAFTER,
"Major-General U. S. V., Comding."

On the 27th the Secretary of War telegraphed General Shafter:

"We are anxiously waiting, but hope you will take sufficient time to get a good ready. The second half of Duffield's brigade left Fort Monroe yesterday. The general, with about 1,400 men, should arrive to-day. Tugs and lighters are on the way. What are your needs?"

Fearing that he might misconstrue this message as an order to delay his advance, the Secretary again cabled him on the same day:

"My despatch of this morning was not intended to direct or retard your movements, or restrain you in the free exercise of your discretion, but to express the hope that you would not be urged to precipitate action before you were ready."

With the information he had obtained regarding the condition of the Spanish garrison and people in Santiago, General Shafter determined to postpone his attack several days to await the arrival of the rein-

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forcements referred to, confident in the belief that his own force and position were daily growing stronger, while those of the Spanish were weakening. Up to this time there had been no rains of any consequence, and the health of his command was remarkably good. On the 27th he thus wrote General Wheeler at the front :

“MY DEAR GENERAL WHEELER,—I had intended to make an advance to-morrow, with the troops that I have, but, in view of telegrams received yesterday, that a large number of reinforcements (about 4,000) are on the way, and the further fact that one of the ships has arrived this morning, I will not feel justified in advancing until I get them on shore. The government seems to be very solicitous about us, and it is possible they have information of which we know nothing. I hope your scheme of sending spies in Santiago has worked. I also understand that a large number of poor people came out yesterday and are within the lines. Of course they will be received, as we can't drive starving people back, at least not at the present time. Question them carefully and get as good an idea as you can of the condition of affairs there and of the location of the forces that are said to be on the road to oppose us. I am shipping out stores as fast as possible, ammunition, forage, and rations, and will direct it all sent to you, to avoid confusion. Will you have your Q. M. take charge of it and pile it where we can get at it conveniently? The forage please issue to the artillery horses and cavalry, as well as horses of officers; and issue subsistence stores to any troops that require it, but not more than three days' at a time for any command.

“I hope you will look up the subject of finding if there is any means of moving a division off to your right, bringing it out at El Caney, a good point from which I do not believe we will be expected, which is only about four and a half miles from the city. My engineer officer tells me there is a wide road leading off to the left on the high ground, generally in the direction of the mouth of the San Juan River, and which will be on Kent's left. From the fact that I hear that Spanish troops are evidently working down towards the Morro, it is possible that they may try or be

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thinking of attempting to flank us on our left flank; so send at least a regiment of Kent's out that road, a couple of miles I should say, to pretty near opposite the left of where Lawton is to be placed this morning, and establish a picket-line connection with him, if practicable. I am going to have Garcia keep men well to the front on our left. I am coming out to see you this afternoon.

"I hope the mounted cavalry are doing well. I had them bring four days' forage on their horses, instead of riding them.

"Very truly yours, WM. R. SHAFTER,

"Major-General U. S. V., Commanding."

June 27th the *Yale* arrived at Siboney, with General Duffield and part of his brigade, consisting of the 33d Michigan and one battalion of the 34th, about 1,200 officers and men. General Duffield was at once directed to place a large force at work upon the road leading from Siboney to the camp of the army in the vicinity of Sevilla. Late in the afternoon of the next day, General Shafter was informed that General Pando,* with 8,000 Spanish regulars, was advancing from Manzanillo to relieve the garrison in Santiago. Pando was reported to be within fifty-four miles of the city, and moving at the rate of twelve miles a day, with an abundance of supplies in the way of pack-trains and beef on the hoof. If the Spanish general met with no opposition, this would bring a strong force, with a large quantity of food, for the relief of General Linares, by the 2d or 3d of July. General Shafter determined, if possible, to prevent General Pando's entering Santiago, and to make the attack without waiting for the additional reinforcements, consisting of the remainder of Duffield's brigade, then *en route*.

* It subsequently proved to be General Escario with a much smaller force.

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General Garcia, with 3,000 Cubans, was requested, on the 29th, to proceed from Siboney to the west and northwest of Santiago and guard the approaches over which the advancing Spanish reinforcements, under Pando, would come. The American outposts were pushed forward to within one and a half miles of Santiago, and General Shafter established his headquarters in advance of the whole army on the Santiago road at the point where it branches with the trail leading to Caney. The next day he determined upon his plan of attack, and gave directions for the disposition of the several divisions, preparatory to the assault, July 1st. He proposed to throw his army against the intrenched position of the enemy on the heights of San Juan: Lawton's division on the right, Wheeler's division in the centre, and Kent's division on the left. Bates's brigade was ordered up from Siboney to the front, to be held in reserve, with two batteries of light artillery, and three troops of Rafferty's mounted cavalry. The remaining troop of the 2d Cavalry was sent with Lawton, as well as a battery of artillery—Capron's (the father of Captain Capron, who was killed on the 24th at Las Guasimas)—while General Shafter directed General Duffield, with one regiment, to make a demonstration against the extreme right of the Spaniards at Aguadores Bridge.

Only 1,200 men of General Duffield's brigade had landed in Cuba, as the navy had directed the *Harvard*, transporting the remainder of his brigade, to convoy a repair-ship which could make but eight or ten knots an hour. This delayed the arrival of his command nearly two days—too late to take part in the engagement of July 1st. General Duffield's command on the

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1st of July consisted only of the 33d Michigan and one battalion of the 34th Michigan. The latter acted as a guard at Siboney. It was not intended that General Duffield, with his small force of 900 men, should attack, across the San Juan, the fortified heights which rose abruptly from that river 300 or 400 feet; but, as General Shafter stated in an official report, General Duffield "was expected to make such a demonstration at Aguadores as would hold at the place all Spanish troops occupying it, and prevent their reinforcing the main body at Santiago. This he accomplished perfectly and with very slight loss. There was no intention of attempting to capture the works, as they would naturally fall with Santiago, and, besides, were very strong. I had the position carefully examined by my engineer officers and General Bates, and personal observation afterwards satisfied me that it was not on the true line of advance for Santiago."

A deep and wide ravine separated the Spanish position from General Duffield's advance. At this season of the year the river, which flows between the high and precipitous banks of this gorge, was broad, swift, and deep—600 to 700 feet in width, and spanned by an iron girder bridge sixty feet above. About 100 feet of the trestle on the Spanish side of the San Juan had been blown up. Moreover, as was subsequently learned and at the time suspected, all that was left of the bridge had been mined. Then, too, the river was not fordable, and had General Duffield's instructions contemplated an assault, which they did not, it would have been impossible for him to cross the San Juan River, since he had no boats or means

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of throwing any part of his small force across the swollen river.

The enemy, protected by stone forts, block-houses, and rifle-pits along the cliffs, was subsequently learned to have been 500 strong, supported by artillery—a force almost equal to that which kept General Lawton's division of over 4,000 a whole day at Caney. In addition to these troops, two companies of marines (about 400 men) from Cervera's fleet were at Las Cruces and vicinity, where they were held in reserve at a distance of about five miles on the railroad leading to Aguadores and from where they could be brought to this place in a very short time. The local conditions were such that our war-ships could not see nor reach many of the trenches across the river confronting General Duffield, and at the very instant the vessels firing upon the heights signalled "there are no Spaniards in the rifle-pits," a volley from the enemy wounded several of our men.

General Duffield's demonstration, coupled with the movement of Garcia on the northwest of Santiago, brought about what General Shafter had hoped—*i. e.*, the Spaniards were kept in doubt as to his real movements and deterred from concentrating their forces at San Juan Ridge.

While General Duffield was making the before-mentioned feint at Aguadores Bridge, Admiral Sampson was requested to bombard that place, as a part of the manœuvre, and to direct such firing against the Spanish works at the mouth of the harbor of Santiago as in his judgment might seem best to further divert the enemy's attention from the main advance. This he did.

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Before moving out to take up the positions assigned them, preparatory to the attack the next morning, General Shafter called the general officers to his headquarters and explained to them fully the plan of battle and the part each was to take in it. This meeting was attended by the division commanders Lawton and Kent, acting division commander General Sumner,* and the brigade commanders Chaffee, Hawkins, Ludlow, and Duffield, as well as the Cuban General Castillo. The battle of July 1st was conducted in direct accord with these plans, with the exception that it took Lawton's division a day instead of two hours, as estimated, to reduce Caney.

* General Sumner had succeeded to the command of the cavalry division as a result of General Wheeler's sickness.

CHAPTER X

CANEY

THE road leading from Siboney to Santiago, *via* Sevilla and El Poso, was the only one available for General Shafter and his army. The road was exceedingly narrow, and the jungles on either side so dense as to forbid any general deployment. General Shafter deemed it necessary to capture El Caney, to the right of El Poso about two and a half miles, and on the direct road from Guantanamo to Santiago. This would block the advance of the 7,000 Spanish troops reported to be at Guantanamo, and give our army another approach to Santiago over the El Caney road.

On the 26th of June, General Wheeler began to reconnoitre El Caney. On the 27th Lieutenant Mendoza, of General Wheeler's staff, assisted by fifteen Cubans, made a preliminary reconnoissance. Captain Chanler, also of General Wheeler's staff, the next day advanced within three-quarters of a mile of Caney. From two Cuban residents he learned that the Spanish garrison consisted of from 500 to 600 regulars, which afterwards proved to be the "Battalion Constitucion," and seventy local guerillas, under the command of General Vara del Rey, the officer who had been with Linares and Toral in the engagement at Las Guasimas. The terrain in the vicinity of Fort

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Marianage (a block-house on the road leading north from El Poso in the direction of Caney) and the country as far northwest of Marianage as the Ducrot House were thoroughly reconnoitred. The last-named place was a large estate, plainly visible from corps headquarters, about two miles southwest of Caney in the direction of Santiago. The plantation was said to be the property of a Frenchman, and had been mutually regarded as neutral territory during the insurrection. Generals Lawton and Chaffee likewise reconnoitred El Caney with two companies of infantry and fifty Cubans, who had widened the trail from the Siboney-Santiago road for three miles, in order that the artillery might be brought up and placed in a position overlooking the town.

To General Lawton, with his division of infantry, was assigned this "turning movement." He was directed to capture or drive out the garrison at Caney, and, swinging around to the right, confront, and if possible flank, the Spanish left in the defences of Santiago. This manœuvre would enable him to join in the forward movement against the enemy's position on the right of the cavalry division.

June 30th was a busy day for the 5th Corps. Early that morning Lawton, accompanied by his brigade commanders, Generals Ludlow and Chaffee and Colonel Evan Miles, personally reconnoitred the vicinity, approaches, and defences of El Caney. The positions they were to occupy that night and the next morning were carefully explained to the brigade commanders, as well as the plan of battle and the part each one was to take therein. While this reconnoissance of Caney was in progress, Shafter, with Gen-

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erals Kent, Sumner, and Hawkins, reconnoitred the enemy's position on San Juan Ridge. In the early afternoon, as already stated, a conference was held at Shafter's headquarters, in which the plans for the general attack were deliberately canvassed and formulated. So far as circumstances would permit, the preparations were complete.

The various reconnoissances of El Caney showed that the enemy occupied a position of great natural strength, and that he had fortified and secured it with all the resources of military science. Cuban refugees had confirmed previous information to the effect that the garrison consisted of some 500 Spanish regulars and seventy guerillas, commanded by General Vara del Rey, and that the defences were five block-houses, a stone fort, well-located rifle-pits, and barbed-wire barriers. A stone church in the town had been loop-holed for riflemen, and a large number of buildings and tall trees in the vicinity were occupied by sharpshooters. Three of the block-houses were on the southwest, each banked with earth four feet high; one was on the northeast limit, and the fifth was located about a mile northeast of the town. These block-houses, with the stone fort, covered all available approaches to Caney, over which our troops would necessarily have to advance. The stone fort, however, was the key to the situation. It occupied a commanding position on a round and prominent knoll about seventy-five feet high, and 800 yards southeast of the town. It was a solidly built, thick-walled structure, thirty-five by forty-five feet in outside dimensions. On the east, south, and west, cut in the rock, were rifle-pits. From the roof of this imposing fortress floated the Spanish flag.

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About three miles along the ridge trail to Caney from the Siboney-Santiago road, a path leads to the left and west, and finally connects with the Caney-Santiago road, in the vicinity of the Ducrot House. Here the artillery, Capron's light battery, four pieces, was installed on the night of the 30th of June, at a distance of about 2,000 yards from Caney. A mile farther along the trail to Caney a jungle-path leads to the left and south of a short ridge facing the stone fort, 700 yards away. The Caney trail itself continues to the north and east, following around the base of a sugar-loaf mountain, and joining the Caney-Guantanamo road some two miles northeast of the town.

At the conference with General Shafter, during the afternoon of the 30th, Lawton explained the proposed plan of attack, which had been suggested by General Chaffee. This plan received General Shafter's approval, and, by his order, the several brigades of Lawton's division began to move out for position between three and four o'clock that afternoon. General Chaffee, with his brigade, camped on the Caney trail beyond the position of the artillery, where the road diverges to the left towards the Caney-Santiago road, and near the foot of the sugar-loaf mountain referred to. He personally placed a company of the 12th Infantry that night on the ridge overlooking the stone fort, and a company of the 7th Infantry was well advanced on the Caney trail, in the rear of the sugar-loaf mountain, near the Guantanamo road. General Ludlow's brigade encamped on the Caney trail, in the rear of Capron's battery. Colonel Miles's brigade occupied a position on the El Poso-Marianage trail south of El Caney. One of his regiments, however, the 1st

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Infantry, was detailed as a support to the light battery. The several brigades and the artillery secured their positions that night under cover of darkness. The entire division bivouacked without lights or calls, and slept on their arms within a short distance of the battle-field.

The proposed assault on Caney was looked upon as a mere incident of the attack on Santiago, to be made the day following. Generals Lawton and Chaffee had expressed the opinion that the town could be taken in a couple of hours. The movement against the town and garrison was to begin as soon as the light of day would permit; then the division was to swing to the right, and, advancing along the Santiago road, join with the two divisions which would be waiting for Lawton in the movement against San Juan Ridge. The hour for this combined assault was fixed at ten o'clock. The small garrison known to be defending Caney; the readiness with which the Spaniards had given way before our landing at Daiquiri, and upon our advance to Siboney and Juraguacito; the ease with which a small force of 964 dismounted cavalry, under General Young, had driven 2,000 of the Spaniards from their intrenched position on the heights of Las Guasimas, seemed to justify the opinion so confidently expressed that the town could be taken in two hours. General Wheeler had also stated to General Shafter that the place could be easily captured, and twice requested authority, on the 28th and 29th of June, to make the attempt.

In the plan of battle General Chaffee's brigade was required to approach the town from the northeast, on the Guantanamo-Caney road, and drive the enemy from

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the stone fort, block-houses, and intrenchments on that side. General Ludlow's brigade was to take a position on the southwest of the town, across the Caney-Santiago road, and cut off the retreat of the garrison, should it attempt escape. Two regiments of Colonel Miles's brigade were to assemble near the Ducrot House, the general rendezvous for the entire division after the engagement, and to act as a reserve if necessary. It was not expected, however, that the 2d Brigade would be called into action.

Between four and five o'clock on the morning of July 1st, the several brigades left their bivouacs and "marched to the field of battle without breakfast, except a cracker and a drink of cold water."*

General Lawton's division was constituted as follows:

1st Brigade.—General Ludlow—8th Infantry, 22d Infantry, 2d Massachusetts Volunteers.

2d Brigade.—Colonel Evan Miles—4th Infantry, 1st Infantry, 25th (colored) Infantry.

3d Brigade.—General Chaffee—7th Infantry, 12th Infantry, 17th Infantry.

Capron's battery of light artillery, four pieces; and fifty Cubans.

The 12th Infantry began to deploy on the ridge opposite the knoll upon which the stone fort was planted, while the 7th and 17th Infantry, with General Chaffee in command, moved to the eastward of the sugar-loaf mountain, and, entering the Caney-Guantanamo road, advanced towards Caney to form a junction on the right of the 12th. The last-named regiment was to be practically on the left of that road,

* General Chaffee's official report.

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the 17th and 7th Infantry to be on the right, the latter regiment forming the centre of the line.

The action opened at 6.30 with the firing from Capron's battery. His guns were directed upon what appeared to be a column of Spanish cavalry moving from Caney in the direction of Santiago at about two miles' range. The firing was accurate and effective, sixteen of that column being killed, as was afterwards learned. Almost at the same time the 7th and 17th Infantry deployed in front of the intrenchments east of the town. A company of the 7th Infantry, with fifty Cubans attached to General Chaffee's brigade, and who remained with that brigade during the entire day, were directed to drive out the garrison in the block-house already referred to as located on a commanding position about a mile northeast of Caney. The approach had to be made in the open through the tall grass, and under a fire from the houses in the town, the block-houses, intrenchments, and the sharpshooters in the trees. The movement was abandoned.

General Chaffee's brigade, having deployed in a rather irregular line due to the inequalities of the ground and the jungle which covered it, began the advance on Caney under a severe fire. The enemy was apparently fully prepared to receive them, as indicated by the accuracy of his volleys, which fell most heavily upon the 7th Infantry. Indeed, this regiment bore the brunt of the fight. In repeated efforts to advance against the Spanish works it was subjected to the direct fire from the rifle-pits in front as well as an enfilading fire on both flanks from the stone fort on the left and the two block-houses on the right. "They took a position so close to the town," says General

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Chaffee, "that a man could not raise his finger without being shot." This, however, did not prevent their persistent advance. They crawled on their hands and knees through the grass, brush, and thickets within arrow-shot of the intrenchments and protected Spaniards, and, says General Carpenter, who was then in command of the regiment, "although no infantry fire in my opinion could have been more severely or certainly delivered from this position, it seemingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire delivered in our front."

In the mean time the 12th Infantry was attempting to take the stone fort on the left. Again and again a company of that regiment advanced to a bald hill but 350 yards from the fort, and was as often forced to fall back. The Spanish resistance was so formidable that it finally became necessary for most of the brigade to take position in a sunken road parallel to the hostile intrenchments and within 300 yards of them. Up this sunken road Colonel Haskell, of the 17th, and his aide, Lieutenant Dickinson, led their men, and stepping fearlessly into the open, to direct the cutting of wire entanglements, they received a full volley from the enemy concealed behind a stone wall immediately in their front. Colonel Haskell fell mortally and Lieutenant Dickinson seriously wounded.

Between necessary halts to rest exhausted men, the 7th Infantry advanced close to the enemy's works and crawled forward fifty yards through the tall grass, where some daring spirits among the sharpshooters long remained to pick off the enemy. But the Spaniards were not yet to be driven from their strong position. The 12th Infantry, moving along the sunken

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road and screened by trees, took a position within 150 yards of the stone fort. It was discovered that the line of assault was impeded by a meshwork of barbed wire. Volunteers were called for. With a coolness and intrepidity that caused the entire regiment to cease firing and hold its breath, two privates crept through the hedge, and within a stone's-throw of the enemy's fort performed the hazardous duty of cutting five lines of wire in a dozen places. They returned unscathed to their comrades. The names of these soldiers are: Private James W. Smith and Private James L. McMillen, both of Company H, 12th Infantry.

The time had now arrived for the general attack. One by one the members of Company F crawled through the grass unseen by the enemy. When assembled they burst forth from their cover, and with a triumphant cheer rushed upon the fort. As they swept up the hill, they were quickly followed by companies A, D, and E, and all swarmed together over the ditches and into the fort through the breaches made in the walls by the artillery. So impulsive was the charge that our infantry captured with their hands armed Spaniards in the trenches outside, and within the fort one lieutenant and nine men were taken prisoners. The interior was a charnel-house. The remains of eighteen dead were lying about. The walls and floors were bespattered with blood. However, there was more fighting yet to be done. The key to the situation had been captured, but the enemy had not been dislodged from his fastnesses in the city and in the block-houses. To hasten forward reinforcements two privates leaped upon the walls and roof of the fort and fearlessly and exultantly waved the na-

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tional and regimental colors amid a hail of shot. Their names are Corporal Edward Meyers and Private Joseph E. Abel, both of Company E, 12th Infantry.

To this inspiring signal cheer upon cheer answered back from the chaparral and open field, across which parts of Ludlow's and Miles's brigades were then rushing on the stone fort and town. The excitement was intense; hunger and fatigue were forgotten; bullets and death were disregarded; and, inspired by the "red god of battle," they pushed on. Some of the more daring sharpshooters forced their way into the town. Sergeant Feldcamp, with a detachment of one corporal and a few men of the 12th, intercepted in their efforts to escape General Vara del Rey and three of his staff, all mounted. The surrender of the Spaniards was demanded. Their answer was a renewed attempt at escape. The Spanish general and his staff were immediately shot.

This assault on the stone fort by Chaffee's brigade occurred at about three o'clock in the afternoon. At noon the two regiments of Colonel Miles's brigade were brought into action on the south of the town proper, between Ludlow and Chaffee; General Bates's independent brigade, which had arrived at ten o'clock that morning from Siboney at General Shafter's headquarters, was ordered to report to Lawton for the purpose of relieving the 2d Brigade, then acting as a reserve. Bates's force, however, was not used as a reserve as intended, but was immediately placed in position by General Lawton between Miles and Chaffee, where it joined the assault on the stone fort in the afternoon. The fighting of this brigade was so severe

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that, when the garrison of the fort was ready to surrender at two o'clock, the Spanish dared not come out, and the men and officers of the 12th Infantry (Chaffee's brigade) dared not attempt to go in the fort on account of Bates's fire.

Meanwhile the left wing under Ludlow on the southwest of the town had been having a hot time. Ludlow soon found his position an exceedingly difficult one. He was confronted by three block-houses and numerous rifle-pits, from which a galling fire was continually poured during the nine hours his brigade was in action. His troops, however, moved steadily forward in the face of a searching fire from the unseen foe, advantage being taken of every opportunity to secure cover by trees, hedges, bushes, and rocks.

The critical period in the combined attack on the town, stone fort, and block-houses by Chaffee, Ludlow, Miles, and Bates occurred at half-past two, when the artillery moved to a new position within a few yards of the town and shelled the three block-houses. By a well-directed and effective fire these were soon silenced. By four o'clock parts of all the brigades had swarmed into the town, and the entire garrison was either captured or destroyed. Most of the enemy who attempted to escape to Santiago were swept down by the fire of Ludlow's men. It has been estimated that of the garrison of 520 men not over forty escaped. Those not killed were captured to the number of 140.

At 2 P.M., just at the time when the cavalry division under Wheeler and the other infantry division under Kent had assaulted and captured the heights of San Juan, and just before the critical moment had been reached by Lawton's division at Caney, General

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Shafter, overlooking, from the elevated position of his headquarters, the operations on both fields of battle, felt that he had made (to use his words) "a terrible mistake in engaging my whole army at six miles intervals." It must not be forgotten, however, that he had been led to believe by those most competent to judge that the engagement at Caney would be over and Lawton's division well on its way to San Juan before the action at that place would begin. General Shafter therefore sent the following note to Lawton:

" July 1st.

"LAWTON,—I would not bother with little block-houses; they cannot harm us. Bates's brigade and your division and Garcia should move on the city and form the right of line going on Sevilla road. Line is now hotly engaged. SHAFTER."

This was not received until it was really too late to stop the action against Caney, although Lawton sent word to his brigade commanders to move forward on Santiago. They were then too deeply involved, however, to withdraw, and Lawton so informed General Shafter in the following note:

" EL CANEY, 4.45 P.M., July 1st.

" Adjutant-General 5th Army Corps.

"SIR,—The enemy were driven from the town about half an hour since. It is impossible now to tell to what extent we have suffered. We have accomplished little except to drive them out of their strongholds. Our losses are considerable, but cannot tell how great. I have everybody at work getting straightened out, the dead buried, and property gathered together.

"I made the effort to communicate with my brigade commanders during the fight to effect a withdrawal. It was impossible to do so. The only alternative was to take the place, which was accomplished very soon after receiving your order. Captain

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Gilmore was present at the time and can explain to you the difficulties to be encountered. My headquarters will be near the Ducrot House. My men are completely worn out, and I doubt if I can get out from there to-night. Very respectfully,

“H. W. LAWTON,
“ Brigadier-General Volunteers.”

To which General Shafter replied:

“ July 1st.

“ DEAR GENERAL,—Very glad to hear of your success. Gather in your wounded and leave sufficient force to take care of them—I should say a regiment and troop of cavalry, which I shall send over in a few moments. Rest and feed your men, but some time during the night, or before daylight, you should be down at Santiago on the extreme right joining Sumner, who is in front of the big barracks on this side of the town. Keep the four men I send you, and Captain Brett, with his troop, will soon join you to remain with the force you have at Caney, from which point messages can be sent to me if anything should turn up.

“ If you have any more ammunition than you need to-night and to-morrow, send it back here immediately. Get your battery in a good position within easy range, and we will knock the town to pieces.

WM. R. SHAFTER.

“ I have just found that Troop D is with you, so keep that and I will not send the additional troops. Send back the messengers.

“ W. R. S.

“ To Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton.”

After burying our dead and those of the Spanish, and providing for the care of the wounded and the prisoners, the exhausted army, leaving a battalion to guard Caney, marched to the Ducrot House, where it arrived at about 9 P.M. With the loss of sleep the night before, lack of food, the exhaustion incident to battle for nine hours, under a tropical sun, and the fatigue of marching through a dense jungle in which scarce a breath of air stirred, the army reached the

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rendezvous so utterly worn out that the men could go no farther, and threw themselves down in the road to rest. The movement towards the position originally assigned his division on the right of Wheeler's cavalry was begun by Lawton a little after 10 P.M., which, because of the protracted struggle at El Caney, was twelve hours late. Two staff officers were sent forward in advance of the division, with General Lawton closely following. They were soon fired upon from out of the dark by the Spanish pickets. General Lawton immediately wrote General Shafter:

“ OPPOSITE DUCROT HOUSE,

“ July 1, 1898, 10.30 P.M.

“ *Adjutant-General 5th Corps.*

“ SIR,—I have been ordered to move forward by the El Caney road to Santiago and take position on the right of Wheeler there, where I would find Colonel Derby who would show me my position. I sent two staff officers to find Colonel Derby, and followed them closely myself a short distance ahead of the advance column. We were fired upon apparently by Spanish pickets. I have no guides, and it is night and I cannot tell what is in my advance. I should have some one to direct me from this point to my place in line. I have sent some Cubans forward to reconnoitre the road. Hurry some one to me if possible who can guide me to my place.”

General Shafter had no means of determining the strength of the enemy in front of Lawton, and therefore ordered him to turn back and come in on the right of the cavalry from the rear by the El Poso road. Lawton rested his troops until 3 A.M., when his patient soldiers began their long fifteen-mile march. Very few of these men had ever been in battle, but during the fight and the long night march they conducted

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themselves with the indomitable and unconquerable spirit that characterizes the American soldier.

At noon on the 2d of July, Lawton, with his division, reached the station to which he had been assigned in the original plan.

In the Caney engagement General Lawton had lost 4 officers and 77 men killed; 25 officers and 332 men wounded—a total casualty of 438, of which 132 were of the 7th Infantry. The enemy lost, as near as can be ascertained, from Spanish reports, something over 500; the exact number is not known. This loss included General Vara del Rey and his two sons killed; a third son prisoner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rey, brother of the general, wounded and a prisoner, together with other Spanish officers. The resistance offered by the Spaniards at Caney was a great surprise to General Lawton and General Chaffee, and much more stubborn than they had expected. This was doubtless attributable to the fact that the Spanish soldiery had been led to believe by their officers that the Americans would give no quarter, and would massacre red-handed every prisoner taken. Indeed, the nervous anxiety and restlessness of the prisoners the next day, after they had been brought to General Shafter's headquarters, betrayed the fears they had been so carefully taught to entertain. When the armed guard, in the regular course of events, came to relieve those in charge of these Spaniards, they thought that their hour had come, and fell upon their knees, trembling and crossing themselves. It was with great difficulty that General Shafter's interpreter assured them of our honorable intentions and kind treatment, and when finally making them

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realize that they were not to be butchered, but would receive a generous allowance of food, their joy scarce knew any bounds. The Spanish wounded showed great reluctance to leave our lines when General Shafter afterwards directed that they be turned over to General Toral. In this, General Shafter showed no little circumspection. The return of the Spanish wounded to their comrades was the best method of disproving the mischievous statement of Spanish officers that American soldiers massacred their prisoners. Doubtless this incident had much influence in determining the subsequent course of events.

The artillery at Caney, four field-pieces, was insufficient, and located at too great a distance in the early part of the engagement to be of much assistance to the infantry in destroying the fortifications or dislodging the enemy from his trenches. It did better service, later in the day, when moved near. Nine hours were consumed in accomplishing what it was thought could be done in two. The engagement, in fact, amounted to an assault by infantry against a strongly fortified and intrenched enemy, armed with Mauser rifles. Such an operation is always extremely difficult, and usually meets with failure. General Lawton's effective force was 226 officers and 4,913 men, after two o'clock in the afternoon, when Miles's and Bates's brigades had been placed in action, and the 2d Massachusetts had been practically withdrawn.

The Spanish version of the Caney fight is thus given by Lieutenant Müller :

"The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney,

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which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any protection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impossible to go near it.

"Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this circumstance to have his soldiers reform the lines and again get ready for the battle.

"The fight commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer possible under these circumstances. The general was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two relatives of the general) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 P.M., the commander being dead and those 520* men having been reduced to less than 100, and most of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a bold attack."

* He apparently does not include the "Civil Guard" at Caney which took part in the fight, and a remnant (16) of which, as prisoners of war, subsequently gave their parole to General Shafter.

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Unfortunately Lieutenant Müller's statements cannot be accepted at all times as correct. He says that the total Spanish losses in killed, wounded, and captured, July 1st, at Caney and Santiago, were 593. He also says that of the force of "520" at Caney only eighty escaped to Santiago, "most of them crippled and bruised." According to these figures the Spanish casualties at Caney alone must have been 440. This would leave his total losses at San Juan only 153,* which is known to be incorrect.

The fight at Caney was less picturesque than the attack on San Juan Ridge, but it was an extremely important affair. It is perhaps fortunate that the town was not captured in two hours, as had been predicted by General Lawton, and as was also believed by his brigade commanders. If Caney had been taken by eight o'clock on the morning of July 1st, and Lawton's division had reached San Juan Ridge at ten o'clock, in time to join in the assault, as planned, it is not unlikely that the three divisions of Kent, Lawton, and Wheeler, when thus united, would have pushed on to the city of Santiago. Had this occurred, the loss of life would have been, in all probability, much greater than it was, as doubtless the enemy, when thus cornered in Santiago, would have fought as they proved that they could at Caney. The resistance of the Spanish soldiery, under such circumstances, is neither

* Although Lieutenant Müller pretends to give an "official statement of all the casualties" at Caney and San Juan as 593, and makes use of these figures in several parts of his book, he also says that during the 1st of July there were received in the hospital in Santiago "in a short time over 300 wounded"—"and they were still coming." All of the wounded must have come from the defences of Santiago alone, as none were removed from Caney July 1st.

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to be despised nor underestimated. I shall always regard the unexpected delay experienced in taking Caney as one of the many incidents connected with the Santiago campaign in which the guiding hand of Providence seems to have interposed for America.

CHAPTER XI

SAN JUAN


FROM General Shafter's headquarters to El Poso the distance was about one mile. The position selected for the artillery was on a height to the left of the road at El Poso. From here to San Juan Ridge it is approximately one and one-half miles, and the narrow road leading thereto crosses the ridge near the centre. About half-way between El Poso and San Juan Heights, 600 yards to the left and south of the road, the Aguadores joins the San Juan River. Both streams are crossed by the Santiago road, the Aguadores or eastern branch three-quarters of a mile from El Poso, and the San Juan one-quarter of a mile farther on, and but 600 yards from the San Juan block-house, the central point of attack. To the edge of this latter river extends an almost impenetrable thicket. The river runs parallel with San Juan Heights, and is separated from it by an open valley covered with grass, waist high. To the right of the road between San Juan River and Las Guames Creek, a branch of the Aguadores, is an open, grass-covered glade 600 yards in width, terminating on the Santiago side in a thick chaparral about 400 yards wide and through the middle of which flows the San Juan River. The edge of this thicket is almost at the foot of a steep and isolated knoll. The grass-covered

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valley already referred to is interposed between this height and the main position on San Juan Ridge, one-third of a mile west. The knoll was topped with a red-roofed house, and subsequently received the name of "Kettle Hill," several large caldrons having been found on its crest when captured by our cavalry.


The Spanish position on San Juan Heights was well adapted to defence and observation. Its steepest side was in the direction of our assault. From his fortified and intrenched position on these heights the enemy could direct a plunging fire into the valley below and sweep the jungle and trails where our troops were compelled to deploy. General Kent was to place his infantry division with the right on the Santiago road and the left on a "green knoll" which was pointed out to him by an officer of General Shafter's staff. The San Juan block-house was on that part of the ridge facing the position assigned to General Kent. The cavalry was to rest its left on the Santiago road, thus joining Kent and, by extending to the right, form a junction with Lawton. Kettle Hill was therefore between the dismounted cavalry and that part of San Juan Ridge on the right of the Santiago road, thus necessitating the taking of the former place before the assault on the main works.

Daylight, July 1st, found our army in readiness for action, the dismounted cavalry, preceded by a small number of Cubans, in the vicinity of El Poso; Kent's division in the rear; and Grimes's light artillery (four guns) in battery on El Poso heights with gun-pits dug, ready for the signal. The day opened clear and hot. Not a breath of air was stirring as the cavalry moved slowly by El Poso along the narrow



**SAN JUAN
BATTLEFIELD**

SCALE OF MILES



ENGRAVED BY BOWMAN & CO., N.Y.



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road, so narrow in fact that the men could only march by file or columns of two. This congestion greatly delayed the forward movement. As General Young was ill, Colonel Carroll had been placed in command of the 1st cavalry brigade, consisting of the 3d, 6th, and 9th (colored) regulars, and Colonel Wood was assigned the second and remaining brigade—the 1st and 10th (colored) regulars and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry.

Grimes's battery was to open upon the block-houses and trenches on San Juan Hill when the musketry and artillery fire of Lawton's division indicated that he was well engaged at Caney, which, as already stated, it was expected would be captured by 8 A.M.; while the cavalry (all dismounted) and Kent's division were to advance slowly along the road withholding their main attack until ten o'clock. This would give Lawton sufficient time, it was expected, to come up and join on the right in the assault.

By eight o'clock the firing in the direction of Caney indicated that the battle was on, and Grimes was directed to open upon the Spanish position on San Juan Heights. The range was 2,600 yards. Each discharge of his guns left a volume of smoke, which clearly discovered the position of the battery to the enemy. The cavalry began to wind its way slowly down the road, the 1st Brigade, headed by the 9th, in the advance, while the 2d Brigade, headed by the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, brought up the rear. There was but one troop of mounted cavalry in Cuba, the horses for the others having been left at Tampa.

At ten o'clock Lieutenant Miley, General Shafter's aide, sent back the following report:

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“General Shafter and Colonel McClernand.

“Since writing last note have gone forward about one-quarter of a mile, and overtaken General Sumner. Colonel Carroll’s brigade is ahead, and Colonel Wood’s brigade has its head with General Sumner. General Sumner has halted Colonel Wood, and ordered Colonel Carroll to move to the front and attempt to turn to the right at the river. Where I am writing the earthworks are visible at 1,000 yards, and it is feared that the fire of rapid-fire guns will be directed down this road. It is suggested that the light batteries at El Poso at once open fire upon these works with shell, and keep up the fire until the troops come into danger from our fire. Captain Howze has just returned and says he has been about 500 yards beyond the San Juan River. Colonel Carroll’s whole brigade is across the river, he reports, and ready to turn to the right. General Kent is waiting with the head of his column one-half mile to the rear. Everybody is cool and determined. The two light batteries should be kept back to avoid confusion in the road if a reverse is suffered.”

In the mean time a captive balloon, which had ascended in the vicinity of El Poso, was moving down the narrow, crowded road. In it were Colonel Derby, Chief Engineer Officer 5th Corps, and Lieutenant-Colonel Maxfield, of the Signal Corps. At half-past nine Colonel Derby had sent this despatch as a result of his observations in the balloon:

“Major-General Commanding.

“Balloon over river bed to right of road 500 yards from El Poso.

“Capron’s battery in position to right of Caney, firing single shots at intervals of several minutes. Active skirmish fire south side of Caney. Cannot distinguish troops. Large force of Cubans at Marianage and along road to west and south.

“Troops moving to front from south of El Poso—also on main road from headquarters towards Santiago. Latter road is blocked with troops at its junction with road from El Poso. Grimes’s battery has not fired since 9 o’clock; nor has the Spanish battery

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in its front, which opened fire with shrapnel at 8.30. Cannot make out location of the battery, which had ceased firing before balloon went up.

“Only few Spaniards visible at block-house beyond San Juan River. This block-house is south of main road to Santiago. There are also trenches north of road and a short piece between block-house and the road. Country beyond San Juan is open; also field half-mile wide a quarter of mile north of road and west of Marianage.

“No troops marching on main road from Santiago to San Juan.

“Head of our column halted in main road within 400 yards of San Juan River. Woods on both sides of road, not very dense to right, where there is a skirmish line deployed.”

Colonel Derby determined to push the balloon to the skirmish line and, ascending to a height of 1,000 feet, report to General Shafter the movements of the army as it advanced on San Juan. But the flight of the balloon down the road a short distance above the tree-tops had disclosed to the enemy our line of march, and his musketry and shrapnel fire soon opened on the balloon and road, raking the latter, crowded with troops. When the Aguadores ford was reached, the balloon moved to the right, but its anchor-ropes becoming entangled in the trees and brush prevented the ascension as planned. It now furnished a large, stationary target for the Spanish marksmen, who by well-directed shots soon brought it to earth.

Although it was possibly a mistake to have pushed the balloon to the front, the reconnoissance served a good purpose. It developed the fact that the enemy was in force in the trenches on San Juan Ridge, and discovered a road in the rear leading to the left, thereby enabling Kent's division to be deployed much more expeditiously than would otherwise have been

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possible.* Much has been written in criticism of the use of the balloon on that road. Of course the Spaniards were perfectly familiar with the road, knowing it to be the only one leading from El Poso across the San Juan River, and therefore that our troops would be obliged to use it.

Before the balloon reached the Aguadores, the entire 1st cavalry brigade and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry regiment had crossed the ford and marched to the right.

By this time the enemy's fire had become very hot from the heights in front as well as on the flanks. The cavalry was ordered to move to the right up the open glade, taking advantage of such cover as an occasional rise in the ground or the bank of the creek afforded. After proceeding about a half-mile, the column was halted and faced to the left, Kettle Hill being then in its front. Sheltered there only by a sunken road leading to the hill, it waited for Kent's division to form on the left.

Lawton was still held at Caney, while Kent and Sumner being so exposed to the enemy's fire had now no recourse but to make the assault. Miley reported from the front: "The heights must be taken at all hazards. A retreat now would mean a disastrous defeat." This was communicated to Shafter, and

* In his testimony before the War Investigation Commission, Lieutenant Miley said (p. 3238):

"This enabled General Kent to hasten his troops to the front and to move simultaneously with Sumner's cavalry division on San Juan. Otherwise it would have been almost impossible to have held Sumner's division in check until General Kent's division had been deployed to the left, if they both had been required to move to the front on the same road."

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McClelland,* at El Poso, thus forwarded his answer to Miley: "I have told General Shafter we are complying with his order for Kent and Sumner to fight all their men if they can do so to advantage. From present firing I think Lawton is at it hard. Don't let him fight it out alone." These orders were at once communicated to General Wheeler, who, ill as he was, on hearing the firing had gone to the front. Wheeler promptly notified General Sumner, whom he had left in immediate command of the cavalry. Kent had in the intervening time received General Shafter's orders to make the assault at once.

Sumner directed Carroll, commanding the first cavalry brigade, to advance on Kettle Hill, supported by Wood. The red-roofed house on the top of the hill was pointed out as the objective, and the forward movement began, first slow and haltingly, as the Spanish volleys were hot and continuous. Crawling through the grass and taking advantage of every shelter, our troops advanced, firing and receiving fire. As they moved forward and into the thick brush at the foot of Kettle Hill, the main line and support became mixed, and no formation could be kept. As at Las Guasimas, it was a troop-commander's fight. At last, however, they forced their way through the undergrowth, crossed the San Juan River, then swollen and deep, and emerging from the jungle and wire entanglements, charged with a cheer. The Spaniards holding Kettle Hill fled to the rear in the direction of their main works on San Juan Ridge. The assault was made simultaneously by one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, the 9th Cavalry, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, all

* Shafter's adjutant.

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charging together over the crest. Two troops of the 9th Cavalry reached the top of the hill first. Part of the 10th Cavalry, most of the 3d and 6th Cavalry and a squadron of the 1st regulars were deflected to the left and joined the infantry in its assault on the main works.

The fearless manner in which the officers had exposed themselves in moving forward their commands resulted in a disproportionately great loss among them. Colonel Hamilton, of the 9th Cavalry, was killed while leading his command to the right of the farm-house on Kettle Hill; Colonel Carroll commanding the first brigade was wounded; and besides many other losses, all five of Colonel Wood's staff were killed, wounded, or prostrated by the heat in this charge and in the subsequent dash across the valley in front. Officers and men of both regulars and volunteers conducted themselves with conspicuous gallantry, and are entitled to great credit for their unshaken discipline under fire, as well as for the fearlessness and impetuosity of their assault.

During this time General Kent directed General Hawkins, who was in advance, to move forward on the main road, with the 6th and 16th Infantry, cross the Aguadores River, deflect to the left, and prepare to make his attack on the ridge as soon as the other two infantry brigades (Pearson and Wikoff) had formed on his left. These latter were to take the trail discovered by the officers in the balloon.

To hasten the movement of Hawkins's brigade, the 71st New York, the remaining regiment of his brigade, was directed to take the lead along the "trail." "This," says General Kent in his official report,

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“would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade.” By this time “the enemy’s fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thicket on our flanks, but from sharp-shooters thickly posted in our rear, and from shrapnel.” When thrown forward into this narrow trail, with the hail of shot and shell from an unseen enemy falling among them, the first battalion recoiled in confusion upon the rest of the regiment. It was a mistake to have placed them in the lead in the jungle through which the enemy’s bullets were then driving in sheets. The strain of the long wait in the road, the galling fire from the invisible foe, and the lack of opportunity to return the fire was too great for them. It would have been a serious trial to experienced veterans under highly trained officers, therefore it is not to be wondered that for the moment it demoralized these inexperienced soldiers whose officers were little better qualified than they for such an emergency. Wikoff’s brigade was, therefore, ordered to take the lead and the movement was resumed. Two regiments, the 2d and 10th Infantry, of the second brigade of this division (Pearson’s brigade) were directed to follow closely in Wikoff’s rear and make their assault from the green knoll, already referred to as the point against which the left of the division was to rest. The third regiment of Pearson’s brigade, the 21st Infantry, was sent down the main road as a support to Hawkins.

The gallant Wikoff was ordered to “hurry forward the brigade, move across the creek by the trail, put the brigade in line on the left of the trail, and begin the

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attack at once." As the brigade entered the narrow, winding path, the sight of the numerous dead and wounded was enough to make the stoutest heart recoil. But that sight did not restrain the onward rush of these fearless soldiers. The time that tried men's courage had arrived, but these were not the kind that blanched. Reaching the precipitous banks of the San Juan, they leaped in, wading the stream waist deep, and clambered up the west bank in sight of the enemy. Totally oblivious of his own danger, Colonel Wikoff personally directed the deployment and formation of the battle-line of the 13th Infantry, then in the lead, until a shot, passing through his body, felled him to the earth to rise no more. His men tenderly carried him to a sheltered spot in the river-bed, where he died with the roar of battle in his ears. Colonel Wikoff had been the spirit of the heroic rush through the jungle, and his personal bravery inspired his men with hope and courage. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, of the 13th Infantry, immediately assumed command of the brigade, and continued the hazardous duty of forming the line of battle under the terrific fusillade of the enemy, who now concentrated the fire of his trenches, block-houses, and artillery upon this place. Five minutes later, Colonel Worth was shot, and Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, of the 24th, had hardly taken command when he, too, was wounded.

In the mean time the 6th and 16th Infantry, under Hawkins, had moved down the main road to take up their position on the left of that road, and to the right of the remainder of the division. After crossing the first ford, the Aguadores, they deflected to the left into a small triangular meadow which was bounded by the

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Santiago road and the two converging streams. Between them and the open valley in their front were a fringe of trees and thick underbrush and the steep banks and swift current of the San Juan River. Across the river a sunken road on the edge of the jungle bordered the field for its entire length. Between our forces and the Spanish position, in their full view and covered by their guns, the way was obstructed by six lines of barbed-wire, stoutly fastened to the trees and brush.

General Hawkins had hoped that when he debouched from this thicket he would be in a position to enfilade the Spanish rifle-pits. He found, however, that his line was parallel to the trenches on San Juan Hill. A Cuban who had accompanied the 6th Infantry bravely hewed down, with his machete, a portion of these wires in the face of a savage fire.* When he had made several breaches, the regiment moved out into the grassy field and opened fire upon the enemy's trenches. Their attack was answered by every rifle-pit, block-house, and battery in sight. With no shelter, and under such a galling fire, in ten minutes one-fourth of the regiment was killed or wounded. To attempt to hold this exposed position, with no support, because the remainder of the division had not yet gone into position on the left, would have resulted in annihilation. Orders for its withdrawal to the protection of the sunken road were given and quickly executed. Without panic or confusion they fell back, carrying their dead and wounded.

* He is the only Cuban recorded as having taken part in the assault on San Juan Hill, upon the crest of which he was killed while fearlessly exposing himself and firing upon the Spanish trenches in front.

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At this moment, about one o'clock, three batteries of our Gatlings opened fire on San Juan Ridge. They were under Lieutenant Parker, who had advanced his guns to an exposed position beyond the Aguadores ford. The little clouds of dust along the line of trenches showed how well-directed was the fire. The effect was magical. In five minutes the Spaniards were seen climbing out of the trenches and running to the rear, only to be mowed down as they fled. Simultaneously with the opening of the Gatlings, Lieutenant Ord,* of General Hawkins's staff, who, with his commander, was with the 16th, and somewhat to the left of the 6th Infantry, called for volunteers to support the latter regiment, which he had seen advance in the grass and withdraw to the road. As he rushed out into the field with a handful of men, the whole line, including Wikoff's brigade, arose in the road, beat down the fence, and swarmed out into the open. At practically the same time a portion of the cavalry joined in the assault on the right and left of the road. The charge on San Juan Hill had begun.

Multitudes of skirmishers poured out into the grass-covered valley, one cheering, shouting, rushing mass. Well in the lead was that grizzled veteran, General Hawkins. With bared head he led the charge, his white locks, erect figure, and inspiring presence forming one of the most gallant and picturesque features of the fight. Waving his hat, he called to his men to charge. "Come on, come on!" was his slogan, and the crowd of yelling, running soldiers swiftly swept

* This gallant and fearless officer was the first officer on San Juan Hill, where he was killed by a wounded Spaniard to whom he was offering assistance.

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across the meadow which had now become their Acedama. Above the staccato of the Gatlings and the roar of shot and shell, above the cheering and din of battle, was heard the thrilling note of the bugle at Hawkins's side, sounding the "Advance." Several companies of the 6th and 16th Infantry reached the slope first. When two-thirds up the hill, well in advance of the main force, cries were heard of "Come back; our artillery is going to fire!" and a bugle in the rear sounded "Cease Firing," "Recall," and "Assembly." The line wavered and faltered, as the fire from our own artillery and Gatlings, directed against the crest of San Juan, became dangerously close overhead. Captain Allen, of the 16th Infantry, well up on the slope of the heights, shouted to his men, "Who will go with me to the top of that hill, in spite of hell and the batteries?" Again the movement up the slope was started, and again checked, but only for a moment, as just then our artillery fire ceased. A moment of silence, like the awful instant that succeeds a vivid flash of lightning before the crash of thunder comes, and then—that triumphant outcry of delight which victory in battle alone inspires. Up sprang the infantry—up the slope and over the crest crowded the men in one long and continuous line. The valor of our troops had broken the enemy so firmly intrenched. The Spaniards had fled, leaving their flag and their dead on the heights which our army had taken. San Juan Hill was ours!

CHAPTER XII

AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN

A PART of the cavalry division which first attacked Kettle Hill did not advance on San Juan Ridge at the time of the assault by the infantry division under Kent. Colonel Roosevelt, in his book *The Rough Riders*, shows that the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, then under his command, as well as parts of the regular regiments which captured Kettle Hill, did not join the infantry in its charge on San Juan block-house and that portion of San Juan Ridge to the left of Santiago road commonly known as San Juan Hill, but made their assault on that part of San Juan Ridge to the right of the road after San Juan block-house and the trenches to the left of the road had been taken by the infantry and part of the cavalry brigade. He thus writes of the matter (pp. 134 and 136):

“ No sooner were we on the crest [of Kettle Hill] than the Spaniards from the line in our front, where they were strongly entrenched, opened a very heavy fire upon us with their rifles. They also opened upon us with one or two pieces of artillery, using time fuses which burned very accurately, the shells exploding right over our heads.

“ On the top of the hill was a huge iron kettle, or something of the kind, probably used for sugar refining. Several of our men took shelter behind this. We had a splendid view of the charge on San Juan block-house to our left [and a third of a mile to the front], where the infantry of Kent, led by Hawkins, were

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climbing the hill. Obviously the proper thing to do was to help them, and I got the men together and started them volley-firing against the Spaniards in the San Juan block-house and in the trenches around it.

“ The infantry got nearer and nearer the crest of the hill. At last we could see the Spaniards running from the rifle-pits as the Americans came on in their final rush. Then I stopped my men for fear they should injure their comrades.”

By these quotations it is not intended in any manner to discredit the part the cavalry took in that battle, but to place them in their true position upon the field. Though a portion of the cavalry brigade did not participate in the attack on San Juan Hill, as it is generally termed, their attack upon Kettle Hill and subsequently upon the enemy's position on San Juan Ridge to the right of the line was gallantly carried out. The percentage loss of the cavalry division was practically equal to that of Kent's division (13.64 per cent.) and considerably more than Lawton's (8.6 per cent.).

Pearson's brigade, also, did not assault that portion of San Juan Hill on which was located San Juan block-house, but, after following Wikoff through the jungle, moved south, passed over “ the green knoll,” and assaulted the ridge to the left of San Juan Hill. Driving the enemy before him, Pearson finally secured a position on the extreme left of the army, nearest Santiago and the second line of the Spanish intrenchments, therefore receiving, perhaps, the most severe fire of all after the capture of the heights.

The Spaniards had retreated to a new and formidable position, only about 800 yards distant, in the outskirts of Santiago. From this position, which con-

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stituted his second line of defence, the enemy now directed his fire on the works we had just taken. Meanwhile the remainder of Duffield's brigade (the 9th Massachusetts and two battalions of the 34th Michigan), which landed at Siboney that morning, were hastening to the front. But they and Lawton were not yet available, nor was Bates, and so the situation stood.

At 2 P.M. Miley thus reported to General Shafter:

"Undoubtedly we have the heights. The artillery must be pushed forward at once and strongly intrenched by night. I believe the road is clear unless Bates is in the road. The Gatling guns and the Hotchkiss guns have gone forward, likewise dynamite gun. I believe they are on the hill now. Ammunition must be brought forward by the men. We will strongly intrench on the hill to-night. Everybody in good spirits, determined, and cool. General Wheeler is with me and I have read him this."

A little later Miley again reported:

"Our men are probably one mile from the river and pushing the enemy, and we certainly have everything on the hill. Captain Best's battery is now on the hill, and second battery must be pushed forward with all possible despatch.* A train of .45-caliber ammunition has just passed and caliber .30 ammunition must be pushed forward with energy. Also get food forward, and fresh troops if any can be spared from Bates's brigade. Our men are going to be too tired to-night to dig much. So far as I can learn, our losses are not great."

* Best's battery found the position on the hill untenable, and soon withdrew to Kettle Hill, a point of relative safety, where, later in the afternoon, Parkhurst's battery also reported. Parker with his Gatlings, however, remained with the most advanced line, rendering invaluable service from that time on until the raising of the siege.

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The exhaustion of the men made a further advance that day unadvisable. More than 1,000 had been killed or wounded in the advance through the jungle and in the assault. In General Kent's division it was feared that the supply of ammunition would not last the day. Naturally this feeling of insecurity deepened as the hours wore on, and in time ran the whole length of the line. The men were utterly worn out; the army sadly decimated; renewed calls for ammunition and reinforcements were heard on every side. Where was Lawton? Where was Bates?

About this time Miley thus wrote General Shafter from San Juan Hill:

"Bates's brigade must be put in here at once. We need fresh men and caliber .30 ammunition to enable us to hold the hill. Urge everything forward."

To this Adjutant-General McClelland replied for General Shafter:

"HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
EL POSO, CUBA, July 1, 1898.

"*Lieutenant Miley.*

"The general was just here. By his order I sent directions to Kent and Wheeler to intrench at night-time and hold position. The general has ordered Lawton to press the enemy. I hear him driving them, I think, near the Ducrot House. He says he will send on ammunition and rations. I will send by the general's directions another battery."

Later in the afternoon General Wheeler, who had taken up his headquarters at the foot of San Juan Ridge, informed General Shafter that, owing to the wounding and drifting away of so many men, the

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right was weak, and fears were entertained that the Spaniards would renew their attack at night. He also expressed the wish that Lawton would make connection on his right. Later in the evening he wrote as follows :

“ General Shafter.

“ SIR,—I examined the line in front of Wood’s brigade, and gave the men shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the same thing. They all promised to do their best, but say the earth is rocky. The positions our men carried were very strong and the intrenchments were very strong. A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige.

“ The lines are now very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with wounded and so many are exhausted ; but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our line intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day. If we can get through to-morrow all right we can make our breastworks very strong the next night. You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The 3d and 6th Cavalry and other troops were up marching or halted on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night.

“ I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down, and reported the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front.

“ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ JOS. WHEELER,

“ Major-General Volunteers.”

General Shafter, however, ordered that the men should intrench at once while waiting for the arri-

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val of reinforcements—to wit: Lawton's division and Bates's brigade.

Such was the situation of our army at sundown on the 1st of July. All day long they had been fighting, undergoing many hardships, and attacking almost insurmountable obstacles. More, they had been harassed, from morning to evening, by the Spanish sharpshooters posted in the trees and everywhere, who made victims not only of our armed soldiers but of the sick, the hospital attendants, and even the wounded. Going into battle our men had stripped themselves of all encumbrances. Blanket-rolls, ponchos, shelter-tents, even their haversacks containing three days' rations, had been thrown away. Thus at nightfall, when both sides ceased firing, when our men lay on the damp ground, without protection and short of rations, it seemed too much to ask of them to give up such poor rest as they could thus obtain, even to erect fortifications against the storm of bullets to come next day. Nevertheless, during the night much fortifying was done. Under cover of darkness twelve field-guns were put in position on San Juan Hill, near the block-house. This was the site Best had been compelled to abandon the afternoon before, and which, soon after sunrise, was reported to be untenable by Major Dillenback, commanding the artillery. Accordingly, these guns were removed to El Poso; but, owing to the condition of the roads and the rising of the San Juan River, were not in place until after three o'clock on the afternoon of that day, July 2d.

At least one cheering incident came when, at 1.30 on the morning of the 2d, General Bates's brigade,

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the 3d and 20th Infantry, reached the front and took position on the extreme left, next to Pearson. This brigade had left Siboney at 8.30 P. M., June 30th; had marched to General Shafter's headquarters that night; had gone thence to support Lawton; had been in the thick of the fight for two hours, and, after seeing the finish, had hurried back by the El Poso trail to the fighting-line on San Juan, where it arrived a little after midnight. With the exception of a brief rest of six hours during the night of June 30th-July 1st, this brigade had been continuously marching and fighting for twenty-nine and a half hours.

The night of July 1st was passed in constant vigil and in strenuous toil. Digging trenches and throwing up fortifications made sorry work for men who had been afoot all day, scaling heights under the fervid heat of a tropical sun, pushing through dense undergrowth, and facing death at every step. Day came and brought but slight relief. Light had scarce broken when the Spaniards opened fire all along the line. On the left an assault was made upon Pearson and Bates, when the enemy advanced in two lines within 600 yards of our position. He was repulsed and driven to cover.

As General Wheeler had predicted in his note to General Shafter, the 2d of July was a day of trial. The flooding rains had now set in, and the twelve miles of road between the firing-line and the base of supply at Siboney had been converted into sloughs. Transportation, except by means of pack-trains, had become virtually impossible, and even the mules were occasionally swept away and lost while attempting to ford the swollen streams. Lawton's division, after

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a long, hard march, arrived at noon and was assigned a position on the extreme right, and so, at last, the whole of Shafter's effective army was on San Juan Ridge. The men lay in the close and stifling pits, alternately scorched by the tropical sun and drenched by the heavy rain. During the entire day of July 2d the Spaniards kept up a severe fire. But neither our own troops nor those of the enemy changed the positions they occupied on the night of July 1st. The Spaniards made no attempt to recapture San Juan Ridge, and our own men were too exhausted to make any farther advance.

CHAPTER XIII

"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION"

SUNDAY, the 3d of July, was the darkest day of the war. Since his despatch, received in the early morning of July 1st, announcing that the "action is now going on," only two messages had come from General Shafter regarding the situation, and these were not encouraging. In one, received late on the night of July 1st, he stated that he had had a very heavy engagement, lasting the entire day. It read:

"We have carried their outer works, and are now in possession of them. There is about three-fourths of a mile of open country between my lines and the city. By morning, troops will be entrenched, and considerable augmentation of forces will be there. General Lawton's division and General Bates's brigade, which have been engaged all day in carrying El Caney (which was accomplished at 4 P.M.), will be in line and in front of Santiago during the night. I regret to say our casualties will be above 400. Of these not many are killed."

The other message from the general reached the department between one and two o'clock on the morning of July 2d. It announced that he had underestimated his losses of the previous day. No word of any character was received from the army in Cuba during the day of July 2d. But the air was filled with foreboding rumors. Although the department had no information to such effect, the press de-

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spatches announced General Shafter's serious illness; that General Wheeler, next in command, was also sick, and unable to perform his duties; and that yellow-fever had appeared among the troops at Siboney.

The following message was sent to General Shafter from the White House at one o'clock on the morning of July 3d:

"We are awaiting with intense anxiety tidings of yesterday."

During the whole of that night (July 2d-3d) I had awaited, with the President and Secretary of Agriculture, news from the front. Hardly a day, from the beginning of the war until its close, had I crossed the threshold of my residence before midnight, and frequently it was in the gray of dawn. The nightly vigils had become a part of our routine life. In fact, these conferences afforded the only opportunity for uninterrupted council.

When Sunday opened with no bulletins from the seat of war, the anxiety for the army at the front was felt by the whole nation. The War Office was thronged continually during the day by people prominent in political and private life, all anxiously inquiring for news.

No despatches coming from General Shafter by eleven o'clock in the morning, I telegraphed him as follows:

"I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for news from you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was received, nor has there been up to this hour, 11 A.M., except an account of the battle of Friday, upon which I congratulate you most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt all messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others,

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and make report at the close of each day, or during the day if there is anything of special importance, at once. The *Relief* left New York yesterday. She has seventeen surgeons aboard, and will come to you as quickly as possible."

Three-quarters of an hour later, however, General Shafter sent a despatch which, owing to a cable-operator's mistake, opened with the ominous words: "Well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line." The message implied that the Spanish had succeeded in flanking Shafter on the right and in the rear.

The missing words of the message were not supplied by the cable company until a much later hour in the day, when the despatch, corrected, read as follows:

"PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 3, 1898.

"*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

"Camp, near Seville, Cuba, July 3d.—We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character, and the defences so strong, it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles, and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we could use, having engines and cars at Siboney.

"Our losses up to date will aggregate a thousand, but list has not yet been made; but little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday, and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon-road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill; confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of

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the troops (regulars) was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will have a consultation with him this morning. He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis and has burned a bridge and removed some rails; also that General Pando has arrived at Palma and that the French consul, with about 400 French citizens, came into his line yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy possible.

SHAFTER,

"Major-General.

"11.44 A.M."

General Shafter had no fear of a successful assault by the Spaniards from the front. He did not believe the enemy were either strong or audacious enough to drive him from even the hastily constructed trenches on the San Juan Heights. "Pando, with 8,000 men," and the strong garrison reported to be at Holguin, were the forces that he apprehended might attack his unprotected flanks and rear.

As there still was the same pressure to abandon the position that General Wheeler mentioned in his letter to General Shafter of July 1st, already quoted, and as the reports of Spanish reinforcements were so numerous and, apparently, authentic, the general deemed it wise to call a conference of the division commanders. The meeting was held at El Poso. Those present were Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, and Bates. "Pando," said General Shafter, "is reported to have been sixteen miles out yesterday with 8,000 men. A large force of troops is at San Luis, twenty-five miles in our rear; 10,000 men are at Holguin; and 7,000 more are in my rear at Guantanamo. If they come down we shall

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have to get back, and I want an expression of opinion against anything that might come. If those forces take us in flank, which would not be difficult in our present exposed position, I will be held responsible."

As is customary in such military conferences, the junior officer is required to express his opinion first. General Bates, whose Independent brigade formed the extreme left of the army, stated that he did not think he could hold his present position. Lawton came next. In his characteristic manner, he said, "Hang on." Kent and Wheeler gave the same advice. The conference lasted two hours. General Shafter did not make known his decision other than to say: "We shall hold our present position for the next twenty-four hours, and if our condition is not improved I shall call upon you again for an expression of your views."

The next morning (July 3d) General Shafter felt it his duty to acquaint the War Department with the situation, and it was for this purpose he sent the despatch. It was not his intention to withdraw, unless the conditions of insecurity should become more aggravated.

At the same time that he sent the discouraging despatch to Washington, on the morning of the 3d of July, with characteristic American spirit he sent a demand to the Spanish general to surrender.* It should be noted that this demand for surrender was prior to any knowledge of Cervera's intention to attempt to escape, and, as already stated, was sent simultaneously with the cablegram to the Secretary of War, intimating the

* The demand on Toral is dated 8.30 A.M., July 3d. See chap. xiv., p. 182.

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possibility of a withdrawal. In Washington, however, the situation could only be judged by the light of the information contained in the message just quoted. It was not there known that the surrender of the Spaniards had been demanded until the evening of July 3d, and all realized that it would be exceedingly unfortunate if Shafter were compelled to abandon his position, for, besides loss of prestige abroad, in the United States the effect would be most keenly felt, and the Spanish government would, without doubt, be greatly encouraged to further resistance. The conditions were regarded as too delicate to warrant any interference with General Shafter in the exercise of his authority in the field. Thence, upon the receipt of his message with reference to the retrograde movement, General Shafter was given full discretionary power, as seen by the following reply:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 3, 1898—12.10 P.M.*

“*Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba.*

“Your first despatch received. Of course you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you can hold your present position, especially San Juan Heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once.

“R. A. ALGER,
“Secretary of War.”

In the mean time every effort of the department was being made towards hastening forward reinforcements. General Brooke, at Chickamauga, was ordered to get Wilson's division ready to move at an hour's notice; General Guy V. Henry was directed to send two of his

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strongest regiments to Newport News to embark on the fast-sailing ships *St. Paul* and *Duchess*, while the rest of his command was to go by way of Charleston, making, with those on the way from Tampa, an increase in the 5th Corps of 10,000 men.* General Shafter was notified of these preparations, and informed that he could have whatever reinforcements he needed.

At seven in the evening another despatch came from Shafter—the second received from him that day—which did not tend to brighten the situation. It announced that Cervera's fleet had come out *and escaped!* In full, the message read as follows:

“PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 3, 1898.

“*Secretary of War, Washington.*

“Camp near Santiago, July 3d.—Lieutenant Allen, 2d Cavalry, is just in from my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago, and which overlooks the entire bay. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet was in full view until nearly ten o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard*, just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signalled Cervera had come out and had escaped and that he was in pursuit. The *Harvard* immediately left. The French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at ten o'clock this morning, and that was the hour Allen witnessed his departure. Cervera told such consul it was better to die fighting than to blow up ships in harbor.

SHAFTER,

“Commanding.

“7 P.M.”

* If not needed in Cuba these troops were to form part of the Puerto Rican expedition.

"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION"

Three-quarters of an hour later, however, there came from the military censor at Playa del Este, where the end of the Cuban cable under our control had been established, a brief message, which stated :

" All Spanish fleet, except one war-ship, destroyed and burned on the beach. It was witnessed by Captain Smith, who told operator. No doubt of its correctness."

This was the first intimation received of the successful operations of the navy, July 3d. After the experience of the day, and the report received from General Shafter, saying that the fleet had come out "and escaped," this unofficial information could hardly be credited. A half-hour later a message from Shafter announced as follows :

" Early this morning I sent in a demand for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. Perfect quiet on lines for an hour. From news just received of escape of fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered."

A few minutes later another message from the censor confirmed his previous despatch. The curtain of gloom was rising. Whatever doubt was still lurking in our minds as to the correctness of these reports was removed by a message from Shafter, which reached Washington the first hour of the Fourth of July, in answer to a cablegram informing him that we had received no news :

" Did not telegraph, as I was too busy looking after things that had to be attended to at once and did not wish to send any news that was not fully confirmed ; besides, I was too much excited myself. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is reported practically destroyed. I demanded the surrender of the

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city at ten o'clock. At this hour, 4.30 P.M., no reply has been received. Perfect quiet along the line. Situation has been precarious, on account of difficulties of supplying command with food and tremendous fighting capabilities by the enemy from his almost impregnable position."

Outside of the refreshing naval information that this message confirmed, the very spirit of it showed a more hopeful condition on the part of the army.

At two o'clock on the morning of July 4th I walked home, with the newsboys crying in my ears the joyful tidings of "Full account of the destruction of Spanish fleet!" I also had with me the last message from General Shafter, received at a quarter past one. It contained but a single sentence—

"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION."

CHAPTER XIV

SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO

AT eleven o'clock on the morning of the 3d of July active hostilities ceased, and were not again renewed until late on the afternoon of July 10th. The firing then continued through the forenoon of July 11th, when the last shot of the Santiago campaign was fired. Fighting practically ended July 3d, the interregnum until the date of formal surrender, July 17th, being devoted, with the exception of the skirmishing on the two days noted, to negotiations for the capitulation. During this entire period, however, both armies, remained in their trenches.

When the news of the destruction of Cervera's fleet reached our troops in the rifle-pits, on the afternoon of July 3d, their enthusiasm knew no bounds. The men cheered along the entire line of our works, and gave vent to their delight as only soldiers can — dancing on the earthworks, throwing up their hats, and embracing one another. General Shafter thus cabled:

“ The good news has inspired everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had managed to keep its instruments on the line played the ‘ Star-Spangled Banner ’ and ‘ There will be a hot time in the old town to-night, ’ men cheering from one end of the line to the other. Officers and

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men, without even shelter-tents, have been soaking for five days in the afternoon rains, but all are happy."

Later in the evening he reported that his lines then completely surrounded the town from the bay on the north to a point on the San Juan River to the south. The enemy, however, still held the ground from the west bend of the San Juan River, at its mouth, up the railroad to the city. Shafter also cabled that Pando was some miles away, and that it was not believed that he would get into Santiago. This last statement was based on a report from Garcia.

The first demand for surrender, forwarded on the morning of July 3d, and already referred to, read:

"HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,

July 3, 1898—8.30 A.M.

"To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.

"SIR,—I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WM. R. SHAFTER,


"Major-General U. S. V."

General Linares, in command of all the Spanish forces in the province of Santiago, had been wounded during our assault on San Juan, July 1st, and had been succeeded by General Toral. The latter thus replied to General Shafter's communication:



"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 3, 1898—3 P.M.*

"His Excellency the General Commanding the Forces of the United States, near San Juan River.

"SIR,—I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-




THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CUBA



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SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO

day, written at 8.30 A.M. and received at 1 P.M., demanding the surrender of the city, or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women, and children that they must leave the city before ten to-morrow morning.

"It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message. Very respectfully,

"JOSE TORAL,

"Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army Corps."

When the threat of bombardment was made known in Santiago, the British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came into our lines and asked that the non-combatants might occupy the town of Caney, and urged that the bombardment be delayed until ten o'clock of the 5th, as there were about 20,000 people who wished to leave the city. These requests were granted, and General Shafter informed the Spanish commander that, out of deference to the expressed wish of the consuls, he would not begin his operations against Santiago until noon of the 5th. He also submitted the matter to Washington, reporting what he had done, and stated that such a large number of refugees to the town of Caney would cause much hardship, as the place could not shelter over 1,000 people, and it had no supplies. He added, "I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the non-combatants come out leisurely, as they come out for food, and will probably be able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive."

This correspondence occurred before positive news of the destruction of Cervera's fleet reached our lines. When that fact was confirmed, General Shafter re-

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newed his demand for the surrender of the city and garrison of Santiago, as follows :

“ HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, July 4, 1898.

“ *The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba.*

“ SIR,—I was informed officially last night that Admiral Cervera is now a captive on U. S. S. *Gloucester* and is unharmed. He was then in the harbor of Siboney. I regret also to have to announce to you the death of General Rey, at Caney, who with two of his sons was killed in the battle of July 1st. His body will be buried this morning with military honors. His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Rey, is wounded and a prisoner in my hands, together with the following officers :

“ Captain Don Antonio Vara del Rey, aide to the general ; Captain Isidore Arias Martinez ; Antonio Mansas, post commander ; Captain Manuel Romero, volunteer force ; who, though severely wounded, will all probably survive. I also have to announce to you that the entire Spanish fleet, with the exception of one vessel, was destroyed, and that is so vigorously followed that it will be impossible to escape.

“ General Pando is opposed by forces sufficient to hold him in check. In view of the above, I suggest that, to save needless effusion of blood and the distress of many people, you may reconsider your determination of yesterday. Your men have certainly shown the gallantry which was expected of them.

“ I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“ WM. R. SHAFTER,

“ Major-General Commanding U. S. V.”

He also offered to return to the Spanish lines a number of seriously wounded officers and men, and, by direction of the Secretary of War, asked for the exchange of Hobson for any unwounded officer held by our troops as a prisoner of war. To these demands and suggestions, General Toral replied :

SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO

“ ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA,
4TH CORPS, GENERAL STAFF.

“ *To His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces.*

“ EXCELLENCY,—I have the honor to reply to the three communications of your excellency, dated to-day, and I am very grateful of the news that you give me in regard to the generals, chiefs, officers, and troops that are your prisoners, and of the good care that you give to the wounded in your possession. With respect to the wounded, I have no objection to receive them in this place, those that your excellency may willingly deliver me, but I am not authorized by the general-in-chief to make any exchange, because he has reserved to himself that authority. Yet I have given him notice of the proposition of your excellency. It is useless for me to tell you how grateful I am for the interest that your excellency has shown for the prisoners, and corpse of General Vara del Rey. Giving you many thanks for chivalrous treatment.

“ The same reason that I explained to you yesterday I have to give again to-day: that this place will not be surrendered.

“ I am yours with great respect and consideration,

“ JOSE TORAL.

“ IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 4, 1898.*”

The next day the Spanish general stated that authority had been granted him to exchange Lieutenant Hobson and his men, and this was effected on the 6th of July.

General Shafter's ill-health caused much anxiety in Washington. He was informed on the 4th of July:

“ Your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are disabled, General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up the work in hand.”

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He was also notified that he would not be expected to make an assault until he was ready.

“Being on the ground and knowing all the conditions, . . . you will use your own judgment as to how and when you will take the city of Santiago, but for manifest reasons it should be accomplished as speedily as possible.”

On the night of July 3d, in spite of the assurances of Garcia that “General Pando would scarcely dare to go into the town of Santiago,” and of General Shafter’s especial injunction to the Cuban general to prevent such an occurrence, reinforcements to the number of 3,654* entered the besieged city from the southwest, over what is known as the Cobre road. This was the force that had been described by Garcia’s scouts as “Pando, with 8,000 men.”

The Spaniards have just cause for referring with pride to the movements of General Escario’s army of relief. He left Manzanillo on the 23d of June, marched one hundred and fifty miles over trails so narrow that his column could only move in single file, and for a good part of the distance the men had to cut their way through the jungles with machetes. During the advance they were continually harassed by the Cubans.

The arrival of this large body of reinforcements made the problem of capturing Santiago more difficult. It also decreased the likelihood of an early surrender, of which General Shafter had been so hopeful since the destruction of the fleet. The general thus reported the situation to Washington:

* Lieutenant Müller says General Escario’s forces consisted of 3,752 men (p. 117), and that his losses, inflicted by the Cubans *en route*, were 98 killed and wounded.

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“CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, CUBA, *July 4.*

“When am I to expect troops from Tampa? Report just received, Pando entered city last night by Cobre road with 5000 from Holguin. Garcia was especially charged with blockading that road.”

And later the same day he cabled :

“There appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando succeeded in entering Santiago last night with his force, said to be about 5000 men. This puts a different aspect upon affairs, and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it would be at the cost of very considerable fighting and loss. General Lawton reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando, informed him at ten o'clock last night that Pando had passed in on Cobre road. Lawton says cannot compel General Garcia to obey my instructions, and doubts if they intend to place themselves in any position where they will have to fight, and that if we intend to reduce Santiago, we will have to depend alone upon our own troops, and that we will require twice the number we now have. . . . If we have got to try and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the expedition, there must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and people are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the troops can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other supplies. There will be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, and I suppose I can put them off a little longer to enable people to get out. Country here is destitute of food or growing crops, except mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good health, though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. I am sorry to say I am no better, and in addition to my weakness cannot be out on account of a slight attack of gout, but hope to be better soon. . . .”

Firing was not resumed at noon on the 5th of July, as intended, as many of the old men, women, and children fleeing to Caney still blocked the roads from Santiago. General Toral was sent the following notice:

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“ In response to the earnest request of the foreign consuls, and because of the large number of persons who wish to leave to-day (July 5), no firing will be made while the women, children, and foreign consuls are coming out of the city, and all such persons will be granted a safe conduct beyond and through our lines.”

General Shafter did not wish to hasten matters, having determined to take no aggressive action until his reinforcements, then on the way, should reach him. He cabled to the War Department:

“ I do not believe I will bombard the city until I get more troops, but will keep up fire on their trenches. If it were simply a going out of the women and children to outside places where they could be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going out to starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not possible now.”

He also stated in another despatch, of the same date, that he expected to see Admiral Sampson the following morning and arrange for the naval cooperation, but added that nothing could be done by the army until Hobson and his men were free, and not even then, if taking the place would require an assault. “ Starving them out is better,” he said.*

In the mean time Shafter was endeavoring to persuade Admiral Sampson to force his way into the harbor, and so relieve the army from its perilous position. As Sampson seemed reluctant to make the effort, it was proposed by the War Department that the army should attempt to run one of its light-draught transports into the harbor, clearing the way for the navy, in accordance with the following despatch:

* Hobson and his men were exchanged the following day.

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“ WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898.

“ Major-General W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba :

“ Your telegram concerning the navy entering Santiago Harbor is received and your action thoroughly approved. The Secretary of War suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a transport, cover the pilot house in most exposed points with baled hay,* attach an anchor to a tow line, and if possible grapple the torpedo cables, and call for volunteers from the army—not a large number—to run into the harbor, thus making way for the navy. Before acting, telegraph what you think of it. One thing is certain: the navy must get into the harbor and must save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy in his intrenchments without aid. This is strictly confidential to you.

“ (Signed) H. C. CORBIN,

“ Adjutant-General.”

The above project was abandoned when Sampson promised to make an effort at countermining and entering the harbor; a feat which, however, he did not accomplish during the entire period of the siege.

In compliance with General Shafter's request for a conference at field headquarters on the morning of the 6th, Admiral Sampson, because of his own illness, sent as representative his chief of staff, Captain Chadwick, of the *New York*.

Captain Chadwick suggested that if more detailed information be conveyed to General Toral regarding the completeness of the naval victory of the 3d, the Spanish general would become convinced of the futility of further resistance, and would surrender. He proposed that he draft a letter for General Shafter's signature, embodying the details of the destruction

* This method was used to protect the pilot houses of Admiral Porter's fleet when he ran past Vicksburg. (*Grant's Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 462.)

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of Cervera's fleet, in another demand for surrender. If this failed, Captain Chadwick promised, in Admiral Sampson's name, to attempt to force the harbor after twenty-four hours' bombardment by the navy. As Shafter's reinforcements had not yet arrived, and as he desired to take advantage of every opportunity for delay, pending their coming, the letter describing the naval victory was drafted by Captain Chadwick. As a play for time, General Shafter directed that there be included in this note an offer to give Toral until noon of the 9th for an answer, on the grounds that the Spanish general might desire to consult his government relative to the situation. This letter, the third demand for surrender, was as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,

“CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, July 6, 1898.

“*To the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.*

“SIR,—In view of the events of the 3d instant, I have the honor to lay before your excellency certain propositions to which I trust your excellency will give the consideration which, in my judgment, they deserve.

“I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday morning which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of 600 of his officers and men and the capture of the remainder. The admiral, General Paredes, and all others who escaped alive, are now prisoners on board the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, and the latter ship, in which are the admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving captains (all except the captain of the *Almirante Oquendo*, who was slain), has already sailed for the United States. If desired by you this may be confirmed by your excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson, and he can arrange to visit the *Harvard*, which will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish officers and men aboard that ship.

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"Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to state that unless a surrender be arranged by noon of the 9th instant, a bombardment of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of the guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards, the 13-inch of course much farther. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the centre of the city.

"I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men either of your excellency's forces or my own; the final result under circumstances so disadvantageous to your excellency being a foregone conclusion.

"As your excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a question to your excellency's home government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow a reply being received.

"I beg an early answer from your excellency.

"I have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servant,

"WM. R. SHAFTER,
"Major-General Commanding."

General Shafter had little faith in the efficacy of this demand, or in the effect of the twenty-four hours' bombardment promised by Captain Chadwick, and so expressed himself in a despatch to Washington at the time, saying, "I do not expect much from long-range firing, but do from course promised by navy for second day," that is, the attempt to force the harbor.

General Toral thus replied to General Shafter:

"ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, 4TH CORPS,

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 6, 1898.

"To the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United States.

"SIR,—I have the honor to answer your communication of this date, requesting that you permit the return to this garrison of the employees of the Cuban Submarine Co. in conformity with the accompanying letter to H. B. M. consul. On the announce-

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ment of the bombardment of the city they (the employees) abandoned it, and I have no one available who can communicate with my government, to submit the propositions made by your excellency in said letter.

"Otherwise it will be impossible for me to consult with my superiors, my military honor will require me to defend to the utmost extreme my position as far as forces and position can go.

". . . Awaiting your reply, I remain your excellency's most obedient servant,

"JOSE TORAL,
"Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Corps of the
Army of the Island of Cuba."

Permission for the return of the English cable operators was given. Hostilities in the meanwhile were suspended, and Shafter reported that he was making his "lines stronger and hanging on." He was instructed to communicate freely with Washington, setting forth any assistance that could be given him.

Late on the night of July 8th he reported:

"Have been visiting the lines all day. I regard them as impregnable against any force the enemy can send. The truce expires at twelve to-morrow, and I expect soon after the firing will begin. No assault will be made or advance from our present lines until the navy comes into the bay. I hope to be able by fire from the intrenchments to drive the enemy into the city."

The following morning Toral submitted a proposition, dated July 8th, to evacuate Santiago de Cuba and march to Holguin with his men.

"ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, 4TH CORPS,

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 8, 1898—10 P.M.

"To His Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United States, in Camp at the San Juan.

"SIR,—In answer to your letter of the 6th instant, I propose to you, to avoid further damage to the city, useless shedding of blood, and other horrors of war, the evacuation of the division of San-

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tiago de Cuba, to retreat to Holguin with my troops with all their baggage, arms, and munitions, without their being attacked during the march, and should this proposition be accepted, the necessary negotiations to effect it should be made under the usual manner and form.

“The loss of the Spanish squadron, as related in the American bulletin, if it is exact, in no way influences the defence of this city, we having been reinforced on the 3d by a column which you doubted could arrive.

“Therefore, I have at my disposal sufficient men to resist any attack, well provided with ammunition, water in abundance, notwithstanding the supply pipes were cut, and rations for a reasonably long time. Now, more than ever, besides my own supplies, I count on those provided for the inhabitants who have emigrated.

“As the troops are placed, with a convenient reserve of rations and plenty of munitions of war, and the city almost entirely deserted, the bombardment will only be felt by the house-owners—foreigners many of them—and many other natives whom the American army came to protect.

“The Spanish soldier is fully acclimated as your troops are not, and the losses attendant on the different attacks on Santiago will be greatly added to by the rigors of a bad climate and the sickness of the present season.

“I consider that my proposition to evacuate extensive territory will save most lamentable loss of life on both sides and of the honor of the Spanish arms saved.

“In view of the above expressions the suspension of hostilities will cease at noon to-morrow unless ruptured meanwhile, and you do not determine anything, or pending any consultation you may wish to make with your superior government referring to those proposals.

“I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

“JOSE TORAL,

“Commander-in-Chief, 4th Army Corps of the
Army of the Island of Cuba.”

General Shafter answered that he would refer the proposal to Washington, but hardly thought that it

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would be accepted; in the intervening time the truce was to continue.

In referring this offer to Washington, General Shaft-er stated that it would give another day to bring up troops from Siboney, as the first transports, with re-inforcements, had just arrived there. General Shafter was at once informed:

“ You will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy’s escape.”

A few hours afterwards, on the same day (July 9th), a second despatch was received from Shafter:

“ *Secretary of War, Washington.*

“ I forwarded General Toral’s proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the harbor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment and who are now suffering where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of which belongs to Cuban and foreign residents; fourth, it at once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow-fever at Siboney, in Michigan regiment, and if it gets started no one knows where it will stop. We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by sentinel, who deserted last night, that 200 men want to come but were afraid our men would fire upon them.

W. R. SHAFTER,

“ General.”

General Shafter was thereupon informed, in no equivocal language, that such a proposition would not be considered:

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“ You have repeatedly been advised that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was impregnable, and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender unconditionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by cutting off their supplies. Under these circumstances, your message recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secretary of War orders, when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago, that you do it. If you have not force enough, it will be despatched to you at the earliest moment practicable. Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been advised. In the mean time nothing is lost by holding the position you now have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.”

General Shafter answered :

“ The instructions of the War Department will be carried out to the letter.”

General Toral was notified that his proposition to evacuate Santiago with his forces was not favorably considered, and the demand for unconditional surrender repeated. The Spanish general was assured that the utmost courtesy and consideration would be extended to all persons of whatsoever grade under his command, as well as to the inhabitants of the city of Santiago. It was suggested that the gallant defence made by the Spanish troops at Caney and in front of Santiago “ would cover every point involved.” If a favorable reply was not received to this call for surrender, the fourth that had been made, it was to be

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understood that all obligations as to active operations would cease at 4 P.M. that day, July 10th. Toral declined to accept the proposition of unconditional surrender, and firing from both sides began that afternoon a little after four. General Shafter informed his division commanders that the effort should be to drive the enemy out of his works and into the town by means of artillery and rifle-fire, and that to do this the volume of fire was of small importance, but accuracy of the greatest. The men were cautioned to fire deliberately and to keep well covered. The several commands were informed that no advance upon the city was expected until after the bombardment. Shafter acquainted the War Department with his plans; adding that he did not intend to assault, and that no lives would be sacrificed.

The enemy opened with light guns, which were soon silenced by our artillery. The firing was not heavy, and neither side advanced from its trenches. The losses of both armies were small. In accordance with the promise of Admiral Sampson, made by Captain Chadwick on the 6th, the navy, as General Shafter expressed it, "fired a few shots from the sea near Aguadores. Effect was not perceptible." Our artillery had been augmented by the arrival at the front of the field-mortars, four of which fired a total of thirty-six rounds. All effort to bring forward the heavy five-inch siege-guns, which had been taken on the expedition at the request of General Miles, proved to be futile. The roads were utterly impassable for such artillery.*

* After much labor the heavy siege-guns were placed on shore at Daiquiri, then returned to the ships, sent to Puerto Rico, and finally

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The action continued, in a desultory manner, during the afternoon of the 10th and until mid-day of the 11th, when the last shot of the Santiago campaign was fired. We had sustained, in the few hours of fighting on both days, a loss of one officer and one man killed, one officer and one man wounded. The Spanish casualties are reported to have been seven men killed, and four officers and sixty-one men wounded.

On the 9th, 10th, and 11th of July a large number of reinforcements reached Cuba, including two batteries of artillery, the 4th and 5th. Part of these additional troops were never disembarked in Cuba, nor were the field batteries, but were sent to Puerto Rico. Two volunteer regiments, the 1st District of Columbia and the 1st Illinois, were landed, and reached the trenches on the 11th of July. With these General Shafter was enabled that night to complete his circumvallation of the town and close up the gap of three miles which had caused him no little anxiety, leaving, as it did, a possible means of escape to the Spanish forces. Our lines now extended all the way down to the bay on the west of Santiago.

When it became evident in Washington that a large number of prisoners would fall into our hands, the question arose as to the best method of disposing of them. Galveston, Texas, was suggested as a convenient and suitable locality for landing, guarding, and camping them. The place seemed to answer every requirement, and its selection met with the President's approval.

Subsequently the Secretary of War conceived the
brought back to the United States without a shot having been fired from them.

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idea of transporting the prisoners to their own country as the happiest solution of the problem. In addition to avoiding the danger of introducing yellow-fever into the United States, this plan, it was thought, would have a good effect upon the people of Spain; the world generally would regard it as a gracious act on the part of a victorious nation, and it would tend to demoralize those Spanish soldiers remaining in Cuba, some of whom had been campaigning there three years, and were anxious to return to their homes. Moreover, it would cost but little more to send them to Spain than to Galveston.

The proposition having received the approval of the President, this cable was sent to General Shafter on the 10th of July:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 10, 1898.*

“*General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba.*

“Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally, and wish to return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense of the United States government.

R. A. ALGER,

“Secretary of War.”

On the afternoon of July 11th, with these instructions as a basis, General Shafter sent to Toral his fifth demand for surrender:

“*To his Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.*

“SIR,—With the largely increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency’s army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so desire the government of the United States will transport the

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entire command of your excellency to Spain. I have the honor to be, etc., etc.,

WM. R. SHAFTER,

“Major-General Commanding.”

General Toral's answer, though dated the 11th, was not received until the morning of the 12th:

“To his Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United States, in the Camp of the San Juan.”

“ESTEEMED SIR,—I have the honor to advise your eminence that your communication of this date is received, and in reply desire to confirm that which I said in my former communication; also to advise you that I have communicated your proposition to the general-in-chief. Reiterating my sentiments, etc., etc.,

“JOSE TORAL,

“Commander-in-Chief, etc.”

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this message came another from the Spanish general:

“ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, 4TH CORPS,

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 12, 1898.

“To his Excellency the General of the American Forces.”

“ESTEEMED SIR,—I have the honor to insist upon my proposition to evacuate the Plaza and the territory of the division of Cuba, under conditions honorable for the Spanish arms, trusting that your chivalry and sentiments as a soldier will make you appreciate exactly the situation, and therefore must a solution be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact. Otherwise you will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to make a defence as far as my strength will permit. . . .

“Very respectfully, etc.,

JOSE TORAL,

“Commander-in-Chief, etc.”

On the day before the receipt of this note (July 11th), Garcia had informed General Shafter that he had received from General Feria, commanding the Cuban forces in the vicinity of Holguin, trustworthy informa-

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tion to the effect that a Spanish force of 6,000 men was preparing to leave Holguin for Santiago. It was reported that to this column would be added another from Manzanillo, whence General Escario had come, the two detachments to form a junction at Jiguani. Although our troops completely surrounded Santiago, the line was very thin, and the ten days' confinement in the trenches was beginning to have a marked effect upon the men. Moreover, there was much suffering among the 20,000 refugees who had gone out to Caney, and, in spite of the fact that everything possible was being done to relieve the destitute, the limited transportation and the almost impassable condition of the roads admitted of only partial success. They were suffering for food. Shafter therefore asked (July 13):

“ Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been perfectly satisfied that he [the enemy] can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease threatening may be at great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep them from starvation, and if the rains continue I do not know how long I can do that.”

General Miles, who had reached Cuba on the *Yale*, July 11th, arrived at General Shafter's headquarters on the afternoon of the next day. Although he was fresh from the United States, and had not been subjected to the trying experience of three weeks' campaigning in the tropics, he seconded the only recommendations made by General Shafter which met with the disapproval of the government.

The despatch of General Miles thus read:

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"CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, *July 12th.*

"*Secretary of War, Washington.*

"The Spanish general to-day asked that some conclusion be reached that shall save his honor. Offers to surrender Santiago province, force, batteries, munitions of war, etc., all except the men and small-arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were not allowed to take any food. The fortitude and heroism of the army has been unsurpassed, and, under the circumstances, I concur with General Shafter and the major-generals, and would request that discretion be granted as to terms, in view of the importance of other immediate operations in which both this part of the army and navy will participate. The very serious part of this situation is that there are 100 cases of yellow-fever in this command, and the opinion of the surgeon is that it will spread rapidly.

MILES,

"Major-General Commanding."

In reply to these despatches General Shafter was sent the following:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 13, 1898—2.14 A.M.*

"*Major-General Shafter, before Santiago, Cuba, Playa del Este.*

"Telegram just received. No modification of former order permitting the Spanish army evacuating Santiago under such conditions as proposed by Toral will be made. The Secretary of the Navy will be consulted at once concerning the ordering of Sampson in to assist you.

R. A. ALGER,

"Secretary of War."

According to the Spanish law, the commanding general could not surrender without authority from his government. To this end General Linares thus

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cabled the Minister of War at Madrid on the 12th of July:

“ To the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of War.

“ Though confined to my bed with great weakness and sharp pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these long-suffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of affairs.

“ Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by nature of ground; ours spread out over fourteen kilometers; troops attenuated; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches incessantly for twenty-four hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food; cannot change or wash clothes. Many casualties, chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in critical moments. Under these circumstances, impossible to open passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency. In order to go out under protection of Holguin division, it would be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a number of rations which they are unable to transport. The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy.

“ Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city enclosed by walls, on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her

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own sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence while awaiting aid which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials, with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remains, and they intend to leave to-day, headed by their prelate.

“ These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of enthusiasm and energy ; they have been fighting for three years with the climate, privations and fatigue ; and now that the most critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. The ideal is lacking ; they are defending the property of people who have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes, the allies of the American forces.

“ There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the government and the whole nation ; for these long-suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

“ If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the *dénouement* anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of national interests.

LINARES.”

The tenor of this letter indicates a devotion and patriotic spirit highly commendable. The conduct of General Linares, as well as his successor, General Toral, was all that any country could reasonably have expected of them. The troops under their command fought bravely and stubbornly, as General Shafter testified in his despatches to Washington, when he spoke of the “ tremendous fighting capabilities shown by the enemy.” It is a pleasure to pay

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a tribute to the courage and honor of both these commanding officers of the enemy.

Several hours after the receipt of Toral's communication insisting upon the evacuation of his troops to Holguin, he again wrote General Shafter, and asked that hostilities be suspended until he received an answer from his government, to which he had communicated the proposition of our army to transport his forces to Spain, free, in event of surrender. An armistice was therefore declared until July 13th, at noon. Later in the day Shafter requested a personal interview with the Spanish commander for nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th, and added that he would be "accompanied by the general-in-chief of the American army." To this General Toral gave his consent.

General Shafter, accompanied by General Miles,*

* On the 6th or 7th of July, when General Miles decided to go to Cuba, he voluntarily stated to the President and myself at the White House, that he was not going to supersede General Shafter who had fought his troops so well, and that he would not assume command if General Shafter was physically able to perform his duties. The attitude of General Miles, as expressed in this conference, was considerate and explicit. In accordance with this conversation, and with a full understanding as to his proposed action in the matter, and for the purpose of assuring General Shafter that the administration was not dissatisfied with his conduct up to that time, the following cablegram was sent him:

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON,

"July 8, 1898.

"Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba.

"Secretary of War directs me inform you that General Miles left here at 10:40 last night for Santiago with instructions not to in any manner supersede you as commander of the forces in the field near Santiago so long as you are able for duty. H. C. CORBIN,

"Adjutant-General."

This is the so-called "secret" despatch to which General Miles has

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General Wheeler, and Lieutenant Miley, met General Toral on the morning of the 13th of July, between the lines, in a small valley a short distance to the south of the Santiago road. Their conference took place under a large ceiba, which has since received the name of "Surrender Tree," from the fact that beneath it were signed the articles of capitulation. Mr. R. G. Mendoza, volunteer aide to General Lawton, and subsequently made a captain and assistant-adjutant-general of volunteers for his services in the Cuban campaign, acted as interpreter. He took a verbatim statement of the conference, from which I quote the following extracts:

"Shortly after 9 A.M. the Spanish flag of truce appeared on the road, with a small escort. The officers coming to the meeting were the Spanish General Jose Toral, commanding, and his chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Ventura Fontan. The Spanish officers brought along with them, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, connected with the firm of Brooks Brothers, in Santiago, Cuba.

"After the usual courtesies, Generals Shafter and Toral sat upon the roots of the ceiba tree facing each other. General Miles remained back of General Shafter.

"General Toral spoke first. In mild and moderate tones, very polite in form, he said that he considered it an honor to meet so prominent officers of the American army, the bravery of which had impressed him most highly in the battles fought during the previous week, though he only regretted that the meeting should take place under circumstances so trying to him. He then proceeded to say that he had received from the commander-in-chief of the American army in the island of Cuba, Major-General

so frequently referred adversely in his numerous newspaper interviews.

The statement, often made in this connection, that there was a "conspiracy" against him, is too absurd to need contradiction.

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William R. Shafter, an intimation of surrender, and had accepted General Shafter's invitation to meet and discuss the matter; that, had it not been for this invitation, he would never have come to speak about the matter; that he only did so now, having been duly authorized by his superior officer, Captain-General Ramon Blanco, at Havana, to open negotiations; that he wished to state that he was only a subordinate officer; that he had no executive power for the surrender of troops or territory under his command, and that, accordingly, nothing that he said in this meeting was to be considered final, because in all matters of importance he had to consult with General Blanco and the government at Madrid. 'I cannot decide by myself; I can only suggest, consult with my chiefs, and obey their orders; therefore I cannot surrender, capitulate, or evacuate the territory without my intended action receiving first the approval of my government.

" 'I have already informed it of the events, and I am authorized to open negotiations only for the evacuation of the city and the capitulation of the forces under my command. My division covers the district known as the Eastern District of Santiago de Cuba, situated to the east of the line, which, starting from Sagua de Tanamo on the northern coast of Cuba, in a southwesterly direction, would pass through Cauto, Palma Soriano and along the river Cauto down to Aserradero on the southern coast. Of course this is to be taken only approximatively, for there is no such line.

" 'I happen to be temporarily in command of the division of the Western District of Santiago de Cuba, of which General Linares is the commander-in-chief; but whatever I might say will only cover my own division, because over Linares's forces and territory I have absolutely no control or jurisdiction beyond maintaining it as an organization. It must be understood that whatever might be the result of these negotiations, I do not look upon them as a surrender. There is going to be a capitulation, and even then my action is not final. If my government approves it, I am ready to evacuate the city, taking all my forces to Holguin. I would march out, taking with me whatever my men could carry—the arms, ammunition, and guns, which usually form an army corps. I would leave behind the heavy guns and other war material which neither follows an army in the field, nor constitutes an entity or a military organization, acting independently.

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“ ‘This is all I can undertake to do. If you should oppose this plan, then I would have to defend myself, but I would not surrender.

“ ‘I am thousands of miles away from my government. Communications with Havana are slow, difficult, and at times absolutely interrupted. We have to use the cable to Jamaica and Bermuda, and, when hard pressed with work, the cable officers at these places disconnect their wire with Cuba. Under the circumstances, I can do nothing else but obey the regulations of the Spanish army. These compel me to defend myself whenever I have men, arms, ammunition, provisions of war and a duty to fulfil. I cannot surrender; but I am perfectly willing to inform my government of your intimation of surrender and await their answer. This I hardly could expect before two or three days. All I want is this brief delay.’ (General Toral said the above in answer to questions put to him by General Shafter, who led the negotiations. I have left out the said questions, and put it in this form because discussion at times dragged a little over the same point, and it is easier for me to remember in whole the substance of General Toral’s point of view. The majority of the sentences or phrases quoted I fully remember to be Toral’s own expressions, translated, in many cases, even to the words, because he insisted often on these points.)

“ General Shafter said to General Toral: ‘Now, general, that is all very well, but you have had already time enough to consult with your government, and the granting of the delay you ask for is absolutely impossible. I have given you until to-morrow at five o’clock in the morning. If by that time you have not received an answer, or decided, as to what you are going to do, well—I will open fire upon your works with every gun I have.’

“ General Toral shrugged his shoulders, and said: ‘Very well, I cannot help it: I will do my duty. If you force me to defend myself, I will do it. But this I beg to say, that I will defend myself to the bitter end, and the city, when fallen, would be found in ruins. I will turn my own guns upon it. I will set it afire, and I will block the entrance to the harbor in such a way as to make it entirely useless to you. Your ships would never get in, and the Cuban families, which you say you come to pro-

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fect, would be left without a home, for I would destroy everything. You would gain practically nothing, and we both would suffer a terrible loss, for my men can fight.'

" ' I am satisfied that they can,' said General Shafter, smiling. ' Two thousand losses I had during the last two weeks bear evidence to your statement. Your men fought bravely.'

" General Toral then thanked General Shafter for the compliment, and went on, saying: ' This would be the result. On the other hand, if you allow me to evacuate the city and the district of Santiago de Cuba, as I suggest, and my government approves it, well. . . . Think of the great advantages you would gain. Withdrawing my forces I would leave in possession of the United States forces, which you command, an extensive territory, very rich in mines, once thickly populated, and which has some of the best ports in Cuba. I would leave to you a harbor for your ships in good condition. I would leave the city and its buildings, wherein your army could better escape the ravages of this climate, which has cost me so many losses during the past three years. Camp life in Cuba is awfully hard. Besides, it would end the fight. The occupation of the Island of Cuba by the United States forces would thus begin, and think of the glory that would come to you for having successfully commenced to solve the Cuban problem. All these advantages, all these benefits you could gain by simply granting me the brief delay which I ask from you and which I expect will allow me the time necessary to receive an answer from my government. It can do you no harm; it will not weaken your position; it will not strengthen mine. I appeal to your soldierly feelings. You see, I am in a very bad plight, and my strong desire, my only wish, is to save the honor of the Spanish army, and not to submit the forces under my command, and myself, to the insult and humiliation of a surrender, or to the disaster of a stubborn defence, for they deserve better treatment. This is all I ask; this is all I can do.'

" General Shafter again spoke and refused to grant the delay asked for. Then General Miles said to General Toral that with General Shafter's permission he would like to say a few words to confirm what the commanding general had just said. General Shafter said, ' Certainly, certainly,' and General Miles spoke thus:

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“ ‘General Toral, General Shafter and myself appreciate the way you feel about your men, and we highly respect your ideas about your duty as a soldier, but at the same time I feel inclined to believe that the situation has changed to such an extent that your duty to defend the city at any cost does no longer exist. Before the battles at Guasimas [Sevilla], Caney, and San Juan were fought, you had a fleet in the harbor to protect, and a city and its inhabitants to defend. You were expecting reinforcements, and your way for a retreat was open, but now the circumstances are entirely different. Your fleet has been destroyed; the majority of the inhabitants have left the city. You are surrounded by overwhelming forces. Your retreat is cut. You expect and perhaps could get no reinforcements. Yours is a very difficult position. I only left Washington a few days ago, and I saw the President on the 7th. He told me that I could have all the men I wanted—5,000 or 50,000. You are 3,000 miles away from your government, and you lack proper communications. There are occasions in which it is more than a duty—a necessity—for a commanding general to act for himself, independent of his government. And if you have no authority, you ought to have it,’ said General Miles, smiling.

“ ‘That is a fact, indeed,’ said Toral, ‘I ought to have such authority, but I have not, and under the circumstances I can do nothing else than obey the army regulations and do my duty.

“ ‘You have just said that I expect no reinforcement. I admit it for the sake of the argument. Then, what harm could come to you from granting the delay I ask for? My only wish is to avoid the loss of blood and to save the honor of the Spanish army.’

“General Shafter then stated again that he had had time to consult with his government during the past days; that the truce would expire at five o’clock A.M. on the 14th day of July, 1898. General Toral insisted upon the ground that he could not get, within so short a time, an answer from his government in regard to the cable informing Madrid of the intimation of surrender received from the commanding general of the United States forces. Generals Miles and Shafter stood up, walked around the tree, and had a short conversation. General Miles, on returning to his seat, looked worried. It appears that both had been discussing the point of extending or not the time of the flag of truce. After

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short parleying, General Shafter said he would allow General Toral until noon of the 14th, and that General Toral would endeavor to reach a decision or to have an answer from his government."*

This morning conference of July 13th lasted an hour and a half, and concluded with an agreement to meet the following day at noon. On the morning of the 14th, General Shafter received a note from Toral, saying that he was authorized to "agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation."

The letter was thus worded:

"SANTIAGO, CUBA, 14.

"General-in-Chief of the American Forces.

"HONORED SIR,—His excellency, the general-in-chief of the army of the island of Cuba, telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P.M. the following: 'Believing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the government of his Majesty, I give notice that I have sent the condition of your telegram asking immediate answer and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government which cannot be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of returning to Spain.' I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case you may find the foregoing satisfactory that he may designate persons representative of himself who, with those in my name, may agree to the clauses of capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain accepted already in the beginning by the gen-

*General Miles wanted to break off the truce at sundown that day (July 13th). General Shafter wisely decided not to do this. On the other hand, he extended the truce from 5 A.M., July 14th, to noon of that day. His good judgment on this occasion undoubtedly saved much bloodshed.

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eral-in-chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully, your servant,

JOSE TORAL,

“Commanding Chief of the 4th Army.”

Another communication accompanied this letter. It appointed, as the Spanish commissioners, Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario; lieutenant-colonel of staff, Don Ventura Fontan; and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, a British subject.

General Shafter, with the same officers as on the previous day, met General Toral, as agreed, at noon on the 14th. The meeting lasted but a few minutes, and, from the conversation that then took place, all present understood that the surrender had been accomplished, and only required the drawing up and signing of the articles of capitulation to make it an accomplished fact. General Shafter at once reported to Washington that Toral had agreed to surrender on the basis of being returned to Spain; that the territory embraced all of eastern Cuba from Aserraderos, on the south to Sagua on the north, *via* Palma; and that commissioners would be appointed that afternoon to definitely arrange terms. And General Miles forwarded this despatch:

“PLAYA, July 14, 1898—3.24 P.M.

“*Secretary of War, Washington.*

“Before Santiago, July 14th.—General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army and division of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain. General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions of arrangements for carrying out the terms of surrender. This is very gratifying, as General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for

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their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles which they encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow-fever, and efforts will be made to separate those who are infected and those free from it and to keep those which are still on board ship separated from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately made for carrying out further instructions of the President and yourself.

“NELSON A. MILES,
“Major-General of the Army.”

The commissioners appointed on the part of the United States were Generals Wheeler and Lawton, and Lieutenant Miley. They met under the giant cotton-tree, already referred to, at 2.30 on the afternoon of July 14th. The Spanish commissioners asked that the water connections to Santiago, destroyed by the American forces, be repaired at once; that, in whatever articles of surrender might be signed, provision be made for the return to Spain of the archives in Santiago province; and that those volunteers who might wish to do so be permitted to remain in Cuba upon giving their parole. Then they inquired if it was proposed to include in the cartel a stipulation demanding the surrender of their arms. Upon being informed that this would be required, they requested an adjournment to refer the matter to General Toral.

The commissioners again met at six o'clock. The representatives of General Shafter suggested the immediate withdrawal of the Spaniards from their trenches, and that the *City of Texas* be permitted to enter the harbor at once with supplies from the Red Cross for the suffering people of Santiago. It soon developed at this second conference that the Spanish commissioners were really without any powers whatsoever, and

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could only discuss terms of a "preliminary agreement for the capitulation of the Spanish forces." When this fact became known, the American commissioners expressed some surprise, in view of Toral's letter of that morning, in which he stated that he had been authorized to "agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation." The Spanish commissioners again raised the point about surrendering their arms, and when informed that the way to surrender was to surrender, stated that they could proceed no further without consulting Generals Toral and Linares, and again requested an adjournment until the next day. General Lawton suggested that the matter be concluded at once, even if the entire night had to be devoted to that purpose, and, after some parleying, they adjourned for the second time that day until 9.30 in the evening, when it was expected that General Toral would be present with his commissioners.

The commissioners met as agreed, accompanied by General Toral. The latter stated emphatically that he could not, contrary to the understanding of General Shafter, arrange "terms" for the surrender, but only a "basis." He also asked that the word "capitulation" be substituted for "surrender" in the tentative articles which had been drawn up; he objected to the entrance into the harbor at this time of the Red Cross ship, or to withdraw from his trenches until he had authority from Madrid to capitulate, on the ground that it would weaken his defences. The American commissioners, on their part, declined to have repaired the water connections to Santiago, for the reason that if General Toral doubted the successful termination of the negotiations, though he assured them he did

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not, an element in the strength of our position would have been weakened. Again the point of the surrender of the arms was raised, and in an impassioned appeal to the American commissioners, addressed particularly to General Wheeler, on "account of his age," as General Toral put it, he asked that his soldiers be permitted to take their arms with them, to save their honor as Spaniards. General Shafter's representatives promised to recommend to the government of the United States, if the time came for finally signing the articles, that the Spanish soldiery be permitted to return with their rifles. As an indication of sympathy for this sentiment, our commissioners agreed to recommend that the Spanish troops be permitted to march out of Santiago "with the honors of war."

General Wheeler has expressed the opinion that Toral did not care so much about the *fact* of the return of the arms as he did that a record of some recommendation to that effect be made, as he was punctiliously insistent upon some reference to the "Spanish honor" and gallantry. Even under the conditions then confronting him, the Spanish general feared the consequences, unless his terms of surrender were sanctioned in advance by the government at Madrid. Toral plainly indicated this on more than one occasion in the course of his conversation with our commissioners.

After the receipt of General Shafter's report of July 14th, announcing that the Spaniards had agreed to surrender, the delay in consummating the negotiations was not understood in Washington. General Shafter was telegraphed that information was desired if the surrender was an accomplished fact. After waiting until the evening of the 15th, without news

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from the front, it was suggested to the general that, as the way of the Spanish diplomat is peculiar and procrastinating, possibly Toral was playing for time in order that reinforcements, then reported to be on the way from Holguin and Manzanillo, might reach him, and finally this cable was sent to General Shafter:

“ WASHINGTON, *July 15, 1898—12 MIDNIGHT.*

“ *Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago.*

“ It is not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the Spanish to carry away their arms. Such a suggestion should be rejected instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the President, and they must be concluded on those lines.

R. A. ALGER,

“ Secretary of War.”

To this he replied:

“ I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely, immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way binds the government, but is one that I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba or leaving them there to be captured later, and probably with much loss to ourselves.”

Later that night (July 15th) he cabled:

“ Surrender was made by Toral yesterday afternoon absolutely on conditions of returning troops to Spain. Delay was caused by commissioners on his part insisting on approval of Madrid. I think they fear death when they get home. We may have to fight them yet.”

In the mean time, after making such minor changes in the “ preliminary basis for capitulation ” as Toral

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asked, the Spanish commissioners signed the draft of that basis, and submitted it, as a proposition to the American representatives, a few minutes after twelve on the night of July 14th-15th.

The commissioners again met the next morning. After a little parleying, our representatives added their signatures, and, at the same time, to satisfy the Spanish sense of honor, which seemed to be the only obstacle in the way, they also signed the following statement:

“ Recognizing the chivalry, courage, and gallantry of Generals Linares and Toral, and of the soldiers of Spain who were engaged in the battles recently fought in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as displayed in said battles, we, the undersigned officers of the United States of America, who had the honor to be engaged in said battles, and now are a duly authorized commission, treating with a like commission of officers of the Spanish army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in earnestly soliciting the proper authority to accord these brave and chivalrous soldiers the privilege of returning to their country bearing the arms they have so bravely defended.”

Finally, on the evening of July 15th, General Toral reported that he had been authorized to surrender:

“ SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 15, 1898.

“ *To Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces.*

“ EXCELLENT SIR,—I am now authorized by my government to capitulate; I have the honor to so advise you, requesting you to designate hour and place where my representatives should appear to compare with those of your excellency to effect the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date. In due time I wish to manifest to your excellency my desire to know the resolutions of the United States government respecting the return of arms, so as to note on the capitulation; also the great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment

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of your great grace's representative, and return for their generous and noble impulse for the Spanish soldiers will allow them to return to the Peninsula with the arms that the American army do them the honor to acknowledge as dutifully defended.

“ JOSE TORAL,

“ Commander-in-Chief, 4th Army Corps.”

The letter was received on the morning of the 16th, and at noon on that day the surrender became an accomplished fact. The conditions of the capitulation are thus set forth:

“ Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows: All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said troops being in command of General Jose Toral, agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners: Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces, on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2d Artillery, aide-de-camp, appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States.

“ 1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this district absolutely and unequivocally cease.

“ 2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said territory.

“ 3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

“ 4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

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" 5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

" 6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above-described district to the commander of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said district.

" 7. That the commander of the Spanish forces in leaving said district is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district.

" 8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizadoes, and guerillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

" 9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon to await their disposition by the United States Government, it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

" 10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed.

" Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commissioners acting under instructions from their respective generals, and with the approbation of their respective governments.

" JOSEPH WHEELER,

" Major-General U. S. V.

" H. W. LAWTON,

" Major-General U. S. V.

" J. D. MILEY,

" First Lieutenant, 2d Artillery,
Aide-de-camp to General Shafter.

" FEDERICO ESCARIO.

" VENTURA FONTAN.

" ROBERT MASON."

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At the request of General Toral, the following letter was signed by General Shafter, embracing certain details of the surrender not included in the formal articles of capitulation :

“ HEADQUARTERS, 5TH ARMY CORPS,

“ CAMP BEFORE SANTIAGO, *July 17, 1898.*

“ *To his Excellency General Jose Toral, Santiago de Cuba.*

“ SIR,—In order to carry out the terms of the capitulation which were signed yesterday, I have the honor to communicate to your excellency the following details, which will be carefully observed :

“ 1. The wounded, sick, and helpless, with their attendants, will remain under the care and protection of the Red Cross Society, under the Medical Corps of the United States army, aided as far as possible by the Spanish attendants. The wounded and sick will receive all the care that their misfortune and ailments entitle them to, and will be sent back to Spain in the same form and manner as the division of the army.

“ 2. The materials of war, to which reference is made in the second article of the capitulation, includes the men and materials of the navy.

“ 3. The commander-in-chief of the American army will afford all facilities for assembling by the Spanish officers all such parts of the division as occupy the towns and parts included in the capitulation, with all the necessary guarantees so that the third article can be safely and promptly carried out. The embarkation of the families of the Spanish chiefs and officers, and also their baggage and private property, will be made in the same steamers in which they embark.

“ 4. The shipment of archives and records referred to in the seventh article of the capitulation will, if possible, be made in the same steamers as the troops to which said records belong ; and if for any reason this is not possible, commissioners of the Spanish army are to remain behind, to duly forward them at the earliest possible date.

“ In confirming, in writing, the above details verbally agreed to between us yesterday, I beg to assure your excellency of the

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high appreciation I entertain of your excellency's soldierly qualities and honor. I am, very respectfully, etc.,

“ WM. R. SHAFTER,
“ Major-General Commanding.”

It now remained to take possession of the city, and to hasten increased supplies to the refugees at Caney, as well as to our own army in the trenches, who had endured, with Spartan fortitude, the trying days of the siege. General Toral was then requested to assist in opening the harbor; the refugees at Caney were permitted to return to Santiago; and arrangements were completed for the formal surrender of the Spanish army.

On the morning of the 17th, General Shafter, with his several division commanders and their full staffs, together with 100 men of the 2d Cavalry, all mounted, advanced between the lines and received the formal surrender, on the part of the Spanish army, of 100 armed men. To General Toral, General Shafter courteously gave the sword of General Vara del Rey, killed at Caney July 1st. The Spaniards, as prisoners, then marched out, depositing their arms, and at noon our entire army lined up along the trenches, and greeted with cheers the raising of the Stars and Stripes on the Governor's Palace. When the old flag finally floated there, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired, and our bands played the “Star Spangled Banner.” The campaign in Cuba was at an end.

CHAPTER XV

ADMIRAL SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO

UNFORTUNATELY the relations between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson during the Santiago campaign were not at all times of the most cordial nature. I approach with some reluctance a discussion of the causes which brought about this condition. What I have to say of Admiral Sampson, however, should not be understood as applying to the navy as a whole. The record of our navy during the war with Spain is of such a character that every American citizen can refer to it with unqualified pride and satisfaction. Its victories were complete, and, considering the insignificant loss of life and treasure and the far-reaching results, they may be called incomparable. The history of naval warfare does not furnish an analogue. What nation can point to the complete destruction of two entire fleets of the enemy, aggregating twenty-one ships of all kinds, with a loss on its part of but an even score of men, only one of whom was killed, and without the loss or disablement of a ship?

Admiral Cervera's fleet entered the harbor of Santiago on the 19th of May. On that very day, by means of confidential agents in Havana, the Western Union Telegraph Company, through the chief signal officer of the army, apprised the War Department of the fact.

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The information was also communicated, through the same agency, to the Secretary of the Navy, and by him to Admiral Sampson at Key West. On the morning of the 19th, before this knowledge reached Key West, Commodore Schley, in command of the flying squadron, sailed with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Marblehead*, accompanied by the *Vixen*, *Eagle*, and the collier *Merrimac*. His destination was Cienfuegos, where it was believed Cervera would be. His squadron arrived off that port during the forenoon of May 22d. As soon as Admiral Sampson learned that the fleet was at Santiago he directed the flying squadron to leave Cienfuegos, if Commodore Schley was satisfied that the enemy was not in that port. These orders reached Schley on the 23d of May, by the *Hawk*. His fleet remained off Cienfuegos until the evening of May 24th, when he proceeded in the direction of Santiago. Although he had been advised of the necessity of haste, he permitted his entire squadron to be delayed on account of the *Eagle*, a vessel of no importance, so far as the Spanish fleet was concerned. The *Eagle* was in a disabled condition, and could only make between four and five knots.

It is but a day's sail from Cienfuegos to Santiago. Schley's squadron did not reach the vicinity of Santiago until 5 o'clock on the evening of the 26th, and then he took up a position at no time nearer than eighteen miles south of that place. Here he remained three hours without making any effort to determine whether the Spanish fleet was in the harbor or not. He then signalled to his squadron, "Destination Key West, *via* south side Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon

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as collier is ready. Speed, nine knots," and started back at 9.20, this time again delayed on account of the *Merrimac*, which had met with an accident to her engines. After proceeding a short distance away from the enemy, the squadron lay to, with engines stopped. They were under way again by morning, leaving Santiago to the rear. As the high sea which had been running for the few days previous had somewhat subsided, the commodore endeavored to coal the *Texas* and the *Marblehead* from the colliers with him.

He sailed west until the afternoon of the 28th, when he reversed his course, and for the second time made for Santiago, off which place the squadron arrived on the evening of the same day. Four days had been consumed in this journey to Santiago, and that night (May 28th), he thus cabled to the Secretary of the Navy:

"The receipt of the telegram of May 26th is acknowledged. Delivered by *Harvard* off Santiago de Cuba. *Merrimac* engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Brooklyn* from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. The *Brooklyn* alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; cannot remain off Santiago present state of squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. *Harvard* reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. *Minneapolis* only coaled for Key West; also *Yale*, which tows *Merrimac*. Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. Obligated to send *Eagle*—admitted no delay—to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had twenty-five tons of coal. Will leave *St. Paul* off Santiago de Cuba. Will

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require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold."

However, the light of the next day (May 29th) brought with it the discovery of Cervera's presence in Santiago Harbor, and Schley reported to the Secretary of the Navy that he had recognized the *Colon*, *Teresa*, and two torpedo-boats.

On the 30th Admiral Sampson left Key West for Santiago, with the *New York*, *Oregon*, *Mayflower*, and *Porter*. Three days before, when reports were received from Commodore Schley that he could not remain off the harbor of Santiago on account of his inability to coal at sea, Admiral Sampson directed him to use the collier *Sterling* to block the exit from Santiago. It was proposed to do this so that there might be no chance for the enemy to succeed should a sortie be attempted. I have never yet been able to see any good reason for sinking the *Merrimac* in the entrance to the harbor on the morning of the 3d of June, after Sampson had arrived off Santiago, when his fleet so greatly outnumbered the Spanish squadron. He had with him the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *New Orleans*, and *Marblehead*, besides the auxiliary vessels, *Harvard*, *Vixen*, *Mayflower*, *Porter*, and the colliers *Merrimac* and *Sterling*. Was it to keep Cervera in, or Sampson out? Was it his purpose to bottle up Cervera and throw upon the army the entire burden of solving this naval problem? With the escape of the Spanish squadron, supposed impossible on account of the obstruction, and the navy shut out, so that it could not co-operate, or even effectively reach the Spanish fleet with its guns,

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was it his intention to have the army capture the city and garrison of Santiago, and also to capture the Spanish fleet?

Admiral Sampson's original proposition seems to have been to prevent a sortie pending the arrival of the army by blocking the channel; and that the army should then attempt the impracticable task of assaulting the precipitous heights of the Morro, with the Spanish army in its rear, and, after capturing the forts at the entrance of the harbor, protect the navy while removing the mines in the channel. But this plan would also have required that our forces should remove the *Merrimac*, if it had successfully obstructed the channel, as was supposed and intended.

There can be no doubt that this was his plan, for he thus states, in a letter to General Shafter, on the 2d of July: "It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes." This would imply that, if the entrance were clear of mines and obstructions, the admiral proposed to engage the enemy's fleet within the harbor. And yet he made no effort to enter the harbor after the Spanish fleet had gone out and had been destroyed, even though repeatedly urged to do so by General Shafter.

It is fortunate that the plan for blocking the channel by sinking the *Merrimac* did not succeed.* It

* Lieutenant Hobson, in his interesting account of the *Merrimac*, published in the *Century Magazine*, thus expresses himself regarding the fortunate outcome of that hazardous venture:

"I had heard Admiral Sampson and Captain Chadwick refer to the selection of a point for landing troops, and wondered if it were intended to try to take the city and attack the ships from the land. The more I thought on the subject the more futile such an attempt

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is the consensus of opinion of the military officers at Santiago that it would have cost us many thousand additional lives to take the city by assault, even after the capture of San Juan Heights. Had Cervera found egress impossible, he would doubtless have destroyed his ships and placed ashore his 2,000 marines and sailors, with their machine and rapid-fire guns, to aid the Spanish army. As a matter of fact, he requested permission of Captain-General Blanco to do this.

At the close of the 2d of July, General Shafter keenly felt that, since his command had suffered a loss of over 1,650 in killed and wounded, in an expedition which was purely naval in its object, that it was about time the fleet took some serious part in the campaign. He therefore requested a conference with Admiral

seemed. How could the city be occupied under the guns of the enemy's ships? How could land artillery of sufficient caliber to outclass the armor of the Spanish vessels ever be placed in position under fire of their guns? How could such artillery even be landed and transported under existing conditions? The conclusion grew stronger and stronger that land operations against the ships and the army of occupation would probably cost thousands of lives and still be futile. It then became clear to me that the ships should be captured or destroyed and the city taken by our vessels, the army's function being simply to cut off escape inland and to occupy the place after surrender. Steadily this conclusion engendered a profound conviction that if the enemy should not come out we should go in. I determined to make every possible endeavor to get back to the fleet with my knowledge of all the defences. Escape from the cell was impossible. My mind turned upon the *Merrimac*. How fortunate it seemed to me now that she did not go down athwart the channel! Our entrance for the rest of the war would have been impossible. She could not be better situated. The enemy would hesitate a long time before trying to pass, thus allowing time for our whole fleet to arrive. Their ships could not form in the enlargement of the channel or even across it, but would have to pass single file and would be at great risk if they tried to pass at night. Heaven had not frowned upon our efforts after all. The series of coincidents that had kept us from going down athwart were only the steady guidance of a kindly fate. I went to sleep with a thankful mind."

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Sampson, with a view to urging upon him the necessity of forcing the harbor.

As has been already stated, General Shafter requested the admiral to come to his headquarters for a conference, which the admiral consented to do. Horses were sent to Siboney to bring the admiral to the front. He left his squadron on the morning of the 3d of July, on his flag-ship the *New York*, with instructions to "disregard the movements of the commander-in-chief," and when he had reached Siboney, ten miles from the harbor entrance, the sortie of the Spanish fleet began. He immediately hastened in the direction of the engagement, then being so gallantly conducted by the captains of the *Oregon*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, and *Gloucester*, but "she [the *New York*] was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the *Gloucester*."*

On the 2d of July, prior to the destruction of the fleet, the following notes were exchanged by General Shafter and Admiral Sampson:

General Shafter to Admiral Sampson

" July 2d.

" Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly entrenched about three-fourths mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can."

* Admiral Sampson's official report (p. 507, Report of Secretary of Navy for 1898).

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*Admiral Sampson to General Shafter, by his Flag-Secretary
Staunton*

“ July 2d.

“ Admiral Sampson had this morning heavily bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? He began at 5.30 and finished at 7.30. Your message to him here; impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines, a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing was accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores.”

General Shafter to Admiral Sampson

“ July 2d.

“ It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those we have been pitted against it will be some time and at a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men.* By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, with time and sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay.”

Admiral Sampson to General Shafter

“ July 2d.

“ I have your note of this morning—just received at 11.20.

“ An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

* His losses up to that time were really something over 1,650 in killed and wounded.

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“ I was in hope that an attack, on your part, of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

“ If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

“ We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.

“ This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

“ It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.”

This letter was considered a distinct promise on the part of the admiral to undertake to force the harbor, which he never did, although he claims that he had taken steps to utilize the countermining outfit which was on the *Resolute* at Guantanamo, and, with this object in view, that orders were given as early as the 28th of June. Santiago did not surrender until the 16th of July. It is well enough to give the admiral credit for this intention, especially since he says “ such an attack as that which the general proposed in his third telegram, herewith mentioned, was in accord with the views which had been held by myself and discussed by my staff,” but he does not give in his reports, nor have I ever seen, any sufficient reason for not putting this plan into execution during the period of nearly three weeks which elapsed from its inception to the final surrender. The third telegram from Shafter, just referred to, has been mentioned in another

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chapter of this book (p. 174, as well as the discussion of it by Admiral Sampson. In that discussion, as we have already seen, Admiral Sampson offers these reasons for not entering the harbor:

“ 1. The *Reina Mercedes* was sunk by the Spanish in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships and possibly the smaller ones.

“ 2. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist.

“ 3. If our smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk there by the mines or by the fire of the batteries the harbor would be effectively closed to us.

“ 4. It was essential to the new scheme of attack of this mined field that the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried.”

Let us discuss these reasons *seriatim*:

1. Of the *Reina Mercedes*, I quote Admiral Sampson's own words, given in his despatch to the Secretary of the Navy, of July 5th:*

“ About midnight last night the *Reina Mercedes* was seen by the *Massachusetts*, which vessel had her searchlight on the channel, coming out of harbor of Santiago. The *Massachusetts* and *Texas* opened fire, and the Spanish vessel was sunk opposite Estrella Cove. I am inclined to think it was the intention to sink her in the channel, thus blocking the harbor entrance. *If so, this plan was defeated by the fire of the ships, as she lies on the edge of the channel and does not block it.*”

On this point Lieutenant Müller also says:

“ Unfortunately the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed.”

* The despatch is dated July 6th, but should undoubtedly have been July 5th, as the *Reina Mercedes* was sunk on the night of July 4th. (See report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, p. 557.)

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And again he writes:

“She (the *Reina Mercedes*) lies in the line of the channel, and therefore does not interfere with the entering or going out of ships.”

The official report of Admiral Sampson of July 5th and the statements of Lieutenant Müller are both borne out by the fact that the army transports had no difficulty in entering the harbor after July 17th, when the mines were removed. The *Reina Mercedes* did not obstruct the entrance.

2. With reference to the “extensive shore batteries,” the admiral again contradicts his statements previously made. On the 15th of June, in giving his “order of battle,” he thus writes: “It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battle-ships,” and in his letter to General Shafter of July 2d, just quoted, we have seen that he says of these batteries: “They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago.”

Admiral Sampson’s own statements, therefore, disprove the claim that the *Reina Mercedes* could have prevented his entrance, or that he had any fear of the shore batteries. Both of these facts he must have known at the time he wrote the report from which we have just quoted extracts.

3. Of the mines, however, we must credit Admiral Sampson with entire lack of information regarding their destroying power. As a matter of fact, these mines proved to be almost as insignificant as the batteries. Moreover, it was not necessary to risk any vessels in the attempt to enter the harbor, but to countermine first, which Admiral Sampson himself seems to have thought possible. The very fact that the

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Spaniards endeavored to sink the *Reina Mercedes* in the channel was an admission that they did not regard it as protected by their mines. And then he must have known that before Cervera's fleet could leave the harbor all contact mines would have to be removed. Lieutenant Müller states:

“As the interior of the harbor did not longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been placed, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, it was decided to sink the *Mercedes* in the channel.”

General Toral also reported to General Blanco on the 3d of July:

“According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first line do not work, and only four of the second line, and as two of the seven Bustamente torpedoes have become unserviceable and two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for enemy to force the harbor entrance.”

I visited Santiago Harbor in the early spring of 1899, when the position and character of the mines were explained to me by officers who were present at the time of their removal. About twenty-eight mines of the Bustamente type were found, but they were so overgrown by barnacles and sea-growth that it was impossible to explode them, with the exception of four, and of those four but one broke the water.

Four torpedoes and three of the observation mines are said to have been fired at the *Merrimac* from the *Pluton* and the *Mercedes*, none of which is thought to have done any damage.

4. Admiral Sampson alone seems to have had any

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knowledge of a "new scheme of attack." There was no new scheme of attack. On the other hand, the situation of the army had grown more serious, owing to the reinforcements which had entered the city under General Escario, and the augmented difficulties of supplying our army over the twelve miles of sloughs and muddy trails which bore the name of roads in Cuba. The necessity for relieving our forces was intensified; the reasons against the navy entering the harbor were lessened. There was now no hostile fleet inside, and our squadron had not been in the least damaged. If Admiral Sampson had been willing, on the 2d of July, to force the harbor, as he intimated in his letter to General Shafter, there would seem to be no reasonable excuse for his failure to attempt it after the destruction of Cervera's fleet.

When General Shafter learned of Admiral Sampson's unwillingness to attempt to clear the harbor and enter, he sent the following despatches to the War Department on the 4th and 5th of July:

" July 4, 1898.

" If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago, we can take the place within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 15,000 troops speedily, and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do my part."

" July 4, 1898.

" I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant and assist in the capture of the place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life."

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“ July 5, 1898.

“ Navy should go into Santiago Harbor at any cost. If they do I believe we will take the city and all the troops that are there. If they do not the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our troops. . . .”

On the 5th of July the Secretary of War carried the second and third of these messages to the President, and asked that, because of the great emergency then confronting the army, the navy should either force the harbor entrance at once, or permit the army to do so with one of the small ships of the navy, which enterprise the army was ready to undertake.

As a result of this conference, Shafter was sent this despatch:

“ ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

“ WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898—11.20 A.M.

“ Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba.

“ Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for co-operation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views you will agree upon the time and manner of attack.

“ By command Major-General Miles. H. C. CORBIN,

“ Adjutant-General.”

A similar message was sent to Admiral Sampson by the Secretary of the Navy.

Following up this order of the President, Captain Chadwick, representing Admiral Sampson, who was sick, appeared at General Shafter's headquarters on the 6th of July, as has already been mentioned. As a result of that conference, the following plan of action was agreed upon:

“ That a long and continued bombardment be made of Santiago from the sea with the heavier guns of the fleet, the fleet to

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fire slowly and continuously during, say, twenty-four hours, at the rate of one shell every five minutes, excepting one hour at the rate of one every two minutes. This refers to the 8-inch to 13-inch shells. If this is not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, then an assault be arranged on the Socapa battery, using marines and the Cuban forces under General Cabreco, and *an effort made to enter the harbor with some of the smaller ships of the squadron.* This attack to be made upon knowing the result of a second demand* made to-day upon the commanding officer of the Spanish forces for the surrender of the place, stating to him the conditions that surround him; destruction of the Spanish fleet, etc., and the number of forces opposed to him. To give him time to consider the matter, the date of the bombardment is fixed at noon of the 9th, unless he positively refuses to consider it at all, when it will be begun at such time as is convenient to ourselves. General Shafter will furnish Admiral Sampson with correct map, showing where his lines will be surrounding the city, and also open telegraphic communication by way of Siboney down to near Aguadores to give information as to falling of shots."

Reference has already been made to the events which occurred between the 6th and 11th of July. On the afternoon of the 10th, and for a few hours on the morning of the 11th, the navy threw some shells into Santiago. Of the naval firing on these two days, General Shafter reported that "the bombardment has absolutely had no effect on the town," and General Wheeler says that many of the shots had too great a range, and went over the city.

Shafter was naturally disinclined to again request Admiral Sampson to force the harbor, after he had received two promises, as he understood them, that such an attempt would be made, "after twenty-four hours' bombardment." Admiral Sampson was in-

* The Chadwick letter, given on p. 190.

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formed of the existence of the truce of July 11th; later he was notified of the possibilities of further operations against the Spaniards. He then sent this message to General Shafter, July 12th:

“Admiral Sampson proposes to begin bombarding to-morrow morning with 13-inch shells, unless there are reasons for not doing so. Will General Shafter please inform him of the distance of the fall of the shot from the cathedral, using the cathedral as a point of reference? And he would like particularly to know immediately if any shell fall in the water.”

Again, on the 13th:

“I am now prepared to shell the city of Santiago with three of my largest iron-clads, with 13-inch projectiles. Can commence at short notice. Will await your signal.”

It will be observed that these two despatches make absolutely no mention of the proposed attempt to force the harbor. The situation of the army had become even more precarious—repeated downpours of rain had made the question of transportation alarming, and this difficulty had been greatly augmented by the obligation, engendered by humanity, to feed 20,000 refugees at Caney; but, most serious of all, yellow-fever had appeared among our troops. General Shafter thus wrote General Miles, then at Siboney:

“July 12, 1898.

“ . . . Admiral Sampson proposed to land 1,000 marines at the little bay two miles west of Santiago Harbor, and from there carry the work just west of the harbor. If the rains continue, it is going to be a physical impossibility to supply my men with rations, and something has got to be done by the navy. . . .”

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He also reported to Washington that nothing had been done by the navy; that the refugees were suffering for food, and that if the rains continued it would be impossible to transport rations over the roads, in which event he would simply have to take the town by assault, without regard to loss of life. He also added that "the navy should be required to make a determined effort at once."

With these reports of the situation, the following note was addressed to the Secretary of the Navy:

" July 13, 1898.

" SIR,—I have the honor to request that you order the fleet off Santiago to force at once its way into the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture of Santiago and the Spanish army defending it.

" The special reasons for immediate action are: First, the very heavy rains that are falling almost continually have made the roads nearly impassable and threaten to cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the trenches altogether. Second, the rains are making the holding of our lines almost impossible, as the trenches are filled with water. Third, the lives of our men are in great danger from yellow-fever, which has broken out among our troops and is spreading rapidly; and, fourth, the character of the works of the enemy is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice of life.

" These conditions, it is believed by the major-general commanding, would be changed were the navy in the bay to co-operate with the army, and the capture of the city and Spanish army thus made a comparatively easy matter. Very respectfully,

" R. A. ALGER,

" Secretary of War.

" *The honorable the Secretary of the Navy.*"

The answer of the Navy Department came:

" NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 14, 1898.

" SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your

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communication of the 13th instant, requesting orders be issued by this department for the fleet off Santiago to force its way into the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture of Santiago and the Spanish army defending it.

JOHN D. LONG,

“ Secretary.

“ *The honorable the Secretary of War.*”

Secretary Long, however, thus cabled to Admiral Sampson :

“ The commanding general of the army urges, and Secretary of War urgently requests, that navy force harbor. Confer with commander of army, wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy. I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked.”

I do not wish to do Admiral Sampson an injustice. It may be that his failure to force the harbor, “ after twenty-four hours’ bombardment,” was due to an impression on his part that the necessity no longer existed. I refer to General Shafter’s telegram of the 11th of July, sent after the navy had bombarded for twenty-four hours, which reads in part :

“ I think it advisable to put some heavy shots, say ten to thirteen inches, to-morrow and see if we can start a fire.”

And again, on the 13th :

“ Message about being ready to open with 13-inch guns received. Thanks. I believe they will surrender before noon to-morrow. If not I will want you to open fire. I will notify you.”

Perhaps these two messages, and the fact that a truce then existed, deterred him from making the promised attempt to countermine and enter the harbor. If

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this be so, then he should have the credit for it. But it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile his promises to his actions, or to harmonize the statements contained in his several official reports. On the 14th of July he thus cabled the Secretary of the Navy:

“Published telegrams of General Shafter, *Herald* of July 6th, reflect on the navy. I wish the department and the President to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupation of forts and intrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army landed he stated that such was the primary object of his operations. If the general chooses to ignore the sea approaches and to attack Santiago to the east and north that is his affair, but it should be clearly understood that this attack does not influence the situation at the harbor entrance, from which his left flank is distant not more than four miles. I have been ready at any time during the last three weeks to silence works, to clear entrance of mines, and to enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper conduct of war assigns to it. To throw my ships to certain destruction upon mine fields would be suicidal folly, and I have not the force to form landing party strong enough to insure the capture of the forts. No disagreements mentioned by the paper have been brought to my notice by General Shafter.”

I cannot see how the admiral reconciles the statements contained in this remarkable despatch with those made in his letters to General Shafter of July 2d, and the promise made by Captain Chadwick in his name, July 6th, to the effect that if a day's shelling of the town “be not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, that an assault be arranged on the Socapa battery,* using marines and the Cuban forces under General

* This battery was located on the west side of the entrance to Santiago Harbor.

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Cebreco, and an effort made to enter the harbor with some of the smaller ships of the squadron."

His statement regarding the "silencing" of the works at the entrance of Santiago Harbor, deserves some consideration. On the 6th of June he reported:

"Bombarded forts at Santiago to-day, 7.30 A.M. to 10 A.M., and have silenced works quickly, without injury of any kind, though stationed within 2,000 yards."

On the 15th of June, in the orders issued to the captains of his fleet for the proposed action on the next day, he wrote:

"It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battle-ships."

And then reported to the Secretary of the Navy, after the firing had taken place:

"Bombarded forts on June 16th for forty-two minutes; firing very accurate. The batteries were silenced completely. Fleet not injured."

And for the third time, on the 2d of July, he stated that he had

"Bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire."

It is to be noted that these reports were made prior to his despatch of July 14th, just quoted, in which he remarks that he has been ready for three weeks to "silence works."

As a matter of fact, these several costly bombardments accomplished little or nothing. On the 17th of

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July a careful examination was made of the different batteries at the entrance to Santiago Harbor. The total result of Admiral Sampson's shelling consisted in the dismounting of one muzzle-loading brass cannon, described as a "very ancient pattern," on the battery east of Morro, and in "damaging" of one of the two modern breech-loading rifles on a naval mount at Punta Gorda battery. Not another gun was found to be injured or dismounted.

It seems incredible that such repeated heavy bombardments could have accomplished so little. The only real damage was to a non-military edifice, a small light-house, and, in several places, the picturesque and historic old Morro Castle, nearly four centuries old, was somewhat marred, but not materially injured, by the shots.

When General Shafter made known to Admiral Sampson that he was to have a conference with the Spanish commander on the morning of July 13th, relative to surrendering, the admiral at once telegraphed:

"As commander-in-chief of the naval forces engaged in joint operations, I expect to be represented in any conference held to arrange the terms of the surrender of Santiago, including the surrender of the shipping and the harbor. Questions are involved of importance to both branches of the service."

General Shafter answered that he would be glad to have the navy represented, and suggested that an officer be sent for that purpose to remain at his headquarters, as it might be difficult to state when arrangements for surrender would be made. If this were not possible, General Shafter agreed to inform the admiral when to send his representative. On the morning of

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the 16th the letter from General Toral was received, saying that he was authorized to surrender. Admiral Sampson was at once notified, but Captain Chadwick did not arrive at the front until the articles of capitulation had been signed by the American and Spanish commissioners.

It does not appear that General Shafter intended that Admiral Sampson, or his representative, should be a signatory party to the capitulation, but that his invitation was with the view of having some officer of the navy take part in the ceremonious function of the formal surrender of the Spanish forces. When the matter was brought to my attention I telegraphed General Shafter:

“As you have won a great victory, and our relations with the navy have been so cordial, ask Admiral Sampson to sign jointly with you the articles of capitulation.”

This despatch, however, was not received by General Shafter until after the articles of capitulation had been signed, and were then on their way to the United States by a special messenger. I quote General Shafter's report in the matter, dated July 19th:

“It is now too late for Admiral Sampson to sign the articles of capitulation. They were completed three days ago, and delivered: one to the Spanish commander, the other was forwarded by the hands of Colonel Astor to you. I did not sign them myself, they were signed only by the commissioners appointed to prescribe the details of the surrender. Surrender was made to me in person, verbally, and later by General Toral declaring, in the presence of myself and the general officers commanding here, that he then and there surrendered the Spanish army and city of

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Santiago represented by a detail of 100 men from the different regiments of his command. This surrender included the officers and men of the navy who were a part of his command."

Admiral Sampson subsequently appealed the matter, through the Secretary of the Navy, to the President, but the latter did not see fit to direct that any officer of the navy should sign the articles of capitulation, which are now in the War Department.

Referring to this matter, Admiral Sampson has stated, in his official report:

"I do not think the commanding general quite appreciates how necessary a part our forces were to the reduction of Santiago and the surrender of its garrison, independently of the effect of our shell, which latter was undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the surrender at this time."

In another portion of his report, in referring to the fact that the articles of capitulation were not signed by a representative of the navy, he says:

"Captain Chadwick arrived at the front at the earliest hour it was possible for him to do so, and informed General Shafter of my expectancy in the matter, but General Shafter peremptorily refused. The convention had already been signed, and he stated as one reason that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action of July 3d.* There would have been

*" WASHINGTON, July 3, 1898.

" Secretary of the Navy.

"The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9.30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the *Cristobal Colon*, had run ashore seventy-five miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizeaya* were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor* and *Pluton* were destroyed within four miles of port.

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as much reason for mentioning the navy in the report of the land action of July 1st, when assault was made by our army on the Spanish lines."

It may not be out of place here to consider just what part the army did take in forcing Admiral Cervera to leave the harbor. The only acceptable evidence on this point would be the statement of the Spaniards themselves, although Admiral Sampson does say, and it is the only reference to that fact in all his official reports and messages, that "after the arrival of the army . . . the *situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision. . . .*"

Based on historical facts, which need no demonstration, and the evidence of the official despatches which passed between Captain-General Blanco at Havana (under whose orders the naval squadron was), and General Toral and the Spanish admiral at Santiago, these statements cannot be controverted:

1. That Cervera went out of Santiago Harbor.
2. That Cervera left the harbor because ordered to do so, July 2d and 3d, by General Blanco.
3. That General Blanco ordered Cervera to make his sortie because General Toral reported to him the "serious condition of Santiago," resulting from the "hostile progress" of the American forces. Upon receipt of this information Blanco telegraphed Toral:

"Main thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be morally defeated, and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy."

Again, after General Toral's report of our military successes July 1st, General Blanco thus telegraphed him:

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“ It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defence as much as possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not to have to surrender nor destroy ships.”

These and many other despatches from the same source prove conclusively, if any evidence were wanting, that the movements of General Shafter's army drove the Spanish squadron out of Santiago Harbor. The complete investment on the land side by the military forces pinned the Spanish admiral to one or the other horn of the dilemma: he was compelled to either destroy his ships himself, or attempt a sortie, under conditions which he conceived would not only result in the destruction of his squadron, but in the useless sacrifice of many lives. Admiral Cervera was in favor of destroying his ships in the harbor. In a despatch to Havana he reported:

“ I shall *never* be the one to decree the horrible hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force.”

General Blanco thought differently, when the success of General Shafter's army was made known to him, and ordered the fleet out.

As we have already seen, when the formal articles of capitulation were signed on the 16th of July, at General Toral's request, supplementary conditions were provided for in a letter over General Shafter's signature. This letter refers to the surrender of the shipping in the harbor, and was based upon a note from the Spanish general, which thus reads in part:

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“ July 17, 1898.

“ *To his Excellency General Shafter.*

“ ESTEEMED SIR,—The terms of the capitulation which has been signed, and which is being carried out, set down the bases of the same, but these bases should be made definite and precise in writing as agreed between us both.

“ As the evidences of these points are to serve me for my defence before my superiors when I am arraigned for the events that have occurred, and should prove how well founded all my acts have been, I should be much obliged to your excellency if you would authorize with your signature the details in the carrying out of the bases we had agreed upon, in the following manner, in case you find them in conformity.

“ 2. *The elements of war to which reference is made in the second article of the bases of capitulation, include the men and materials of the navy.*

“ I appeal to the sentiments of justice and soldierly honor which I recognize in your excellency, begging you to give me proof of your good will by authorizing in writing what I have set down above which was verbally agreed to yesterday.

“ With great respect, etc., etc., JOSE TORAL,

“ Commander-in-Chief, etc.”

After General Toral had verbally surrendered to Shafter the vessels in the harbor of Santiago, July 16th, Captain Chadwick informed Shafter that Admiral Sampson would expect these “prize vessels” to be turned over to the navy. As the city, its garrison, the harbor, and the shipping in it had been surrendered to Shafter, I could not see the justice, in view of what had transpired, of permitting Admiral Sampson to secure these vessels as prizes of war. I therefore directed Shafter to hold the vessels; whereupon he placed a guard upon them, under General McKibben. On the

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17th of July, the very day upon which the formal surrender took place, Admiral Sampson, without consulting General Shafter, sent into the harbor of Santiago prize crews for the captured vessels. General McKibbin informed Lieutenant Doyle, sent by the admiral to take possession of the ships, that they were the property of the army, having been surrendered to General Shafter by the Spanish general, and were to be kept by the military forces, by order of the Secretary of War. Admiral Sampson thus wrote to General Shafter:

“ U. S. FLAG-SHIP ‘NEW YORK,’ 1ST RATE,

“ *July 18, 1898—1.40 A.M.*

“ SIR,—The following has just been sent me by Lieutenant Doyle in charge of Spanish prizes in the harbor of Santiago:

“ ‘SANTIAGO, *July 17, 1898.*

“ ‘Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, and in the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer him with his officers and men to their respective ships.

“ ‘C. MCKIBBIN,

“ ‘Brigadier-General Commanding.’

“ 2. I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such a paper.

“ 3. No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation, though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of July 13th.

“ 4. Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed by the President, and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and usage surrenders the floating material in such case to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it.

“ 5. I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary of War over my actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy and await his instructions.

“ 6. In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the question will of course be decided by the President

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of the United States; until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed them. Very respectfully,

“ W. T. SAMPSON,

“ Commander-in-Chief, etc.

“ *Major-General Shafter, Commanding 5th Army Corps.*”

In the mean time Lieutenant Marble, of the navy, had presented himself to General McKibbin, and represented that, by an understanding between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson, the *Alvarado*, one of the surrendered boats, was to be turned over to the navy. No such agreement had been made or implied. Upon his representations, however, the *Alvarado* was turned over to the navy, with which he proceeded at once to Guantanamo. Admiral Sampson's letter, just quoted, was in answer to a note from General Shafter, requesting the return of the vessel, and protesting against his action.

General McKibbin reported the facts to General Shafter in the following note:

“ July 18, 1898.

“ SIR,—The letters sent herewith were turned over to me by a naval officer, with the request that I read and forward. The note quoted was given by me to Lieutenant Doyle, as he had no means of getting back to his ship, and would be compelled to stay on the wharf if I sent him ashore. Lieutenant Doyle said nothing about taking possession. On the contrary, he stated that he was sent to assist in the care and management of the vessels. Admiral Sampson expresses no surprise at the dishonorable trick on the part of Lieutenant Marble to get possession of the *Alvarado*, nor does he express surprise at the equivocal language of Lieutenant Doyle. Again, there is no mention of the fact that in every case except the *San Juan* armed guards were aboard the vessels. Joint occupation continues, and I await your orders.

“ Very respectfully,

C. MCKIBBIN,

“ Brigadier-General U. S. V.”

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It is to the credit of General Shafter that he did not reply to Admiral Sampson's letter in the same spirit in which that communication was written. On the contrary, he informed the admiral that there was no necessity for a collision or clash of authority between the naval and military authorities, or even hard feeling. He was generous enough to say that he believed that the admiral wished to do what he regarded as right, and assured him that he was actuated by the same motive. His orders, however, from the Secretary of War, required that all the ships and shipping surrendered to him in the harbor be retained by the army, as they belonged to it. He added that it was very easy to submit the matter to the President, through the Secretaries of War and Navy.

In the mean time, the Attorney-General, to whom the question had been referred, rendered the opinion that vessels captured by the army, or by the army and navy jointly, were not subject to the laws regarding prizes. As the military authorities had no means of caring for the ships, General Shafter was ordered to turn them over to the navy. This he did. Subsequently, however, the President directed that the five merchant vessels be returned by Admiral Sampson, in order that they might be used for transporting troops.

Admiral Sampson's inexplicable attitude was not confined to General Shafter. On the 11th of July the *Yale* and *Columbia* reached Cuba with reinforcements for the 5th Corps. If not needed in Cuba, it was ordered that they were to form a part of the Puerto Rican expedition. The *Yale*, formerly the *Paris*, had been used by the navy during the early part of the war as a scouting vessel, but, after the destruction of Cervera's

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fleet, was turned over to the army, together with the *Harvard* (*New York*), as fast transports. They were, of course, entirely unarmored, and with an insignificant armament. Aware of the unfortunate results experienced during the Santiago campaign from a lack of that cordial co-operation which ought to exist between the two branches of our service, General Miles thus telegraphed from Guantanamo, where he was with the *Yale* and *Columbia*, on the 18th of July:

“ . . . I notified Admiral Sampson that I was authorized to organize and take an expedition to Puerto Rico and desired the co-operation of the navy. Last night I sent a telegram saying that I was ready to go with 3,000 men, and desired an escort to cover debarkation. No replies have been received to either of these communications. As the enterprise is so important, and time valuable, I think it advisable that some naval officer, with whatever vessels may be spared, be ordered to report at once to act under the general direction of the commanding general of the army. *The experience of the last few weeks should not be repeated.*”

In another despatch he also asked that the convoy be placed under Commodore Schley.

The President ordered that Admiral Sampson should give such assistance to General Miles as they might jointly regard as necessary for convoying troops and covering their landing.

The expedition to Puerto Rico was of such a character as to demand an immediate movement. A delay would give the enemy opportunity to increase his forces by raising Puerto Rican volunteers, then reported by the American consul at St. Thomas as organizing; it was known that the Spanish were strengthening their fortifications, and daily adding to the mines

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in the several harbors; the spread of yellow-fever in General Shafter's army made it desirable to remove these 3,000 or 4,000 troops from the infected neighborhood; and it was believed that by seizing Puerto Rico we would be in a better position to enforce our demands upon the Spanish government.

The President's order, above referred to, was dated July 18th. Two days passed and nothing was done in the way of furnishing a convoy, whereupon Secretary Long again cabled Sampson, on the 20th, to give immediate assistance in the way of a suitable convoy. On the afternoon of that day the admiral informed General Miles that the *Yale* and *Columbia* would act as a convoy for themselves, but that he would furnish the *Cincinnati*, although he did not know where she was, and the *New Orleans*, if she was at San Juan. With this information, General Miles cabled the War Department:

“PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 20, 1898.

“(Received 11.07 P.M.)

“Admiral Sampson came on board the *Yale* this morning. He had not at that time seen the order of Secretary Long. He was furnished a copy of it, and after sending to his flag-ship found the order there. I asked him to give us as strong a force of the navy as possible in the movement against Puerto Rico. He said he would inform me later. At five o'clock he came on board, and stated that he would furnish, to assist our landing, the *Yale* and *Columbia*. These are the two ships with which we left Charleston, S. C. He said that the *Columbia* would take three or four days to coal. He also stated that he would give us the *Cincinnati*, but does not know where she is. Also 'the *New Orleans*, if she is now at San Juan.' If the *New Orleans* is not at San Juan there is nothing to prevent the small Spanish gunboats coming out of that harbor and attacking the transports *en route*, and it is highly

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important that she should remain, blockading that harbor while we land at Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. This assures but two vessels to cover our landing, and these are loaded with troops. The *Columbia* and *Yale* could not silence a piece of artillery on shore without risking the lives of from 300 to 1,500 of Garretson's brigade on board. This, in my judgment, is not in accordance with the orders of Secretary Long, to give such assistance as is necessary for landing, or in accordance with your telegram of the 18th. I think you and the President should be apprised of the fact that, while these ten transports, loaded with troops and munitions of war, are waiting here, a great portion of the American navy are within cannon-shot of this place, and some of them actively engaged in bringing into this harbor vessels which were captured by and surrendered to the army. There are battle-ships enough here to enable us to land within cannon-shot of the city of San Juan. I request that positive orders be given to the navy to cover the landing of at least 10,000 troops on the island of Puerto Rico without delay, as that number will be there within a week."

I quote the President's letter in this matter, written at midnight July 20th-21st:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION.

"*Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy.*

"SIR,—I hand you a despatch just received from General Miles. It is evident from this despatch that Admiral Sampson is not proposing to furnish such assistance as I have heretofore directed. He should send enough ships, and strong enough, as will enable General Miles to land his troops in safety at Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan, and to remain so long as their assistance is needed.

"General Wilson has already sailed from Charleston, with orders to proceed to Point Fajardo. If your convoy is delayed he will reach Point Fajardo without any protection whatever, which must not be permitted. Wilson cannot be reached by wire. He has no guns on his ships. The Secretary of War says that General Wilson is due to arrive at Point Fajardo in three or four days. Prompt action should be taken to give General Wilson

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protection on his arrival there. It seems to me a cruiser or battleship, or both, should be detailed for this duty.

“ Please see that the necessary orders are issued at once.

“ WILLIAM MCKINLEY.”

At two o'clock on the morning of July 21st, the Secretary of the Navy forwarded such a message to Sampson that he yielded to the instructions of the President, and furnished a convoy consisting of the *Massachusetts*, *Dixie*, *Gloucester*, *Cincinnati*, *Annapolis*, *Leyden*, and *Wasp*.

Admiral Sampson's explanation is that he considered the expedition he was then preparing against the Spanish coast as of first importance; that the *Yale* and *Columbia* would answer every purpose, and that his instructions from the Navy Department did not permit of sending any heavy ships. His instructions from the President, transmitted through the Secretary of the Navy, were to furnish such convoy as he and General Miles might regard as necessary, and the latter insisted from the outset that at least one battleship would be required.

I give here, in full, his explanations to the Navy Department:

“ PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAITI, July 21, 1898.

“ *Secretary of Navy, Washington.*

“ Off Playa del Este, Cuba, July 21st.—Replying to your No. 56, I was ordered, July 12th, to prepare all armored ships and certain cruisers for special service [Watson's movement to coast of Spain], and I have been led to believe that the department regarded this of prime importance. This work is in progress. I was ordered to send a specified force to Nipe to remove mines and hold it as a rendezvous. This was done. I was informed yesterday that the army has decided not to rendezvous there, but the expedition had sailed. I placed yesterday at General Miles's

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disposal the *Cincinnati*, which had been ordered from Key West, and the *New Orleans*, blockading at San Juan. The *Columbia* and the *Yale* carrying troops are both powerfully armed.* This is an ample convoy for his expedition and to effect his landing. At his urgent request for further force, however, I sent to Nipe to order the *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Leyden* to San Juan. They will await the troops at Cape San Juan. I also added the *Gloucester* here, and have ordered three monitors from Key West. General Miles has from the first insisted upon a convoy of heavy ships. This, I have told him, my instructions did not permit. The department will observe that General Miles's failure to obtain the naval force which he considers necessary is due to the department's instructions. Following the instructions in department's No. 56, I have ordered the *Massachusetts* and the *Dixie*. The *Indiana* and *Newark* are under repair to steam machinery. The *Iowa* is not in condition to go. I cannot find any telegram here unanswered.

SAMPSON."

It is difficult to account for Admiral Sampson's seeming attitude towards the army during the operations before Santiago, as well as to excuse him for his contradictory statements, subsequently made in his official report. After the 3d of July the admiral's conduct may be due to the keen disappointment resulting from his non-participation in the engagement with Cervera's squadron. Possibly he felt that Shaft'er's request for a conference on the morning of July 3d, innocent though it was, was responsible for his being deprived of the honor of actively participating as commander-in-chief in one of the most remarkable victories in the annals of naval warfare.

* The *Yale* had already been turned over to the War Department for transporting troops, and was not subject to the admiral's orders. Her armament consisted of eight 5-inch rapid-fire guns; four 3-pounders; and four 6-pounders. The vessel was totally unarmored.

CHAPTER XVI

THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT

THE first alarm of an epidemic of sickness in the army in front of Santiago reached the department on July 13th. It came in the form of a telegram, which thus read in part:

" . . . The serious part of the situation is that there are 100 cases of yellow-fever in this command, and the opinion of the surgeons is that it will spread rapidly."*

This announcement injected a new and most alarming factor into a problem already difficult. In the first place, negotiations for the surrender were still in progress, and in the next place the existence of yellow-fever forbade the sending of any portion of Shafter's army to Puerto Rico to reinforce General Miles, who was then at Guantanamo, on the transports carrying part of his expedition. It was fair to assume, if Toral became aware of an outbreak of yellow-fever among our troops, especially if it was attended by the least sign of panic and demoralization, he would at once interrupt negotiations. With disease fighting his battles for him, the Spanish general would soon be

* As we have already seen, General Shafter announced on the 9th of July that three cases of yellow-fever had appeared in a Michigan regiment. This extract is from General Miles's despatch, quoted in full on p. 201.

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master of the situation. It was indispensable, therefore, that the military status should be preserved at any cost. Our army was threatened by other perils than yellow-fever, and, pending the successful conclusion of our efforts to secure Toral's capitulation, the smallest blunder might have involved us in disaster.

It was known to General Shafter that, in addition to the Spanish forces inside the Santiago defences, there were about 4,000 of the enemy twenty-five miles to the north, about 7,500 at Guantanamo, and 10,000 at Holguin—making an army outside of Santiago larger than his own. Under the circumstances we had no alternative than to maintain the military situation as it then stood. Even the measures for checking the spread of the fever had to be made with caution, and under many embarrassments. The Secretary of War had, on July 13th, advised General Shafter by telegraph:

“As soon as the military situation admits of such action, troops should be withdrawn from proximity to the infected towns and encamped on high ground near the coast and within easy reach of their base of supplies. The camps should be well separated, and any regiment which remains in such fresh camp for five days without having any cases of yellow-fever among the troops could be put on a transport, if desired, to return home or go to some other point of active operations. If cases of yellow-fever occur in any regiment by itself, they should at once be sent to the hospital established for the reception of such cases and the regiment should not be put upon a transport until at least five days have elapsed since the last case of yellow-fever. In general, no cases of yellow-fever and no suspicious cases of yellow fever should go upon the transports, as it is extremely important that these should not become infected.”

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It was again explained to General Shafter, on July 14th, that as soon as the surrender was accomplished the 5th Army Corps was to be put into camp near Santiago, but above the fever belt.

"Experts here say this can be done. This is the first step to fight the fever. If, later, it is found advisable to bring your troops away, it will be done. After careful consideration of the question, your views and recommendations are desired. Every possible aid in the power of the government will be given you."

For the moment, however, there was no option save that of preserving an unbroken front.

Fortunately the tension was soon relieved. The Spaniards capitulated four days after the first announcement of a yellow-fever epidemic, and General Shafter was free to deal with the problem—not wholly free, though, for the disarmed Spanish prisoners had to be guarded, not only to prevent them from escaping, but to protect them against the Cubans, who were now extremely warlike; and this double duty called for vigilance and no little show of force on General Shafter's part. Indeed, the chief duty of our troops at that time consisted in guarding the disarmed Spaniards.

On the day of the formal surrender, General Shafter was notified that

"The Secretary of War expects that you will take the fever question into active consideration. How far will it be possible to place the command above the fever belt, and how soon? An early report on the situation is requested."

Shafter replied (July 18th):

"Troops will be put in good camps as soon as possible. I put the cavalry division out this A.M., but until prisoners are sent

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away it will not be safe to send other troops to higher camp. Feeling between Spaniards and Cubans is very bitter, and care will have to be taken to avoid collision."

And on the 22d of July he again reported:

"The minute the prisoners can be disposed of will put troops twenty miles inland on railroad, and hope for improvement."

The quarantine authorities in the United States were reluctant to advise that an army infected with yellow-fever be brought to any part of the country. In fact, when it was made known that the department proposed to bring this army to some point on the New England coast, several prominent Senators called at the War Department to personally protest against such a course. Moreover, experts in such matters had expressed the opinion, as already stated, that General Shafter's corps could be moved to the mountainous regions about Santiago, above the supposed fever belt, where the troops could be kept until the yellow-fever was eradicated, in which General Miles, then in Cuba, expressed concurrence. Then, too, the government was not unmindful of the danger of infecting every transport in its already too limited fleet, that might be used to return the troops in Cuba.

Military necessity demanded the presence of the troops at Santiago to guard the Spanish prisoners; prudence and protection of the country against an epidemic of yellow-fever prevented their return until that supposed danger had passed, or its real condition was determined—every consideration, in fact, of strategy and prudence made it imperative that the 5th Corps remain in Cuba. Such was the position held

THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT

by the administration in the light of the information then before it.

The intention of the War Department to bring the troops back to the United States as soon as the military situation would permit, and as soon as it was regarded by the medical and quarantine authorities as safe, was made known to General Shafter, as already stated, as early as July 13th, and repeated to him, July 23d, in the following despatch:

"The Secretary of War asks for report on fever conditions to-day, and what progress is being made in getting troops to high grounds, and how effective this is going to be. Would you advise sending more than two immune regiments now on the way to you? The desire is to help you in every way possible. As soon as it can be done with safety, *it is the intention to bring the entire 5th Corps North for rest and recuperation.*"

On the same day, July 23d, General Shafter replied, however, that "the situation is not alarming," but that "it is out of the question to move any more troops until the prisoners are started for Spain, and the railroad is repaired."

On the 26th of July the Surgeon-General was directed to proceed to Montauk Point, and report on the suitability of that place as a camp of recuperation. The favorable decision of the department, based upon his report, was communicated to Shafter on the 28th of July, as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 28, 1898.

General Shafter, Cuba.

"Would it not be well to encourage your command by telling them they will be moved North as soon as the fever cases subside? It would stimulate them, it seems to me, and that frequently is a

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tonic. We have selected Montauk Point, Long Island, for your command when it can be moved. How many troops should be sent to take the place of your command? How many Spaniards have surrendered to date?

R. A. ALGER,
"Secretary of War."

On the 27th of July General Shafter reported that, from a pathological point of view, it would be safe to order the cavalry division back to the United States. On the 1st of August he regarded the military situation so much relieved that the cavalry division "could be spared." Instructions were therefore given him on that day (August 1st)

"to send some of Wheeler's dismounted cavalry on the *Louisiana* to New York, where they will be put in camp at Montauk Point. Great care should be had that no man infected with fever be sent. On the result of this shipment will depend further action in moving your command. Have a careful medical officer come with them."

Orders for the necessary contracts to prepare Montauk Point were given on the 1st of August and approved on the 2d. These provisions, however, were for a detention camp of but 5,000, and a general hospital of 500, then regarded as more than sufficient to meet the demands of the 5th Corps, which it was proposed to return in instalments. There was, however, at Montauk Point ample camping-ground for a whole army.*

* An army in the field is supposed to be a complete unit in itself, and to carry with it every necessity for properly feeding and sheltering the troops. All, and a great deal more, than an army usually does for itself had to be done by the War Department for Shafter's men. Not only were tents erected for them in two separate camps (the detention camp and the general camp), but these tents and the hospitals were floored. See, however, chapter on "Camps and Disease."

THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT

So far as the information in the possession of the War Department showed, the situation on the 1st of August was as follows: Military considerations had made it impossible for Shafter to detach any part of his command, other than the cavalry, with a view of checking the spread of yellow-fever. In the mean time, the War Department had selected Montauk Point (July 26th) as a place in every way suitable for the return of the troops, of which fact General Shafter was informed July 28th. Contracts for a camp suitable for a small part of the army were ordered on the 1st of August and let on the 2d. July 26th General Shafter recommended the embarkation of the cavalry division; July 28th he reported it safe for that division to return, and August 1st said that that part of his army could be spared. On the date last named, General Wheeler's command was ordered back to the United States, while preparations at Montauk Point were rapidly made for its reception.*

* As a detachment of the regular cavalry at Santiago had been left at Tampa, Port Tampa, and Fernandina, as well as one battalion of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Wood's regiment), and all the horses for both the regular and volunteer cavalry organizations, it was decided, August 1st, when the cavalry division was ordered to the United States, to have these detachments join their commands at Montauk with their mounts; but the order for this purpose was not given until August 3d. General Shafter and General Miles had recommended that the cavalry division be mounted upon its return to the United States. Then, too, the health of the cavalry detachments in Florida, as well as the condition of the mounts for the entire cavalry division, made the change advisable. Since Montauk Point afforded excellent facilities for cavalry drill, it was proposed to establish there a camp of preparation as well as of recuperation, for the expedition against Havana then still thought to be necessary. While I have no knowledge or even belief that the ordering of these 3,459 officers and men to Montauk Point was a detriment or that the sending of 5,505 horses and mules there caused additional sickness, yet their presence in a measure increased the confusion caused by the

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As already stated, upon the success of this movement was to depend the return of the remainder of the 5th Corps. Up to this time the yellow-fever situation was reported constantly "improving," and "not alarming," and even as late as July 29th "daily reports show rapid increase of cases, but at the same time they are not severe."

On the morning of the 2d of August the following despatch was received from General Shafter :

" I am told that at any time an epidemic of yellow-fever is liable to occur. I advise that the troops be moved as rapidly as possible while the sickness is of a mild type. With the departure of the first lot of prisoners, all but a brigade can go, and now cavalry division can be spared."

Later that day a conference was held at the White House, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Surgeon-General being present. As a result of that conference, General Shafter was notified that

" after full consultation with Surgeon-General, it is deemed best to have you move your command up to end of railroad, where yellow-fever is impossible. Then we will move them north as rapidly as possible. What do you advise?"

When General Shafter was informed that it was proposed to move his army " up to the end of the railroad," he sent the following cablegram, dated August 3d, and received the same day :

necessity suddenly thrust upon the department of expanding a recuperative camp originally intended for but 3,000 or 4,000 into a camp for 30,000. We were still preparing for war, as it was known that at least 180,000 Spanish troops, well armed, were in Cuba.

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Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

"In reply to telegram this date, stating that it is deemed best that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow-fever is impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says that it is not a good camping-ground. The country is covered with grass as high as a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the hills there is no water, and it will be required to pump water two miles. He also states that rainfall is twice as great as it is here and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been housed in barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is to immediately transport the 5th Corps and the detached regiments that came with it to the United States. If it is not done, I believe the death-rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow-fever in almost every regiment throughout the command. As soon as it develops they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise, not very many, it is true, and it is of a mild type, but nevertheless it is here. All men taken with it will, of course, have to be left and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken sick on the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than if an attempt is made to move this army to the interior, which is now really an army of convalescents; at least seventy-five per cent. of the men having had malarial fever, and all so much weakened by the exposure and hardships which they have undergone that they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be put at once on all the transports in the harbor and not crowded at all, and this movement should begin to-morrow and be completed before the fifteenth. All here believe the loss of life by doing this will be much less than if more time is taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out, there will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is past,

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and I believe there will be then very few to move. There are other diseases which are prevailing—typhoid-fever, dysentery, etc., and severe types of malarial-fever, which are quite as fatal as yellow-fever. The matter of moving this army has been placed before you, and you have the opinions of all commanding officers and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course left open for the preservation of this army. There can be no danger to the people at home, and it seems to me that infected ships is a matter of small moment.

SHAFTER,

“Major-General.”

The information this message contained was a great surprise. General Miles had reported, on the 16th of July: “It is hoped that by moving them (the troops) on high ground the fever may be stamped out.” General Shafter had cabled, July 22d, as we have seen, that “the minute the prisoners can be disposed of will put troops twenty miles inland on railroad, and hope for improvement,” and as late as the 2d of August the Surgeon-General had expressed the opinion that the fever could be stamped out by the removal to the high ground above the supposed fever belt. Moreover, up to the 2d of August, when General Shafter announced the army was threatened with a yellow-fever epidemic, the health reports from Cuba indicated a constantly improving condition, and the daily bulletins of sickness were beginning to show that more men were returning to duty than were going on the sick-list.

General Shafter’s report of August 1st (received August 2d) stated: “Total sick, 4,255; total fever cases, 3,164; new cases of fever, 653; cases of fever returned to duty, 722.”

Nevertheless, immediately upon the receipt of General Shafter’s message describing in detail the alarming condition of the army, he was directed (August 3d):

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" To move to the United States such of the troops under your command as are not required for duty at Santiago. You can use for that purpose the transports now at Santiago, and such others will be furnished you as rapidly as possible as you may wire may be necessary. How many troops in your judgment will be required to remain pending the removal of the Spanish prisoners, and when removed how many troops will be required to properly garrison the district which was surrendered to you? Whom do you intend to leave in command? Cannot the colored troops in your command be safely kept at Santiago for the time being? How many of them have you? Will send immunes. We have to-night ordered General Miles to send the *St. Louis* and *St. Paul*, which are now at Ponce, to Santiago to report to you. By order of the President.

R. A. ALGER,
" Secretary of War."

The letter to General Shafter, signed by his general officers, referred to in his alarming despatch of August 3d, and commonly known as the "Round Robin," was not received until August 4th. It was accompanied by a letter from the chief surgeons of his command. Both of these papers were received after General Shafter had been directed to repatriate his army, and the War Department had given instructions for additional transports to report to Santiago, and hastened orders for the increased accommodations at Montauk Point.

The "Round Robin" is as follows:

" SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI,

" August 3, 1898.

" (Received August 4, 1898.)

" *Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington.*

" Following letter giving the views of the general officers of this command is sent for the consideration of the War Department:

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“ ‘ To Major-General W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States forces in Cuba :

“ ‘ We, the undersigned general officers, commanding various brigades, divisions, etc., of the United States army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army must at once be taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern sea-coast of United States ; that this can be done without danger to the people of the United States ; that there is no epidemic of yellow-fever in the army at present—only a few sporadic cases ; that the army is disabled by malarial-fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow-fever sure to come in the near future. We know from reports from competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facilities for such move, if attempted, and will not be until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities in the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial-fever almost as badly as from yellow-fever. This army must be moved at once or it will perish. As an army it can be safely moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful and personal observations, and are also based upon the unanimous opinion of our medical officers, who are with the army and understand the situation absolutely. (Signed) Jos. Wheeler, Major-General Volunteers ; Samuel S. Sumner, commanding Cavalry Brigade ; William Ludlow, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., commanding 1st Brigade, 2d Division ; Adelbert Ames, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., commanding 3d Brigade, 1st Division ; Leonard Wood, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., commanding city Santiago ; Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel, commanding 2d Cavalry Brigade ; J. Ford Kent, Major-General Volunteers, commanding 1st Division, 5th Corps ; J. C. Bates, Major-General Volunteers, commanding Provisional Division, 5th Corps ; H. W. Lawton, Major-General Volunteers, commanding 2d Division, 5th Corps ; C. McKibbin, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., commanding 2d Brigade, 2d Division.’

“ SHAFTER, Major-General.”

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In further explanation, and to somewhat moderate the expressions describing the situation, General Shaft-er sent the following :

" SANTIAGO, August 8, 1898.

" Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington.

" In connection with my telegram of the 3d instant and the letter of the general officers to me of the same date, I have the honor to say that since then I have talked with the division commanders and they join me in saying that the first report was made so strong because of the weakened and exhausted condition of the command, more than seventy-five per cent. of which have been ill with a very weakening malarial-fever lasting from four to six days and which leaves every man too much broken down to be of any service, and in no condition to withstand an epidemic of yellow-fever which all regard as imminent, as there are more or less cases in every regiment here. For strong and healthy regiments coming here now and a little later, with plenty of tentage to cover them and not subject to any hardships and with plenty of nourishing food, the danger, in my opinion and that of the division commanders, will be reduced to a minimum. For days this command lay in trenches without shelter, exposed to sun and rain, and with only hard bread, bacon, and coffee, and these hardships account for its present condition, to none of which will troops coming now be subjected."

In adding his signature to the "Round Robin," General Lawton, with thorough military spirit, and an insight into the true situation which subsequent events proved to have been most remarkable, wrote the following endorsement :

" In signing the above letter, I do so with the understanding it has been seen and approved by the commanding general. I desire to express it as my strong opinion that ' the best medical authorities of the island ' and ' all the surgeons of the command ' be also required to sign the paper. At least the chief surgeon

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of the army and each division. I desire also to express the opinion that the mandatory language used in the letter is impolitic and unnecessary. Milder expressions to those high in authority generally accomplish just as much. It is also my opinion that much of the fatal illness is due to homesickness and other depressing influences."

Apparently, as a result of this recommendation, the chief surgeons sent the following to General Shafter:

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI, *August 3, 1898.*

"*Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington.*

"Following letter giving the opinion of the medical officers of this command is sent for the consideration of the War Department:

"*The Adjutant-General 5th Army Corps.*

"SIR,—The chief surgeon of the 5th Army Corps and the surgeons of divisions consider it to be their imperative duty, after mature deliberation, to express their unanimous opinion that this army is now in a very critical condition. They believe that the prevalent malarial-fever will doubtless continue its ravages, and that its mortality will soon increase; that there is imminent danger that the yellow-fever, now sporadic and of a mild type, may any day assume a virulent type and become epidemic. They unanimously recommend that the only course to pursue to save the lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole army to the United States as quickly as possible. Such transport they consider practicable and reasonably free from danger. The proposed move to the plateau of San Luis they believe dangerous and impracticable. Very respectfully, V. Havard, Major and Surgeon, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon; H. S. Kilbourne, Major and Surgeon, Chief Surgeon 2d Division, 5th Corps; M. Wood, Major and Chief Surgeon 1st Division, 5th Corps; Frank J. Ives, Major and Surgeon U. S. V., Chief Surgeon Provisional Division; H. S. T. Harris, Major and Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Surgeon Cavalry Division.'

SHAFTER,

"Major-General."

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For reasons of public policy the alarming information contained in General Shafter's messages received August 2d, 3d, and 4th, as well as the fact that the cavalry division had been ordered back August 1st and the entire army August 3d, were not made public.

It was therefore generally believed that the "Round Robin" was responsible for the orders issued from the War Department for the return of the 5th Corps, and for the selection of Montauk Point. As a matter of fact, it had nothing whatever to do with either.

The "Round Robin," exclusive of General Lawton's endorsement, and the paper signed by the surgeons just quoted were given to the Associated Press correspondent at Santiago, and were published throughout the United States and the world at large on the morning of August 4th.

Of the "Round Robin" itself, I have no criticism to offer. General Shafter invited his officers to a conference, and himself telegraphed to the War Department their conclusions and recommendations, which was entirely proper for him to do. But I do criticise the agencies through which these alarming utterances were given to the world. The publication of the "Round Robin" at that time was one of the most unfortunate and regrettable incidents of the war. This communication did not, as commonly reported, result in a selection of Montauk Point; neither did it hasten the return of the Santiago army, as every possible effort had already been made, and was then making, for the speedy repatriation of our troops. On the other hand, the information this startling paper made known not only brought terror and anguish to half the communities and neighborhoods in

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the land, but it returned to Cuba in due time to spread demoralization among our troops. It did more than this—it threatened, and might have accomplished even, an interruption of the peace negotiations then in progress between the United States and Spain. Those negotiations had been inaugurated by Spain on the 26th of July, through M. Cambon, the ambassador of France, and had reached their most delicate stage at the time when the “Round Robin,” with all its suggestions of panic and disaster, was made public in the four corners of the earth. That a satisfactory agreement between the two governments was at last reached cannot be credited to those who precipitately gave out information which might have prevented it. Moreover, the publication of this official letter was a gross breach of army regulations and military discipline; and through the agency of it the enemy secured information regarding our situation when the government was most anxious to conceal the facts until the acceptance of the demands of the United States could be assured.

The matter was regarded so seriously that, after a conference at the White House, the following message was sent:

“WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, *August 4, 1898.*
“*General Shafter, Santiago.*

“At this time, when peace is talked of, it seems strange that you should give out your cable signed by your general officers, concerning the condition of your army, to the Associated Press without permission from the War Department. You did not even await a reply to your communication.

“R. A. ALGER,
“Secretary of War.”

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To which General Shafter replied:

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *August 4, 1898.*

"*Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

"The report* was given out, as I have since learned, before it reached me. I called the general officers together, to tell them what I proposed to do and to express to them my views and ask them to give me theirs. I found we all felt alike. Some one then proposed they write me a letter, setting forth their views, and I told them to do so. Meanwhile I wrote my telegram, and later it was handed in and forwarded, with the letter of the surgeons and the letter of these officers. It was not until some time after that I learned their letter had been given to the press. It was a foolish, improper thing to do, and I regret very much that it occurred. . . .

. . . I have been very careful about giving to the press any information, and I will continue to be so.

"W. R. SHAFTER,
"Major-General."

It appears from General Shafter's official declaration, therefore, that the text of the "Round Robin" was made known to the press agents before the document itself reached him. When the President read the "Round Robin" for the first time in the newspapers he became very much excited and indignant. Every possible effort was made to ascertain the name of the person responsible for its publication that he might be called to a proper account for the act, but in vain.

To counteract the effect of the "Round Robin," the following statement was given to the press:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, *August 4, 1898.*

"The Secretary of War has ordered General Shafter's troops

* That is, the "Round Robin."

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relieved from further duty in Santiago as fast as transportation can be provided, and the transfer of Spanish prisoners will admit of reduction of the garrison. . . . These will sail for New York as fast as they can be comfortably embarked.

“The rest at Montauk Point will prepare these seasoned troops for the campaign against Havana, in which they will probably take part. The first transport left Santiago yesterday. The movement is expected to be completed by the 20th of the month. Five United States volunteer regiments, immunes, have been ordered to Santiago for garrison duty. The first has already arrived, the others are being pushed forward as rapidly as transportation can be furnished.”

As soon as the announcement was made that the “immune” regiments were to be sent to Santiago many protests were received against such action. No attention, however, could be paid to these communications. The following indicates their general character:

“MACON, GEORGIA, August 5, 1898.

“General H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

“It is distinctly understood throughout the whole country that the 3d Regiment United States Volunteers, although called immune, are no more immune from yellow-fever than any other volunteer regiment. It is composed almost exclusively of Georgians, nearly all of whom are very young men, and many of them minors. When enlisted, the government subjected them to a rigid physical examination, but no proof was demanded or desired as to their immunity from yellow-fever. To send these young men and boys to Santiago at this time, with no enemy to fight, is to expose them to the same deadly peril from yellow-fever as is now said to confront those who, having reaped the honors, are now demanding to be sent to a Northern seaside. If more troops were now needed at Santiago, or if fighting were to be done, then the order for this regiment would be approved by all, but

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it is a wholly different matter to send them into a pestilence that other soldiers, who are probably more nearly immune than they, may be removed from the danger. A solemn sense of my duty to these young men impels me, therefore, to request most earnestly and urgently that the order for their removal to Santiago be revoked. I send this without the knowledge of any officer or man in the regiment.

A. O. BACON,

"United States Senator."

It would be impossible to exaggerate the mischievous and wicked effects of the "Round Robin." It afflicted the country with a plague of anguish and apprehension. There are martyrs in all wars, but the most piteous of these are the silent, helpless, heartbroken ones who stay at home to weep and pray and wait—the mother, the sister, wife, and sweetheart. To their natural suspense and suffering these publications added the pangs of imaginary terrors. They had endured, through sympathy, the battle-field, the wasting hardships of the camp, the campaign in the tropics, the fever-stricken trench. They might at least have been spared this wanton torture, this inpalpable and formless yet overwhelming blow.

CHAPTER XVII

RÉSUMÉ OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

THE assault on San Juan Ridge, July 1st, of Kent's division of infantry and Wheeler's dismounted cavalry was made by about 7,000 men. According to General Wheeler's estimate the number was much less, resulting from the drifting away of numerous stragglers, from the prostration by heat of many more, and from details to care for the wounded.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the strength of the force opposed to us. A Spanish prisoner stated that there were between 250 and 300 men in the trenches of San Juan early on the morning of July 1st, and that at about eleven o'clock, before our assault, these were reinforced by 500 more. But these figures do not include the 400 marines who were also at least in the vicinity of San Juan Ridge, if not in the trenches, and took an active part in the fight. At least one naval officer, Lieutenant Bustamente, Admiral Cervera's chief-of-staff, died from the wounds received at San Juan Hill. This would bring the Spanish forces defending that immediate position to 1,150 men known to have formed part of troops there. At the time of our assault, July 1st, there were in Santiago not less than 12,000 Spanish regulars and 1,000 marines. If the Spanish did not have more than 1,150 men on San Juan Ridge, when it became evident that our attack

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was to be centred upon that point, then their commander was guilty of a tactical blunder utterly at variance with the skilful manner in which he conducted every other feature of his campaign. I do not give any credit to the report. A prisoner captured after the fight of July 1st stated that the Spanish casualties were 1,500. This was outside of the losses at Caney. It hardly seems probable that their killed and wounded could have been so great, fighting as they did behind strong entrenchments; but the Spanish loss was certainly large. On the 15th of July the officers of General Toral's staff, meeting in a council of war, stated that the force in Santiago then numbered 11,500,* and that there were 1,700 in hospital. Of the latter, however, a large number must have been sick, not wounded.

On the 2d of July, after the divisions of Lawton and Bates had reached San Juan Ridge and the hills flanking it on both sides, General Shafter could not have had on the firing line over 15,000 men at the most, including the 33d Michigan, at Aguadores, the 34th Michigan, and 9th Massachusetts, which came to the front from Siboney early July 2d. It is more probable that his force did not exceed 13,000. No other reinforcements reached him until July 11, when the 1st District of Columbia and the 1st Illinois Volunteers arrived. However, firing had then practically ceased.

On the 26th of May, General Linares reported to the Minister of War that he should need rations for 12,000 men in Santiago, and "cotton suits" for the same number. If we put the Spanish losses in battle and wounded and sick in hospital at 2,000, this would

* It is not believed that this included the volunteers.

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leave him an available force for the defence of the city, July 2d, of 10,000. On the night of the 3d of July Escario's column reinforced him to the extent of 3,654—bringing the total Spanish force in Santiago up to 13,500 in round numbers. The accuracy of these figures is confirmed by the number of prisoners that surrendered on the 17th of July. The statement is fully warranted, therefore, that the Spanish army in Santiago at least equalled in numbers the force under General Shafter besieging the city. The concurrent testimony of all American officers who took part in that campaign is that our available force* in the trenches was much less than General Toral had in Santiago.

No matter from what point, therefore, the campaign is viewed, the conclusion is inevitable that it was a most creditable victory for the American army as a whole, and for the individual soldiers composing it.

The offer to transport the Spanish prisoners to Spain contributed greatly to the surrender. It was not until this suggestion was made to the Spanish general that he consented to consider the question of complete surrender. Had he persisted in his proposal to evacuate Santiago with his forces, it would have necessitated either an assault or a protraction of the siege. In any event, the loss of life among our forces would doubtless have been great.

Outside of the advantage which this scheme pos-

* No reference is here made to General Garcia's force of Cubans, for the reason that their presence added no appreciable strength to our operations. The only duty assigned them—stopping Escario—they failed to perform, and General Shafter finally found it necessary to place our men in front of the Cubans.

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sessed of relieving the government from the annoyance and expense of guarding such a large number of prisoners; of avoiding any danger of yellow-fever infection from that source; and of enabling the department to retain the services of all vessels for our own immediate purposes, it exerted a most salutary influence upon General Toral's troops, who were already without interest in the war, and anxious, above all things, to return to their homes. The proposal had a most demoralizing effect, too, upon the Spanish troops in Cuba generally, and this was fully appreciated by General Blanco. To no other cause can be ascribed the alacrity with which 12,000 Spanish regulars, in the province of Santiago, outside of the city, surrendered without having fired a shot. When Lieutenant Miley, with a Spanish officer representing General Toral, appeared at San Luis and the other posts where parts of Toral's command were stationed, to make known the fact of their surrender, these several garrisons declined to accept his statement without verification, and sent commissions to Santiago for that purpose. Upon learning that they were to be immediately transported to their own country they accepted the conditions of surrender with unmistakable delight.

General Shafter wrote, on the 18th of July, after he had entered the city of Santiago, that the Spanish troops "are perfectly delighted at the thought of going home. I believe this knowledge of the disposition made of them, as soon as it reaches other troops in Cuba, will utterly demoralize the whole island." This prediction was confirmed by subsequent events and by the testimony of many Spanish officers. Imme-

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diately upon the fall of Santiago, the War Department set to work to arrange for the speedy return of Toral's army, and bids for transporting the prisoners were invited. Ten transatlantic steamship companies competed, nine of which submitted practically the same bids! The nine bids were all from British and German companies, as the ships of the American lines had been taken by the War and Navy Departments. The terms of each of these liners were: \$110 for commissioned officers, and \$55 for enlisted men, the steamers to be despatched from Santiago de Cuba within forty-eight hours of their arrival, or demurrage to be paid at the rate of sixty cents per capita a day passenger capacity; if passengers were on board during any day of delay, forty cents additional charge per capita per day was to be made. The same conditions were stipulated if the transports were detained at the place of destination by quarantine or other cause. The bid of the Spanish Transatlantic Company was \$55 for commissioned officers, and \$20 for enlisted men, with no demurrage. The bid of the Spanish company was accepted. These figures are given in detail, because at the time there was much criticism based upon a misapprehension of the facts. The bid of the Spanish company, in addition to being less than fifty per cent. of that of the other lines, had the advantage of placing the prisoners entirely under the control of citizens of their own country, and did not contemplate the use of vessels available to the government of the United States, since they sailed under the Spanish flag. Moreover, the Spanish line agreed to ship prisoners much earlier than the other lines. On the part of the United States, it was required that the ships

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should not be overcrowded; that commissioned officers should be furnished first-class accommodations, and that subsistence *en route* should be equal to the garrison ration of the United States army. To insure fulfilment of this contract, army officers were detailed to superintend loading and rations furnished.

The wisdom of giving the contract to this Spanish company was fully demonstrated by the successful manner in which the work was performed. No complaint ever reached the War Department of ill-treatment of the Spanish prisoners, or failure of the company to completely meet the requirements of its contract. The total number of prisoners thus shipped was 22,864, at a cost of \$513,860. The actual saving to the government, over the bids of the British and German lines, was practically \$800,000, not including possible demurrage charges.

After the surrender of Santiago, the relations between our troops and the Spaniards were of the most cordial character. General Shafter reported that the friendship between his men and General Toral's troops was something remarkable, and that it was with difficulty he could keep them apart. And of the Spanish prisoners themselves he said they were "the most orderly, tractable, and generally best-behaved men that I have ever known."

When they left Santiago these soldiers expressed their appreciation of the courteous treatment received from the general and his men in the following letters:

"SANTIAGO, CUBA, August 2, 1898.

"To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba.

"SIR,—The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place

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on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who are,

“ Your most humble servants,

“ PEDRO LOPEZ CASTILLO,

“ Private of Infantry.”

“ SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY,—We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our strength endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate towards the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective states; you fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated, a quality which we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but, hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world; have given an honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and, lastly, to us whose condition was terrible you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy; for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

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With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours who have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood as your conscience called for under the demand of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities.

“ From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.

“ PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,

“ Soldier of Infantry.

“ SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 21st of August, 1898.”

Although the greater part of the Santiago garrison had been in Cuba from two to three years, and were supposed to have become acclimated, and, notwithstanding the fact that the Spanish soldiers had had comfortable quarters, there was much sickness among them. When the American forces took possession of the city, no less than 2,000 Spanish soldiers were found in the hospitals. The deaths among them at the time of capitulation were said to number from thirty-five to fifty a day. In spite of their well-appointed hospitals and an abundance of medical supplies, the same Cuban fevers which later attacked practically our whole army had seized the Spanish troops.* Experience proved that, no matter what precautions were taken, or how favorable were the circumstances for preventing sickness, all American troops that came to the province of Santiago de Cuba, after the capitulation, sooner or later

* I personally visited these hospitals in April, 1899, and found them to be models of their kind.

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fell victims to the same diseases. The 5th United States Infantry, which reached Santiago after the campaign, were provided with floored tents, boiled water, fresh meat, vegetables, etc., and did not experience the exposure and hardships of Shafter's army, yet that regiment had the same kind and proportion of sickness, in spite of these precautions. Scarcely a man in it, or in any of the other regiments arriving after the fall of Santiago, escaped sickness. The statement has been made, and yet remains unchallenged, that not one per cent. of the troops which went to Santiago after the surrender escaped the Cuban malarial fevers which had previously seized the 5th Corps.

On this subject General Wood thus testified before the War Investigation Commission :

“ We had never served in that climate, so peculiarly deadly from the effects of malaria, and in this respect my opinions have changed very much since the close of the war. If I had been called before you in the first week of August I might have been disposed to have answered a little differently in some respects. I have been there ever since, and have seen regiments come to Cuba in perfect health and go into tents with floors and with flies, camped up on high hills, given boiled water, and have seen them have practically the identical troubles we had during the campaign. The losses may not have been as heavy, as we are organized to take them into hospitals protected from the sun, which seemed to be a depressing cause. All the immune regiments serving in my department since the war have been at one time or another unfit for service. I have had all the officers of my staff repeatedly too sick for duty. I don't think that any amount of precaution or preparation, in addition to what we had, would have made any practical difference in the sickness of the troops of the army of invasion. This is a candid opinion, and an absolutely frank

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one. If I had answered this question in August, without the experience I have had since August, I might have been disposed to attribute more to the lack of tentage than I do now ; but I think the food, while lacking necessarily in variety, was ample."

The experience of fresh troops arriving in Cuba after Shafter's army left warrants the assertion that the sickness of the 5th Corps was not due to the hardships of the campaign, but to climatic causes. This brings us to a consideration of the nature and causes of what has been referred to as the "hardships" of the Santiago campaign. The causes naturally fall under two heads: (1) Those which may be regarded as uncontrollable—the result of climatic conditions, or of military necessity, and (2) those discomforts attributable to deficiencies in kind or quantity of clothing, food, and medical supplies.

1. Of the climatic and uncontrollable cause, little need be said. The suffering from the intense heat, heavy tropical rains, lack of roads, and indigenous maladies followed logically the despatch of an expedition to the tropics at that season of the year. Our army would not have been sent to one of the most unhealthy sections of Cuba at the worst season of the year but for the fact that the Spanish admiral took refuge in Santiago Harbor. But in this, as in all campaigns, the enemy creates the problems, and no campaign ever furnishes a complete guide for another.

2. Of what had been charged with regard to the shortcomings in clothing, food, and medical supplies I think it can be shown that the deficiencies in this direction are almost, if not wholly, due to causes for

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which the climate and physical conditions were chiefly responsible.

With respect to clothing: It has already been shown that the department had no reserve supply on hand when war was declared. We may add, also, that the question of clothing suitable for use in the tropics had never been raised or considered. Immediately after the declaration of war the Quartermaster's Department undertook to secure khaki uniforms. When it was found that there was no khaki cloth made in the United States, and that no establishment here could make it, contracts were let, as an emergency makeshift, for the manufacture of uniforms of duck and drill—the only available substitutes. Despite the best efforts of the Quartermaster-General, the first delivery of these tropical suits only amounted to 5,000 (exclusive of Colonel Wood's regiment) before Shafter's army sailed from Tampa, but by the second week in July canvas uniforms for the entire 5th Corps reached Siboney. While some discomfort resulted from this failure to furnish canvas uniforms immediately, it is not in order to blame the Quartermaster's Department. The regular army was clothed as it had always been for campaigns in Texas, Arizona, and the almost tropical arid plains of the Southwest. Under the circumstances, the worst that can be said in this connection is that some inconvenience resulted, but no death nor any hardship worthy of the name.

In spite of the calamitous newspaper reports to the contrary, and the statements of amateur soldiers accompanying the 5th Corps, there was never a day at Santiago when the troops at the front were not supplied with the three most important components of the

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army ration—coffee (and sugar), bacon, and hard bread,* although the most of them threw away their haversacks, containing three days' rations, as they went into action. This is always the case where an army goes into action carrying its complete outfit. The usual way is to stack everything but guns and ammunition and the least clothing possible. Americans, however, had never before campaigned where everything left behind was stolen. The full ration al-

* I do not wish to depreciate, and I certainly would not belittle, the discomforts experienced by General Shafter's troops in Cuba. And yet the hardships of the brief Santiago campaign are not comparable to what almost every soldier repeatedly went through during the Civil War.

General Grant has described in his *Memoirs* the condition of the Federal army as he found it after Rosecrans's defeat about Chattanooga. It must be remembered that these conditions existed within the boundaries of the United States—on our own territory—and after the Civil War had been in progress two and a half years (the fall of 1863). General Grant says (pp. 24 and 25, vol. ii.):

"The country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef, driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there—'on the lift.' Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on 'half rations of hard bread and *beef dried on the hoof*.'

"Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps."

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lowed by law included, in addition to articles just mentioned, fresh meat, beans, rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, etc. Of these, four months' supplies were taken on the transports. The reinforcements that subsequently arrived brought with them supplies of all kinds for the same period. There was aboard the transports, therefore, no lack at any time of the full ration allowed by law for the entire army. It was simply a question of transportation—from the ships to the shore, and thence to the front. The unusual and harassing difficulties attending this operation have already been discussed.

During the campaign there was a lack of surgeons and hospital supplies. Attention has already been invited to the fact that, after the assignments to volunteer organizations and other details, there were left but fifty-nine surgeons of the regular army available as regimental surgeons with the regular troops. Thirty-six of these were sent with Shafter's army. In addition, there were fifteen volunteer surgeons with the volunteer regiments, and twenty contract doctors, giving a total of seventy-one surgeons for an army of approximately 17,000; about four to every 1,000 men. The number proved to be inadequate; but it was thought by those in charge of the expedition that the Santiago campaign would be of very short duration, and not likely to result in many casualties or much sickness. Admiral Sampson said, on June 7th, that the fleet and city "would be ours in forty-eight hours" with 10,000 men; the major-general commanding, in his instructions to General Shafter, said: "It is not expected that you will go but a short distance inland." Moreover, it was not deemed advisable by the Surgeon-

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General to send from the United States at that time more regular surgeons; they were needed for the vast army of volunteers then assembling in camps for the expedition against Havana, and to instruct the inexperienced volunteer surgeons coming into the service. This matter, as with others of a professional nature, was left to the judgment of the Surgeon-General of the army.

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2d Brigade (Evan Miles's) ..	1	15	6	43	15	127	69	945	4	77	25	335	..	2	..	10	1	1	1	11	869	17,365
1st U. S. Infantry
4th U. S. Infantry
25th U. S. Infantry
3d Brigade (Chaffec's)
7th U. S. Infantry
12th U. S. Infantry
17th U. S. Infantry
Independent Brig. (Bates's)
3d U. S. Infantry
20th U. S. Infantry
Cavalry Division (Wheeler's)
1st Brigade (Sumner)
3d U. S. Cavalry
6th U. S. Cavalry
9th U. S. Cavalry
2d Brigade (Young's)
1st U. S. Cavalry
10th U. S. Cavalry
1st U. S. V. Cavalry
Artillery Battalion
E, 1st Artillery
K, 1st Artillery
A, 2d Artillery
F, 2d Artillery
G, 4th Artillery (Siege Art.)
H, 4th Artillery (Siege Art.)
General Duffield's Brigade
9th Mass. Infantry
33d Michigan Infantry
34th Michigan Infantry
Total	1	15	6	43	15	127	69	945	4	77	25	335	..	2	..	10	1	1	1	11	869	17,365

* Estimated—no return.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

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The large number of wounded and the epidemic of sickness that occurred were unexpected* by officers best qualified to judge such matters. There was, therefore, a lack of medicines, tents, ambulances, cots, and litters. And yet it appears that with each regular regiment leaving Tampa three months' medical supplies were taken. Full equipment for four divisional hospitals was organized, while, as a reserve, one-half of the supplies in the medical depot at Tampa were sent on the *Segurança*. Every rational provision appears to have been made by the medical department for medicines and supplies. The deficiencies in both seem to have been due to an insufficient number of transports to take all the hospital equipment and ambulances, and to the inadequate means of transporting supplies from the vessels off Siboney to the land.

General Shafter left Tampa under imperative orders to sail at once. Owing to the limited number of transports at his disposal, he was confronted with the question as to whether he should sacrifice troops to ambulances. To take the full number of ambulances on hand for the four divisional hospitals, he would have *been compelled* to devote one entire ship to that purpose, and that would have entailed the abandonment at Tampa of 1,000 to 1,500 men. He determined to take troops. He intended to rely upon his supply wagons for conveying the wounded and sick, if necessity demanded. For this decision and the results which flowed from it General Shafter

* In his testimony before the War Investigation Commission (vol. vii., p. 3199) General Shafter said: "We had been led to believe the force at Santiago was very small;" and, again, "I had no idea we were going to have 1,500 men wounded."

RÉSUMÉ OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

has frankly assumed the entire responsibility. He should have left the Miles shields and siege-train and taken ambulances instead. The deficiency in medicines was due to a combination of causes; to the failure, in the first instance, to land the regimental medical chests from the transports, and to the unexpected epidemic that suddenly seized the army during the latter part of July. The chief surgeon of the 5th Corps is responsible for the statement that two-thirds of the regimental chests, with supplies for three months, were not removed from the transports until after Santiago had fallen; and the records of the War Department show that the medical supplies on six of the transports of the original expedition were not unloaded until the 30th of July. Moreover, at least two vessels, the *Grande Duchesse* and the *Mobile*, returned to the United States with a large quantity of medical stores aboard which should have been unloaded at Santiago. These supplies were not finally unloaded until the vessels made a second trip to Santiago, when the urgent necessity for medical supplies had passed. No excuse can be given for the carelessness in shipping these supplies, or for not putting them ashore with the army. Some conception of the quantities of medicine shipped to Santiago may be formed when it is stated that, in addition to the material previously landed, the hospital ship *Relief* reached Siboney, July 8th, with 700 tons of medicine and hospital equipment, and that there was, besides, the Red Cross ship *State of Texas*. Moreover, further supplies, nurses, and surgeons arrived on the 24th, and the *Olivette*, with large quantities of medical stores and hospital outfit, reached Santiago August 3d.

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The shortage in medical and hospital supplies, up to the date of the surrender—July 17th—in addition to the carelessness in shipping, was due to the same causes that embarrassed the delivery of food on the firing line—that is, to the lack of means for unloading the ships, resulting from the loss of lighters, heretofore mentioned, and the difficulty of transporting material of all kinds from Siboney to San Juan Ridge. It should not be forgotten, however, that every man wounded in the fight of Las Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan, either had upon his person, or was at once furnished with, the “first-aid packet.” To the immediate use of this antiseptic dressing must be ascribed the low mortality among the wounded, which was only seven per cent. for the entire campaign. The mortality for the entire 5th Corps while in Cuba was but 659, of which 243 were killed in battle or died from wounds. The deaths from disease, 416 (including forty-six from yellow-fever), are remarkably small when it is understood that the army was subjected to a tropical-fever epidemic, and that during the brief campaign nearly ninety per cent. of the entire 5th Corps was stricken down with one or another form of tropical fever.

Reference has been made to the loss of the lighters and barges accompanying the original expedition, as well as the accidents to those subsequently sent. Brigadier-General Charles F. Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster of the 5th Corps, has stated that, in the light of his experience, it would have been better to have taken more steam-lighters and barges for disembarking the troops and supplies, though he says that but for the accidents to the lighters and barges the diffi-

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culties in getting material to the shore would have been avoided. However, a part of the time the sea off Siboney and Daiquiri was so rough that it was impossible to do any unloading whatsoever. Two hundred and two wagons, including seven ambulances, together with eight pack-trains, formed the transportation taken with the 5th Corps. Undoubtedly this would have been sufficient but for the impassable roads. General Shafter stated in his testimony before the War Investigation Commission: "There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the surrender could all the wagons I had be used."

The roads were so bad the pack-mules could take but one-half of their accustomed loads a great portion of the time. Moreover, by the 10th of July, when the transportation of supplies and ammunition had fallen entirely upon the pack-trains, half of the expert packers were disabled by heat-exhaustion and disease. In consequence of this, two whole pack-trains were put out of service. These conditions were aggravated by the necessity of feeding 5,000 Cubans of General Garcia's army. And yet, embarrassed as he was from bad roads, and the consequent impossibility of using all his wagons, transportation, and pack-mules, after the 5th of July, General Shafter was called upon to feed 20,000 Cuban refugees at El Caney or see them starve.

Considered from any point of view one may elect, the Santiago campaign was without precedent. General Shafter was informed that "time is the essence of the situation," and he was instructed by the major-general commanding the army to "limit the animals to the least number for artillery and trans-

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portation." General Shafter was selected for the expedition, as he had established in the Civil War a reputation as a "rough-and-ready" campaigner. He left Tampa before his expedition was thoroughly prepared because of Admiral Sampson's urgent and justifiable message to the effect that "every consideration demands immediate movement," upon which the President based his instructions of the evening of June 7th "to sail at once." The emergency demanded an immediate movement on Santiago, and thorough preparation was sacrificed to that estimate of the situation. The fact that he was delayed a week on account of the "Ghost Fleet" does not affect this statement. His army, its supplies and animals, were aboard the transports during that time, momentarily expecting orders to sail, and little could be done outside of a rearrangement to relieve the congestion on some of the vessels.

When the army reached Santiago the necessity for precipitate action was intensified by local conditions and the question of health, in spite of innumerable difficulties of the most harassing nature. "The campaign," said General Ludlow, in his testimony before the War Investigation Commission, "was a race between the physical vigor of the men and the Cuban malarial fever that lay in wait for them, and if General Shafter had awaited to do all these things [constructing roads, docks, etc.], the army would have been on its back before the surrender instead of after, and we could not have taken Santiago as we did." Two weeks' delay, with disease as an ally, would have defeated the 5th Corps. A general less aggressive or less sensible to the necessity of an impulsive campaign would have failed by detaining his army in Cuba for

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preparations. Neither the necessity nor the conditions permitted a campaign on the lines laid down by tactics and military precepts. Moreover, the problems to be met were entirely new. The American army had never before operated under similar conditions, not excepting the Mexican War. The Santiago campaign saw the regular army assembled together for the first time since 1865. New weapons, and new tactics resulting therefrom, were quantities that could not be determined in advance, in the absence of any experience. This campaign furnished the first instance of a conflict between two armies each equipped with magazine rifles of great range, small caliber, and smokeless powder.

Eighty-nine newspaper correspondents accompanied General Shafter's expedition, or about six to a regiment of 1,000 men. Not five per cent. of these representatives of the press had ever seen a battle, and very few, if any, were experienced war correspondents. The hardships of war were entirely new to them, and a large proportion of the reports in the daily press should have been read at the time with this understanding. Many of the accounts criticising the conduct of that campaign were absolutely without foundation in fact. I refer to such statements as the reports of the alleged massacre of Spanish prisoners in our possession by Cubans; the starving of our troops in the trenches, etc., etc.

It is to be said of the operations of the 5th Corps that throughout the entire campaign not a complaint was received by the War Department from any officer or enlisted man in the regular army. The reasons for this are too apparent to require explanation. The reg-

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ular soldier endured with Spartan fortitude and cheerfulness any and all discomforts which the operations of an army in the field invariably carry with them. General Lawton and General Wood, both good types of the American regular soldier, have testified that they endured on more occasions than one greater hardships in Indian campaigns than the Santiago expedition entailed.

But what are the facts, after all? Shafter's army landed in Cuba, June 22d-24th. The surrender of the Spanish garrison in Santiago occurred July 16th (the formal capitulation the next day). June 24th to July 16th, a total of twenty-three days, represents the length of time covered by the siege and actual hostilities. The losses in battle during the entire period, including the engagements of Guasimas, Caney, and San Juan Ridge, amounted to the total of but 243 killed, officers and men, and 1,445 wounded.

After all that has been said or written of the Santiago campaign, it must be admitted that the expedition was successful beyond the most sanguine expectation.* Landing on a hostile coast, in a tropical country, at the worst season of the year, in an open roadstead, with a heavy surf beating upon a coral shore, the American forces drove the enemy from his intrenched outposts, forcing him back from line to line, until finally he took refuge in his last and strongest defences, immediately surrounding the city of Santiago. The resistless advance of that army forced the Spanish fleet

* "Such a disembarkation," says Admiral Sampson in his report (see p. 864, Report of Secretary of Navy for 1898), "in the face of the enemy and upon a surf-bound coast of the character of this, must be regarded as a very successful piece of work."

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out of the harbor and secured the surrender of 24,000 prisoners, almost as many arms, over 1,000,000 rations, and a territory embracing practically all that part of Cuba east of Aserradero. And this capture of the Spanish army, consisting of a much larger force than our own, was accomplished without the loss of a prisoner, without the loss of a gun, and without the loss of a color, notwithstanding the fact that during a period of nearly two weeks, when the question of keeping up communication with the base of supplies was most serious, our army fed, in addition to its own forces, 5,000 Cubans and 20,000 helpless men, women, and children, whom the fortune of war had thrust into our keeping.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO

IN discussing the general plans of campaign, we have already seen that the major-general commanding the army regarded the capture of Puerto Rico more important than that of Santiago. There is no doubt but that this was his best judgment, and, furthermore, that he believed it would require a large force to take the island. His telegram of June 6th from Tampa, in which his views on this matter were expressed, has already been quoted. It will be remembered that in that despatch he suggested that Santiago be left "safely guarded," while he, with the remainder of the 5th Corps, and the assistance of the navy, captured Puerto Rico, "before it can be reinforced." He proposed that this expedition should be immediately increased by 30,000 men. He also recommended that when Puerto Rico was taken, a sufficient force be left to hold it, while the balance of his army return and capture Santiago, which he believed could be "easily accomplished." The President promptly disapproved the plan, and directed that Santiago be taken first.

The day following (June 7th) this telegram was sent to General Miles at Tampa :

"As you report that an expedition to Puerto Rico with 30,000 troops can be ready in ten days, you are directed to assemble such troops at once for the purpose."

THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO

In order that he might confer with the President and Secretary of War concerning his plans, after Shafter had sailed the general was directed to return to Washington. This was on the 15th of June. After repeated conferences, the general was furnished detailed and specific instructions for the organization of his army. His orders thus read:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,

“WASHINGTON, *June 26, 1898.*

“*Major-General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

“SIR,—By direction of the President an expedition will be organized with the least possible delay under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke, U. S. A., consisting of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the 1st and 3d Army Corps, and two divisions from the 4th Army Corps, for movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition, and you will command the forces thus united in person.

“Transports for this service will be assembled at Tampa with the least possible delay. The naval forces will furnish convoy and co-operate with you in accomplishing the object in view. You will place yourself in close touch with the senior officer of the navy in those waters, with the view to harmonious and forceful action.

“Estimates will be made by you immediately on the several staff departments for the necessary supplies and subsistence, such estimates to be submitted to the Secretary of War.

“For the information of the President, copies of all orders and instructions given by you, from time to time, will be forwarded on the day of their issue to the Adjutant-General of the army. Also daily report of the state and condition of your command will be made to the Secretary of War direct.

“It is important that immediate preparation be made for this

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movement and, when ready, report to this department for further instructions. Very respectfully,

“ R. A. ALGER,
“ Secretary of War.”

General Miles acknowledged receipt of his orders in a formal note of June 27th as follows:

“ I assume that it is expected that I, as general commanding the army, will give the necessary instructions for the equipment of the expedition with cavalry, light artillery, siege train, wagon, and pack transportation, reserve ammunition and ammunition train, engineer battalion, signal corps, balloon material, pontoon train, intrenching tools, hospital supplies, etc., which will be needed to effectively equip an expedition of the character contemplated.”

On July 5th the general sent the following communication:

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
“ WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1898.



“ *The Honorable the Secretary of War.*

“ SIR,—As the object for which the army was sent to Santiago de Cuba has been accomplished—viz., the forcing of the Spanish fleet out of the harbor and its destruction by the navy,* I deem the present time most favorable for proceeding immediately to Puerto Rico. I consider it of the highest importance that we should take and keep that island, which is the gateway to the Spanish possessions on the Western Hemisphere, and it is also important that our troops should be landed there as early as possible during this month. There are now about 4,000 men on transports at Key West, approximately 7,000 will soon be at Charleston, S. C.,

* In his despatch of May 30th to Shafter, General Miles says: “Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet.” (See p. 63, chap. vi., “Embarkation at Tampa.”)

A T L A N T I C O C E A N

PORTO RICO




EXPLANATION

- Railroads ————
- Country Roads ————
- Municipalized Highways ————

Barrow & Co., Engravers, N.Y.

Lengths West from Greenwich. 66° 30' 65° 30' 64° 30' 63° 30'

15° 30' 15° 30' 15° 30' 15° 30'



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO

and there are already 20,000 at Santiago. If this force is not sufficient, the transports can return for more if required.

“Very respectfully,

“NELSON A. MILES,

“Major-General Commanding.”

This proposition to withdraw our army from the siege of the garrison and city of Santiago was, of course, not approved.

Three days after the date of this letter General Miles sailed from Charleston with from 3,000 to 4,000 men as reinforcements for General Shafter's army. He did not return to the United States until after his Puerto Rican campaign.

It was the original plan, as expressed in the order to General Miles on June 26th, to use whatever available force General Shafter might have, after the capture of Santiago, as part of the Puerto Rican expedition. Soon after the general reached Cuba, July 11th, it became evident that, owing to the presence of yellow-fever in the 5th Corps, no part of that army could be used in Puerto Rico. The Secretary of War suggested to the general, in a telegraphic note of July 14th, that he return to the United States for the purpose of personally superintending the organization and despatch of this Puerto Rican army, in accordance with the President's instructions, twice communicated to him. This suggestion, however, the general did not follow.

On the 18th of July the general thus cabled:

“PLAYA, July 18, 1898.

“(Received 11.19 A.M.)

“Secretary of War, Washington.

“On board U. S. S. *Yale*, Guantanamo, July 18, 1898.—I consider it of highest importance that some officers of the navy, with

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efficient force, should proceed with me immediately to Puerto Rico, in order to seize wharfs and commanding positions at and in vicinity of Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. We can land and take position to cover the deployment of the troops as fast as they arrive. After consultation with Admiral Sampson, that place was considered best. I can land there or on one of the islands. One transport can remain and balance return, including *Yale*. It has abundance of coal to go there and return to New York. Not safe to transfer these troops to transports that have men on who have been exposed to fever. I hope that you will ask that Admiral Schley be designated and directed to co-operate with my movement and support my command. Will remain at cable station and can talk freely with you.

MILES,

“Major-General Commanding.”

In answer to this despatch, final orders, resulting from the altered circumstances, were made known to General Miles as follows:

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

“WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1898*—1.10 P.M.

“*Major-General Miles, on board Yale, Guantanamo Playa.*

“In reply to your telegram of this date, the Secretary of War directs you land troops now on *Yale* and other transports at such points in Puerto Rico as you may designate. He gives you the fullest discretion, but your determination of time and place of such landing should be made with full knowledge that reinforcements cannot reach you from five to seven days from this date. Admiral Sampson will be ordered to give you such assistance as you and he may regard as necessary. The Secretary of War further directs that, on your landing on the island of Puerto Rico, you hoist the American flag. Ernst's brigade, from Charleston, should sail to-day, and so should the troops from Tampa; so that it is quite possible that, by your leaving orders at Santiago, or giving them direct, these reinforcements may reach you earlier than herein stated, but the Secretary of War and the President did not think it well for you to consider them sure at an earlier date.

H. C. CORBIN,

“Adjutant-General.”

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At this time, although 30,000 troops were assembling under Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Schwan, to reinforce General Miles, he thus cabled the War Department:

"PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAITI, *July 20, 1898.*

"(Received 8.25 P.M.)

"*Secretary War, Washington.*

"There is an excellent battalion of about 500 marines here. If the President would authorize, would like to take them with my command to Puerto Rico, as they are anxious to go and the navy has no further use for them. MILES."

To this message the following reply was sent:

"*July 20, 1898.*

"*General Miles, Playa del Este, Cuba.*

"I do not think well of your suggestion about marines. We have army enough for our work. Do not take Colonel Humphrey away from Santiago.

R. A. ALGER,

"Secretary of War."

After the tedious delay caused by the discussion regarding the character of the convoy, General Miles set sail from Guantanamo July 21st. Before sailing he indicated the strength of the command accompanying him by this despatch:

"FROM PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July 21, 1898.*

"*Secretary of War, Washington.*

"The following troops are with me aboard transports Guantanamo harbor *en route* to Puerto Rico: four light batteries, 3d and 4th, Lomias battery B, 5th Artillery, 6th Illinois, 6th Massachusetts, 275 recruits for regiments 5th Corps, 6th Signal Corps, 7th Hospital Corps—3,415 all told; others expected daily.

"MILES."

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These troops were commanded by Brigadier-General Garretson, of General Henry's division.

Point Fajardo, a cape on the northeast coast of Puerto Rico, was selected by General Miles and Admiral Sampson as the best landing-place for the expedition. July 26th the War Department was informed, through an Associated Press despatch, that the forces under General Miles, which left Guantanamo Bay July 21st, had landed at Port Guanica, on the southwest coast of Puerto Rico. This was the first intimation of a change that reached Washington. Guanica is but a short distance west of Ponce, and almost diametrically opposite the place originally selected for the disembarkation—Point Fajardo, on the northeast coast. The press despatches referred to were to this effect:

“The United States expedition under the command of Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding army of United States, which left Guantanamo Bay during the evening of Thursday last, July 21st, was landed here—Port of Guanica—safely to-day, after a skirmish with a detachment of the Spanish troops and a crew of thirty belonging to the launch *Funistas*, auxiliary gunboat *Gloucester*, formerly Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan's steam-yacht *Corsair*.⁸ Four Spaniards were killed and no Americans were hurt. The troops were pushed forward promptly in order to capture the railroad leading to Ponce, which is only about ten miles east of this place.”

General Miles had wisely insisted upon a large convoy for his expedition on the grounds that there was “nothing to prevent the small Spanish gunboats coming out of the harbor of San Juan and attacking the transports *en route*.”

The announcement that he had suddenly changed

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his destination caused much anxiety, as two expeditions, to form part of the Puerto Rican command, were then at sea *en route* to Point Fajardo, and without any convoy whatsoever. Major-General James H. Wilson had sailed from Charleston with his command (3,571 officers and men) July 20th, and Brigadier-General Theodore Schwan had left Tampa on the 24th with 2,896 officers and men. Fear was entertained that these unprotected transports with their troops might be attacked by some of the small gunboats then thought to be in San Juan Harbor, and this message was therefore sent him :

“ WASHINGTON, *July 26, 1898.*

“ *Major-General Miles, Puerto Rico.*

“ Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why did you change? Doraco, near Ensenada, about fifteen miles west of San Juan, is reported an excellent place to land. The *Yosemite* went in there and remained several days. Did you send ships to direct Schwan and Wilson, now *en route*, where to find you? General Brooke will leave Fortress Monroe to-morrow.

“ R. A. ALGER,

“ Secretary of War.”

To which General Miles replied :

“ VIA BERMUDA, ST. THOMAS, *July 26, 1898.*

“ *Secretary of War, Washington.*

“ Circumstances were such that I deemed it advisable to take the harbor of Guanica first, fifteen miles west of Ponce, which was successfully accomplished between daylight and eleven o'clock. Spaniards surprised. The *Gloucester*, Commander Wainwright, first entered the harbor ; met with slight resistance ; fired a few shots. All the transports are now in the harbor, and infantry and artillery rapidly going ashore. This is a well-protected harbor ; water sufficiently deep for all transports, and heavy vessels can anchor within a few hundred yards of shore. The

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Spanish flag was lowered and the American flag raised at eleven o'clock to-day. Captain Higginson, with his fleet, has rendered able and earnest assistance. Hope to move on Ponce in a few days, that being the largest city in Puerto Rico. Notification has been sent to transports going to Cape San Juan, and all transports and supplies should be directed to this port or Ponce until further notice. Troops in good health and best spirits. No casualties.

“ MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding Army.”

Later he wrote, in further explanation of the change in his movements:

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ PORT OF PONCE, PUERTO RICO, *July 30, 1898.*

“ *The honorable the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

“ SIR,—This command was made up of detachments of troops sent from Santiago, Tampa, Charleston, and Newport News, and it was not intended at first to make more than a rendezvous for the purpose of organizing the command at Guantanamo, or one of the islands near Cape San Juan. On the representation of one of the naval officers, however, Point Fajardo was selected. It was later found that this point was more of an open roadstead than a safe harbor, and, further, that it was well known that we were to land there, the Spaniards being thus enabled to concentrate their forces in that vicinity before our arrival. In addition to this, I found later that the road was not suitable there for wagons or artillery. Before leaving Guantanamo, however, I had expected lighters, steam tugs, etc., to be sent from Santiago, and also a construction corps from New York. None of these arrived, nor did we meet them, as expected, in the Windward Passage. This left the command without lighters and no wagon transportation. The above are some of the reasons why I decided to take the harbors of Guanica and Ponce, where we were least expected, and from which latter point there is a macadamized road, which cost the Spanish government millions of dollars, and over which it is only seventy miles to San Juan.

“ We have now landed in a perfectly healthy country, well

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settled, and where, if necessary, a large amount of beef can be obtained and also transportation, and under the circumstances, in my mind, much more suitable and more important, in a strategic way, than the other point; besides ample time will be furnished here for thoroughly organizing the expedition before the march, and for creating a favorable impression upon the people. Every precaution has been taken to notify transports coming to proceed to this point, a large number of which have arrived.

“ Marching across the country, rather than under the guns of the fleet, will have in every way a desirable effect upon the inhabitants of this country. At least four-fifths of the people hail with great joy the arrival of United States troops, and requests for our national flag to place over public buildings come in from every direction.

“ I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ NELSON A. MILES,

“ Major-General Commanding.”

General Wilson sailed with his command to Point Fajardo where he received word of the change in plans, and thence moved to Ponce, arriving there on the 28th. General Schwan, with his command, reached the same place two days later. Fortunately they met with no hostile ship or accident.

The change in destination was undoubtedly warranted by the circumstances and subsequent events, and General Miles's action in the matter was both wise and commendable. It probably saved a battle.

General Guy V. Henry's division, of which the expedition leaving Guantanamo July 21st was largely composed, arrived off Guanica July 25th, and began disembarkation the same day. The difficulties in landing experienced at Siboney and Daiquiri by General Shafter's corps were not met with here. Guanica had a protected harbor, with deep water close ashore,

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so near, in fact, that pontoon bridges could be pushed out from the transports to the shore line. Moreover, a large number of lighters were found in the harbors of Guanica and Ponce. They were seized and used for the disembarkation of troops and supplies.

In addition to General Henry's division, which left Guantanamo accompanied by General Miles, there were three other expeditions forming the Puerto Rican command. These were the troops under Major-General Wilson, which landed at Ponce July 28th; the command of Brigadier-General Schwan arriving at the same place two days later; and the forces under Major-General Brooke, which sailed from Newport News for Puerto Rico July 28th. When he reached Ponce, General Brooke was directed to disembark his troops at Arroyo, a short distance east of that place.

The arrival of General Brooke gave a total force, in Puerto Rico, of 15,199 men,* and 106 mortars, howitzers, field, and siege-guns.

On July 26th, the day following the disembarkation at Guanica of the force accompanying General Miles, Brigadier-General Garretson's brigade, of General Henry's division, had a spirited skirmish. The next day the same command had an affair at Yauco, which

* I am informed by the office of the Adjutant-General of the army that General Miles rendered no "return" of his troops in Puerto Rico. These figures are based upon the despatch of the major-general commanding, dated July 21st, in which he states that his force all told at Guantanamo numbered 3,415; the report of General Wilson of July 20th to the effect that he had 3,571 officers and men on transports ready to sail; the report of General Schwan of July 23d that 2,896 officers and men of his command would sail next day; and the despatches of July 28th from Major-General Brooke and Brigadier-General Hains announcing that their commands consisted respectively of 1,272 and 4,045 officers and men—a total of 15,199.

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was at once occupied in the advance on Ponce, where the command arrived July 28th. Our casualties were four wounded. The Spaniards are reported to have lost three killed and thirteen wounded. The American flag was raised over Ponce, where the people received our troops with unfeigned enthusiasm and cordiality. The small force of Spanish soldiers in the vicinity fell back in the mountains, which run the full length of the island.

Ponce is said to be the largest city of Puerto Rico, having a population of 22,000, and a jurisdiction of 47,000 people. It is connected with San Juan, the capital city, by a most excellent military road, seventy miles long. This, the best and principal highway of the island, equal to any in the United States, passes over sierras, hills, and heights. The enemy took up a strong position on the Ponce-San Juan road at Coama and Aibonito. These places they thoroughly fortified, although naturally they are well provided for defence, as Aibonito has an elevation of nearly 3,000 feet.

The interval between the landing of the several expeditions and the 8th of August was devoted to preparations for the campaign. The forces accompanying Generals Henry, Wilson, and Schwan were assembled at Ponce and vicinity, where headquarters of the army were established. In general terms the plan of campaign consisted of operations in the western part of the island, to drive out the Spanish garrisons there, combined with a direct movement against San Juan, the principal objective. The execution of the advance across the island on San Juan, and the expulsion of hostile detachments from the southern and western parts of the island, required four separate

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military movements. These forces were thus organized:

Major-General John R. Brooke, in command of the 1st Corps. Immediately under him was Brigadier-General P. C. Hains, commanding the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Army Corps. This brigade consisted of the 4th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; 3d Illinois Volunteer Infantry; 4th Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Troop H, 6th Cavalry; Philadelphia City Cavalry; Battery B, Pennsylvania Artillery; Battery A, Missouri Artillery; Battery A, Illinois Artillery; 27th Indiana Artillery; battalion Signal Corps; two dynamite-guns.

Major-General James H. Wilson commanded the 1st Division, 1st Corps. His command consisted of the 16th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; 3d Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry; 2d Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry; Battery F, 3d Artillery; Battery B, 5th Artillery—Brigadier-General O. H. Ernst, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Corps.

Brigadier-General Guy V. Henry was in command of what was known as a "Provisional Division," consisting of one battalion 19th Infantry; 6th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 6th Illinois Volunteer Infantry; Troop B, 2d United States Cavalry—Brigadier-General G. A. Garretson, 1st Brigade, Provisional Division.

Brigadier-General Theodore Schwan commanded what was known as the "Independent Brigade," consisting of 11th Infantry; 1st Kentucky Volunteers (joined him after engagements had been fought); Troop A, 5th Cavalry; Battery C, 3d Artillery; Battery D, 5th Artillery. It was proposed that, in the

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final movement on San Juan, his brigade should form part of Henry's "Provisional Division."

In addition to the forces of these four separate organizations, the garrisons of Ponce and vicinity consisted of two battalions 19th Infantry; 1st Illinois Volunteers; Battery M, 7th Artillery; Battery C, 7th Artillery; Battery G, 5th Artillery; Battery B, 5th Artillery; detachments of Provisional Battalion Engineers, battalion Signal Corps, and United States Engineers.

In detail, the plan of campaign required a movement against the Spanish strongholds at Coama and Aibonito by General Brooke and General Wilson, and a concerted advance by Generals Henry and Schwan over the western portion of the island northward to Arecibo, a small town on the north coast, about thirty-five miles from San Juan, with which it is connected by a railroad.

General Brooke disembarked August 3d, 4th, and 5th, at Arroyo, forty-five miles east of Ponce, and thence moved to Guayamo, a short distance westward. His objective point was to be Cayey, a small town on the military road running from Ponce to San Juan, and in the rear of Aibonito. He was to intercept the Spanish forces, should they attempt to withdraw from Aibonito, against which General Wilson was to advance on the main road direct. In moving to Guayamo from Arroyo, August 5th, the troops under General Hains met with some slight opposition, our casualties being four wounded. The place was taken, and the small garrison driven to the hills on the north, in the direction of Cayey. The native inhabitants received the American forces with warm expressions of wel-

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come. In reconnoitring the mountain road from Guayamo to Cayey, August 8th, some opposition was offered by the enemy. The Americans had eight wounded. In their reconnoissance it was developed that the Spaniards had taken up a strong position to the north of Guayamo, to intercept our advance to Cayey. On the morning of the 13th of August a well-developed flank movement, under General Hains, was in progress, when notification of the suspension of hostilities, caused by the signing of the protocol the day before, was received. A few hours more and the Spanish force would have been completely surrounded. The Spanish losses have been never ascertained.

By the 9th of August the command under General Wilson had advanced along the military road to Coamo. The Spaniards here were too strongly entrenched to warrant a direct assault. A successfully executed turning movement by Brigadier-General Ernst drove the enemy from his position, with a loss to the Spaniards of two officers and four men killed and thirty wounded. Five officers and 162 men were taken prisoners. General Wilson's loss was six wounded. The success at Coamo was followed by an advance on Aibonito, a position of great natural strength, and one which the Spaniards had strongly fortified. The enemy had placed batteries upon the heights of El Penon and Asomanti, so effectively commanding the direct approaches that a flank movement was again regarded as necessary. The absence of roads and the rough character of the country made this much more difficult than at Coamo. After two days had been spent in reconnoissance, a successful attempt

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was made to develop the enemy's strength by artillery fire, and to divert his attention from our real purpose. The effort to turn the Spanish right, which began early August 13th, was checked by receipt of information that the peace protocol had been signed. The total casualties in General Wilson's command were two men killed, two officers and three men wounded.

On the 8th of August General Henry, commanding the Provisional Division, started for Arecibo. He was accompanied by Brigadier-General Garretson's brigade. His objective point was to be reached by a mountain-pass which the Spaniards had neglected to fortify or guard, leading through Adjuntas and Utuado. This movement would have cut off the retreat to San Juan of the Spanish forces at Lares and Arecibo, against which General Schwan's brigade was advancing *via* Mayaguez. Bad roads and the mountainous country impeded the progress, and it was not until August 12th that Utuado was reached by a battalion of the 19th Infantry. Further movement was checked the next day by news of the signing of the protocol. The command had met with no opposition and had suffered no casualties.

Brigadier-General Schwan's brigade consisted entirely of regular troops: the 11th Infantry, Troop A, 5th Cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. It fell to the lot of this brigade to have the heaviest fighting in Puerto Rico by our troops.

General Schwan's instructions thus read:

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ PORT PONCE, PUERTO RICO, *August 6, 1898.*

“ GENERAL,—The major-general commanding the army directs me to transmit to you the following instructions:

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“ You will proceed from Ponce with six companies of the 11th Infantry to Yauco, moving by rail if desirable. You will also move by wagon road Troop A, 5th Cavalry, and two batteries of light artillery. At Yauco you will take the remainder of the 11th Infantry and two companies of the 19th and proceed to Sabana Grande, San German, Mayaguez, thence to Lares and Arecibo.

“ At Yauco you will take with you all the wagon transportation brought from Guanica.

“ You will drive out or capture all Spanish troops in the western portion of Puerto Rico. You will take all necessary precautions and exercise great care against being surprised or ambushed by the enemy, and make the movement as rapidly as possible, at the same time exercising your best judgment in the care of your command to accomplish the object of your expedition.

“ It is expected that at Arecibo you will be joined by the balance of your brigade. Such rations and supplies will be taken as you decide to be proper and necessary.

“ Report frequently by telegraph. Very respectfully,

“ J. C. GILMORE,

“ Brigadier-General U. S. V.”

“ *Brigadier-General Theodore Schwan,*

“ *Commanding Brigade, Ponce, Puerto Rico.*”

General Schwan's command, numbering, all told, 1,447 men, left Yauco, where it was organized, on the 9th of August. His orders contemplated a march of from sixty to seventy miles (from Yauco to Arecibo *via* Mayaguez), through a rough and rolling country, over poor roads, and in the face of an enemy at least equally strong in numbers. It was reported that the Spaniards had 1,362 troops in the vicinity of Mayaguez—all regulars save 252 volunteers—and that they were prepared to resist our advance. General Schwan was accompanied by a few native Puerto Rican scouts, whose service proved of great value.

Sabana Grande was occupied without opposition

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August 9th, and on the morning of the next day General Schwan's command entered San German. Here it was learned that the entire Mayaguez garrison had started for San German, and was then moving out to give battle. Schwan at once determined to advance and meet the Spanish forces. When half-way between San German and Mayaguez, southwest of the little hamlet of Hormigueros, the advance of our cavalry was fired upon, though without effect, by the enemy's outposts, concealed in the underbrush off the road. The Spaniards were strong in numbers and position, and were intrenched on a range of low hills, completely commanding the valley of the Rio Grande, along which the main body of our troops was advancing. The first and second lines of the enemy were well screened, and his guns were so placed as to inflict the greatest injury upon our troops. With much coolness and skill, General Schwan planted his artillery on the hills to the left, opposite the Spanish position; a portion of the advance guard moved to a detached knoll on the enemy's right, doing much damage with the Gatlings; the infantry advanced to the centre for the frontal attack; and at the same time the cavalry executed a skilful flank movement. Attacked in the front by artillery and infantry, enfiladed on the right by Gatlings, and threatened on the left by cavalry, the enemy was forced to evacuate his position, completely out-manœuvred, although he enjoyed the choice of position, and lay strongly intrenched, with a force almost equal in numbers to our own. The Spaniards' loss was estimated at not less than fifteen killed and thirty-five wounded. Ours was two enlisted men killed, one officer and fourteen enlisted

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men wounded. That night (August 10th) General Schwan's command occupied the enemy's camp, and the next morning, without opposition, marched into Mayaguez.

Although Mayaguez had been prepared for a defence, upon our approach the garrison fled in the direction of Las Marias. Pursuit was begun at once, but the Spaniards were not overtaken until the next day (August 12th), when a part of Schwan's command came across them, retreating towards Lares. Seven hundred of the Spanish force had been cut off by the sudden rising of the Rio Prieto. They were completely routed, demoralized, and disorganized. We took forty prisoners, including the colonel, the lieutenant-colonel, and a lieutenant. Five killed and fourteen wounded were reported.

A movement which would have led to the capture or destruction of the entire Spanish command was well advanced when news of the signing of the protocol checked further operations. In the mean time the entire western end of the island had been cleared, the Spanish forces in the vicinity had been completely defeated, and the city of Mayaguez, the third in size and importance on the island, had fallen into our hands.

The campaign in Puerto Rico was over. It had lasted two weeks, and consisted of six skirmishes. Our total loss was four killed and forty wounded, of which latter four were officers.

At no place in Puerto Rico were the Spaniards encountered in large numbers, nor did they offer much resistance when met. This was in part due to the clever tactics adopted by the individual American

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commanders at each of the engagements, and in part due to the general plan of campaign, for which General Miles should receive full credit. The campaign in Puerto Rico had been well conceived and skilfully executed.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

THE declaration of war with Spain found the Asiatic squadron, under Admiral (then commodore) Dewey, at Hong-Kong. Soon after the destruction of the *Maine* the commodore had been notified that, in the event of war, it would be his duty to see that the Spanish squadron did not leave its Asiatic station, and that he would also be expected to undertake offensive operations in the Philippines.

On the 24th of April, 1898, Dewey's flotilla consisted of the *Olympia*, *Boston*, *Raleigh*, *Baltimore*, *Concord*, and *Petrel*, together with the revenue-cutter *McCulloch*, and the supply-ships *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*.

The commodore had been in constant communication with the United States consul at Manila, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, and from him learned much concerning the condition and movements of the Spanish squadron, as well as of the character and strength of the land batteries about Manila. The American fleet was therefore prepared and expectant when this momentous order flashed half-way around the world on the day following the first call for volunteers:

“ WASHINGTON, *April 24, 1898.*

“ *Dewey, Hong-Kong.*

“ War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations

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at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. LONG."

In order that he might be in possession of the latest information regarding the movements of the Spanish fleet, Commodore Dewey delayed his sailing until the arrival of the American consul from Manila, who was then on his way to Hong-Kong. On the 25th of April the commodore had left the latter place for Mirs Bay, China, near by, as a result of Great Britain's neutrality proclamation.

The Spanish fleet had assembled at Subig Bay, on the west coast of the island of Luzon, and here the enemy at first intended to await the arrival of the American squadron and give battle. Towards Subig Bay, then, Dewey directed his course. The destination of our fleet had been conjectured by the Spanish agents in Hong-Kong, and cabled to the Spanish authorities at Manila, who in turn forwarded the information to Admiral Montojo, in Subig Bay. The Spanish admiral, who had but three days before sailed from Manila to Subig Bay, "to cover the entrance to the port," upon the receipt of this information forthwith retraced his course to Manila, "in order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions."

Luzon, the most northern, as well as the largest and most important island of the Philippine group, is by nature divided into two parts, the greater of which runs in a general direction north and south, and the lesser, or boot-shaped portion, which is joined to the other by a narrow neck of land, lies generally northwest and southeast. The axes of the two parts of the island form an obtuse angle. On the southwest coast of the

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larger part of Luzon, and a little above the elbow of the island, lies Manila, the capital and chief city, founded over three hundred years ago (in 1571). The city is by nature well provided for defence, since it lies at the western extremity of the harbor bearing its name, and thirty miles from the entrance. The harbor is almost landlocked, with an entrance of but three miles in width—less than half the range of a modern high-power gun. The channel leading to the harbor is further naturally defended by two islands, one of which, Corregidor, rises 600 feet from the sea—a veritable Gibraltar—and the other, Caballo, has an altitude of over 400 feet. These islands form two channels leading to Manila Bay, the south channel, or that between Caballo and the mainland, being known as Boca Grande.

After the *Boston* and *Concord* had carefully reconnoitred Port Subig on the afternoon of April 30th, and ascertained that the enemy was not there, Dewey slowly proceeded towards the entrance to Manila Bay, thirty miles south. Although the information in the possession of our navy was to the effect that the entrance to the bay was well fortified by high-power guns, and that the channel was strewn with mines, yet, nothing daunted, about midnight, April 30th, at the head of his flotilla, the American commodore fearlessly steamed through the Boca Grande, under the very shadow of Caballo Island. If there were any torpedoes or mines, they did not explode, and the few shots from the batteries on the island and the mainland, fired when the fleet had nearly passed through the channel, were without effect, and were only answered by the *Boston* and the revenue-cutter *McCulloch*.

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The Spanish admiral arranged his fleet in battle array off the arsenal of Cavité, where he would receive the support of the two strong land batteries in the vicinity, as well as the three shore batteries of Manila.

As soon as day broke the firing began from one of the Spanish forts. The American commander knew that the Spanish fleet was ready for his attack; that between him and it was a mined field; and that the enemy was supported by five shore batteries, which were reported to be armed with modern high-power guns. Not one of Dewey's vessels was an armor-clad, and yet with dauntless courage he advanced to the attack, his own flag-ship in the lead, nor hesitated when two mines exploded in his front. Under his personal supervision and direction the fleet fought as a unit.

With great skill and resolution Commodore Dewey bore down upon the Spanish squadron, huddled under cover of the land batteries, and opened fire. Three times his ships circled in front of the Spanish vessels, and each revolution brought it nearer to the enemy. The battle raged furiously until the commodore was erroneously informed that his fleet was running short of ammunition for the 5-inch rapid-fire guns. He withdrew his squadron for redistribution of ammunition, and to give his gallant crews an opportunity for breakfast and rest. In one hour and fifty-four minutes he had sunk the *Reina Christina*, the *Castilla*, and the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, while the remainder of the Spanish fleet was in flames.

At quarter-past eleven the American fleet returned to the attack. It required but an hour and fifteen

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minutes to complete the work of destruction, and, says Admiral Dewey, "at 12.30 P.M. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burned, and deserted." His flotilla of six* vessels, the *Olympia*, *Boston*, *Raleigh*, *Baltimore*, *Concord*, and *Petrel*, not one of which, as has already been stated, was an armor-clad, or could have withstood the armor-piercing shell of the Spaniards, had sunk, burned, or captured the following Spanish vessels:

Protected cruisers—*Isla de Luzon*, burned; *Isla de Cuba*, burned. Unprotected cruisers—*Reina Christina*, sunk; *Castilla*, sunk; *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, sunk; *Velasco*, burned; *Don Juan de Austria*, burned. Gunboats—*General Lezo*, burned; *Marquis del Duero*, burned. Armored transport—*Isla de Mindano*, burned. Armed surveying vessel—*Argos*, burned. Transport—*Manila*, captured. Gunboat—*Callao*, captured.

Dewey announced the result of his engagement with a simplicity in keeping with the greatness of his victory. He modestly reported:

"The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: *Reina Christina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marquis del Duero*, *El Curreo*, *Velasco*,† one transport, *Isla de Mindano*, water battery at Cavité. I shall destroy Cavité arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I request the department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition.

* The revenue-cutter *McCulloch* and the supply-ships *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*, of course, took no part in the fight.

† The list of vessels destroyed and captured was subsequently amended to read as given.

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The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hong-Kong."

It has been said by those who would detract from Admiral Dewey's victory that the Spanish fleet was composed of obsolete vessels, that it was outclassed in the number and size of its guns, and that the victory at Manila Bay, after all, was nothing more nor less than the triumph of the strong over the weak. Let us look at the facts, as they will bear the closest scrutiny. The Spaniards had the choice of position. Had they but possessed the energy or genius of the American navy the shore batteries and mines at the entrance of the harbor, or during the engagement off Cavité arsenal, could certainly have done great damage to a fleet of six vessels manœuvring at times within a range of a mile. The steel cruiser *Reina Christina*, as well as the steel protected cruisers *Isla de Luzon* and *Isla de Cuba*, and the iron cruiser *Don Juan de Austria*, were all built within a year of the time the *Baltimore*, *Concord*, and *Petrel* were constructed. And although the guns of the Spanish fleet did not quite equal in number or caliber those of Dewey's fleet, the combined guns of the Spanish squadron and the shore batteries which took part in the fight exceeded in number and caliber those of the American ships. The Spaniards had two protected cruisers, five unprotected cruisers, and two gunboats, a total of nine vessels, opposed to our three protected cruisers, one partially protected cruiser, and two gunboats; their vessels were manned by a crew of 1,875 against 1,709 of the American fleet. This number for the Spanish strength does not include, of course, the forces engaged in the

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five shore batteries which fought against us. With such possibilities under the control of any other nation than Spain, the American squadron would have been outclassed. Yet, look at the comparative results: The entire Spanish fleet was burned, sunk, or destroyed—utterly annihilated; not one of Dewey's ships was appreciably injured or damaged; the Spanish admiral reports his loss at 381 killed and wounded; Admiral Dewey had but seven men slightly wounded, none killed. History furnishes no parallel for such a complete, crushing, and overwhelming victory. The Spaniards had on their ships, among other batteries, fourteen modern guns of approximately 6-inch caliber, and twenty-two modern guns of approximately 5-inch caliber, and, notwithstanding the range was at times but 2,000 yards, still not a vessel of our fleet was materially injured. The Spaniards had within two of the number of rapid-fire guns carried on our fleet.

Compare our freedom from injury with Admiral Montojo's account of the effect of the American seaman's marksmanship against his steel cruiser and flag-ship, the *Reina Christina*, the best vessel in the fleet.

“ The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7.30 one shell destroyed completely the steering-gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen-masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A further shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling

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the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode.

“Immediately amidships several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on deck.

“The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the gun crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action.”

One hundred and fifty men were killed and ninety wounded on this vessel alone.

If that encounter determined anything it decisively confirmed the superiority of the American officers and seamen over the Spaniards, and from whatever point of view the battle of Manila Bay is considered, the victory must be classed, and ever will be classed by the American people, with Nelson's heroic battles or with the glorious exploits of John Paul Jones.

After the destruction by Admiral Dewey of the enemy's fleet in Philippine waters, the land forces of the Spaniards in Manila could obtain neither reinforcements nor supplies. Outside of the city of Manila the country was infested with hostile Filipinos, and the presence of Dewey's fleet in the Bay made impossible any hope of relief from the home government. The Spanish troops in the Philippines numbered about 21,000, all of which, save about 1,000, were in Manila. Of the 20,000 in Manila, 15,000 were Spanish regulars.

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Admiral Dewey reported that he could take the city at any moment, or that he could reduce the defences without difficulty, but that he considered it useless to do so until the arrival of land forces sufficient to retain permanent possession. Thus came about the necessity, within two weeks of the declaration of war, for the hasty preparation of a military force to invade a comparatively unknown territory.

Although the determination to send an army of occupation to the Philippines was reached before Dewey's victory occurred, and orders for assembling volunteers at San Francisco with this object in view had been given as early as May 4th*, the news of the success of Manila Bay greatly hastened the preparations for this army. It was part of the general plan of campaign "in further prosecution of the measures adopted by this government for the purpose of bringing about honorable and durable peace with Spain." But a military movement to the Philippines was regarded as secondary in importance to the proposed operations in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Upon the receipt of the news announcing Dewey's victory orders were immediately issued for the mobilization at San Francisco of an army of 12,000, consisting chiefly of Western volunteers. Notwithstanding the fact that the War Department was already deeply engaged in the preparation on the Atlantic coast of expeditions to Cuba and Puerto Rico, the necessity for the early despatch of a large force 7,000 miles from our base of

* Owing to the cutting of the cable between Hong-Kong and Manila the announcement of Dewey's victory did not reach Washington until May 7th.

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supplies imperatively demanded the solution of new and perplexing difficulties in the way of mobilization, equipment, and transportation.

In the order of seniority Major-General Wesley Merritt, then in command of the Department of the East, was ranked by no other officer in the army except Major-General Miles. When the despatch of an army to the Philippines became an immediate necessity, General Merritt was ordered to Washington. It was left to his choice as to whether he would command an expedition to Cuba, the army of occupation to the Philippines, or remain in command of the Department of the East, which would include the fortifications and a large number of troops to be assembled practically along the entire Atlantic coast—a detail involving a large command and many responsibilities. As has already been stated, at this time (before May 15th, 1898) it was proposed to send but a small force to Cuba, principally for the purpose of reconnoissance. General Merritt chose the command of the troops designated for the Philippines.

Additional information as to the number of the Spanish forces in the city of Manila made it advisable to increase to 20,000 the strength of the 8th Corps—for such was the designation given to the Philippine expedition.

General Merritt arrived at San Francisco during the latter part of May, and devoted his entire time and energy to the instruction, organization, and equipment of his command. The success of his expedition, and the clever manner in which every feature of it was developed and conducted, bear testimony to this officer's skill and efforts.

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A discussion of the military operations in the Philippines naturally falls under the following three heads, and will be so treated:

1. The assault and capture, August 13th, 1898, of the city of Manila by General Merritt's army of approximately 10,000 men, co-operating with the fleet of Admiral Dewey.

2. The relations of the American troops under General Otis, numbering about 20,000, with the insurgent forces during the period following the fall of Manila, and the unprovoked assault of Aguinaldo's men upon our army, February 4th, 1899.

3. The operations since February 4th, 1899, of the American forces under General Otis in quelling the Tagalog rebellion. (These operations will be discussed only to August 1st, 1899.)

The harassing difficulties of limited railroad facilities, inadequate harbor accommodations, and the necessity for embarking at once a large body of men, such as General Shafter had confronting him at Tampa, were not experienced at San Francisco. San Francisco is a government depot for army supplies, and the harbor and railroad facilities of that port were in no way taxed by the mobilization and the embarkation of the 8th Corps there. But the question of securing sufficient transports was indeed a serious one. Only threats of pressing into service some of the vessels which were of American register made it possible for the government to secure even part of the tonnage required. The charter or purchase of all suitable ships carrying the American flag still left unprovided for, many thousands of troops. This lack of transport accommodation, which was only finally corrected by sending vessels from the Atlantic coast, coupled with the imperative necessity for despatching some troops immediately to the Philippines, resulted in the

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movement of the 8th Corps by seven instalments, extending over a period from May to October. Only three of these expeditions reached Manila in time to take part in the assault and capture of that city. They were:

First expedition, commanded by Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson: 1st California Volunteer Infantry; 2d Oregon Volunteer Infantry; five companies 14th United States Infantry; detachment California Volunteer Artillery. Sailed May 25th, arrived Manila June 30th; 115 officers and 2,386 men.

Second expedition, commanded by Brigadier-General F. V. Greene: 1st Colorado Volunteer Infantry; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; four companies 18th United States Infantry; four companies 23d United States Infantry; two batteries Utah Volunteer Artillery; detachment United States Engineers. Sailed June 15th, arrived Manila July 17th; 158 officers and 3,428 men.

Third expedition, Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur. Major-General Wesley Merritt accompanying: four companies 18th United States Infantry; four companies 23d United States Infantry; four batteries 3d United States Artillery acting as Infantry; one company United States Engineers; 1st Idaho Volunteer Infantry; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Infantry; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Astor Volunteer Battery; detachments of Hospital and Signal Corps. Sailed June 27th and 29th, arrived Manila July 25th and 31st; 197 officers, 4,650 men. Total force for the three expeditions was, therefore, 470 officers and 10,464 men.

The city of Manila is divided into two parts — the

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intramural and the extramural sections. The old or walled portion of the city is strongly defended by nature and fortifications. It was here that the Spanish headquarters were centred. "Manila Intramuros," as the Spanish term the walled city, has in general the shape of the sector of a circle. Along the north side runs the River Pasig, about 350 feet in width and not fordable. On the west and southwest the city is bounded by the sea, but the arc of the sector is entirely on land securely defended from attack by high and thick walls, which are further protected by citadels, bulwarks, and moats, which can be flooded by opening sluices leading to the river and the sea. Strong walls also run along the two sides bounded by the bay and river. The new, or extramural, city is separated from Manila proper by the Pasig River, and although its houses and streets are continuous and contiguous, sections of it bear different names, as if they were separate suburbs, such as Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, San Miguel, etc.

About a half-mile south of the walls of Manila along the beach is the suburb Ermita, and still farther south, about one and one-fourth miles, lies Malate. Somewhat less than a mile inland from the last-named suburb is the little hamlet of Cingalon. Here it was that the severest fighting took place in the assault on the city, August 13th. Still farther along the beach, one-half to three-fourths of a mile south of Malate, Fort de San Antonio Abad is located. Westward from this fort ran the Spanish trenches, strong in position and construction, and completely encircling the city and its suburbs. A second line of defence to the rear followed the road joining Malate and Cingalon.

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That portion of the shore of the Bay of Manila off which our fleet lay and where the operations on land took place is shaped like a fish-hook—Manila forming the eye and Cavité Arsenal the point. A good road along the beach following the outline of the fish-hook connects Manila with the naval port at Cavité, making the distance about fifteen miles by land and seven miles by sea. This highway, known as the Calle Real, passes through Ermita, Malate, and runs by Fort de San Antonio Abad. Another approach to Manila, known as the Pasay Road, parallels the Calle Real about one-half mile to the west. It passes through Cingalon, and where it crosses the Spanish trenches, one and one-fourth miles south of Cingalon, is located block-house No. 14, placed at an elbow in the trenches as they turn to the north in the circumvallation of the town.

Almost the entire section of Manila Province south of the city, included between the Calle Real and the Pasay Road, is practically impassable for troops on account of the bamboo thickets, marshes, thorn entanglements, and flooded rice-fields. Any attack upon the Spanish trenches and city must of necessity be made along the beach and the two roads mentioned.

General Merritt found both a difficult and delicate task confronting him on his arrival in Manila Bay, July 25th. The 6,000 American troops which had already reached the Philippines under Generals Anderson and Greene were partly quartered at Cavité Arsenal and partly in camp near the beach three miles south of Manila and only one-third of that distance from the Spanish first line of defence. The troops under General MacArthur (a little over 4,000),

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sailing from San Francisco approximately at the same time as General Merritt, did not arrive until July 31st.

The Spaniards had a force in Manila nearly twice as large as that under General Merritt; they were strongly intrenched and protected from attack, and the country over which any hostile approach to their works could be made by a land force was fraught with many and great difficulties. But these were not the only embarrassments which opposed General Merritt. Another and most unusual situation confronted him: How to deal with the Filipinos, who surrounded the city in motley hordes, unable to capture Manila by themselves, but ready to take advantage of any American victory for the purpose of looting the town, in accordance with their native custom. Moreover, their trenches had been placed half-way between General Greene's camp and the Spanish lines, from which their position measured but 800 yards.

General Merritt thus refers to the "peculiar conditions of our relations with the insurgents" as he found them on his arrival:

"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the true leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavité from Hong-Kong and, with the consent of the naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military

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possession of many points in the island other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

“As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that ‘the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants,’ I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation to enforce my authority, in event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

“For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces.”

The wisdom of this action was demonstrated by subsequent events.


General Merritt directed General Greene to arrange with the Filipino general in charge of the trenches in his front on the Calle Real to evacuate them in his favor. This he skilfully accomplished without compromising our future relations by any promises and without incurring the open hostility of these forces. Our troops advanced beyond the trenches of the Filipinos on the night of July 30th, and constructed trenches of their own about 100 yards nearer the Spanish lines.


Observing that the Americans had intrenched in front of the position formerly occupied by the natives, on the night of July 31st the Spaniards opened a spirited attack upon our position, then held by two battalions of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, a battery of the 3d United States Artillery acting as in-


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fantry (about 200 strong), and a battery of the Utah Volunteer Artillery. The firing was very heavy for several hours, although it does not appear that the Spaniards left their trenches. Our casualties were ten killed and forty-three wounded—a greater loss than was incurred during the entire Puerto Rican campaign and almost as heavy as at Las Guasimas. The enemy again attacked our position with much vigor on the nights of August 1st, 2d, and 5th, our losses aggregating, for these four nights of passive resistance, fifteen killed and fifty-three wounded. During this trying period General Merritt requested Admiral Dewey to open with his ships on the Spanish trenches. The admiral was unwilling to do this, fearing some of his ships might be injured by the guns of the forts, and that the firing from his fleet might bring on a general engagement, which he was anxious to avoid in view of the delicate and complicated situation then confronting him. He preferred to await the arrival of his monitors then on the way.

The forces accompanying General MacArthur were unable to land until the 7th of August, owing to the heavy surf and strong gales. When, at last, after eight days' delay, his command was ashore, General Merritt organized his army in the Philippines, now aggregating approximately 10,000, into a division, at the head of which he placed Brigadier-General Anderson. This division embraced two brigades, the first under Brigadier-General MacArthur, consisting of the 23d United States Infantry, two battalions; 14th United States Infantry, one battalion; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer







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Infantry, two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, one battalion; Astor Battery.

The second brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, consisted of the 18th United States Infantry, two battalions; 3d United States Artillery, four foot batteries; Company A, Battalion United States Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Infantry, 1st Colorado Volunteer Infantry, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Artillery; Light Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Infantry and the California Heavy Artillery remained at Cavité.

The *Monterey* having arrived on the 4th of August, General Merritt and Admiral Dewey determined to demand the submission of the besieged city. On the 7th of August the general-in-chief commanding the Spanish forces in Manila was notified in a joint letter "that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defences of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours." This was acknowledged in a courteous note by the Spanish general; whereupon the exodus from the city began, and the foreign squadrons withdrew from the harbor. Two days later General Merritt and Admiral Dewey demanded the surrender of Manila, suggesting to the Spanish general, as he could not escape and as the destruction of the Spanish fleet made impossible the hope of any succor or supplies, that he should yield to the inevitable and avoid the horrors of a bombardment. The Spanish general requested time to submit the matter to his home government. As both General Merritt and Admiral Dewey

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believed that he could gain nothing but time in granting this request, permission to communicate with the Spanish government was denied, and preparations were begun at once for a joint assault on the city.

The tactical scheme of the battle on land was devised by Generals MacArthur and Greene. The preparation of the plan was in accordance with General Merritt's instructions, and when submitted was approved by him. The general features of the assault involved a combined artillery attack from the navy and the few small guns of the Utah and Astor batteries, which comprised the only artillery General Merritt had. The troops were directed to hold themselves in readiness to move on the enemy in front, "occupying the intrenchments after they were so shaken as to make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage to our troops."

General Greene's brigade formed the left of the line in front of Fort de San Antonio Abad and the Spanish trenches in the vicinity. When ordered to do so, he was to advance along the Calle Real and the beach, to pass through Malate and Ermita in succession, and, proceeding across the Pasig, to occupy that portion of Manila on the north of the river where were the custom-house and large warehouses. His duty was to protect the lives and property of New Manila, and prevent the Filipinos from entering that part of the city for the purpose of loot. General MacArthur was directed to capture block-house No. 14, and, driving the enemy from the trenches in his front, advance to Cingalon along the Pasay Road, place guards in and raise the American flag over Malate and Ermita, and

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keep the natives from entering either of these suburbs or the city for the purpose of securing booty.

This disposition of the two brigades, if successful, would form a complete cordon around Manila, surrounding the Spaniards and confronting the Filipinos. It was believed that the firing on Fort de San Antonio Abad and the trenches by the navy and artillery would speedily bring the enemy to a realization of the futility of further resistance and the necessity for surrender to prevent a bombardment of the town. Indeed, General Merritt hoped that the city might be captured without loss of life on our part, and especially enjoined his general officers to attempt no advance until ordered to do so from his headquarters, which he had established on the navy supply-ship *Zafiro*, that he might the better see and follow, from offshore, the movements of our troops and the enemy's endeavors.

The navy opened fire upon the Spanish forts and batteries at 9.30 on the morning of the 13th of August. This was followed in a few minutes by the guns of the Utah battery, with General Greene's brigade on the left of the American line, his fire being directed against Fort de San Antonio Abad and the trenches in his front. At the same time the Astor Battery, on the right, accompanying General MacArthur's brigade, attacked block-house No. 14 and the Spanish trenches.

The first shots from the navy and land batteries seemed to silence the artillery fire of the Spaniards in Fort de San Antonio Abad, and in less than three-quarters of an hour General Merritt ordered an advance. On the left this movement was led by the 1st Colorado Volunteer Infantry and the 3d Artillery,

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acting as infantry. At the signal the soldiers of these two organizations swarmed out of their trenches, passed swiftly along the beach and the Calle Real, and, with very little resistance, were soon in possession of the Spanish fort. The remainder of General Greene's brigade quickly followed, and, after some slight skirmishing and desultory firing on the part of the Spaniards, occupying something over an hour, it passed through Malate and Ermita, reaching the walls of Manila almost simultaneously with the hoisting there of the white flag of surrender. The movement of the Americans had been so swift that they arrived at the walls of the city in advance of 1,000 Spanish troops, then retreating from the outer trenches in the direction of Santa Ana on the right.

General Merritt had planned and conducted his fight irrespective of the presence or attitude of the Filipinos, and, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future, he had even gone so far on the night of August 12th as to request Aguinaldo "to prevent his soldiers from joining in the attack and entering the city." In spite of this request, however, when General Greene's advance-guard reached the walls of Manila, they were followed there by a considerable force of the natives, who, by their superior knowledge of the roads, rushed ahead of our troops and opened fire at once upon the five or six thousand Spanish soldiers on the walls of the city, regardless of the fact that at that time the Spaniards had ceased firing, and the white flag was flying from the fortifications. This unprovoked attack precipitated a renewal of the firing upon our troops on the part of the enemy, resulting in the death of one and the wounding of two

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other soldiers of the 1st California Volunteers. After quieting the hostile and excited Filipinos, and assuring himself that there was little likelihood of further trouble, General Greene moved his brigade across the Pasig, in accordance with the original plan, and so disposed his troops as to fully protect the people and property of New Manila. His losses were one enlisted man killed and five wounded.

The 1st Brigade, under General MacArthur, forming the right, since it did not have the support and assistance of the navy, met with much more resistance. Little difficulty was experienced in driving the Spanish from block-house No. 14 and from the trenches in our front. General MacArthur's advance on the Spaniards second line of defence was made when he knew by the cheering of General Greene's men on the left that a forward movement was in progress. The enemy had, however, taken up a strong position outside of the little hamlet of Cingalon, and here occurred the most stubborn resistance and the fiercest fighting exhibited by the Spaniards during the day. However, in this, as in every other engagement of the war, the Spanish troops seemed unable to withstand the repeated and persistent assaults of our soldiers. The 13th Minnesota, the 23d Infantry, and the Astor Battery chiefly bore the brunt of this engagement, which lasted an hour. After many deeds of heroism and intrepidity on the part of General MacArthur's men, they finally drove the Spanish troops back from their trenches and towards the walled city.

The country south and east was now cleared; and to the north and northeast General Greene's brigade covered every avenue of escape for the Spaniards or for

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the approach of the Filipinos. The enemy, in the city of Manila, had signalled that he had had enough, and the horrors of a Filipino horde let loose in the town to indulge in its expected carnival of loot, arson, and rapine, had been avoided.

General MacArthur's losses were three officers wounded, four enlisted men killed, and thirty-five wounded, making a total of five killed and forty-three wounded during the assault and capture of the city. The Spanish losses have never been ascertained. Our trophies as a result of the articles of capitulation, which were signed the next day, August 14th, amounted to 13,000 prisoners, 22,000 stands of modern arms, 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and \$900,000.

In not a few of its features the siege and capture of Manila is comparable to the Santiago campaign. The landing of 10,000 troops was made under great natural difficulties, resulting from a high and dangerous surf, which, as we have seen, actually prevented for eight days the disembarkation of the troops accompanying General MacArthur, and numbering nearly 5,000. Part of General Merritt's army was in the trenches from July 30th to August 13th—fourteen days—practically as long as General Shafter's army occupied the trenches before Santiago. In Manila, however, the heat was greater and the rains heavier than in Cuba, and at times the trenches had no less than two feet of water in them. Here, under the constant strain of four night attacks and many other threatened assaults, the American regulars and volunteers endured the trying hardships without shelter or protection and without complaint. The nervous tension during this period was certainly as great as,

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if not greater than, at Santiago, where the trenches were occupied for much of the time of the siege under flag of truce. The Spanish army of regular veterans exceeded our own in numbers. A third of the circumference of the globe separated our little army from its base of supplies. Moreover, the attitude of the native forces during this period was so uncertain and at times so hostile that it was even feared that the Filipinos might be included among our enemies. Our landing was made during the season of the highest temperature, but, for the same reasons that applied to the Santiago campaign, all the troops in the Philippines could not be furnished with khaki uniforms before leaving the United States. And, for these same reasons that applied to the Santiago campaign, only the simplest components of the army ration could be placed on shore or furnished the army before Manila fell. Although the full allowance of every component of the ration was on the ships, only sugar and coffee, bacon and hardtack could be landed, and once, when the surf was unusually heavy, the troops ashore were twenty-four hours without food. The watchful vigil in the flooded trenches resulted in the destruction of many pairs of shoes, and 300 men of General Merritt's army marched into Manila barefooted. Conceive the remarks of the yellow press had this incident, so common in war, occurred at Santiago instead of at Manila!

Yet there were no complaints from those sturdy heroes. Every general officer who has written of the battle and the trying period preceding has highly commended their fortitude, their cheerfulness, and their patience under all conditions.

Notice of the signing of the peace protocol, August

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12th, did not reach Manila until August 16th, owing to the destruction by Admiral Dewey of the Spanish cable between Manila and Hong-Kong. As General Merritt had been ordered to Paris to attend the sessions of the Peace Commission, he left Manila on the 30th of August, and turned over the command of the military forces to Major-General Elwell S. Otis. General Otis had arrived in Manila Bay with 1,700 men, forming part of the 8th Corps, August 21st.

Before passing to a consideration of the second phase of the Philippine situation—the period included between the fall of Manila August 13th, 1898, and the assault of the Tagalog insurgents upon the American troops February 4th, 1899—a discussion of the particulars which lead up to Aguinaldo's presence in the Philippines will not be out of place

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CHAPTER XX

OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO

SPAIN'S colonial policy in the Philippines was marked by the same barbarous cruelty and inhumanity that had for so long a time characterized her government in Cuba. In the Philippines, as in Cuba, we find events moving in the same old cycle: a merciless tyranny on the part of Spain, followed by insurrection on the part of the native inhabitants; then liberal promises by the Spanish government; an immediate repudiation of those promises when it was believed that the force of the rebellion had been broken; and finally a return to its former inhuman practices; and the inevitable repetition follows.

In 1896 an insurrection had broken out on the island of Luzon. The rebellion originated in the province of Cavité to the south of Manila, and was confined to the Tagals, a tribe which comprises about one-fifth of the total population of the island. The revolution was led by a native of Cavité province, Emilio Aguinaldo, then said to be about twenty-eight years old—a Tagal of mediocre education, but possessing much native shrewdness and no little military ability. It should be distinctly understood, however, that the insurgents were not fighting for independence and did not make at any time during this rebellion any claim for independence. They demanded

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a redress of grievances, which were indeed serious enough and of sufficient duration to warrant a revolt. The insurgents were poorly armed and could do little towards pressing their claims beyond conducting a guerilla warfare and harassing the Spaniards in their rural outposts. When confronted or pursued by a Spanish force the Tagalog revolutionists would retire to their mountain fastnesses, there to remain until opportunity arrived for further raid upon the Spanish outposts.

This state of affairs lasted until the latter part of 1897 without either side making progress in the settlement of the rebellion or of the questions demanding reform. Finally, the Governor-General of the Philippines, Primo de Rivera, a soldier of pacific temperament, offered to grant the reforms for which the insurgents were fighting.

The rebellious subjects demanded :

1. Expulsion or secularization of the monastic orders.
2. Representation in the Spanish Cortes.
3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration.
4. Freedom of the press.
5. General amnesty for all rebels.

General Rivera further agreed to pay the insurgents the sum of \$800,000 (Mexican) on the condition that Aguinaldo and thirty of the principal rebels would leave the country. These conditions Aguinaldo included in a treaty signed on the 14th of December, 1897, at Biac-Na-Bato. This treaty proves that the "Supreme Leader" of the Philippine insurgents was then making no claims of Filipino independence, and

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that he recognized Spanish sovereignty. One article of that treaty thus reads:

“ Don Emilio Aguinaldo, in his quality as supreme leader of those in the island of Luzon now waging open hostilities against their legitimate government, and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and Don Mariano Llanera, who also exercise important commands in the forces mentioned, are to cease their hostile attitude, surrender their arms that they are using against their fatherland, and are to surrender to the legitimate authorities, claiming their rights as Spanish Filipino citizens, which they desire to preserve. As a consequence of this surrender they obligate themselves to cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow them and those who recognize them as leaders and obey their orders.”

Aguinaldo and thirty of his companions retired to Hong-Kong and received half of the promised bounty. The remainder of the money was never paid, and it is hardly necessary to say that the promises of reform were not kept. Probably it was never intended that they should be. The Spanish authorities in the Philippines returned to their same policy of cruelty, wanton massacre of the Filipinos, and secret deportation of political suspects, while the friars grew more arrogant, powerful, and odious than before.

As a result of these violated pledges and repeated acts of inhuman tyranny, the insurrection had again broken out in Luzon early in 1898. Aguinaldo and his associates were still in exile.

About the time of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, Aguinaldo, who had been living at Saigon, Siam, went to Singapore. Here he secured a conference with the United States Consul-General, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, on the 24th of April.

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The insurgent leader expressed a desire to return to the Philippines for the purpose of assuming absolute control over the revolutionary forces, and promised that, if permitted to go to Luzon, he would conduct his troops in strict compliance with the rules of civilized warfare. He also stated, referring to the President, that he would lead his forces "as our commander would direct." Aguinaldo's request was communicated to Admiral Dewey, then at Hong-Kong. Hong-Kong for a long time had been the real centre of the Filipino revolutionary headquarters, and here it was that their Junta sat and transacted its business. Members of this body repeatedly presented themselves at the American Consulate requesting that Aguinaldo be permitted to return to the Philippines, pledging that the revolutionary troops would "obey the laws of civilized warfare," and that Aguinaldo would "obey unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Philippines." Moreover, many officers of the revolutionary party in Luzon in and about Manila had visited our consul there, Mr. Williams, and voluntarily gave him assurance that they would "swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag."

These statements had been repeated to Admiral Dewey before he received the despatch from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore conveying Aguinaldo's request that he might be allowed to return to the Philippines. Dewey granted the request, but Aguinaldo did not reach Hong-Kong until after the American fleet had sailed for Manila. He appeared, however, at the American Consulate and renewed his petition for permission to join the insurrectionary forces which were then confronting the Spanish troops in Luzon.

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Their strength was estimated at about 8,000. Our Consul-General at Hong-Kong, Mr. Rounsevelle Wildman, secured from Aguinaldo a confirmation of the promises already made by the Junta, and these pledges were later renewed by Aguinaldo after he had landed near Manila.

Aguinaldo and thirteen other Filipinos took passage on the *McCulloch* when that vessel was returning to the fleet after filing at Hong-Kong the news of Dewey's victory of May 1st. They arrived in Manila Bay May 19th. Admiral Dewey permitted the forces over which Aguinaldo then took command to occupy Cavité, which he had captured from the Spaniards on the 3d, and to take possession of the arms there secured.

The report that Dewey saluted the Filipino flag, or officially recognized that flag or the insurrectionary "government," is repudiated by the admiral, and not supported by any evidence.

The fear of the bombardment of Manila by the guns of our fleet, coupled with the dispiriting effect of Dewey's signal victory over the Spanish squadron, made it possible for Aguinaldo to soon gain several victories over the Spanish troops about Manila, with the arms and ammunition secured from the Cavité arsenal. Although the insurgents had no less than 30,000 troops, they were neither able nor courageous enough to attempt the assault of the besieged city wherein were only 13,000 Spanish regulars. This same force the Spanish subsequently surrendered to our army and navy when we had scarce 10,000 men.

Immediately upon landing at Cavité, Aguinaldo disclosed his real purpose—to establish an independent Filipino government, with himself at the head.

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On the 24th of May he issued a proclamation, in which he said, among other things, "The great nation, North America. . . has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested towards us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land." The promise of independence here made in the name of the United States was entirely without authority, and was not given Aguinaldo by any official or officer under our government. Indeed, Aguinaldo "freely admitted, in a private conversation with the members of his cabinet," says the first Philippine Commission, "that neither Admiral Dewey nor any other American had made him any such promise." On the 18th of June he issued another proclamation, establishing a dictatorial government, with himself at the head. In this paper he refers to the independence of the Filipinos as the ambition of his life; and yet only two days before, on the 16th of June, Consul Williams states that Aguinaldo personally informed him that "his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America." This is not the first instance in which the wily Tagal made professions to the Filipinos differing from those given the representatives of the United States.

In less than a week, by another proclamation, he established a revolutionary government, with its capital at Cavité, and followed this on the 6th of August with a message to the foreign powers, asking for recognition of the "republic."

On the 20th of June, General Anderson, with the first detachment of the army, arrived in Manila Bay. Aguinaldo was requested to evacuate Cavité, which

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request he unwillingly complied with, although this arsenal had been captured by Dewey. Here our troops encamped, as it was the most suitable place for the purpose. General Anderson says, in an official report, that the Tagalog general "did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet."

The change in Aguinaldo's demeanor now became apparent. His patriotism had been but a veneer to hide his ambition. He moved his "government" to a neighboring town in the same province—Bacoor—and secretly threw every obstacle he could in General Anderson's way. The latter found it exceedingly difficult to get the necessary horses, buffaloes, and carts for army-transportation purposes. Even when he offered pay for these things, the natives replied that under General Aguinaldo's orders they were not permitted to dispose of their wagons, etc. Aguinaldo himself did not offer to assist our troops when attempting to land under most difficult circumstances. On the other hand, he assumed such an arrogant and hostile attitude towards the Americans that Admiral Dewey reported to Washington, "Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with the insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening towards our army." The landing, July 17th, of the second detachment of United States troops, under General Greene, was followed by a letter from Aguinaldo to General Anderson, in which the latter was warned not to disembark on Filipino soil any additional troops of the United States without his knowledge and consent. Of course, no attention was paid to this ri-

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diculous demand. The arrival of General Merritt, with the forces under General MacArthur, July 25th and 31st, naturally did not tend to make Aguinaldo's attitude towards the Americans any less aggressive.

Before General Merritt left the United States he had been enjoined to make no alliance, political or otherwise, with the Tagalog insurgents. Hence his determination to conduct the assault on Manila without the assistance of Aguinaldo or his forces. Moreover, Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt when he reached Manila Bay; he did not offer his services or the support of his troops; and he did not assist any one of the three expeditions in landing, or in providing their necessary transportation, for which they had to depend entirely upon the country. There was no cooperation and no alliance between the American forces and the insurgents. Manila was taken without their assistance or support. Indeed, as has already been related, General Merritt addressed a note to the Tagalog general requesting that the insurrectionary forces be restrained from taking part in our proposed assault on the city the next day, and asked that they be not allowed to follow the American troops into the city. Whether Aguinaldo was unwilling or unable to check the troops in their anxiety to loot is not known, for they did attempt to enter the city in the wake of our victorious army.

Immediately after the fall of Manila, Aguinaldo demanded joint occupation of the city. This was refused, and he later admitted that joint occupation was impossible. He had probably made this request to pave the way for his subsequent demands. General Merritt requested Aguinaldo to withdraw his troops

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from the suburbs of Manila, where they had followed our forces, and where they had taken up a position with every apparent intention of remaining. To this proposition Aguinaldo reluctantly consented, and his men were finally withdrawn from the suburbs of Manila beyond a certain line, where they took up a position which General Merritt had indicated they would be permitted to occupy. Here they at once threw up intrenchments confronting our lines, their excuse being that this proceeding was necessary in order "to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain should she return to her late possessions." In the mean time the insurgent government had been moved from its second "capital" at Bacoor, on the south, to Malolos, on the Manila and Dagupan Railway, about thirty miles north of Manila.

The interval between the capture of Manila and the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris by the commissioners of the United States and Spain, December 10th, 1898, was a trying and tedious one for our army. The relations between the two forces, which were strained from the beginning, owing to Aguinaldo's attitude, now became intensified and aggravated. The insurgents continued to strengthen their lines, which completely encircled our own, and the revolutionary government at Malolos issued, with a remarkable rapidity, edicts, proclamations, and manifestoes. The time was well employed by Aguinaldo and his followers to discredit the motives and habits of our people, and a feeling of keen antagonism, founded upon false reports, was fomented everywhere. In the mean time the American troops remained quietly in the city of Manila, holding fast to what had been captured,

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and efficiently guarding the city, its inhabitants, and its property, in accordance with the terms of the articles of capitulation.

After the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris the forces under Aguinaldo could no longer maintain the position that their trenches were being held and strengthened to oppose the forces of Spain. Instead of withdrawing and peacefully awaiting the decision of Congress with respect to their "civil rights and political status," as provided by the treaty, they continued to throw up intrenchments and to mount guns with the muzzles pointed towards our troops. It now became evident that Aguinaldo intended that the insurrection against Spain for the correction of grievous abuses should be transferred to the United States in a demand for independence.

For the purpose of manifesting to the native Filipinos the intentions of the government of the United States, General Otis, in accordance with the President's instructions, issued a proclamation on the 4th of January, 1899, in which the Filipinos were informed that it was the purpose of this government to give them "in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people," and that they "would receive the blessings of good and stable government," in which representative men of the Filipino people would be given responsible and authoritative positions. The next day appeared a counter-proclamation from Aguinaldo, as illy advised as it was malign in intent. In this document he complained:

1. That he had been ignored in the articles of capitulation,

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and that his forces had been compelled to evacuate the suburbs of Manila.

2. That the naval authorities had seized his launches in Manila Bay.

3. That his commissioners had been received in an insolent manner by Admiral Dewey.

4. That Consul-General Pratt at Singapore had promised him independence.

5. That the "American General" had ordered forces to Iloilo, "for the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government."

All this he charged as evidence of broken faith on the part of the United States, and concluded: "Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Viscayan Islands."

Realizing the inadvisability of this proclamation, an effort was made to recall it on the day of issue and substitute in place thereof another more moderate in tone and in its claims. In this second proclamation, which appeared on the same day—January 5th—Aguinaldo confined his protests to General Otis's subscription under the President's proclamation as "Military Governor of the Philippines;" stated that he had never recognized the sovereignty of the United States, and that his original intention in returning to the Philippines was for the purpose of securing the independence of the people; that the army and navy of the United States had recognized the belligerency of the Filipinos; and concluded with a protest against "this intrusion of the United States government on the sovereignty of these islands."

As a result of the threat to commence hostilities

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against the United States, contained in the first of Aguinaldo's proclamations, 40,000 people are said to have left Manila within a fortnight.

For some time prior to Aguinaldo's open threat of war Manila had been in a high state of fomentation and anxiety. Some of its most intelligent, influential, and wealthy citizens had communicated with General Otis, expressing the hope that a conflict would be avoided, and tendered their services with that object in view. General Otis informed them that he would appoint a commission to treat with any representatives selected by Aguinaldo, as general of the insurrectionary forces, but that he could not recognize the so-called Filipino republic. Moreover, which is of more importance, in a letter written to Aguinaldo at the time on this matter General Otis informed him that the troops of the United States were under strict orders from the President not to bring on a conflict with the native forces.

The commissioners on the part of General Otis were: Brigadier-General R. P. Hughes, Colonel Joseph F. Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Crowder.

Aguinaldo designated the following soldiers and civilian to represent him: Florentino Flores, Eufrasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles.

The commission met in Manila on the day of their appointment—January 9th—and sat until the 25th. From the outset it was difficult for the representatives of General Otis to secure information from the commissioners on the part of Aguinaldo as to exactly what they wanted. They admitted that their government could not exist without the assistance and protection of the United States, but to what extent we should

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exercise that protection they were at first either unable or unwilling to define. Finally, after being repeatedly informed that the question of sovereignty could not be discussed, as that was a matter for Congress to determine, they grew unreasonable in their demands and illogical in their arguments, and stated that they would accept nothing but "absolute independence under United States protection;" that the military forces of the United States should at once be withdrawn from the Philippines; and that the navy should remain for their protection until they should order it away.

During the meetings of this commission and ever since the signing of the treaty of peace, December 10th, the conditions of that treaty were under discussion in the Senate and throughout the United States generally. The division of opinion in this country regarding the question of acquiring sovereignty over the Philippines, together with the encouragement received from certain individuals in the United States, through letters and messages; the passivity of our troops in Manila; the declaration of General Otis that the forces of the United States would not be allowed to bring on a conflict—all conspired to give Aguinaldo what Admiral Dewey described at the time in a personal letter as the "big head." His own arrogance and that of his troops increased rapidly and expressed itself in repeated insults to our officers and men guarding Manila, where the insurgent troops were allowed to freely pass, if unarmed. The soldiers of Aguinaldo strutted about the streets of Manila in the presence of our troops, whom they taunted and openly charged with cowardice. The patience and passive submis-

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sion to these insults on the part of our soldiers is remarkable and almost as creditable as their subsequent heroism in battle. While this condition lasted nearly six months and grew more intolerable with the increase of its days, a few incidents will suffice to show the magnanimous fortitude and forbearance of our army.

After the fall of Manila, when the armed natives had taken up their position outside of the city in a line of works confronting and encircling our own, it was mutually agreed that the officers and soldiers of either army would be permitted to pass within the lines of the other, if unarmed. On the 9th of October, notwithstanding this agreement, which had been strictly respected by General Otis's forces, Major-General Anderson, while on a pleasure excursion up the Pasig River, was stopped and insolently forbidden to pass the insurgent lines by one of Aguinaldo's pickets. Repeated and persistent efforts were made to draw the fire of our pickets, and, although the limits of the territory under American jurisdiction were distinctly marked on a map and acknowledged by Aguinaldo, the insurgents, says General Otis, "entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches." Under cover of darkness, one of Aguinaldo's men approached an American picket whom he attempted to assassinate with a knife. He met the fate his treacherous conduct merited. Another effort was made to kill one of General Otis's pickets while on guard well within the limits of our own territory, but fortunately the shot fired at him did not take effect. During the first days of February a party of our engineers, making a topographical survey many yards

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within the lines agreed as coming under the control of the American forces, was seized and taken prisoner to Malolos, without reason or excuse. On the night of the 2d of February a strong detail of Filipino soldiers defiantly confronted one of our remote pickets, well within the limits of our acknowledged jurisdiction, and there remained during the entire night openly taunting our imperturbable men in an attempt to draw their fire. And, finally, on the night of February 4th, growing bolder and more persistent in their efforts to bring on a conflict, a strong detail of Filipino soldiers again appeared at one of our outposts on the east of the city and at the west end of the Santa Mesa bridge. The detachment was led by one of Aguinaldo's officers who attempted to pass and push back our picket then a hundred yards or more within our lines. Private Grayson, Company D, 1st Nebraska Volunteers, challenged the Filipino and his detachment, and, after giving his third warning, fired, killing the lieutenant while he still persisted in his attempt to force our picket-line. Immediately the insurgents opened fire upon our troops from their entire line of works surrounding the city and many miles in length.

Aguinaldo had accomplished that which he had so long conspired to bring about. By an overt act he had succeeded in drawing the fire of our picket. The Americans had "fired the first shot." And this was their signal for assaulting us along the entire line of their works. That evening (the firing began at 8.30) Aguinaldo issued a grandiloquent order to the Filipino army, intended for European consumption, in which he stated: "I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it [the conflict] at all costs, using

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all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights."

The assault upon our troops on the night of February 4th was unprovoked by any act on the part of our military, was premeditated, and deliberately brought on by the forces of Aguinaldo. It is no defence of Aguinaldo to say that he took advantage of a military situation in the Philippines and a political situation in the United States which seemed most favorable to the success of his assault. The government of the United States had broken no pledges with the Filipinos, for neither it nor any of its representatives had made promises of any character whatsoever. The treaty of peace which provided for a transfer of sovereignty had not yet been approved by the Senate, and even if approved as the treaty stood February 4th, it provided that the "civil rights and political status" of the Philippines "shall be determined by Congress."

In only two of his proclamations or manifestoes does Aguinaldo claim that he was made any promises by representatives of this government; the first in his proclamation of May 24th, already referred to, and which statement he subsequently admitted to his cabinet officers was unwarranted; and second, in his recalled proclamation of January 5th, wherein he states: "I hoped that, once the Paris Conference was at end, my people would obtain the independence promised them by Consul-General Pratt at Singapore." While the secret denial to his cabinet officers of any authority for the promise of independence, made to the Filipinos in his proclamation of May 24th, would also cover this

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claim, it may be well to refer to other evidence to disprove it.

The statement has been so often made, repeated, and reiterated in the United States that Aguinaldo was promised independence by the civil and military officers of this government, and that thereby Aguinaldo was grossly deceived when he was "brought" to Luzon, that the allegation merits circumstantial denial to show how unwarranted it is.

The only representatives of the United States competent to make promises in the name of this government with whom Aguinaldo came in contact before he reached Manila were Consul-General E. Spencer Pratt at Singapore, Consul-General Rounsevelle Wildman at Hong-Kong, and Admiral Dewey. After Aguinaldo landed at Cavité he had repeated conversations with Consul Oscar F. Williams, who had been the representative of the United States at Manila prior to the war with Spain. Each of these gentlemen, sworn officers of the government all, have emphatically and specifically denied that they at any time promised Aguinaldo, or any of the Filipinos, independence, or that they had made promises to him or to them of any kind whatsoever. This feature of the discussion has such an important bearing on the matter that I quote in full the official refutation of each officer made either to the State or to the Navy Department.

Admiral Dewey says: "No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of independence made to him then (when he reached Cavité) or any other time."

Consul-General Pratt says: "I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the

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future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines; I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the government would co-operate with him—General Aguinaldo—for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.”

And Consul-General Wildman, of Hong-Kong, speaking for himself and Consul Williams, of Manila, says: “We made him no pledges and extracted from him but two—viz., to obey unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands, and to conduct his war on civilized lines.”

These are the statements of the sworn officers of our government and the admiral of our navy, and, if Aguinaldo had not voluntarily confessed the falsity of his claim of promises of independence to the contrary, their statements would need no corroboration.

But there is additional testimony to disprove the assertion that any agreement was made between this government or any representative thereof and Aguinaldo. The War Department has in its possession an original document bearing date of January 4th, 1899, and signed by Mabini, of Aguinaldo's cabinet. The document is in the nature of official instructions to one of Aguinaldo's emissaries, and thus reads in part:

“The chief of the Philippine people has not made any agreement with the government of the United States.”

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Neither is it true that Aguinaldo or the Filipinos were ever regarded or treated as our allies. On this point the statement of Admiral Dewey to the Navy Department, under date of June 29th, 1898, is interesting. He says:

“ The United States is not bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promise, and he (Aguinaldo) is not to my knowledge committed to assist us.”

When Aguinaldo reached the Philippines, May 19th, Dewey completely controlled Manila city and bay with the guns of his fleet. The Filipinos already confronted the Spaniards in Manila before Aguinaldo arrived, and by means of the arms placed in their hands inflicted no little loss upon the Spaniards. But there was no co-operation between our fleet and the Tagalog forces. Without any promise by word or act Dewey permitted the Filipinos to harass the Spaniards under his guns pending the arrival of our troops. Aguinaldo did not assist our troops in landing; neither did he assist our troops after they had landed in preparing for the assault on Manila; General Merritt purposely refrained from negotiating or communicating with him or his representatives; and when the time came for the attack on Manila he requested that the insurgent troops should be restrained from taking any part in the affair; and finally the city of Manila was captured by the combined effort of the American army and navy without the support or assistance of Aguinaldo or his troops.

The evidence, therefore, leads conclusively to these statements:

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1. No promises of independence or promises of any kind whatsoever were made Aguinaldo or the insurgents before or during the war with Spain.

2. The insurgents were not our allies; they were never treated as our allies; and at no time was there any co-operation between either the land or naval forces of the United States and the Tagalog forces under Aguinaldo.

3. Manila and its suburbs were captured by the army and navy of the United States without the assistance or co-operation of the insurrectionary forces.

4. The articles of capitulation provided for the surrender of Manila stipulated: "This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army." The army of the United States was therefore in honor bound to occupy, protect, and defend that city from the insurgents, who wanted to loot and burn it, until the question of its final disposition should be determined.

5. The treaty of peace signed at Paris, December 10th, 1898, provided for the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippines from Spain to the United States. The Senate of the United States did not recommend the ratification of that treaty until February 6th, 1899, and the treaty did not legally become operative until ratifications were exchanged between this government and that of Spain, April 11th, 1899.

6. Even before the Senate of the United States recommended ratification of the Paris Treaty, while our troops were peacefully occupying Manila in pursuance of the pledges contained in the articles of capitulation, which intrusted "its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions," to the "faith and honor of the American army," the insurgent forces under Aguinaldo on the 4th of February, while the approval* of the treaty by the United States was still very much in doubt, deliberately provoked an assault, brought on a conflict, and attacked the American forces

* The treaty passed the Senate by only one vote more than the necessary two-thirds.

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in Manila without cause or excuse, so far as the conduct of our troops was concerned.

This premeditated and unwarranted assault on our forces by the Tagalog insurgents under Aguinaldo precipitated the present conflict in the Philippines. The defence of our troops and the protection of our pledges given upon the "faith and honor of the American army" rendered imperative active operations on our part in the first instance. After February 6th, when the Senate recommended ratification of the Paris Treaty, the sovereignty over the Philippines became practically effective, and without discontinuance of the conflict it may be said that since then the troops have been employed in maintaining the sovereignty transferred to the United States by the Treaty of Paris and in suppressing those who, before that transfer was accomplished, assaulted our forces.

CHAPTER XXI

THE TAGALOG REBELLION

WAR in the Philippines had begun. The fire from the insurgent trenches, which opened upon our lines at 8.30 on the evening of February 4th, continued without intermission until midnight. The insurgents did not advance from their works, doubtless waiting for the co-operation on the part of their sympathizers in the city, who had been secretly armed and drilled with the intention of uprising when this planned assault should take place. The Tagalog confederates of Aguinaldo in Manila are said to have numbered 10,000, but their first attempt at concerted action, on the night of February 4th, was quickly and efficiently met by General Hughes's provost guard, which killed and wounded sixty of the rebels, thus substantially checking their work.

At daybreak, February 5th, the insurgents again opened up their attack. An order was given for a general charge against the enemy's works on the north, south, and east of the city, and our troops, long waiting for an opportunity to resent the insults of the misguided Filipinos, carried the entire line of trenches surrounding the city, although outnumbered two to one. General Otis's effective forces in Manila amounted to approximately 14,000, while the insurgents are said to have had between 30,000 and 40,000. By five

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o'clock in the afternoon, when active hostilities ceased, General MacArthur's division, consisting of the brigades of Hale and H. G. Otis, had captured the reservoir, San Juan del Monte, and all the block-houses, and held a line extending from a point opposite San Pedro Macati to the bay, about nine miles in length. General Anderson's two brigades (King's and Ovenshine's) occupied a shorter but stronger line on the south, extending from Pasay to San Pedro Macati on the Pasig River.

The navy rendered valuable and effective assistance along the bay on the 5th by shelling the enemy's works.

Aguinaldo's troops were severely punished. By this fight they learned that the pledges of the American soldier to protect and defend the city and inhabitants of Manila upon his "faith and honor" meant something more than the mere expression of that pledge in words. The insurrectionary troops were routed and demoralized. They had lost 3,000 in killed and wounded, 700 of whom we buried, and our hospitals were filled with their wounded. The American casualties were about 250, few of whom were killed.

The insurgents soon recovered, however, and began to mass near Caloocan, two or three miles north of Manila, on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad. General Luna, the ablest military leader of the Filipinos, who was subsequently assassinated, it is said, by Aguinaldo's order, commanded at Caloocan the Filipino rebels, numbering 4,000. On the 11th of February, General MacArthur successfully dislodged and drove General Luna back in a spirited attack, in which the Montana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania volunteers es-

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
pecially distinguished themselves. The small force available and the great length of our lines made it unadvisable for General MacArthur to follow up this victory. The rebels, however, were still aggressively active in the vicinity of Manila, even yet hoping that they could take the city, supported by their sympathizers within our lines.

On the 15th of February there was issued from Malolos, where Aguinaldo's headquarters had been transferred, an order to the insurrectionary rebels in Manila. The order prescribed "Death to the tyrants, war without quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived us," and the extermination of all "individuals" other than Filipinos was enjoined. These commands were followed, on the night of February 22d, by an uprising within our lines, which General Otis pronounced "successful in its inception and preliminary stages." Only the prompt and fearless suppression by the provost guard of the natives taking part in it prevented a massacre too horrible to contemplate. This endeavor cost the rebels 500 men in killed and wounded. The American losses were insignificant. The intended massacre of February 22d, 1899, practically ended offensive operations of Aguinaldo's followers in and about Manila.

The principal operations in the Philippines, after the engagements in the vicinity of Manila, extending from February 4th to 23d, consisted of two campaigns to the north in the valley of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, a raid across Laguna de Bay to the west, by Lawton, and the battle of Zapote Bridge to the south. These movements, which were not so much the result of a general campaign in the Philippines as of the ag-

NORTHERN LUZON

Scale of Miles



A C I F I C

A F S

LINGA

C. Engano - HERMANOS IS.
 PALLU I.
 Pt. Escarpada
 Pt. Diura
 Pt. Padmamungan

Pt. Mauntra
 Pt. Didiac
 Pt. Negra
 C. Bojador
 Pasopuh
 Landa
 S. Miguel
 L. Pasaol
 Batac
 Banna
 San Jose

Pt. Salomague
 S. Hilomague
 Virague
 S. Hilomague
 S. Hilomague
 S. Hilomague

Pt. Gondon
 Canda
 Sta. Lucia
 Sta. Cruz
 Sepila
 Tagudin
 Bangay
 Namparapay
 Pt. Darigayog
 S. Juan
 S. Fernando
 Pt. S. Fernando


Pt. Batifino
 Buigay
 Camalupa
 Lala
 Lala
 Lala

Pt. Cabibangan
 Pampanga
 Pampanga
 Pampanga
 Pampanga
 Pampanga

Pt. Dinstanson
 Pt. Biebian
 Pampanga Bay
 Pampanga

Pt. Dinstanson
 Pt. Biebian
 Pampanga Bay
 Pampanga





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gressive attitude of the rebels, were practically terminated in the middle of June, 1899. Vigorous operations in pursuing and attacking the forces under Aguinaldo were hampered by the lack of forces and the impracticability of campaigning during the rainy season. After his futile attempts to take the city, Aguinaldo still retained his headquarters at Malolos, about thirty miles north of Manila, on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad. Between the insurrectionary capital and Manila, on the line of the railroad, the principal part of the Filipino forces remained.

During the latter part of March the rebels were observed to be massing on the north of our lines not far from Caloocan. General Luna was in command, with 6,000 to 8,000 men. A "northern movement," as General Otis terms it, was therefore determined upon for the purpose of developing the enemy's strength and scattering his forces, before he could be sufficiently reinforced to render his threatening attitude dangerous. In the mean time General Otis's army had been augmented by the arrival of the 20th and 22d Infantry, February 23d and March 4th-5th, and by the 14th and 17th Infantry, accompanying General Lawton, March 10th-22d. As General Anderson had been made a brigadier-general in the regular army and ordered back to the United States, Major-General Lawton was assigned to the 1st Division of the 8th Corps, consisting of the brigades of Ovenshine, King, and Wheaton; and Major-General MacArthur to the 2d Division, consisting of the brigades of Hale, H. G. Otis, and Hall.

The northern movement was assigned to MacArthur's division, assisted by Wheaton's brigade of the 1st Division. Operations began on the morning of March

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25th, General Wheaton's brigade on the left, a column under General MacArthur, consisting of Hale's and Otis's brigades, forming the centre, while Hall's command acted as a protection for the right flank of the other operating brigades. It was hoped that the brigades under the division commander could march to Novaliches, to the northeast of Manila, swing to the left, and come in on the rear or on the left flank of the enemy's position in the vicinity of Polo, upon which General Wheaton was to attack direct. Owing to the almost impassable character of the country, the progress of General MacArthur's column was much slower than expected, and the turning movement, by way of Novaliches, was finally abandoned on account of the impossibility of moving our artillery and transportation over that route. In the mean time Wheaton's advance along the railroad had met with fierce resistance at Malinta, which place he captured on the 26th, after a heavy engagement in crossing the Tuliahan River, where the gallant Colonel Egbert, of the 22d Infantry, was killed. On the same day Wheaton's command joined the troops accompanying MacArthur, who had swung to the left without going as far east as Novaliches. The commands thus united assaulted and captured Polo, not without stubborn resistance, however, and finally, on the 31st of the month, MacArthur entered Malolos, after meeting and successfully defeating the enemy in numerous battles between Polo and the abandoned capital of the rebel chief. Malolos was set on fire by Aguinaldo's forces before they were driven out of the town. The insurgents fell back on Calumpit, eight miles to the northwest along the railroad, and Quingua, nearly the same distance north

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from Malolos. Aguinaldo moved his capital up the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, to San Isidro, in the province of Nueva Ecija. Malolos and the railroad line south to Manila have been held continuously since by our forces.

Notwithstanding the northern movement, with MacArthur's 11,780 men, had failed to get in the rear of the enemy, it had cleared the country north of Manila between Malolos as far east as Novaliches, and inflicted a heavy loss upon Aguinaldo's forces. Our own losses, too, had been large, the casualties in killed and wounded being 534.

Despite the fact that the insurgents suffered greatly in men and prestige as a result of the capture of their capital, it became evident that a determined effort was to be made to recapture Malolos, and if possible to check any further northward movement on the part of the American forces. During the latter part of May their activity had reached such a stage that it was believed a demonstration against Malolos was threatened.

The arrival in the Philippines of the two regular regiments accompanying General Lawton brought the forces under General Otis in Luzon to 16,500. A diversion movement was therefore determined upon to relieve the pressure on Malolos, and if possible to drive the enemy farther north. This expedition, which developed into the most masterly, swift, and difficult campaign of the war in the Philippines, was intrusted to General Lawton.

The first objective was San Miguel, where Lawton was to march, by way of Novaliches and Norzagaray, the main part of his command, about 4,000 strong,

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while a detachment was to move over the railroad by way of Bocaue and then march to Norzagaray. On the date fixed for the arrival of the last-named place, General MacArthur was to attack Calumpit and then advance northeast to join Lawton in an attack on San Miguel.

The almost impassable condition of the country over which Lawton's troops had to pass delayed his march, so that he did not reach Norzagaray until the 25th of May. The heat and absence of roads prostrated many of the buffaloes drawing the supply-carts. These carts, therefore, had to be hauled by the troops. On the 24th, in accordance with the prearranged plan, MacArthur's troops captured Calumpit, after crossing both the Bagbag and Calumpit rivers under great difficulties and in the face of a destructive fire from the intrenched enemy. At the Calumpit River the enemy was especially stubborn in his resistance. Not until Colonel Funston, of the 20th Kansas, with Lieutenant Ball and Sergeants Enston and Barshfield, swam the river and had driven the enemy from his trenches could the insurgents be dislodged from their advantageous position. In spite of the fact that General Luna had 4,000 men firmly intrenched about Calumpit, and that two deep and swift rivers separated him from General MacArthur's troops, numbering less than those of the insurgents, Calumpit fell before the resistless assault of our men, who soon advanced along the railroad to San Fernando.

In the mean time General Lawton was moving in the valley of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga with a swiftness and effectiveness that stupefied the insurgents. In succession he had taken Novaliches,

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San José del Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, Balinag, San Luis, Maasim, Idlefonso, Arayat, and, finally, on the 17th of May, he marched into San Isidro, the second capital of the insurgents captured by our forces in less than two months. Aguinaldo and his government and the troops under General Pilar fled to Cabanatuan, up the valley to the northeast about fourteen miles, while what was left of General Luna's command fell back along the railroad to Tarlac.

A line so far from our base of supplies and so great in extent could not long be held by the small force then in the Philippines. Moreover, the ratification by the Senate of the treaty of peace, February 6th, 1899, practically terminated the enlistment of sixty per cent. of the regular troops in the Philippines, as well as the entire volunteer force. The volunteers and the men forming the increase in the regular army had enlisted for two years or during the war with Spain. These men, therefore, were justly entitled to their discharge after the 6th of February. Then, too, the rainy season had now set in, and this made any aggressive operations practically impossible in a country where, during the spring of 1899, forty-six inches of rain fell in one month alone. The railroad between San Fernando and Calumpit had been greatly damaged by the rebels in their retreat, and could not be repaired for some time; while General MacArthur's division, from the strain of battle, which had lasted now since the 4th of February—nearly three months—from the enervating blaze of the tropical sun, and from the arduous character of the campaign generally, had almost collapsed. Thirty per cent. of his command are said

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to have reached San Fernando sick. In one regiment the surgeon reported that but ninety-six men were fit for duty. General MacArthur's division, therefore, fell back to Calumpit, and General Lawton gradually withdrew his forces from all places captured, south to Balinag. A line between these two towns, with a guard at Quingua, now marked the northern limits of the territory under American control. Along this line and down the railroad from Calumpit to Manila outposts were to remain until the forces in the Philippines could be sufficiently augmented to begin operations anew in the fall of 1899.

General Lawton returned to Manila after his brilliant campaign in the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, and immediately began to clear the country of Tagalog rebels east and south of Manila. Soon after his arrival in the Philippines, during the middle of April, he had made a raid across Laguna de Bay against Santa Cruz, which he captured, together with numerous insurgent steam launches—the particular object of his expedition. The insurgents, however, had again assembled east of Manila on the narrow neck of land between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay along the Pasig River. Under Lawton's direction, Hall undertook a vigorous campaign up the Pasig River to Laguna de Bay, successfully meeting and defeating the enemy at Pasig, Taguig, Taytay, Antipolo, and Morong, where the insurgents had made a stand in strong numbers under the outlaw Pilar—the Fra Diavolo of the Philippines. This cleared the country upon which the city of Manila chiefly depends for its farm products. The expedition, which terminated on the 8th of June, was immediately

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followed by General Lawton in a successful effort to drive off the insurgents to the south, where they were massing within four miles of Manila. A strong force of rebels had assembled at Paranaque and also near San Pedro Macati, and here it was reported they proposed to stand until the last ditch, as a sort of religious fascination had attached itself to the locality, from the fact that in Cavité province the insurrection against Spain first broke out. General Lawton, with the brigades of Wheaton and Ovenshine, met the enemy on the 13th of June at Zapote Bridge, and one of the most stoutly contested engagements of the entire Filipino war, before or since, took place. With a strong force and much determination the enemy resisted the attacks of our troops, and finally, resorting to American tactics, boldly advanced towards our position until within 130 to 100 yards of the American lines. Although well armed and of stronger numbers, the Filipinos were soon driven back with much loss and great discomfiture. The insurgent troops were badly scattered to the east and west after "a beautiful battle," as the brave Lawton pronounced it. The rebels, 3,000 strong, had lost in killed and wounded over one-third of their number. The American casualties amounted to forty.

The battle of Zapote Bridge and a repulsed assault on Malolos three days later by General MacArthur's forces, practically ended the war in the Philippines during the period coming under my personal observation. The American forces had defeated the insurgents in every engagement, and now occupied the richest and most thickly populated section of the most important island of the Philippines.

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Any discussion of affairs in the Philippines would be manifestly incomplete which did not include the highest of eulogiums upon the Western volunteers who remained in the Philippines fighting for their country's honor after they were legally entitled to discharge and return to the United States. The ratification of the treaty of peace, February 6th, 1899, practically entitled all volunteer regiments and the individual members of the regular army, numbering many thousands who enlisted for the war, to immediate discharge from the army. And yet some of these volunteers did not leave the Philippines until four months subsequent to that date, while several of the regiments remained defending their country's flag for seven months afterwards. This is an exhibition of sturdy patriotism which it seems to me has never been fully appreciated. No complaint ever came from these soldiers on account of the hardships, ever forming part of war, or for the delay in being returned to their homes after they were entitled to discharge. They yielded to the situation as cheerfully as they endured the great and fatiguing privations of hauling guns and carts over the mountain-passes and through the trails of muck and mire under the enervating blaze of a tropical sun when even the native draught animals had been overcome with heat exhaustion. The nation, indeed, owes these noble soldiers a debt which I trust Congress will not fail to recognize in some substantial way. The roll of honor includes the following organizations, besides every man in the regular service who enlisted for the war, who, though numerous to mention, are none the less entitled to the country's gratitude and praise:

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ROLL OF HONOR OF ENLISTED MEN

	ARRIVED IN PHILIPPINES	LEFT PHILIPPINES
1st California Infantry . . .	June 30, 1898	July 26, 1899
A and D, California Artillery	Nov. 22 "	" 26 "
1st Colorado Infantry . . .	July 16 "	" 18 "
1st Idaho Infantry	July 31 "	" 30 "
51st Iowa Infantry	Dec. 7 "	Aug. 25 "
20th Kansas Infantry . . .	Nov. 3 "	Sept. 3 "
13th Minnesota Infantry . .	July 31 "	Aug. 11 "
1st Montana Infantry . . .	Aug. 24 "	" 22 "
1st Nebraska Infantry . . .	July 17 "	July 1 "
Troop Nevada Cavalry . . .	Dec. 10 "	Sept. 29 "
1st North Dakota Infantry .	July 31 "	July 30 "
2d Oregon Infantry	June 30 "	June 14 "
10th Pennsylvania Infantry.	July 17 "	July 11 "
1st South Dakota Infantry .	Aug. 24 "	Aug. 11 "
1st Tennessee Infantry . .	Nov. 29 "	Oct. 8 "
A and B, Utah Artillery. . .	July 17 "	July 1 "
1st Washington Infantry. .	Nov. 22 "	Sept. 5 "
1st Wyoming Infantry . . .	July 31 "	July 30 "
Wyoming Battery	Dec. 6 "	July 30 "

CHAPTER XXII

THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY

THE Commission appointed by the President at my request* to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain, commonly known as the War Investigation or the Dodge Commission, met on the 24th day of September, 1898.† Up to the 21st of December, 1898, this Commission had taken testimony in seventeen towns and cities and in many different camps, granting, wherever it went, to the citizens, soldiers, or ex-soldiers, an opportunity to appear for complaint or testimony of any kind regarding the conduct of the war. The Commission

* "September 8, 1898.

" *To the President.*

" I have the honor to ask that a Board, consisting of from five to seven members of the most distinguished soldiers and civilians that can be selected, be appointed by you, with full power to investigate thoroughly every bureau of the War Department, in connection with the mustering, clothing, supplying, and arming of troops, transportation, the letting of contracts and chartering vessels, and all expenditures of every kind, as well as of orders issued by this department—indeed, that everything connected with the army be thoroughly investigated for your information.

R. A. ALGER,
"Secretary of War."

† This Commission consisted of General Grenville M. Dodge, President; Colonel James A. Sexton, Colonel Charles Denby, Captain Evan P. Howell, ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; General James A. Beaver, Major-General Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A. (retired); Dr. Phineas S. Conner, and Mr. Richard Weightman, Secretary.

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visited numerous camps in which there still were many thousands of soldiers, both regulars and volunteers, who were invited to give their evidence without regard to rank or service. On the 21st of December the major-general commanding the army of the United States appeared before the Commission, then sitting in Washington, and made his statements with respect to the canned fresh and refrigerated beef furnished to the army during the war. General Miles refused to be sworn or affirmed, as every other of the 495 witnesses had been, declaring in substance that he would "make his statements without being sworn, and was responsible for what he said."

Although the Commission had been sitting nearly three months, the charges with respect to canned and refrigerated beef were now made for the first time; and, stranger and more inexcusable and more unsoldierly still, during all those months, with this pretended knowledge of facts which, if they existed, should have been made known to the Secretary of War, for the protection of the army, General Miles had never mentioned the subject. Nor did I ever hear a rumor of chemically treated beef being purchased for the army until the general's testimony was given before the Commission. These allegations are as follows:

"CAPTAIN HOWELL. I want to ask you, general, is that canned beef a part of the ration?"

"GENERAL MILES. It was made part of the ration during this war, to the extent of sending to Puerto Rico, as I say, nearly 200,000 pounds of it.

"Q. I mean by that, was it fixed by Congress as a part of the army ration?"

"A. No, sir.

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“Q. Who fixed it, then, as a part of the army ration?

“A. You will have to ask some one here in Washington.

“Q. I want to know how it became part of the army ration. If he does not know, who should (referring to General Miles)?

“A. You had better ask the Secretary of War or the Commissary-General; I think they can tell you. I know it was sent to the army as food, and the pretence is that it was sent as an experiment. . . . There was sent to Puerto Rico 337 tons of what is known as, or called, refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef. . . . Now, if you want to ascertain the cost to the government of this so-called refrigerated beef—embalmed beef—take the original cost. . . . I do not know what may have been injected into it. . . . The understanding is that this is a secret process of preserving beef. . . . It may be that they are still sending the stuff down there. I don't know. . . . If I was furnished for any expedition in this country, or any other, with such stuff, I would prohibit the men from taking it. . . . I do not think that beef such as was sent to Cuba and Puerto Rico would be good in any country in the stomach of any man. . . . They could get some bacon, but that is not considered suitable food for the tropics. . . . You ask about food. In my judgment that was one of the serious causes of so much sickness and distress on the part of our troops.”

Not content with these grave and scandalous charges, thus made public for the first time before the War Investigation Commission, General Miles permitted himself to be interviewed on the following day, December 22d, at Cincinnati, Ohio, when he made these charges:

“The part in my testimony of yesterday of 337 tons of refrigerated beef and 198,000 pounds of canned fresh beef, which was unfit for food, is only an item. This quantity was sent to one town in Puerto Rico. How much more was sent I do not know. . . . Yes; or it might do for one man to try it on his own stomach; but to feed an army, that was more than an experiment. . . .

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As I stated in my testimony, I believe the action of these chemicals was largely responsible for the sickness in the army. I have medical authority for this statement, and believe it to be true."

General Miles was given an opportunity to officially deny this interview, but he did not do so. His written and official reply was evasive and equivocal. When he appeared before the Court of Inquiry, to be hereafter referred to, he was unable under oath to repudiate that interview.

The allegations that unsuitable food, not a part of the legal ration, had been furnished to the army under pretence of an experiment, and that refrigerated beef, treated with poisonous chemicals, had been and was being supplied to our army of 275,000 men, were indeed serious, implying, as they did, criminal incompetency on the part of the Commissary Department, if not wilful negligence and dishonesty.

Upon Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan the charges fell with the suddenness and sharpness of a blow from an assassin's knife out of the dark. General Eagan had been an officer of the regular army for thirty-six years. He had risen from a second-lieutenancy to the highest rank in the Commissary Department to which his ambition could aspire. Gallant and fearless on the battle-fields of the Civil War and the hostile Indian plains of the West, he had a record for soldierly qualities of which any officer might well be proud. With energy, honesty, and zeal, he had administered his department during the war with Spain; a fitting climax to a long and honorable career in the service of his country.

No other supply bureau of the army had excelled the Commissary Department in promptness, efficiency,

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and successful administration during the war. I never entered the War Department, whether early in the day or late at night, and called for the Commissary-General that he did not report at once. I never gave him an order that was not immediately carried out to the letter. Indeed, his zeal and anxiety for the soldiers in camp and field were so great that his efforts in their behalf, during the long and weary days and nights of the hot summer, nearly resulted in his prostration from overwork. The charges of General Miles, made so publicly and so positively, and the manner in which they were for the first time made known, seemed to General Eagan, in his nervous condition, the more magnified and horrible. Upon hearing them, he exclaimed: "General Miles has crucified me upon a cross of falsehood and misrepresentation."

General Eagan had already been examined by the War Investigation Commission when General Miles's hearing occurred; but, when the testimony of the latter appeared in the newspapers, General Eagan immediately requested a rehearing. This was granted him on the 12th of January, 1899. After being sworn, General Eagan said:

"I desire to say here that the first intimation I ever had that this beef was chemically treated beef—embalmed beef—was read by me in the newspapers as coming from the senior Major-General of the army, Nelson A. Miles. When I read it I could not believe it. The statements in the newspapers were so utterly at variance with the truth that I expected to see an immediate denial from General Miles."

General Eagan read his reply to the War Investigation Commission from a carefully prepared type-

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written manuscript. Lashed to the quick by the allegations contained in General Miles's testimony, and in his subsequent interview, which appeared on December 23d in a New York newspaper, his indignation exceeded the limits of his self-control, and in his efforts to deny the charges made, his language became vituperative, extravagant, and highly improper. I believe that, had General Eagan's health not been seriously impaired by overwork and anxiety, the two objectionable paragraphs—of 300 words, out of an aggregate of 12,000 words contained in his reply—would never have been written or uttered. Even yet, divested of its offensive adjectives in the two paragraphs referred to, his reply to General Miles remains unanswerable in its logic and incontrovertible in its facts.

The allegation that I had inspired or had any knowledge of General Eagan's intended attack upon the statement of General Miles, is absolutely untrue. He did not make known to me the nature of his proposed answer to the charges. Neither did he consult me in the matter. He gave me not the slightest hint of the nature of his proposed statement before the War Investigation Commission. I never saw the reply, nor did I know its character until a copy of it was handed to me by a member of the press. Had General Eagan submitted his manuscript to me, he would undoubtedly at this writing still be in full possession of the rank and privileges of the office of Commissary-General of the United States Army. As it was, even the self-prejudicial and intemperate presentation made by General Eagan convinced the Commission that there was no foundation in fact for the charges and

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insinuations deducible from the terms "pretence of experiment" and "embalmed beef."

As soon as I learned of General Eagan's statement before the Commission, I sent for him. I informed him of my surprise and mortification at his conduct. "Why did you not permit your friends to read your testimony? Why did you not show it to me and thereby have prevented the disgrace that is now sure to come upon you and the uniform you wear? You had no right," I continued, "to make use of such unbridled language at a time and under circumstances which will assuredly result in associating the President's name and my own with such a disgraceful episode."

The language of General Eagan could not be overlooked. He was tried by court-martial for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and for conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline; of these charges and specifications he was found guilty, and recommended to be dismissed from the service. The sentence of the court, however, was commuted to suspension from rank and duty for six years until his retirement—"in view of his gallant conduct in battle upon more than one occasion, which merited and has received the warm commendation of his superiors, and of his long and honorable record of service, extending over a period surpassing in duration that usually allotted to a generation; having regard, also, to the mitigating circumstances which were developed during the trial of the case, and in deference to the recommendation of clemency submitted in his behalf."

The suspension of General Eagan from the functions of his office until his retirement, stripped the service of

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an honest and able officer. His court-martial was not the outcome of General Miles's charges, but the result of intemperate and unmilitary language, conceived in an indignation pardonable, perhaps, in its existence, but unpardonable in its mode of expression.*

General Miles seemed to be pleased with the notoriety which his startling statements before the Commission and his subsequent newspaper interview gave him; for again, on the 31st of March, 1899, in New York City, he published, through representatives of the Associated Press, and of a metropolitan paper, additional charges. This unmilitary and questionable method of making in public grave and scandalous charges regarding a brother officer and the work of his department—charges which subsequent and careful investigation proved both unwarranted and untrue—seemed to appeal to certain characteristics of the Major-General Commanding to which reference here would be out of place.

The interview, which appeared on the morning of February 1st, General Miles was called upon to deny under oath; and, as he was unable to do so, part of his statements in it were used by the Court of Inquiry as a basis for investigation. I quote two paragraphs proven to be part of the statements made by General Miles to the reporters:

“I have overwhelming evidence that the embalmed beef was treated with chemicals in order to preserve it. I have affidavits from men who saw the beef undergoing treatment or embalming process. . . . Now, as to the canned roast beef, that was different from the embalmed beef. The canned roast beef was the beef after the extract had been boiled out of it. You have

* General Eagan has since been reinstated in the service. Immediately thereafter he was placed on the retired list at his own request.

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seen the advertisements 'Beef Extract, one pound contains the substance of from four to five pounds of prime beef.' Well, this is the beef after the extract has been taken from it. They put this beef pulp up in cans and labelled it 'canned roast beef.' The soldiers report that the canned beef was nauseating. If swallowed, it could not be kept on the stomach."

It is proposed to treat General Miles's allegations specifically and in detail. His charges with respect to canned roast beef were, that it was not a part of the army ration, and (by inference) had been issued to the army by the Secretary of War and the Commissary-General without authority of law; and that it was the meat residue—a beef pulp which was left after the extract had been taken from it. With respect to refrigerated beef, he alleged that it was "embalmed beef," which had been artificially preserved by injecting chemicals into it; that he had overwhelming evidence that the "embalmed beef" was treated with chemicals to preserve it; and that the refrigerated beef would not be "good in any country in the stomach of any man."

He also said, generally, that bacon was not considered a suitable ration for the tropics, and that the beef furnished the army was the cause of much sickness and distress; that it was largely responsible for the sickness in the army, and that he had medical authority for this statement.

General Miles should have known that neither the Secretary of War nor the Commissary-General could legally alter or add to the ration of the army. The ration is fixed by law, and its components can be changed only by the President of the United States. An examination of the records of the War Department, or inquiry of the Commissary-General, would have

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speedily developed the fact that canned fresh beef (or, as it is known, canned roast beef) had been a recognized part of the army ration for nearly a quarter of a century. If General Miles did not know that canned fresh beef was a part of the army ration, then he displayed an ignorance in an important matter of his profession that is, to say the least, most remarkable; if he did know that canned fresh beef was a recognized part of the ration, then his allegation to the contrary is so much the more reprehensible.

On the 1st of August, 1878, canned fresh beef first became a part of the travel ration of the United States army, then under the command of General Sherman, and while the Honorable George W. McCrary was Secretary of War. This fact was made known in a public order issued by the War Department:

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE,

“ WASHINGTON, August 1, 1878.

“ *General Orders No. 59.*

“ By direction of the Secretary of War the following order is published to the army:

“ I. The following issues may be made to troops travelling upon cars or transports, or in the field, when it is impracticable to cook their rations—viz: *Seventy-five pounds of canned fresh or corned beef*, and sixteen three-pound cans or six one-gallon cans of baked beans, or fifteen pounds of cheese per hundred rations—the issues of *canned beef* to be in lieu of the meat, and the beans and cheese in lieu of the vegetable ration authorized by existing regulations and orders. None of the above-mentioned articles will be sold by companies or detachments as savings.

“ By command of General Sherman:

“ E. D. TOWNSEND,

“ Adjutant-General.”

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Canned fresh beef was again specifically referred to in General Orders, under dates of November, 1879, of September 28th, 1881, January 19th, 1888, and February 8th, 1888. The last-mentioned order changed the Army Regulations and included in those regulations a reference to canned fresh beef:

“ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
“ ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“ WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1888.*

“ *General Orders No. 8.*

“ By direction of the Secretary of War, paragraph 2150 of the regulations is amended to read as follows:

“ 2150. A ration is the established daily allowance of food for one person. For the United States army it is now composed as follows: Twelve ounces of pork or bacon *or canned beef (fresh or corned)*, or one pound and four ounces of fresh beef, or twenty-two ounces of salt beef; eighteen ounces of soft bread or flour, or sixteen ounces of hard bread, or one pound and four ounces of corn meal. To every 100 rations, fifteen pounds of beans or pease, or ten pounds of rice or hominy; ten pounds of green coffee or eight pounds of roasted (or roasted and ground) coffee, or two pounds of tea; fifteen pounds of sugar; four quarts of vinegar; one pound and eight ounces of adamantine or star candles; four pounds of soap; four pounds of salt; four ounces of pepper; and to troops in the field, when necessary, four pounds of yeast powder to the 100 rations of flour.

“ By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan,

“ R. C. DRUM,

“ Adjutant-General.”

The statements of General Miles, that canned fresh beef was not a part of the army ration, and that it was issued as the “pretence of an experiment,” were not only contrary to fact, but were made absolutely without a particle of evidence or excuse. If General Miles really believed his serious charges, his conduct is all

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the more blameworthy, in that he apparently made no effort to assure himself of their truthfulness, nor to report them to the Secretary of War before publicly uttering them.

If we are to believe written evidence to the contrary, it does not appear that General Miles was even honest in making his dilatory charges that the tinned beef was issued as the "pretence of an experiment," and that it was not a part of the ration. On the 17th of June, 1898, his most confidential staff officer signed a letter by "direction of the Major-General Commanding the army," instructing the depot commissary at Tampa to furnish to General Nunez 10,644 pounds of canned roast beef, to be issued from the "subsistence stores of the army." If we are to accept the reading of this letter as correct, it proves that General Miles knew that canned fresh beef was a part of the ration; that he knew there was a large quantity of it at Tampa for issue to the troops; and that he so far approved of its use as to direct that the ration be furnished in large quantities to our allies. The letter is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"TAMPA, FLA., June 17, 1898.

"Major A. L. Smith, Department Commissary, Tampa, Florida.

"SIR,—The Major-General Commanding directs that you transfer to General Nunez, of the Cuban army, on board the steamer *Florida*, at Port Tampa, for issue to the insurgent forces, the following subsistence stores:

	<i>Lbs.</i>
48 barrels Pork	9,600
336 crates Bacon	67,275
19 cases Beef, Canned, Boiled No. 4	456
37 " Beef, Canned, Roasted No. 6	444
406 " Beef, Canned, Roasted No. 2	9,744

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	<i>Lbs.</i>
159 barrels Corn Meal	31,164
189 sacks Beans	18,900
(176 barrels.)	
3 sacks Potatoes	48,760
22 " Green Coffee	3,330
24 " Sugar (issued)	2,400

" Yours very respectfully, F. MICHLER,
" Assistant Adjutant-General."

It was never intended by the Commissary Department that canned beef should be used other than as an emergency or travel ration. General Eagan's predecessors in office had, twenty years before the Spanish-American War, highly recommended its use, and it had been officially included in the regular travel ration. Canned fresh beef has, ever since the Civil War, been a part of the regular navy ration, 500,000 pounds of this food having been used annually in our navy before the war with Spain. For years, large quantities of canned fresh beef have been shipped to the European armies, France alone purchasing 25,000,000 pounds of one firm in the United States, while Great Britain has secured from the same establishment, for her army and navy, no less than from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 pounds. With a legal warrant for its use, the approval of at least two previous commissaries-general, its extended use abroad, and its large consumption in our own navy, General Eagan was certainly fortified in his belief that it could be efficaciously used by our troops. Moreover, the present Commissary-General, then Colonel J. F. Weston, in a letter to General Eagan, under date of March 24th, 1898, thus refers to canned fresh beef :

" The Armour Company is putting up a roast beef and boiled

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beef canned. It is from strips, and about what I wanted so far as process, but not so good, as it does not include the whole; still it is good. I have made hash, also stew, from it that was fit for the immortal gods and not beneath the notice of a general, using a little bacon, potatoes, onions, flour, and condiments; just what a soldier has. It makes a good, palatable, hearty meal, and I am entirely safe in saying that we, in this way, can furnish fresh beef to any number of men concentrated in Florida or Cuba at about 10.5 cents per pound. It will not be steak, or choice roast; still it will be fresh beef. It can be furnished without loss, and that is more than can be said of cattle on the hoof or in refrigerator cars; it will be healthful, which is not the case if killed at once; a necessity if furnished on the hoof. To me it presents a solution of a difficult problem, a problem that must be met; there is no substitute."

Fresh canned beef was preferred over corned canned beef, because of the fact that the salt in the latter produces thirst—a decided objection in a tropical country; but the tinned beef should have been used only when cooked with vegetables and properly seasoned. In this statement lies the secret of the source of complaint against canned fresh beef. The only fault found with the ration was that it was unpalatable when served without additional cooking and without vegetables and condiments. The ration was not used to any great extent in the camps in the United States, but only on the transports to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and for a short time in Cuba by part of Shafter's army in the trenches, where objection to its use could also be raised on account of the inability to cook and serve it suitably. A few issues were also made in Puerto Rico. And yet, despite the improper preparation of the food, owing to unavoidable circumstances resulting from military necessity, no complaints of its unpalatability

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reached the War Department. The chief commissary of the Shafter expedition testified under oath that, while he was in Cuba, he "never heard a single, solitary complaint." General Shafter testified to practically the same effect; and the chief surgeon of the 5th Corps says that there did not come to him any complaint of the use of the tinned beef.

While General Miles's charges that canned fresh beef was not a part of the legal ration, and that it was furnished as a pretence of experiment, could be and were so easily disproven by records and incontrovertible facts—of which he could have readily been made cognizant, had he been as thorough in his prior investigations as he had been positive in his charges—his allegation that the meat was the "pulp" from which the extract of beef had been taken, while not believed, required painstaking and careful investigation. It was immediately determined that no expense or effort should be spared to ascertain the truth or falsity of this charge. The most expert and scientific men in the country were, therefore, employed by the government to further the investigation—such physiological chemists as Professor R. H. Chittenden, of Yale, and Professor W. O. Atwater, of Wesleyan University, as well as Dr. W. D. Bigelow, a chemist in the United States Department of Agriculture.

The Court of Inquiry visited several of the large packing-houses, accompanied by Dr. Bigelow. The results of personal examinations and of the investigations of the experts employed, conclusively showed that there was not one jot or tittle of evidence or excuse for the statement that canned fresh beef was the pulp after the beef extract had been removed. The

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methods obtaining in all packing-houses for the preparation of this product are practically the same. After passing an inspection by the officials of the Agricultural Department, representing the government at all of these establishments, the beef is cut up into small sections, boiled for fifteen or twenty minutes, placed in cans, after the tendons and gristle have been cut away, sealed, subjected to a sterilization process, under a temperature of 215° to 225° Fahrenheit, for two or three hours, then punctured to allow the gas to escape, and again sealed. This process does not extract any of the nutritive or muscle-forming elements of the meat, the only losses incurred in it being "water, fat, soluble ash, and meat bases. Of these the fat is useful in supplying fuel for body-heat, and the meat bases have some value as a tonic."* Instead of being "pulp," or residuum of any character whatsoever, canned fresh beef is a concentrated product.

While General Miles's specifications did not include any statements regarding the use of preservatives in the tinned meat, a number of cans sent to Havana, Santiago, and Puerto Rico with the army were furnished by General Miles and carefully analyzed. No trace of any preservatives or chemicals were found in them.

The imputations with respect to canned fresh beef were most carefully and thoroughly examined and reported upon by two impartial tribunals, one being composed of eminent citizens, ex-soldiers, and a distinguished general officer of the regular army (I refer

* Report of Dr. W. D. Bigelow, Assistant Chemist, U. S. Department of Agriculture.

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to the War Investigation Commission); the other, the Court of Inquiry, consisting wholly of officers of the regular army of high rank and unimpeachable integrity, especially assembled to investigate this question. There was no subject to which the Dodge Commission devoted more time or more thoroughly investigated than the assertions of the senior Major-General of the army. This Commission personally visited many large camps and numerous cities, receiving and courting testimony on this important matter wherever it went. The Court of Inquiry was even more thorough in its research; its visits included the large packing-houses where the canned meat is prepared. What did these tribunals find? That there was no foundation for the charge that canned fresh beef was not a part of the ration, nor that it had been furnished as the pretence of experiment, nor that it was the pulp from beef.

The Court of Inquiry properly found that canned fresh beef was an unpalatable ration, without condiments, when not cooked and when not served with vegetables. In the haste under which the Santiago expedition left Tampa, proper provision for cooking the food of the men on the transports seems to have been either neglected or impossible. General Miles arrived at Tampa on June 1st, for the purpose of rendering such assistance to the commanding general of the Santiago expedition as his military experience and high rank could or was supposed to give. He was the special representative of the President and War Department, delegated to overlook that expedition and assist in its preparation and embarkation. He remained at Tampa until June 15th, the day after the 5th Corps sailed. During his stay at Tampa,

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there arrived there no less than twenty days' rations—for Shafter's army of nearly 17,000—of canned fresh beef alone, or fifty car-loads. If General Miles did not look into the question of food for the Santiago expedition; if he did not consult with the commanding general of that expedition concerning the ration to be taken with the troops and its method of preparation; if he did not consult with the chief commissary of that expedition concerning this important feature of the campaign, he was as culpable as though he had failed to inspect all other important matters, such as ammunition, transportation, etc., and he must share whatever responsibility attached to the use of the canned fresh beef on the transports. There was no shortage in vegetables, since nearly 2,000,000 rations of potatoes, onions, and canned tomatoes were shipped to Cuba with General Shafter's army; and, before the end of July, this supply had been increased to nearly 4,000,000 rations of vegetables. The unexpected delay of eight days on the transports off Tampa, resulting from the fright of the ghost fleet, prolonged the use of the canned beef on the transports and intensified the dislike for it, which was created by improper cooking facilities and lack of accessibility to the vegetables.

The use of the ration in the trenches before Santiago has never been fully explained. While only part of the army used canned fresh beef during the siege, it seems strange that any regimental commissary should have drawn it at Siboney if, after its use on the transports, the troops objected to it, and when there was plenty of bacon available. No less than 1,230,317 rations of bacon were at Siboney and on the trans-

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ports off shore. The men in the trenches were confronted with the same unfavorable conditions which had already attended the use of the beef ration on the transports. It could not be properly cooked, and the difficulties of communication between Siboney and the Santiago trenches made it impossible to transport any large quantities of vegetables before July 17th.

Besides finding that canned fresh beef was unsuitable when not cooked with vegetables, the Court of Inquiry also expressed the opinion that the purchase of 7,000,000 rations by the Commissary-General, during the first two months of the war with Spain, was a "colossal error for which there is no palliation." This, of course, is a question for judgment as between the Court of Inquiry and General Eagan. The latter has stated, however, that 7,000,000 rations would provision a force of 275,000 men, for which it was purchased, for only twenty-five and five-eleventh days. No canned fresh beef was purchased after June. The entire force of the army was intended to be used in active military operations, its disposal to depend on the development of the war. It was expected that at least a large portion of this force would constitute armies of invasion. Under these conditions, travel rations must be provided. The Commissary-General was by law confined to canned fresh beef, or corned beef, as the meat component to the travel ration. At the time this quantity of canned fresh beef was purchased, the investment of Havana by an army of 70,000 was in contemplation, besides expeditions to the south coast of Cuba, to Puerto Rico, and to the Philippines. It was also proposed to open up communication with the insurgent army, then estimated at 100,-

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000, and to feed them, as well as the thousands of Cuban reconcentrados, whose numbers were at that time greatly overestimated. The ration was not a perishable article, and I do not think that the expression "colossal error," as applied to this purchase, was entirely warranted. Moreover, the Navy Department, for its force of 13,121 officers and men, prior to the war, purchased annually 500,000 pounds, or 667,000 rations, of this same canned beef. This would be at the rate of 14,000,000 rations a year for a naval force the size of the army during the war. Again, the War Department is now* sending to the Philippines 160,000 rations of canned fresh beef a month, for a force something less than 70,000! This is at the rate of approximately 2,000,000 rations a year for a force about one-fourth the size of the army for which General Eagan provided 7,000,000 rations during the war with Spain, when he expected to feed, and did feed, also our Cuban allies, besides many starving Cuban reconcentrados. The most optimistic estimate fixed the duration of the war with Spain at hardly less than a year. That the war was fought out in three months should not be charged up against General Eagan's forethoughtfulness, especially since nearly all of the canned beef purchased by him has been consumed by the army,† thereby causing the government no financial loss in the matter.

General Miles's charges with respect to refrigerated beef were much more serious than his imputations regarding canned beef. His allegations, in substance, were that the beef furnished the army had been ar-

* November, 1900.

† Some was distributed to the destitute Cubans. A few cans were spoiled as a result of being punctured and letting in air, less than one-half of one per cent. in all.

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tificially preserved by injecting into it chemicals which were injurious to health; that he had overwhelming proof that this "embalmed beef" had been treated with chemicals; and that the refrigerated beef, such as was furnished our army, would not be "good in any country in the stomach of any man." It is significant to observe, at the outset, that the War Investigation Commission says: "Of the witnesses examined by this Commission, General Miles and Dr. Daly are the only ones who make this charge" of chemically treated beef. Astounding as this statement may seem, General Miles did not base his allegations upon personal experience or submit any proof in support of them. His startling and scandalous accusations appear to have been based entirely upon the verbal statements of Dr. W. H. Daly, a volunteer major and surgeon upon his staff during the war with Spain, and upon a single letter subsequently sent him by Dr. Daly. The letter is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., September 21,* 1898.

*"The Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, D. C.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to report, in the interest of the service, that in the several inspections I made in the various camps and troop-ships at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga, and Puerto Rico, that I found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroys its natural flavor, and which I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops.

"While on duty at headquarters of the army at Tampa at the time of the embarkation of the 'Shafter expedition,' Colonel Weston, the efficient chief commissary, showed me a quarter of beef that had already, as a test, been sixty hours in the sun with-

* Dr. Daly claimed in his evidence before the War Investigation Commission that this letter should have been dated October 21.

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out being perceptibly tainted, so far as the sense of smell could detect.

“ It is impossible to keep fresh beef so long untainted in the sun in that climate without the use of deleterious preservatives, such as boric acid, salicylic acid, or nitrate potash, injected into it in quantities liable to be hurtful to the health of the consumer.

“ At Ponce, Puerto Rico, much of the beef I examined arriving on the transports from the United States was also of the same character, being apparently preserved by injecting chemicals to aid deficient cold storage.

“ Where efficient cold storage is impossible transporting beef alive is the method that should receive the fullest consideration by the government as being safest for the health of the consumer. When detailed to take charge of the transport *Panama*, for conveying convalescents to the United States, I obtained 2,000 pounds of fresh beef from the commissary at Ponce. It looked well, but had an odor similar to that of a dead human body after being injected with preservatives, and it tasted when first cooked like decomposed boric acid, while, after standing a day for further inspection, it became so bitter, nauseous, and unpalatable as to be quite impossible for use. I was therefore obliged, owing to its condition, and the just complaints of the sick about it, and the disgustingly sickening odor it emitted when being cooked, and its mawkish, flat taste when served, and the safety of my patients—255 convalescent soldiers on board—to organize a board of survey, condemn and throw 1,500 pounds, all we had, overboard; consequently the convalescents were entirely without much-needed fresh beef, making the duty of bringing the men to the United States in an improved condition a very difficult matter.

“ In my inspection of the 4th United States Volunteer Infantry at Jacksonville recently I observed the same odor and taste upon the fresh beef, but not so marked, and at camp of 6th United States Volunteer Infantry at Chickamauga I also, at several inspections, observed it markedly. I there inspected a lot of beef just issued to that regiment, and, while it looked well, was of a sickening odor, like a human body dead of disease and injected with preservatives, and when cooked was quite unpalatable, consequently likely to prove an efficient cause of ill-health. The men complain-

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ed of its insipid and mawkish flavor that high seasoning could not conceal.

“Believing that the Commissary Department has been imposed upon by the misdirected commercial spirit of persons furnishing beef, I respectfully recommend that the matter be investigated by experts making a quantitative and qualitative chemical analysis of the several preservatives suspected to be used by getting samples of beef furnished for export to Cuba and Puerto Rico.

“If the question arises that a report should have been made by me earlier, I beg to say that I have endeavored, with all my opportunities, to first inform myself, by observation, of the conditions above noted sufficiently to warrant my drawing the attention of the adjutant-general at headquarters of the army to the matter. Very respectfully,

“W. H. DALY,

“Major and Chief Surgeon U. S. V.”

The processed beef at Tampa exhibited by a Mr. Powell, referred to in Dr. Daly's letter, was brought to Tampa by the inventor of the method by which it was treated, on his own responsibility and at his own expense. Neither the process nor the meat he furnished, nor the inventor, Mr. Powell himself, bore any relation to the contractors who supplied the army with beef, then or since. The inventor requested permission to exhibit his artificially preserved beef, and was allowed to do so in his private capacity. He requested and received permission to put two quarters of his own beef on one of the transports. It spoiled when at sea a few days later, and was thrown overboard. None of it was ever issued to the troops. Mr. Powell never again approached the government in the matter, and he has stated under oath that his secret process was neither used then nor since by the contractors who furnished refrigerated beef to the army. Upon this

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single exhibit, his individual experience in eating some of this meat at Tampa and some refrigerated beef in Puerto Rico, and upon the alleged chemical tests made by himself of meat claimed to be refrigerated beef, this doctor based his opinions and his evidence. Dr. Daly's "observations," as he terms these experiences, at Tampa, in Puerto Rico, and subsequently at several of the camps in the United States, were confined almost exclusively to his sense of smell and taste—especially the latter. In his testimony before the Dodge Commission, he stated that he took some of the meat treated by the Powell process, cooked and ate it; that he afterwards became sick and had a taste in his mouth similar to that experienced when, on a hunting trip out West, he had eaten some antelopes and elk treated with boric and salicylic acids. He also claimed to have experienced the same taste when he ate some of the refrigerated beef in Puerto Rico. This led him to infer that the Powell meat, and also the refrigerated beef in Puerto Rico, had been treated with the same chemicals as the antelope and elk meat already mentioned. As a matter of fact, the inventor of the Powell process of treating meat swore that the beef exhibited by him at Tampa and eaten by Dr. Daly was treated by fumigation, and that neither boric nor salicylic acid was used at all in the operation. Dr. Daly made himself further ridiculous, in his letter to General Miles, by referring to the taste and smell of decomposed boric acid in the meat condemned by the board on the *Panama*. Scientific evidence was submitted to the effect that boric acid does not decompose when used as a meat preservative, and that it has neither taste nor odor.

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The beef placed on board the *Panama* had been taken from a refrigerator ship, removed to the shore, kept there several days, and then put on the *Panama* with some native Puerto Rican beef. Proper care had not been used to protect this meat from spoiling, and when several days out from Ponce, the beef became bad, a Board of Survey condemned 963 pounds (not 1,500 pounds, as claimed by Dr. Daly). The Board of Survey, consisting of three officers, two of whom were surgeons, reported simply that the beef was "rotten and unfit for use," and that it was "not in prime condition when received in the hurry of leaving Ponce." Dr. Daly approved the proceedings of the board and directed "that the tainted meat be at once thrown overboard." No mention is made in this board's report of any suspected treatment with chemicals, and Dr. Daly does not refer to it in his endorsement on the board's report. Without consulting any of his brother officers, or making known to them his suspicions that the beef had been chemically treated, he claims to have taken two samples of the meat from a kettle in which some beef was cooking on the ship, and, upon his return to the United States, to have made a chemical analysis thereof, and to have discovered traces of boric and salicylic acids. But he could establish no connection between the material which, he alleges, contained these acids and the refrigerated beef furnished by the contractors. As soon as Dr. Daly offered his testimony, the War Investigation Commission sent telegraphic instructions to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and several places in the United States for samples of refrigerated beef then in the hands of the troops, and furnished by the same contractors who

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had supplied all the beef during the war. These samples were sealed in jars, brought to the United States, and tested by expert chemists. Of the twenty-nine specimens thus secured and analyzed, not one developed the presence of so much as a trace of boric, or salicylic, or any other acids or adulterants. They were all pure beef.

Dr. Daly also claimed, in the course of his testimony before the Dodge Commission, that he repeatedly tested (only by his two senses already referred to) the refrigerated beef at some of the camps of Puerto Rico, and that he got the "same taste." Yet Colonel Huidkoper, a surgeon upon General Miles's staff, who made repeated observations of the troops, their camps, and the food used in Puerto Rico, testified that he found no complaint regarding the meat; and he visited the camps in Puerto Rico at practically the same time that Dr. Daly did. Dr. Daly also alleged that the beef at Chickamauga was apparently artificially preserved. The records show that 5,100,000 pounds of refrigerated beef were supplied to the troops at Chickamauga during the war with Spain. So far as my knowledge goes, not a single complaint was ever made regarding the beef furnished, either to General Brooke or to General Breckinridge, or to any person whomsoever. Indeed, Dr. Daly was the only witness who ever testified that refrigerated beef was artificially preserved with chemical, or "doctored" at all; and General Miles's allegations seem to have been based entirely upon the flimsy experience of this single officer's defective taste and his highly questionable "observations" on the *Panama*. At the time the *Panama* incident occur-

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red, Dr. Daly himself admits that his observations had been in progress for three months. He did not communicate his suspicions to the board which condemned and threw overboard the spoiled meat, which he claims to have suspected of being treated with chemicals, although the opportunity was an excellent one to have conclusively proven either the truth or error of his opinion. Neither did he submit his alleged samples of that meat to the government experts and chemists for examination and test, but secretly took them to his home, and made an analysis himself, to which he did not even refer in his official report on this matter to General Miles. He did bring to Washington a residue claimed to have been taken from the *Panama*, which contained traces of boric and salicylic acids, but this meat was not proven to be refrigerated beef. The circumstance is suspicious, and does not reflect credit upon General Miles's only witness.

Upon the unsupported and conclusively disproved testimony of this single officer General Miles based his statements which led to a scandal as thoroughly unwarranted as it was unequalled in the history of our army.

The War Investigation Commission thus reported:

“The Commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors, and issued to the troops during the war with Spain, was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ.”

The Court of Inquiry went even further, and stated:

“The board has recorded its opinion that the refrigerated beef, furnished under contracts for the use of the armies, was not ‘doc-

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tored ' or treated with any other agent than cold air. If any such treatment had been applied, it is the opinion of the Court that a knowledge of it could not have been concealed from the Commissary-General and his officers."

Again it says:

" The use of refrigerated beef on shore, after the troops had secured convenient harbors and landing facilities, was wise and desirable. The Court believes that there was no better food available or practicable."

With reference to General Miles's general charges that bacon was "not considered a suitable food for the tropics," and that the food furnished was the cause of the sickness in the army, little need be said with respect to bacon other than that it now continues to form one of the principal components of the ration furnished to the troops serving in the tropics and in Cuba.

The allegation that the food furnished the army was the cause of much sickness seems to have been as little investigated, or to have had as little warrant for its utterance, as the other disproved charges. Although on the transports for fourteen days, during which time canned fresh beef was the principal meat ration, the Shafter expedition of nearly 17,000 men landed in Cuba with only 150 sick. It is the concurrent testimony of every officer that the army landed in Cuba in excellent condition, notwithstanding the heat and confinement on the transports. It was not until August 1st, fifty-three days after the 5th Corps had embarked at Tampa, that sickness became alarming; and then the causes of that sickness were indisputably traced to the climate and the diseases indigenous to the tropics. Kent's division of 4,442, on the 10th day

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of July, had but 214 sick, and five days afterwards this had fallen off to 200; and when the sickness in Shafter's army grew to such proportions as to cause concern, Lawton's division, which had subsisted almost entirely on bacon as the meat component of its ration, had the same percentage of sickness as Kent's division, which had subsisted almost entirely on canned fresh beef. The 1st Volunteer Cavalry had had little canned beef in Cuba, and yet its sick-rate was practically the same as Kent's and Lawton's divisions. Moreover, we have already seen from General Wood's statement, which is supported by the records of the War Department, that every regiment that came to Santiago after the war, even when provided with floored tents and boiled water, had practically the same amount of sickness as Shafter's army. The nature and extent of the sickness in Cuba and Puerto Rico among our soldiers were almost entirely due to climatic causes. There was no evidence to support General Miles's statement that the food caused the sickness, but there was and is incontrovertible evidence to disprove it.

In matters of professional detail, the President and the Secretary of War must of necessity rely upon the Major-General commanding the army, the Adjutant-General, the Inspector-General, and the other bureau chiefs. But it is the especial duty of the Inspector-General's department to discover and report upon:

“ All that pertains to the efficiency of the army, the condition and state of supplies of all kinds, of arms, equipments, etc., etc., and report with strict impartiality in regard to all irregularities that may be discovered. From time to time they will make such suggestions as may appear to them practicable for the cure of any defects that may come under their observation.”

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The Inspector-General of the army was with General Shafter's corps at Tampa; he accompanied that expedition to Cuba; he was at the front during the entire period occupied by that army in the trenches; and, finally, he was, from August 2d until the abandonment of that camp, in command of the army and camp at Chickamauga. Tampa, the transports to Cuba, the trenches before Santiago, and Chickamauga were designated by General Miles as the particular places where bad beef, both canned and refrigerated, was issued. And yet, on the 1st of November, 1898, the Inspector-General made no mention in his official annual report of any complaints against either canned or refrigerated beef, but specifically stated: "The Commissary Department has conducted its business, so far as I have been able to observe, in a most satisfactory manner in this war;" and again: "The quality of the food furnished is generally reported excellent, and there has been no complaint as to the quantity."

The army had won its battles in Cuba and the Philippines; Puerto Rico had peacefully come into our hands after a few skirmishes; the protocol had been in operation for over four months, and even the treaty of peace had been signed at Paris. Then came the major-general commanding the army of the United States with his charges. While the allegations of General Miles were not based upon fact, and were conclusively disproven by two separate tribunals, unimpeachable in their composition and methods of investigation, the irreparable damage had been done. A brother-officer, suffering under the lash of such cruel, unwarranted, and unjustified imputations, while exonerated from

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the heavy odium of those charges, was, as a result of them, sacrificed on the altar of his own passion, righteous in its existence, but inexcusable in its expression. But this, serious as it is, was not the worst result of General Miles's conduct. A false impression had been created throughout the country as to the food furnished the army, which may never be removed. I doubt if the war with Spain will ever be referred to in this generation without the odious hue and cry of the day of "rotten beef." Such is the persistency with which false rumor clings to any great event. The charges of General Miles, twice proven false in spirit and substance, are therefore the more heinous in their effect.

But why should arguments or statements be employed to demonstrate the efficacy of both canned fresh and refrigerated beef? This fact alone would prove that proposition had not testimony and evidence already done so: 160,000 rations a month of canned fresh beef and 742,000 pounds a month of refrigerated beef are now being supplied the army of the United States in the tropics!*

General Miles had been directed, in the order of June 26th, 1898, instructing him to organize the Puerto Rican expedition, to make a "daily report of the state and condition of your command . . . to the Secretary of War direct." He was at Tampa for two weeks

* These data are based on a letter received from the War Department bearing date of November 12th, 1900. In that communication it is stated that, of the 742,000 pounds of refrigerated beef, 217,000 pounds a month are sent to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the remainder, 525,000 pounds, to the Philippines. The latter is frozen beef from Australia, but does not differ from refrigerated beef proper, except that the refrigerators in which it is shipped are kept several degrees lower in temperature.

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before the Shafter expedition sailed, and at Tampa there were no less than a half-hundred car-loads of canned fresh ("roast") beef; when he left the United States, July 7th, he accompanied the troops to Cuba on the transports; he spent the greater part of three days at the front with General Shafter's army; he was again on the transports to Puerto Rico, with part of his command (3,415 officers and men), and these troops, when they reached Puerto Rico, had then been on the ships without intermission from July 8th to July 26th, eighteen days, during which time canned fresh beef ("roast beef") formed the principal part of their meat ration. General Miles remained in Puerto Rico from July 26th until September 1st. With exceptionally favorable opportunities, therefore, for observing the effects of the canned beef, and with expressed instructions to make a daily report of the state and condition of his command to the Secretary of War direct, he did not in any of his communications hint to the President, Secretary of War, or Commissary-General that improper or unwholesome food was being furnished the army, although he did make request by cable that his entire command be at once supplied with "blue rosettes, aigrettes, and cords for infantry hats." Three and a half months after his return to the United States, and after his command had been disbanded, he made his charges relative to canned beef.

In respect to refrigerated beef, his chief and only witness swore that he made known to the general early in August his belief that the refrigerated beef was "embalmed." His letter specifying in detail this belief was received by General Miles not later than October 22d. And yet the general neither reported

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the fact nor the rumor to the President, Secretary of War, or Commissary-General, nor did he take any steps to investigate or correct the issue to the army of beef which he said was "embalmed" by injecting deleterious chemicals into it, and which he described as "unfit in any country in the stomach of any man," until his verbal statement was made before the War Investigation Commission on December 21st, four and a half months afterwards.

His annual report bore date of November 5th, 1898, a half-month after the receipt of the Daly letter, and three and a half months after Dr. Daly made known to him his belief that the refrigerated beef was treated with chemicals. General Miles made no mention in his annual report of either refrigerated ("embalmed") or canned beef, but only stated (p. 36) that his command in Puerto Rico "suffered to some extent on account of exposure and the usual climatic effects incident to the country"—and that "a large portion of the troops returned in good condition to the United States."

If General Miles believed that "beef pulp" was being issued to the troops under "pretence of an experiment"—and that expression can mean nothing but fraud and experimenting upon the lives of the men of our army, than which no graver charge save wilful murder could be made—or if he believed that 275,000 men of our army were being fed upon "embalmed" beef, why did he not take steps to immediately stop the issue of such alleged unwholesome food? So far as I am aware, there are not even now any formal charges on file in the War Department from him in this matter.

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Why did he fail to notify at once, in the interest of the brave men whom he commanded and who were intrusted to his care, the President, his Commander-in-Chief, or the Secretary of War? An officer who permits in silence what he believes to be hurtful and unlawful food to be served to the men under his command in the field certainly forgets the first duty of a soldier. The Court of Inquiry went further than to prove that General Miles's allegations were not sustained. It specifically stated: "The Court also finds that the major-general commanding the army had not sufficient justification for alleging that the refrigerated beef was embalmed, or was unfit for issue to troops. It also finds that he committed an error in that, having belief or knowledge, as claimed, that the food was unfit, that it caused sickness and distress, that some of it was supplied under pretence of experiment, that other beef was embalmed, he did not immediately report such knowledge or belief to the Secretary of War, to the end that a proper remedy might be promptly applied." The Court also says, evidently referring to General Miles, "It has been developed in the course of the inquiry, as recited in this report, that in some instances certain individuals failed to perform the full measure of duty, or to observe the proprieties which dignify high military command."

General Miles won deserved fame as a fighting soldier during his active career, and it has often been remarked of him that he looked carefully after the well-being of his soldiers. Time and circumstances must have wrought great changes in him in this respect, for his anxiety about the food which was furnished to his men must have been an after-thought, and pro-

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ceeded from a motive apart from their interest. Had I consciously permitted a ration of food which I believed to be bad to be served to a soldier on duty in the field under the flag of this republic, I should not dare to hope or ask to be forgiven.

CHAPTER XXIII

CAMPS AND DISEASE

DURING the war with Spain no site for a camp, whether for mobilization, instruction, or recuperation, was selected until after a careful examination, inspection, and favorable report had been made thereof by one or more officers of the regular army.*

There was no national camp occupied by our troops during the summer of 1898 that was in itself unhealthy. There was a much smaller per cent. of sickness, indeed, among the troops encamped in the United States than there was during the same season in 1861; there was relatively less sickness than there is now among the British soldiers in South Africa; there was relatively less sickness than there has ever been in any war of modern times. And yet, even with this excellent record, much of the camp sickness was preventable. During the war typhoid-fever occurred in every camp in the United States; typhoid-fever became epidemic in every camp, State or national; more than ninety per cent. of the volunteer regiments developed this disease within eight weeks after their

* Miami is an exception to this statement. Five thousand troops were sent to that place upon the urgent request of General Miles, although its fitness for a camp had been reported adversely upon by General Wade, as well as by a board of officers especially sent to examine into the site. As a result of its unsuitableness, Miami was soon abandoned.

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enrolment; and the deaths from this camp scourge alone amounted to more than eighty per cent. of the total deaths from disease.*

With this statement of the facts, the question arises, What was the cause? The answer is simple and of easy demonstration. Generically described, the cause of the sickness was CAMP POLLUTION; specifically, the cause was due to ignorance or neglect on the part of officers, coupled with the inexperience of the newly enlisted soldiers. It is an axiom of military life, that there is nothing of which the recruit is so prodigal as his health. This fact, and the liability to the occurrence of camp diseases wherever large bodies of men are assembled, impelled the War Department to issue a circular to the army which dealt with the questions of camp sanitation and hygiene. These instructions were sent to every camp and issued to the troops upon their arrival:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, SURGEON-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1898.*

“*Circular No. 1.*

“In time of war a great responsibility rests upon medical officers of the army, for the result of a campaign may depend upon the sanitary measures adopted or neglected by commanding generals of armies in the field. The medical officer is responsible for proper recommendations relating to the protection of the health of troops in camp or in garrison, and it is believed that, as a rule, medical officers of the United States army are well informed as to the necessary measures of prophylaxis and the serious results which infallibly follow a neglect of these measures, especially when unacclimated troops are called upon for service in a tropical or semitropical country during the sickly season. In Cuba our

* See report of Board on Typhoid-Fever, to be hereafter referred to.

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armies will have to contend not only with malarial fevers and the usual camp diseases—typhoid-fever, diarrhœa, and dysentery—but they will be more or less exposed in localities where yellow-fever is endemic and under conditions extremely favorable for the development of an epidemic among unacclimated troops. In view of this danger, the attention of medical officers and of all others responsible for the health of our troops in the field is invited to the following recommendations:

“ When practicable, camps should be established on high and well-drained ground not previously occupied.

“ Sinks should be dug before a camp is occupied or as soon after as practicable. The surface of fecal matter should be covered with fresh earth or quicklime or ashes three times a day.

“ New sinks should be dug and old ones filled when contents of old ones are two feet from surface of ground.

“ Every man should be punished who fails to make use of the sinks.

“ All kitchen refuse should be promptly buried and perfect sanitary police maintained.

“ Troops should drink only boiled or filtered water and coffee or tea (hot or cold), except where spring water can be obtained which is pronounced to be wholesome by a medical officer.

“ Every case of fever should receive prompt attention. If albumin is found in the urine of a patient with fever, it should be considered suspicious (of yellow-fever), and he should be placed in an isolated tent. The discharges of patients with fever should always be disinfected at once with a solution of carbolic acid (five per cent.) or of chloride of lime (six ounces to gallon of water) or with milk of lime made from fresh quicklime.

“ Whenever a case of yellow-fever occurs in camp, the troops should be promptly moved to a fresh camping-ground located a mile or more from infected camp.

“ No doubt typhoid-fever, camp diarrhœa, and probably yellow-fever are frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the agency of flies, which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all kinds deposited upon the ground or in shallow pits and directly convey infectious material, attached to their feet or contained in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while being prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess tent.

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It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important. Also because the water supply may be contaminated in the same way or by surface drainage.

“ If it can be avoided, marches should not be made in the hottest part of the day—from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M.

“ When called upon for duty at night or early in the morning, a cup of hot coffee should be taken.

“ It is unsafe to eat heartily or drink freely when greatly fatigued or overheated.

“ Ripe fruit may be eaten in moderation, but green or overripe fruit will give rise to bowel complaints. Food should be thoroughly cooked and free from fermentation or putrefactive changes.

“ In decidedly malarious localities from three to five grains of quinine may be taken in the early morning as a prophylactic, but the taking of quinine as a routine practice should only be recommended under exceptional circumstances.

“ Light woollen underclothing should be worn, and when a soldier's clothing or bedding becomes damp from exposure to rain or heavy dews the first opportunity should be taken to dry it in the sun or by fires.

GEO. M. STERNBERG,

“ Surgeon-General United States Army.”

To further insure these methods of sanitation, followed in the regular army and referred to in this circular, a regular army officer of high rank and long experience was placed in command of every national camp in the United States. Especial attention is invited to this fact.

Camp Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Tennessee (commanded by Major-General John R. Brooke, U.S.A.), was the largest. Whatever can be said of the conditions of that camp apply to all, though the epidemic of typhoid-fever was more widespread there than elsewhere. It may, therefore, be regarded as a type, and the statements which follow, although directly applicable to it, apply to all.

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This camp was selected upon the recommendation of the major-general commanding the army, who, through his adjutant-general, notified the War Department that he had been "informed by Colonel Smith, a member of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military Park Commission, that there are ample facilities in the park for camping any number of troops." The selection of that camp site was believed to be a good one because of its location, convenience, suitability, healthfulness, and pure water supply. Malarial and typhoid fever were practically unknown in the counties in which the park was located. It had been one of our best camps for a much larger army for a longer period and with much less of supplies during the Civil War. The climate is salubrious, the country is rolling and well drained, and the territory under the control of the government covered approximately ten square miles.

In August, 1898, when the number of sick throughout the camps became great, a board of medical officers was appointed to examine into and report upon the causes of the existence and spread of typhoid-fever. The board was composed of Major Walter Reed, surgeon regular army; Major Victor C. Vaughan, division surgeon U. S. V.; and Major E. O. Shakespeare, brigade surgeon U. S. V. This board visited the national camps, and obtained, as far as possible, the sanitary and medical history of all regiments. Later it devoted eighteen months to a study and analysis of the medical records of the army of 1898. The report of this board shows what all others familiar with the facts have stated, that the location and site of the camp at Chickamauga Park was healthy; that the

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water was primarily good; that the food furnished there was abundant and wholesome; and that typhoid-fever was brought to Camp Thomas by the volunteers and spread by their neglect of the rules of sanitary and military hygiene heretofore described. The records of their investigation cover the regiments and organizations of the 1st and 3d Corps, an aggregate of 44,803* men.

The board found that of the forty-eight regiments which constituted the two corps referred to, four reached Chickamauga Park with developed, recognized cases of typhoid-fever, and five others arrived with cases otherwise diagnosed, but whose subsequent history showed that they were cases of this disease. It was further discovered that five regiments developed typhoid-fever in the first week, and that eleven other regiments had probable cases. That is, twenty-five regiments, or over one-half of the forty-eight at Chickamauga, developed typhoid-fever within a week after they reached the park. Moreover, this disease appeared among twelve other regiments within the second week, and at the expiration of one month only two regiments of the forty-eight were free from typhoid-fever. A member of the board has expressed the opinion, as a result of his studies, that ninety per cent. of the volunteer regiments came to Camp Thomas bringing typhoid-fever with them.

The record of that camp shows that during July and August it became highly unsanitary. No at-

* From the establishment of Camp Thomas to its abandonment, approximately 80,000 men passed through the camp, although that number was not assembled there at any one time. It probably did not exceed 56,000.

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tention seems to have been paid to the circular issued by the Surgeon-General, and as a consequence the germs of typhoid-fever were soon spread throughout the entire camp. Of the 44,803 men of the 1st and 3d Army Corps at Chickamauga, coming under the observation of the Typhoid-Fever Board, there were no less than 4,068 cases of recognized typhoid-fever, and 5,892 cases of fever which, while not diagnosed as typhoid, are so regarded from their subsequent history. Of these 9,960 cases (practically one-fifth of the army at Camp Thomas under investigation), there were 713 deaths.

And yet these unhealthy conditions are not chargeable to the site or fitness of Camp Thomas for assembling a large body of soldiers. The existence there of camp fevers was due to neglect of camp sanitation.

General Brooke was in command of Camp Thomas from April 20th to July 23d; General Wade, from July 23d to August 2d; and General Breckinridge, from the 2d of August to the abandonment of the camp in the latter part of that month. None of these officers ever reported to the War Department that the sanitary condition of the camp was alarming, as it had become before the 1st of August, and it was not until I sent my personal aid, Major George H. Hopkins, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., that I learned of the real state of affairs. Upon the report and recommendations of this officer, made to me direct, I ordered the immediate abandonment of the camp and the movement of the troops to other posts.

Although the number of typhoid-fever cases at Camp Thomas was large, the percentage of deaths was remarkably small. The Board of Typhoid-Fever as-

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certained that the average death-rate from this disease in nine large hospitals in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York was 9.24 per cent. The death-rate among the troops at Chickamauga from typhoid-fever was 7.38 per cent. This, however, is no excuse for the lack of care of the camps, and no cause for exultation as to the per cent. of the death-rate. These ratios show, however, that the military hospitals must have been good. Of the 713 deaths from this disease, out of a total of 9,960 cases, 352 died at some army hospital, and 315 died elsewhere, probably at the homes of the soldiers. The places of the deaths of the remainder are not known.

Notwithstanding the fact that the conditions at Chickamauga were bad, they were grossly and maliciously exaggerated. Brigadier-General H. V. Boynton, U. S. V., who was and still is chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military Park Commission, was at Camp Thomas much of the time it was occupied by our troops. As the government had expended \$1,000,000 in making a public park out of that great battle-field, it was his duty to protect its interests and, at the same time, to render such assistance as he could to the several commanding officers in the way of boring wells, securing firewood, protecting the park, etc., etc. His experience at that encampment during the war and afterwards especially fits him to describe the conditions with respect to the camp and the soldiers there. I therefore quote at length remarks recently made by General Boynton upon this subject:*

* Speech made at the re-union of the 35th Ohio, Miamisburg, September 20th, 1900.

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“ Since I last met with you, my comrades, it has been my privilege to see a great army, assembled from all sections, under one flag, on the battle-field of Chickamauga. As you know, for the numbers engaged and the time of fighting, that was the bloodiest battle-field of modern times. As in your own, so in many brigades on each side, every other man was killed or wounded, while for the armies as a whole the casualty list embraced one-third of those engaged. Only iron veterans could do such fighting as that.

“ You remember that you marched the whole night before the battle opened, and went into it the next morning without breakfast and fought through the day without food or water till night—that the second day, after the thin shadow of a breakfast, you fought again till after dark, then marched five miles to a new line of battle at Rossville, which secured Chattanooga and gave the Union army the victory. Undoubtedly you have most vivid recollections of your experiences and your supplies, or the want of them, in that wonderful strategic campaign of five weeks in the enemy’s country over a wide river and three mountain ranges.*

“ You have also in clear remembrance the horrible tales [during the Spanish-American War] of short rations, of spoiled beef, of inadequate hospitals, of the absence of medical supplies, of polluted water, of universal sickness, of an astounding death-roll, of the incompetency of every staff corps, and the imbecility and worse of the Secretary of War with which the sensational press of this country finally caused the honest people of this land to believe that inhumanity in every form to their boys and failure and neglect in every branch of military duty were the rule without exception at Camp Thomas. This belief at the time became a craze which swept over the country and could not then be checked by the truth, for the truth could secure no hearing. In its origin it was pure and unadulterated journalistic diabolism.

“ Now, I want to tell my comrades who know that ground and had experiences of real war in that vicinity, how the 80,000† soldiers of the war with Spain who, from first to last, were assembled there, actually fared. I was on duty at Camp Thomas

* The battle occurred November 23, 24, and 25, 1863.

† A few regiments spent only two or three days at Camp Thomas.

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from the time the first regiment arrived until the last one departed. Under special instructions from the Secretary of War, I was so placed as to be able to clearly see the whole inside management at that great camp where a third of the regular army and nearly a third of the entire army enlisted for the war with Spain assembled. Let it be remembered that, when war was declared, the Secretary of War and the staff corps under him who had been caring for an army of 25,000, were suddenly called upon to equip a quarter of a million soldiers for immediate field service. This herculean task was accomplished in two months, under Secretary Alger. Considering the circumstances of the case, it was a most marvelous and successful mobilization. When the work began the complete list of all military stores on hand in the quartermaster's department covered less than two printed octavo pages. Everything else that the government had on hand for war on land was in the same proportion. As a single example, the material for tents was not in the market, and the mills had to produce it.

"First, it will interest you to know how these soldiers of the Spanish war travelled. You well remember the box, cattle, and platform cars in which you rode the very few times you were favored with railroad transportation. Few of you ever rode in a day coach, and I doubt whether a soldier of the Civil War ever saw a sleeping-car south of the Ohio. First came Colonel Andy Burt's infantry regiment of colored troops—you remember him on 'Bob' McCook's staff and wounded at Mill Springs. I went down to Shel mound to meet them. What do you suppose I found them in? Pullman sleepers, and first-class day coaches, to a man. And their horses and mules were in what were called patent palace stock cars. It required four sections of ten cars each to accommodate this regiment. A short time after, there came a colored cavalry regiment. How do you think I found them travelling? In four sections, of ten Wagner sleepers each, upholstered throughout with blue plush, and every soldier had either an upper or a lower berth. There was nothing that I found to remind me of travel in that section when you and I explored it. And so this whole great army was assembled at Camp Thomas, and was carried away from there in Pullmans, Wagners, tourist Pullmans, and day coaches, every man in a day coach having an entire seat to himself. You know what tourist Pullmans are, with upper

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and lower berths as comfortable for travelling as the more elaborately furnished Pullman sleepers.

“ To sum up this subject, the War Department used 644 standard Pullmans, 1,501 tourist Pullmans, and 3,285 first-class day coaches—all provided with ice-water by the barrel—for the transportation of the Camp Thomas troops alone. And the yellow journals insisted that the department was crowding the soldiers into cattle-cars—and insisted upon it, till the country believed it.

“ You remember where you bivouacked in the Dyer Field at the close of the first day's fight after twenty-seven hours' marching and fighting without a meal—bivouacked without fires when a white frost was settling down, and with only a few crackers and scraps of bacon and pork which could not be cooked because the enemy's lines were too close to admit of fires. Well, in the days which tried the souls of the sensational journals in the Spanish War, just back of where you bivouacked the commissary department had a bakery with a capacity of 66,000 eighteen-ounce loaves, and every soldier and civilian employé in that army got a loaf of it every day if he wanted it, and it was as good bread as I ever care to see on my own table. If they preferred hardtack, they got that.

“ As to fresh meat, seven days out of ten there were issued full rations of as good beef as ever came in refrigerator cars to the cities and towns of the North. Every quarter carried the tag of government inspection. There were 5,100,000 pounds of it issued there without the loss of a pound, except where some of it fell into the hands of regiments whose men did not know how to take care of fresh meat in hot weather, and whose officers did not know how to tell them. And let me say to you here that, in spite of all the sensational charges with which the humane and honest people of the country were driven wild, there never was a pound of embalmed beef issued to a single soldier of the Spanish War—not a pound—for the good reason that the government never purchased a pound of beef that had been embalmed. I state this on my personal responsibility to substantiate the truth of what I say against anybody, of any rank.

“ For the other three days, the troops had bacon. If you suppose it was the old 'sides' which we used to receive, sent down in freight cars, stacked up like cord-wood, you will make a mis-

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take. It was family bacon, in sealed tin cans such as you buy at the first-class family groceries.

“Then there were three vegetable rations extra—potatoes, onions, and canned tomatoes. Each regiment could choose which it would have. It required eighteen car-loads of potatoes for each ten days’ issue, and for hauling each issue of rations to the camp required 750 six-mule teams, and every component of the ration was better than we ever saw in our soldier days. These are all facts. Yet the country was made to believe that its soldiers were given spoiled food, and short rations even of that.

“As to canned beef and canned roast beef, the brand was the same, and from the same firms, as was used by the navy throughout the war, and as is being used now both by the army and navy in all our operations the world around. The English army used this beef in Egypt, and is using it in South Africa. Of course there were some spoiled cans, but the percentage was too small to express in appreciable figures. I doubt whether there is a person here who has not known of spoiled canned goods in his own house. It must be remembered that the War Department was keeping house with 274,000 boarders.

“Let me tell you about the field hospitals. Representing the camp, which, as you all know, is in one of the healthiest regions of the United States as a ‘pest hole,’ and the hospitals as in terrible condition, was the quickest way and the shortest way which the diabolical journals of sensationalism found to the hearts of the people. They made the country believe their falsehoods, and deceived many an honest journal into accepting them. It was also the easiest way for officers to hide their neglect of all sanitary measures, to charge consequent sickness upon the location and the water.

“I say to you, my comrades, upon my personal honor, that those hospitals which received the severest press denunciations at Camp Thomas were better and more fully supplied than any which we saw in the Civil War—and the Army of the Cumberland had some pretty good ones. Those at Camp Thomas had cots with woven wire coverings and hair mattresses. There was crowding at times, and at times a lack of nurses, and everything did not move as smoothly as a church fair, but there was no lack either

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of supplies or care or excellent attention, beyond what was inseparable from the rapid organization of a great camp.

“ Because typhoid-fever became prevalent the camp site and the water were condemned. But, at last, an able medical commission, after patiently tracing every early case of fever in the camp, has ascertained that the regiments brought this infection with them. As to the water, the thirteen regiments and ten batteries of the regular army drank it, as did the large park force engaged in clearing up the ten square miles of camps, including all the hospital sites, without a single case of fever developing among them. These regular soldiers, one-third of the whole regular army, who knew how to take care of themselves, never lost a man from any camp disease whatever.

“ The death-rate at Camp Thomas is the best test of all the sensational stories with which the country was deceived, enraged, and driven wellnigh crazy. The journals attacking the War Department told you that the soldiers there died off like sheep. So you will expect to hear rather startling figures—and you will. The muster-out rolls, as you well know, show every death and its cause. I have them all for that army. As thus shown, the death-rate at Camp Thomas, from the arrival to the departure of the troops, was a trifle less than one-half of one per cent.

“ You will be interested to know how this sensation was worked up in one regiment—the 8th New York. The governor of that State, with patriotic purpose, stirred by the stories of neglect, epidemic, and malignant disease, sent the surgeon-general of the State to examine and report. He arrived in the evening. That night the word ran around the camp: ‘ All who want to go home report at sick-call in the morning.’ When the call was sounded, 400 responded, and lined up before this astonished surgeon-general. Besides this, they brought a man on a cot, into whose eyes they had injected belladonna to make him stare, and told the surgeon that he was paralyzed and a specimen of hospital inattention and want of accommodation, since he had been left out on the ground under the trees the night before because of a crowded hospital. When the troops moved from Camp Thomas there were medical stores enough left behind to fit out fifty regiments with full field supplies for active campaigning.

“ But these statements are enough to show veterans of our

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Civil War the vast gulf between the truth and the conditions which the country was made to believe existed at the time.

“ Next to the falsehoods about rations and hospitals, the sensational writers stirred the country up over what they were pleased to call the frightful and criminal inefficiencies of the staff corps. It was my privilege to be on duty in the War Department while these attacks upon ‘ bureaucracy ’ and Secretary Alger were at their height. I regard it as high privilege to stand before my comrades and declare that, in spite of all charges to the contrary, the work of the War Department, and of every one of the staff corps, in promptly mobilizing a quarter of a million men was, considering the situation, and the empty military store-houses when war was declared, wonderful and creditable to a degree that language can scarcely express. It will constitute one of the proudest chapters in the history of the War Department and of the Republic. In this affirmation I desire to be understood as including the offices of the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General, and the quartermaster, commissary, medical and ordnance corps. Of course, there were lacks at times. Every true soldier knows that these are inseparable from war conditions. But the quartermaster’s and commissary’s departments could not furnish cradles and trundle-beds and Mother Winslow’s Soothing Syrup on the spur of the moment, and so it was impossible to check the squalling of the few who imagined they were going into a summer encampment, and found themselves in war camps instead. And the sensational journals became the willing organs of all this baby business. But the country did not then understand that these attacks had political origin, and as it was not deemed expedient to make direct attacks on a War President, the scheme was devised of striking him by attempting to discredit his War Department and the management of the war.”

The circumstances leading to the selection of the site at Montauk Point and the history of the army there, make it necessary to treat that camp separately. Montauk Point was primarily a camp of recuperation only.

Reference has already been made to the fact that

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contracts were let on the 2d of August for boring wells, piping water, supplying lumber for the tent floors and hospitals, and numerous quartermaster and other supplies. On the evening of the next day General Shafter's alarming despatch was received, announcing the necessity for the immediate return of his command to avoid further spread of yellow-fever and to save the lives of the soldiers comprising practically the whole army in Cuba, sick or convalescent with tropical fevers. The order for the return of the entire army was given on the same day (August 3d). The plans and instructions already prepared for a detention camp of 5,000 and a hospital of 500, in addition to a general camp, had to be changed accordingly. Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young was placed in command of the camp, arriving at Montauk Point August 5th. General Young had commanded, under General Wheeler, the dismounted cavalry forces at Las Guasimas, and shortly thereafter had returned to the United States invalided.

On the 6th of August lumber for the tent floors and hospitals reached Montauk, and the boring of the wells began. The full strength and energy of every supply department of the military establishment was employed to meet the emergency. In less than a week after the arrival of the contractors' materials on the ground, the troops from Santiago began to land, but before a soldier reached Camp Wikoff from Cuba wells had been bored, water had been piped to the sites selected for the camps, and 10,000 tents had been erected. In the mean time supplies of all kinds had been accumulated on the ground. On the 15th of August General Wheeler landed at Montauk. He

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was immediately directed to proceed to Washington. Upon his arrival he was ordered to return to Montauk, "take command of the troops, and, without considering expense, have the men taken care of."

Camp Wikoff was located on Long Island, 125 miles from New York City, and connected therewith by a single-track railroad. Owing to the presence of yellow-fever among the troops, two camps had to be prepared—a detention camp, in which the commands arriving from Cuba were placed for five days, and a general camp. Ninety per cent. of the officers and soldiers of General Shafter's command reached Montauk sick or convalescent. No less than 10,000 men passed through the hospitals, and a number equally as large was sick in quarters or received medical attention and assistance. In a remarkably brief time 2,000,000 feet of lumber reached Montauk for the hospitals and floors of tents; tents were erected for the entire command of 25,000;* numerous wells dug; twelve miles of pipe were laid, so that each regiment drew water from a faucet in its midst; a laundry plant was erected; a disinfecting-plant constructed; a distilling-plant set up; a bakery established; numerous diet kitchens formed, which were presided over by the best chefs that could be found in New York and Boston; and, in fact, every provision was made by the supply bureaus of the War Department for the comfortable reception and treatment of the soldiers, without regard to expense or the ordinary processes of War Department administration.

* Approximately 22,000 troops came from Cuba and a little over 3,000 from Tampa. (See chapter entitled "The Round-Robin Incident.")

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I made two visits to Montauk—the first while General Wheeler was in command, and later when he had been superseded by General Shafter. Both of these officers were personally instructed by me not to regard precedent, regulations, or expense in providing for every possible comfort and care of the soldiers. It was further ordered that the sixty-cents-a-day hospital allowance, in lieu of ration, should be granted every soldier who seemed to require it at the discretion of the commanding officers. As a result of these orders, although there was no authority of law for the purchase or gratuitous issue of such material, the following articles of food, among other things secured, were procured and issued through the Commissary Department, in addition to the hospital supplies purchased with the sixty-cent allowance per day just referred to:

Ice	1,085,200 pounds
Milk	54,860 gallons
Halibut	3,000 pounds
Lima beans	47,047 "
Tea	250 "
Apples (canned)	6,020 3-pound cans
Apples (canned)	1,774 gallon cans
Apples (evaporated)	21,550 pounds
Apricots (evaporated)	14,500 "
Butter	34,799 "
Corn (canned)	13,889 cans
Cocoa	1,080 pounds
Soda crackers	9,950 "
Ham (sugar-cured)	19,927 "
Evaporated cream	31,140 cans
Oatmeal	31,985 pounds
Peaches (evaporated)	18,025 "
Peaches (canned)	14,973 cans
Pears (canned)	14,869 "
Pease (canned)	16,128 "
Prunes	9,925 pounds
Beef soup	7,500 cans

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Chicken soup	11,490 cans
Pickles	7,100 gallons
Oranges	300 crates
Lemons	150 "
Eggs	53,070 dozen

This list does not include the enormous quantities of food received at Montauk from the public at large, including, among other delicacies and sweet-meats, turkeys, pheasants, squabs, eggs, milk, chickens, whiskey, wines, brandies, and champagne *ad libitum*.

I directed that each soldier be provided with a cot, or bed-sack, whether in the detention or general camp. In addition, every man was to be furnished, before leaving camp, with a gratuitous issue of a new uniform throughout, although there was no authority of law for such action. Some conception of the quartermaster's supplies sent to this camp, within a period of a little over thirty days after its establishment, can be formed from a perusal of this list:

3,000 drawers, knit wool	5,000 sky-blue trousers
4,000 duck trousers	10,000 common tents
20,000 pairs leggings	850 hospital tents
20,000 blouses	700 hospital flies
40,000 drawers, summer	1,000 wall tents
20,000 campaign hats	1,000 wall flies
9,000 overcoats (3,000 cavalry, 6,000 infantry)	500 mattress covers
20,000 dark-blue shirts	20,000 bedsacks
43,000 undershirts, S. M.	390 horses
20,000 shoes, calf	632 mules
40,000 pairs stockings, cotton	118 escort wagons
2,000 trousers, cavalry	12 water wagons
13,000 trousers, infantry	6 Dougherty wagons
16,000 ponchos, rubber	5 carriages
30,000 woollen blankets	1 buckboard
	33 ambulances

In addition to the above-mentioned transportation,

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198 horses and fifty-nine wagons were employed under emergency contract. As clothing ran short, requisitions were made by telegraph for additional supplies, which were at once forwarded.

With these provisions for the reception and treatment of the Santiago army at Camp Wikoff, the questions are pertinent—What was the cause of the caustic criticism of that camp and its management? Why were there charges of gross negligence in providing for the comfort and care of our heroes forming Shafter's army?

The widespread publication of the "Round Robin" and the Roosevelt letter, heretofore referred to, had put the people of the United States in a frame of mind to believe anything adverse with respect to the conditions and proper treatment of the soldiers. It was not then known that General Shafter's telegram, preceding the "Round Robin," was as much a surprise to the War Department as the information it contained, made known through the "Round Robin" and the other letter, was to the country. Nor was it then known that within an hour after the receipt of the alarming news respecting the condition of the Santiago troops, conveyed by General Shafter's cablegram, and before the receipt of the "Round Robin," that army was ordered to return to the United States at once. A wave of indignation, caused by a misapprehension, swept over the United States, and every act of the War Department was interpreted from this distorted point of view. In its psychological aspects this universal hysteria was not unlike other incidents in the history of our country wherein sentiment smotherers reason and loose opinion runs riot. Approximate-

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ly 22,000 men reached Montauk from Cuba, and of this number probably 20,000 were invalids or convalescents—sick, enfeebled, and emaciated by the ruthless ravages of the Cuban malarial or yellow fever. The sight of these noble men thus returning, after their signal victories on a foreign soil, was indeed disheartening, and one never before witnessed by citizens of this country. Without stopping to analyze the causes, their condition was forthwith charged to the War Department. The truth did not prevail, because it could not secure a hearing. Camp Wikoff was thrown open to the public, and here flocked kind-hearted men and women to serve the troops, and incidentally express their horror at the condition of the soldiers, of the camp, and of its management. Most of these persons had never before seen a military camp; none of them had ever before seen an army returning from a campaign in the tropics; and none had ever before inspected a field hospital in time of war and while filled with the sick.

Major Ira C. Brown, executive officer of the hospitals at Camp Wikoff, thus testified, when he was asked by the War Investigation Commission how he accounted for the great number of complaints made of that camp:

“By the statements of people who talked mostly of things they knew the least about, principally women, who are sympathetic. They were nervous and flashy about certain things. They came there, having never seen a hospital and never seen a sick soldier, or anything of the kind. It was not a condition that would inspire a poet, but it was nothing unusual except as to the numbers. It was practically as bad in Tampa, only there was not as large a number, and they thought the soldiers were terribly abused because they did not have feather-beds and lamb chops,

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and all that sort of thing. The fact of giving typhoid-fever patients liquid diet led them to think we were starving them. There was a case where a woman got into a ward where a man had dysentery and gave him oranges. He had had hemorrhages, and we had just got his dysentery checked. We had had a hard time to stop it, and it went through him whole. That is one of the things we had to contend with. The 'hero worshippers' wanted hands to hold and brows to rub, and they would get in, and you could not keep them out."*

* One of the very trying problems during the latter part of 1898 was the constant appeals from parents and friends to grant furloughs to men who were convalescent and desirous of returning to their homes. To this end the department was besieged day and night by letters and personal applications.

Many soldiers, under the stimulating hope of going to their home, appeared to be stronger than they really were, and when the number in the hospitals was so large, the surgeons were too easily persuaded to grant furloughs to those who should not have been permitted to leave the camp. I recall one instance. A prominent citizen in western Massachusetts telegraphed to the War Department asking that a young man of his town be granted a furlough from Montauk Point. The order was issued on the condition that the surgeon in attendance should regard it safe for this soldier to travel. The young man was granted his furlough, went to his home, received the congratulations of his townspeople, was fêted, and in the excitement which followed probably over-exerted himself and possibly ate things which he should not have eaten. In one week from the day of his arrival home he was dead.

All medical authorities are unanimously of opinion that a convalescent typhoid-fever patient should eat no solid food. The appetites of the patients, however, are often beyond their control. When free from the restraint of doctors or nurses they are apt to yield to the pangs of hunger and take more or less solid or improper food. On the night of September 2d, 1898, in company with the President, I visited Montauk Point. We arrived at the railroad station on Long Island, just opposite New York City, at ten o'clock that evening. A train had just come in from Montauk with a large number of furloughed convalescents. It was supposed that they were quite able to travel to their homes when they left camp, yet on the way to Brooklyn, 125 miles from camp, three had died, and when the train reached Brooklyn twenty were unable to walk and had to be carried into the Red Cross station established near by. Upon our arrival at Montauk I inquired into the cause. It was reported that many good people had visited the men in the trains and had given them to eat and drink that which

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He further remarked in the course of his testimony:

“ But when was there a camp in the world in which so much was done so well? The death-rate was only two per cent. ; and I have searched the records and you cannot find a hospital in the world with a record like that. Everybody that came to it was sick.”

It was a noticeable feature of the criticisms of Montauk and other camps that those who were most vigorous in their fault-finding and denunciations knew the least about the facts, and when subsequently called before the War Investigation Commission were compelled to admit that they had no personal knowledge of the facts, and that the statements so publicly and so often made by them were based upon mere hearsay. One incident of this kind is furnished by the conduct of the Rev. Teunis S. Hamlin, pastor of the Church of the Covenant, Washington, D. C. In the open pulpit of his church, a place above all where one would expect to hear uttered only truth, he thus remarked as part of the Sunday address to his congregation on the 18th of September, 1898, just after he had returned from his summer outing:

“ Whether there have been deliberate crimes against the lives of our soldiers or the blunders of ignorance and incompetence

they ought not to have had and which the men, in their uncontrollable desire for food, partook of. They were literally killed by kindness. As a result of what was learned at Montauk orders were immediately given that no more furloughs should be granted to men unless it was absolutely certain that it was safe for them to travel.

It is not unlikely, however, that a great many deaths occurred among furloughed soldiers, convalescent from typhoid and Cuban fevers, as a result of eating food that should not have been taken by the men for weeks, perhaps, after leaving the hospital.

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that are as bad as crimes, the public does not yet know. But it does know that in Cuba they were but half clothed, half fed, half sheltered, half doctored when wounded or sick. It does know that in camps, within sight of our great cities, one of them within sight of our national capital, they have been decimated by perfectly preventable diseases and have died untended and un-comforted. It does know that the transports have renewed the horrors of the 'middle passage,' and that men have starved while supply-ships floated aimlessly for weeks and months upon the ocean and trains loaded with food and medical supplies stood unopened upon the rails. It does know that somehow our soldiers have become objects of public charity. Meanwhile the War Office 'pleads the baby act.' A Cabinet officer, a Senator, and a general pronounce the water at Montauk 'good' after tasting it; the head of the department, in a public letter, shields himself by throwing all blame upon his subordinates, in the same breath saying that there really is no blame after all, and that war is not a picnic. The American public understands this perfectly; expected deaths, sickness, and suffering; is slow to believe evil of those in whom it delights to take unqualified pride. But it is capable of a righteous indignation. It is feeling that indignation profoundly to-day. Will the feeling evaporate and the needless and cruel sufferings of thousands of brave men be forgotten? Or will what is now a feeling issue in even-handed justice, after calm investigation into all the facts, in adequate penalties, no matter upon whom they may fall? The issue of all this will sharply test our national character; will disclose our love of both justice and humanity. If it shall also bring the Congress to realize the evil of meddling with administrative functions, abolish politics from the army and navy, and make it impossible that men without experience or capacity should have human lives intrusted to their care, then the martyrs of our camps and transports will not have died in vain."

After the War Investigation Commission was convened, I suggested that Dr. Hamlin be invited to appear before it and substantiate his statements. He was called upon to submit his evidence and thus re-

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plied in a letter to the Secretary of that Commission, October 8, 1898:

“ The sermon to which you allude as preached by me on the 18th ultimo was upon the great events of the summer. The paragraph that touched subjects covered by your commission’s work is illustrative of a trait of national character, and based upon what then passed current as public knowledge. I had and have ‘ no experience,’ but spoke upon information found in reputable papers . . . and statements issued from officials of the War Department and found in the public press. A reading of the paragraph will show that it dealt only with matters of presumably public knowledge.”

Vice-President Hobart was so incensed at this minister’s sermon that he gave up his pew and immediately left the Church of the Covenant.

Another incident of the same kind is afforded by the letters and newspaper interviews of Mr. Robert B. Roosevelt, of New York City. This gentleman, I understand, has the reputation of being a worthy and respectable citizen in the community where he resides. He was one of many, however, who were influenced by the exaggerated and untrue statements that found their way into the press.

In his communications to the President and the War Investigation Commission, he made use of such expressions as “intentional cruelties”; “cruel sufferings of the soldiers in consequence of shortcomings in the medical, quartermaster, and commissary branches of army administration”; “untold horrors and cruelties at the hands of unfeeling nurses and attendants in the hospitals”; and claimed that the soldiers “were starved in a land of plenty, were uncared for when sick, left without attention when wound-

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ed, were abused, maltreated, in some cases practically murdered.”

Admitting that Mr. Roosevelt believed all that he charged in his letters, it is interesting to note his conduct when he was invited to appear before the War Investigation Commission for the purpose of substantiating his statements. I quote his testimony in full:

“STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. ROOSEVELT

“Robert B. Roosevelt appeared at the request of the commission and made the following statement:

“By General Dodge:

“Q. Do you wish to be sworn, Mr. Roosevelt?

“A. Well, I have no objection; but I can't give any testimony of my own knowledge. All I have heard is pure hearsay. I can probably supply you with the names of additional witnesses if you want some witnesses; but personally I have no testimony. As I told the gentleman at the door, I have no knowledge. I wasn't in the war at all. My nephew,* Colonel Roosevelt, was in the war.

“Q. Have you any more witnesses besides those you furnished us?

“A. I can probably give the others if it is desirable.

“Q. Are there any more you think it is necessary for us to ex-

* Colonel Roosevelt thus swore before the War Investigation Commission regarding the treatment of his regiment at Montauk Point:

“Our regiment was admirably treated. As far as my own regiment is concerned, (we) were well treated—admirably treated. Again and again I would ask them how they were being treated, and they would answer me, ‘This is heaven.’ They were getting chicken broth; they were getting milk. We got so much milk and goodies and things like that that we finally had to stop receiving them. I would take them around and give them to other regiments. My troop commanders and the regimental commanders who reported to me when I was brigade commander would report that they would not use any more delicacies; that they didn't want any more and couldn't use any more.”

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amine outside of those which you have given us—any that will have additional knowledge ?

“ A. I only sent the names of the witnesses as to those matters which we had presented in our statement to the President. Outside of that there was a vast field on which we could probably furnish a number of witnesses. We have a meeting of our committee to-morrow. Will you gentlemen be here through the week?

“ Q. Yes.

“ A. Then I will submit a list of additional witnesses.

“ Q. When you submit the witnesses won't you be kind enough to state as to what they will be examined so we will know what line to take?

“ A. Yes.”

It is the universal testimony of the soldiers at Montauk that everything that could be done for them was tenderly and thoughtfully done. The regular army surgeons, the volunteer surgeons, the contract doctors, and the army nurses worked unceasingly and devotedly to alleviate the suffering and add to the comfort of the sick and convalescent.

In this connection I desire to testify to the work of the trained nurses and that noble band of women, who, under Miss Clara Barton and her Red Cross flag, rendered such acts of tenderness and sweet mercy to the wounded and the dying, the sick, and the convalescent on the battle-field and in camp. Miss Barton, her corps of assistants, and the supplies on the Red Cross ship *Texas* were of inestimable assistance after the battle of San Juan.

I have elsewhere referred to the enthusiastic tender of service on the part of the men in the United States in response to the first and second calls for volunteers. I would be wanting both in candor and in fairness did I not say, that the women were no less patriotic

in their offers to render such duties as the government might see fit to assign them. The Daughters of the American Revolution, with characteristic patriotism and with a definiteness of purpose highly commendable, immediately set to work to organize a bureau for trained nurses. Of the many thousands from among those angels of mercy, this society examined into each applicant's professional and moral fitness for the services these women were to perform, and was never lacking in fit candidates when the War Department called upon it for nurses. To the Daughters of the American Revolution and Mrs. Whitelaw Reid, the executive officer for the New York Chapter, the nation and its soldiers owe, indeed, a debt of immeasurable gratitude. With grateful heart and sweet recollection many a soldier lad recalls the trim nurse who, with gentle grace, soft hand, and tender smile, seemed to make worth while the wound of battle or the tedium of sickness. The space within the covers of this book would not be sufficient for the bare mention of the labor and self-sacrifice of those women who served or offered to serve so unselfishly in such capacity as their sex fits them by the side of their fathers, their brothers, and their husbands. It is no exaggeration to say that they saved more lives than the enemy's bullets destroyed.

I cannot resist the temptation to mention one name held in grateful remembrance by the War Department, as I am sure it is enshrined in many a soldier's heart. Miss Helen Gould gave not only her time and personal services, but liberally of her wealth as well.

The man with the gun is not the only hero in time of war.

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The record of Camp Wikoff conclusively proves that most of the charges against it were without cause or reason. A camp of ten days' preparation for over 25,000 men, of whom 20,000 are received sick within thirty days, only 126 of whom die, surely cannot be regarded as otherwise than creditable to those officers responsible for its establishment and control. Every prediction of a typhoid or other epidemic so frequently made in the press by "special representatives" and others, was unfulfilled.

There is an abundance of evidence to prove that there was a determined and concerted effort on the part of certain newspapers to misstate, and to scrupulously avoid mention of, facts—and there were many—creditable to the conduct and supply of that camp. I have selected a few extracts from the sworn testimony of officers of the regular army and others bearing upon this point. These statements were made before the War Investigation Commission:

"Corporal EDWARD G. STANTON, 2d Volunteer Engineers.

"Q. You saw nothing, as a soldier or private there, that you had cause to complain of?

"A. No, sir; none whatever. The men were all sick when they came there. Of course some complained, but that was natural for men in their position. I know I had friends and relatives who wrote to me in regard to the terrible state of affairs that they saw in the papers. I wrote back immediately that they need have no fear. The *New York Journal* was responsible for a good deal."

"Major A. W. CORLISS, 7th U. S. Infantry.

"Q. Have you seen the complaints in the papers that have been made against the 7th?

"A. I have seen some of them.

"Q. Are they truthful or untruthful complaints?

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“ A. What I have seen are exaggerated. I have seen no complaints against the regiment. I have seen some complaints in general.

“ Q. From the men—what complaints have you heard from the men?

“ A. I have never heard of any myself. I was speaking of what was in the papers.

“ Q. You have never heard any complaint from the men of their treatment, lack of food, water, or of lying out on the ground?

“ A. No, sir.

“ Q. Or about their treatment in the hospital?

“ A. No, sir.

“ Q. If there had been any such complaint would you be likely to know?

“ A. I would.

“ Q. How do you account for these complaints in the papers?

“ A. They just want to appear in print, I guess.

“ Q. So far as you saw, was there any truth in them?

“ A. Not a particle.”

“ Major CHARLES B. NANCREDE, Chief Surgeon.

“ The doctors we had were far above the average of medical intelligence, and were the hardest working set of men I ever saw. Because he is a contract doctor he is no better or worse.

“ Q. You saw the unusual complaint from the people in the press of New York about Montauk and the way the above hospital was run, naturally, did you not?

“ A. Yes, sir; I saw a good deal of it.

“ Q. What explanation can you give for that?

“ A. I was informed by a Boston reporter that the New York reporters were to roast everything.

“ Q. Were those his instructions?

“ A. No; I don't think the Boston papers roasted them so much, but he told me this voluntarily; I don't know whether reliable or not.”

“ Captain ROBERT W. DOWDY, U. S. A.

“ Q. How much were ambulances used by officers and their friends to the detriment of the sick?

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“ A. I could state positively not at all, so far as came under my observation. The rumors that the newspapers circulated about that are mostly simple stories out of whole cloth. When ambulances were coming from the hospital back to the corral, which was near the station, no doubt many officers would ride down. I think it may be possible when out around the camp that drivers would take a fee from visitors, either going from one point to another, but, of course, I saw the ambulances more than any one else, and I can honestly state that I never saw them used for purposes not intended.”

“ Captain JONATHAN M. PATTON, Assistant Quartermaster
U. S. V.

“ Q. Did you see among the correspondents of the daily papers that were there in Montauk a very severe criticism as to the treatment of those who came there?

“ A. I think there was a great deal of injustice in those statements. . . .

“ Q. Captain, in general was there anything needed by the troops there from the quartermaster's department which you could not furnish—that was not furnished?

“ A. I don't know of a single, solitary thing that was ever asked for that was not furnished without a particle of hesitation, or without even waiting for a receipt for it; it was sent when it was asked for.”

“ Colonel W. H. FORWOOD, Assistant Surgeon-General U. S. A.

“ A. There were complaints made by men sent up there. They were hired by newspapers to come up there and write articles for newspapers for the stipulated sum of \$50, I think, usually, and they came up and wrote their articles.

“ Q. Newspaper men or doctors?

“ A. Doctors. Dr. Lee, of New York, was one, and being a very personal friend of mine, he came to me first, and I told him I wanted him to look around and into every hole and corner and criticise everything he could find, because criticism was valuable and we were not infallible, and we wanted to see ourselves as others saw us. I told him I wanted him to do it. He went around to look at things, and he made it flattering in some respects; but when

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it was printed he was very much disgusted because they left all the favorable parts out.

“ Q. Did he get his \$50?

“ A. Yes, sir.

Another doctor came there, and he wrote a very scurrilous article. He said a great many things that were not true. He said the men were lying on the ground.

“ Q. Do you remember the name of that doctor?

“ A. I believe it was Stimpson. He said ‘ dirt ’ kitchens, and it went out and it was published ‘ dirty ’ kitchens. This did us a great deal of injustice. He came up there, he said, to inform the public, and he should have told the truth. He should have told the public the truth, but should have told them that those kitchens were presided over by the finest chefs that could be found in New York and Boston. They were provided by Miss Helen Gould, who came up there and offered me an unlimited amount of assistance. Each cook had an assistant, and we put them in the detention hospital and general hospital and the annex, and they presided over these kitchens during the whole history of the hospital. They gave their services to the benefit of preparing a diet. One of those men I interviewed, and I found that for three years and six months he had been private cook for W. K. Vanderbilt. He had been on that yacht that was sunk in the harbor. He was loaned—so were others—by the richest people in New York City. Instead of doling out government rations prepared by army cooks, the army ration was scarcely considered. We had bread and meat and flour, of course, but the army rations were supplemented by everything you could find in the larder of the Waldorf in New York. ”

“ Hon. W. H. BALDWIN, Jr., President of the Long Island Railroad.

“ The scare of no water was started deliberately and maliciously by a newspaper correspondent, who, by his own confession, had never been on the ground and never knew anything about it, and boasted of his enterprise in forcing the government to act.”*

* It is to be said to the great credit of the management of this road

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“Brigadier-General S. B. M. YOUNG, U. S. A.

“Q. As a matter of fact, did the men complain?

“A. As a matter of fact, not at Montauk. Now, answering the question the general asked me, ‘Did I have anything to do with the newspaper correspondents,’ it was told me and shown to me, instructions that newspaper correspondents received at Montauk, that he must write on these subjects commencing with A, enumerating down to M. This gentleman (I honor him for it) informed his papers that they had made a mistake in the man;

that during the entire time of the existence of Montauk Camp, when its freight and traffic had been increased many times, there was not an accident or the loss of a single life. The president of the road went to Montauk and for days and entire nights worked without intermission. He thus further testified before the War Investigation Commission:

“The other persons to whom I wish to refer in order to have you get the right view of our part in this matter are the men on the Long Island Railroad. I talked with them when this first began and told them what was coming. I told them the difficulties, the serious situation of the government, the responsibility which they had to themselves and the government and to humanity, and I urged upon them loyal, cordial work and support, and I will say to you that the most beautiful picture I know of in connection with this whole war was the devotion and the sacrifice and the hunger and the work and the life and everything that is beautiful of the men on that little Long Island one-horse railroad you are talking about. We lost five people; they died. They didn’t die from being at Montauk, but in three cases out of five from carrying and helping sick men. My own brother stayed there night and day from the beginning to the end of the camp, and stayed until the last troop went, and he was stronger than a bull and yet fell in utter collapse, and is to-day. It was life. It was not sordid motive, and there was not a sign of it from the beginning up to this moment in this whole camp.

“Q. You are speaking of the operating men on your road?

“A. Yes, sir. There were as many heroes there as there were in some of the places during the war. It was a fearful job and a fearful responsibility. We passed along with the daily criticism, fortunately, without paying attention to it, because it was untrue. The only fear I had was that the daily attack of newspapers, in their lack of information—that it might embarrass our men and cause some serious wreck. Fortunately, by calmness and good judgment, the men hung together, and it was nothing but devotion to the cause that prompted the operation of our road under the circumstances. It was more than human.”

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they would have to send another writer there. That man I spoke to and asked him—of course, I cannot give his name.

“By General BEAVER:

“Q. Can you give the name of the paper?

“A. That would be giving the thing away, too.

“By Colonel SEXTON:

“Q. I think the people ought to have that.

“A. The *World*. He said, ‘Yes; but it would cost me my place.’ I said, ‘No; they will not discharge you on that; you have too good a hold.’ They did send other people there, and they wrote things purporting to be letters and complaints from men that we have investigated, and there was not a word of truth in it.

“By Governor WOODBURY:

“Q. They were manufactured letters?

“A. Yes, sir; manufactured letters; names were not given half the time, but where they were given we found it was not true. I did not investigate, but told officers to investigate.”

“Major ROYCE D. FRY, Brigade Surgeon U. S. V.

“A. That the reporters from the various papers in New York were sent there with instructions to find out everything bad, and if they found anything good to say nothing about it. It was an open secret. People do not make any bones about it, and if anything could be said in favor of the camp they didn’t want to say it; if there was anything bad or disreputable they wrote it up.”

“Captain GEORGE ALLEN DODD, U. S. Cavalry.

“Q. Did you read in the public press while at Montauk Point the criticisms that were made upon that place?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Please state whether, in your opinion, those were just or unjust.

“A. I suppose you refer to this thing of men starving and going around lantern-jawed, not enough to eat, begging for something to eat—absolutely false. It is false—everything of that kind. Those stories were gotten up by a lot of sensationalists.

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I don't know who they are or what they belong to, but there seemed to be an organized band of them there. They would come around and look at a man's tongue and ask him if he didn't feel badly—try to convince a man that he was sick, and all that. There was no suffering of that kind there. I have been over every inch of it time and again, in different places. The men themselves would laugh at those stories when they came out.

“ Q. Have you been engaged at any time during your term of service in Indian warfare?

“ A. I have ; yes, sir. I served for twelve years, and my service was west of the Missouri River, and I never crossed it.

“ Q. I don't know but you may have stated, I think you possibly have, before in your testimony, but I will ask you the question again: Please state the comparative deprivation and suffering in some of the Indian campaigns in which you have been engaged and the campaign in Cuba during the war with Spain.

“ A. I stated, I think, something with regard to the percentage of sick that I had. I have suffered very much more in Indian campaigns than in Cuba ; men have suffered more ; enlisted men then had less to eat and not so well provided for in other respects.”

“ Major HENRY B. HERSEY, 1st Volunteer Cavalry.

“ A. No, sir. These reports, as far as my experience is concerned, are absolutely unfounded. I do not believe that any soldiers in the history of mankind have ever been taken care of as they were at Montauk. It was a standing joke among the boys when we were getting the papers to say, ‘ Let us see who are starving now.’ They had to read the papers, and all laughed at the horrible cases of men dying in the grass with none to assist them, when they were just as happy and just as glad as they could be to know that they were being taken care of so well. We sent away loads of stuff from our camp. We sent over to the 10th Cavalry loads of stuff we could not use, because we had them brought to us from the friendly societies, and from the friends of officers of the regiment in such quantities that we could not begin to use them—the choicest kind of supplies ; and we would send them over to the 10th, to those darky boys, because we could not

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use them. We felt in our hearts that they were good fellows, and they had done well."

Another incident of the same kind is furnished by a letter from General Shafter, sent on his own volition:

"HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
"MONTAUK POINT, LONG ISLAND,

"September 3, 1898.

"MY DEAR GENERAL ALGER,—I have just seen the *New York World* of to-day, in which it refers to an interview with me day before yesterday. Every word which refers to charging incompetency or gross mismanagement of supply departments or that alleges that persons ordering the army to Cuba are responsible for present condition of army is absolutely false. I not only never said this, but entertain no such opinion. I only spoke to the reporter on the success of the campaign and the natural difficulties to be overcome.

"I suppose, general, you have gotten used to newspaper lies by this time and can appreciate the situation. I am,

"Very respectfully, WM. R. SHAFTER.

"Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, etc."

The statements were so often, so persistently, and so positively made that the soldiers were being fed with improper food, that they were being starved, that they were criminally neglected, that every bureau of the War Department was incompetent and negligent—that many of our most intelligent and conservative citizens even came to believe the malicious and mischievous false rumors and reports when they had no opportunity to examine into the conditions personally.

This was especially true after General Miles charged that "beef pulp" was being furnished the army "under the pretence of an experiment," and that refrigerated beef ("embalmed beef") was

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being issued to the troops. It is not to be wondered at that, until each and every one of these unwarrantable statements were proven to be false, many persons were misguided and deceived. Their indignation and resentment rightfully should have been directed towards the person who conceived and brought forth such a hideous creature of the imagination.

The persistent misstatements and exaggerations caused widespread and untold suffering and anxiety throughout the country.* Every charge of neglect, mismanagement, or abuse at Montauk from respon-

* In an official report to the War Department, so recent as March 14th, 1901, Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, then commanding United States troops in China, thus wrote of the baneful and pernicious effect upon soldiers resulting from careless and exaggerated newspaper statements :

“ And I may add, although perhaps it is not germane to the subject, that if correspondents have studied with care the effect produced upon soldiers by exaggeration of their hardships by comparison or otherwise, or the effect of frequent reference to their hardships and privations, they must have discovered that the effect is positively injurious to the soldier, the service, and the government, and is largely responsible for the absence from the evening campfire of the one-time songs which cheered and rested the men, following the long march, day of fatigue or battle ; for the absence of the camp joker, who provided the best substitute in the world for water, bread, meat, etc., when not plentiful or not present, owing to some incident of war or of the march, which every honest soldier knows is never the result of premeditation of his government or his officers ; for the marked decay of individual will-power, without which nothing difficult can be accomplished by an army ; for baleful countenances observed when hardships abound and difficulties accumulate, distress surrounds. Soldiers do not like sympathy ; sympathy is for women and children. Soldiers are men, but they do like fair commendation when deserving of it, and especially when their fortitude has been severely tested. Commend our soldiers for manfully undergoing privations and they will readily respond again ; but prate of their privations, deficiencies, and heavy burdens and they soon learn to dread the hour that shall disturb their ease ; the spirit becomes one of submission rather than one cheerfully embracing the opportunity to exhibit their endurance and their stamina.”

sible sources (and from a good many irresponsible newspapers) received immediate consideration and thorough investigation by the War Department at Washington or by those in command at Camp Wikoff. Exceedingly few of the charges, on investigation, proved warranted or were considered to be the result of neglect or abuse.

With this evidence of a concerted attempt to discredit the efforts of the supply bureaus of the War Department and the commanding generals of Camp Wikoff, little more need be said to prove that much of the criticism was unjust and that more was untrue. On the other hand, it is interesting to note what the three commanding generals at Montauk had to say for it several months afterwards. These statements were made before the War Investigation Commission under oath.

Major-General Wheeler said:

“ We had that wonderful result of 22,000 soldiers coming from the yellow-fever district, with the yellow-fever supposed to be in some of the ships, and some of them infected, and yet not the spread of a single case of fever.

“ If there were any camp horrors the commander of the camp would certainly be the responsible person because he had ample authority to rectify any wrongs and give the proper comfort to the soldiers. I do not know of any complaints from soldiers at that time. There were a number of individual instances of suffering on the part of the soldiers, but they were very few in comparison to the great number of soldiers there and to the great amount of sickness. I went through the hospitals and made it a special point to ask in every ward if there was anything that they wanted that they did not have, and the answer was always speaking in gratitude of the good care they were receiving.”

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General Young said:

"I have never seen its equal. I hope never to be called upon to make such efforts again. The country looked upon us to do this, and we were going to make a success of it, and I think we did make a success of it."

And General Shafter said:

"I thought it was the best camp I ever saw."

Returning now to the camps of instruction and mobilization, the evidence is overwhelming that the sickness among the soldiers encamped in the United States during the summer of 1898 was the result of ignorance, inexperience, and carelessness on the part of both officers and men. The fact that typhoid-fever was prevalent in every camp, whether of 1,000 or 50,000 men, indicates what other indisputable evidence conclusively demonstrates.

An interesting comparison can be made between the records of disease among the volunteers and regulars. The 15th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, consisting of forty-six officers and 1,279 men, was encamped alone in its own State on the Fair Grounds at St. Paul during July, and at Fort Snelling during August. In July this regiment had 131 sick, and in August its sick list had grown to the astounding number of 602, nearly fifty per cent. of the entire command; 260 of these cases were typhoid-fever. Other volunteer regiments remaining in their own States upon the camping-grounds selected by their several governors met with a similar experience, notably the 203d New York at Camp Black, Long Island, and the 35th Michigan at Island Lake, Michigan. On the other

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hand, about 12,000 men of the regular army were at Chickamauga in April and May, part of these troops remaining there for a full month. Not a case of typhoid-fever or other camp disease developed among them, and but two deaths occurred, one from accident and the other from pneumonia.

The experience of the regulars and volunteers during the Santiago campaign is especially interesting on this point. General Shafter sailed from Tampa on the 14th of June with 14,412 regulars and 2,465 volunteers (1st Volunteer Cavalry, 2d Massachusetts, and 71st New York). General Duffield's volunteer brigade (consisting of the 9th Massachusetts, the 33d and 34th Michigan) reached Cuba on the 27th of June and the 1st of July; and the 1st District of Columbia and the 1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry arrived at the front on the 11th of July. These additional volunteers brought General Shafter's command to 14,412 regulars and 7,443 volunteers. The deaths from disease during the time the 5th Corps was in Cuba amounted to 210 regulars and 206 volunteers—practically as many volunteers as regulars, although there were only about half as many volunteers as regulars. This large ratio of deaths from disease existed among the volunteers in spite of the fact that three volunteer regiments did not arrive until about a week after the entire command landed and two other volunteer regiments did not reach the front until the 11th of July. One regiment of regulars, the 24th Infantry (colored), lost many men from disease because that gallant regiment was detailed to nurse the sick with yellow-fever.*

* The number of cases in the Yellow-Fever Hospital at Siboney in

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Again, another interesting comparison of disease among regulars and volunteers can be made from the records of sickness of troops remaining in the United States. And in this connection it should be remembered that by far the larger proportion of the regulars in the United States were recruits, as 14,412 of the regular army alone accompanied the Santiago campaign. But the regulars in the United States had the benefit of the instruction and discipline of regular army officers. As a result of this fact and the example of the regular soldiers in camp, the Surgeon-General reports that from May, 1898, to June, 1899, the death-rate among the regulars in the United States was but 17.43 per thousand of strength, while the death-rate among the volunteers equalled 26.67 per thousand of strength. Moreover, and this statement is even more significant, the Surgeon-General reports that in the United States the regular troops lost but 7.78 per thousand of strength from typhoid-fever while the volunteers lost considerably over twice as many, or 18.21 per thousand of strength.

If further evidence were wanting these facts would conclusively demonstrate the proposition that the large amount of sickness among the volunteers was the result of their own inexperience and carelessness. But the records of the medical department furnish additional proof of this statement. Three or four months of camp life give both officers and men a knowledge of camp sanitation and of the simple rules necessary

July and August, 1898, was 549, with forty-six deaths (Report of Surgeon-Generals, 1898, p. 128). One hundred and sixty-seven of these cases and twenty-three—just half—of the deaths occurred in the 24th Infantry.

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for the preservation of their health and strength that neither text-books nor instruction when enforced by rigid discipline can give. The mortality from disease in the camps of the United States reached its acme in September, and then its fall was both rapid and great. The ratio per thousand of deaths from disease was as follows: May, 1898, .26; June, 1898, .44; July, 1898, 1.72; August, 1898, 5.21; September, 1898, 5.89. In October it fell to 3.17; in November it was but 1.51, and continued to fall until in April, 1899, it was but .71.*

That a clean camp and an observation of the few simple rules of hygiene laid down by the medical department of the army will prevent much sickness and save many lives, is a maxim of military life demonstrated long before the occurrence of the war with Spain. Camp life during that war and since has added strength to that military aphorism as exemplified in numerous experiences. The command of Brigadier-General J. P. Sanger at Matanzas, Cuba, when I visited that camp in the spring of 1899, consisted of two regular regiments and four volunteer regiments: 10th U. S. Infantry, 2d U. S. Cavalry, 8th Massachusetts, 12th New York, 160th Indiana, and 3d Kentucky.

These troops were in camp under General Sanger's command from January until June, 1899. Two of the volunteer regiments were at Matanzas two months, two were there four months, and the regular regiments, four and five months respectively. Sanitation and camp hygiene received the most careful consid-

* See the interesting pamphlet of Surgeon-General Sternberg entitled *Sanitary Lessons of the War*.

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eration. General Sanger had the gratifying result of but one death, and that from drowning, during the entire six months he was stationed at Matanzas.

Notwithstanding the alarming reports made with respect to the deaths at Chickamauga; notwithstanding the exaggerated reports of deaths from disease in the camp near Washington and other camps; notwithstanding the false charges respecting the conditions at Montauk, the ratio of mortality from disease during the war with Spain was much less than the first months of the Civil War, despite the fact that a large part of the army of 1898 campaigned in the tropics. Upon this point the Surgeon-General thus writes:*

“ In comparing the death-rates from disease during the year of the Spanish-American War, May 1st, 1898, to April 30th, 1899, and the first year of the Civil War, May 1st, 1861, to April 30th, 1862, note should be taken in the first place that the mean strength in May, 1861, was only 16,161, as compared with 163,726 men in service in May, 1898. The mustering-in of volunteer troops was more slow in 1861 than during the recent war, so that it was not until September and October, 1861, that the mean strength assumed proportions equal to that of corresponding months of the Spanish War. Although the number present in the camps of 1861-62 after October, 1861, was largely in excess of those aggregated during the past year, the average annual strength during both wars did not differ greatly. Nevertheless, the deaths from disease in 1861-62 numbered 10,522, while in 1898-99 they amounted only to 5,438. The death-rate per 1,000 of strength mounted gradually month by month in 1861-62, and indeed it did not reach its acme until February, 1863, when the rate of 6.39 was reached. In 1898, on the other hand, the acme, 5.89, was reached suddenly in September, but owing to the sanitary meas-

* *Sanitary Lessons of the War.*

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ares adopted, the fall during October and November was as rapid as had been the rise.

“ The comparatively small number of medical officers of the regular army available for duty in the large camps occupied by our volunteer troops at the outset of the war proved to be entirely inadequate to control the sanitary situation in these camps, and as a result of the conditions existing, the mortality from typhoid fever in our armies during the year ending April 30th, 1899, has been more than twenty-two times the annual mortality in our regular army during the decade immediately preceding the war period. As compared with the first year of the Civil War, however, there is a decided improvement, the typhoid mortality for the first year of the Civil War having been 1,971 per 100,000 of mean strength, and for the Spanish-American War, 1,237 per 100,000. Moreover, as shown by the chart, the vigorous sanitary measures enforced enabled our troops to quickly free themselves from the ravages of this infectious disease, and while the line of typhoid mortality continued to ascend during the first year of the Civil War and subsequently, it rapidly fell after the middle of September last, and for the last six months of the period under consideration has been remarkably low. Indeed, in the history of large armies the record has never heretofore been equalled.”

The comparison is even stronger if we consider the period from the 1st of May until the end of September in 1861 and 1898. Taking all organizations which were in service from ninety days to five months during the Rebellion and whose records are sufficiently complete to enable a definite statement to be made with regard to them, it is found that the total strength of these organizations amounted to 157,484 officers and men, and that the deaths in action, or of wounds received in action, numbered 367, while the deaths from disease, or causes other than wounds received in action numbered 2,356, making the total deaths from all causes 2,723. From the commencement of the Spanish War.

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in the latter part of April, until the 30th of September, 1898, there were 274,717 officers and men in service. The deaths in action or wounds received in action during this period numbered 345, and the deaths from disease, or causes other than wounds received in action, numbered 2,565, making the total deaths 2,910. In this connection it should be remembered that a good part of our army during this period was operating in a tropical country at the worst season of the year. These figures show a ratio of deaths from all causes, per 1,000 of total strength, of 17.29 in the organizations under consideration for the War of the Rebellion, and 10.59 for the troops in service during the Spanish War. But what is more significant, the ratio of deaths from disease alone, or causes other than wounds received in action, is 14.96 for those organizations in the War of the Rebellion, and only 9.34 for the troops in the war with Spain.*

I repeat the statement, that the records of any army in the world do not show as small a mortality percentage from disease as the army of the United States during the war with Spain.

* From a statement prepared in October, 1898, by Brigadier-General F. C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Record and Pension Office, U. S. War Department.

CHAPTER XXIV

CONCLUSION

IT is doubtful if any nation rated as a first power ever entered upon a war of offence in a condition of less military preparation than was the United States in 1898. At that time there were not sufficient reserve supplies in the possession of the War Department to fully equip 10,000 men in addition to the regular army as it then stood.

In discussing the unpreparedness for war, in another chapter of this book, it has been shown that the small number of Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifles and carbines—and the small arm was the only element of equipment of which there was a reserve—was barely sufficient to meet the needs of the increase in the regular army to 61,000. The entire body of volunteers, outside of the three volunteer cavalry regiments, were at first furnished with single-loading Springfield .45-caliber rifles, because there was no other weapon in the possession of the War Department.

We saw also that the government of the United States did not provide smokeless powder for the Springfield rifles, nor for the field artillery in the early part of the war, simply for the reason that it had none to provide. No type of smokeless powder, indeed, had been adopted even for either of these important adjuncts of war. The issue of smokeless powder subsequently was de-

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pendent upon the output of the few plants in the United States capable of manufacturing it. We have also seen that the War Department did not even own or control a single transport, and there was no troop-ship on the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans available to the United States;* that many elements of field, siege, and sea-coast artillery were in a transitional state; that the military establishment was palpably deficient in trained artillerists; that the regular army had not been mobilized since the Civil War; one-third of a century had elapsed since the army, as a whole, or any great part of it had been brought together; that there was no strategic staff, and no large number of officers who were experienced in the concentration of troops, or in battalion, division, or corps manœuvres; that there was no place in the United States especially adapted or prepared for army mobilization, and that neither the army nor any officer in it had any experience in meeting, or operating under, the new conditions incident to a campaign in the tropics.

To these causes, most of which may be directly ascribed to the failure of Congress to provide for the

* The generosity of the government of the United States in providing for the care and comfort of our soldiers when the War Department has the money and the time at its disposal to meet the conditions confronting it, is well exemplified in the vessels fitted up during and soon after the war with Spain. These ships, for their kind, are the most complete in appointments of any troop-ships afloat. They are provided with ice-plants, distilling apparatus, carbonating plants, cold storage large enough to take fresh meat and vegetables from New York to Manila, a steam laundry, a hospital, a contagious hospital ward, electric lights and fans throughout, a spring mattress for each of the 1,200 to 2,000 soldiers, and other conveniences to be found only in the most complete metropolitan hotels. Six troop-ships of this class are the *Grant*, *Sherman*, *Sheridan*, *Meade*, *Logan*, and *Thomas*. They are of modern design, with twin screws and fin keels.

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emergency of war, must be added another: the statutes under which the military establishment operated were not elastic enough to permit of large purchases of supplies necessitated by the sudden expansion of the army to a war footing.

When the crisis, so often predicted by military experts, at last came it found us totally unprepared for war and with problems to be met at home and abroad which were both unusual and difficult.*

The effort has been made frequently to draw comparisons between the efficiency of the army and that of the navy during the war. The conditions do not admit of comparison. At the commencement of hostilities in 1898 the full number of men authorized by law for the navy was but 12,500. This was subsequently increased to 24,123 men—the maximum attained August 15th, 1898. The number of naval officers allowed by law in April, 1898, was 921. By August this force had been increased to a total of 1,035 commissioned officers.

In April, 1898, the enlisted strength of the army was 26,040. In August, this force had been increased to

* Touching on this matter, the junior Senator from Massachusetts thus spoke on the floor of the Senate in January, 1901:

“ Mr. President, Any one who has studied carefully the history of the Spanish War and events connected therewith knows perfectly well all the troubles which befell us at that time in the way of transports, in the way of organization, all the things that led to the outcry here, were owing to defective organization. I never shared, I never had any sympathy with, the wolfish cry which went up to punish individuals for faults which were due to a system.

“ The system was bad. It was owing to us—to Congress—to the lack of interest in the newspapers, to the lack of interest among the people, that we had a bad system. It was not fair to pick out a man here and a man there and hold him up and crucify him before the American people and before the world because he could not suddenly transform a bad system into a good one.”

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263,609 men; and the number of officers in the army in April, 2,143, had been augmented to 11,108 volunteers and regulars. Of this number approximately 8,000 were appointed by governors of States, in accordance with law, and not by the War Department or the President or under the regulations of either. These figures in themselves show how unfair and impossible is a comparison between the two branches of the service for the period under consideration.

Moreover, the augmented naval force of 24,123 men was housed, rationed, and provided with every comfort a ship affords and not subjected to the exposure of camp life or the influences of tropical diseases on land. Aboard ship the sailor has shelter from heat and storms, cooling facilities, sewerage and the abundant pure water supply that the regular army would have in time of peace in barracks. The ship has its refrigerators, its hospital ward, and every convenience contributing to the creature comforts always at hand.

With practically the same comforts in war as it had in peace and with its force scarcely doubled no comparison can be made justly with the army, which was increased ten times its original size with all the necessary equipment, and which had to operate in the field through a tropical country where disease lurked at every step.

These statements are not to be interpreted as either an attempt or a desire to cast reflection upon the record of our navy—magnificent and incomparable as it is—but only to show that the increase and control of the navy during the war are not comparable to the conditions surrounding the increase and control of the army.

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As has been shown, whatever criticisms can be justly directed towards the operations of the army during the first stages of the war have for their causes lack of military preparation. The provisions for suddenly expanding the regular army or for quickly creating an army for service on a war basis were either non-existent or so crude as to be of little value. The failings naturally flowing from this condition of unpreparedness have been largely charged to faulty army organization. In my opinion these criticisms are in the main unjust.

What was needed was not reorganization so much as development along the lines upon which the army is now organized. No military structure can be regarded faulty in its basic principles which successfully quelled the greatest civil war of modern times, for the organization of the army was practically the same in 1898 as it was in 1861-65. Nor is it proper to say that the triumph of our army of 1898 was not because of, but in spite of, the military system. The achievements of our army both in equipping and mobilizing a large force under great difficulties and in conquering an enemy on a foreign shore, were the direct result of the sterling qualities of the regular and volunteer soldier and the system under which they operated. The regular army was the nucleus for this work. It was the nucleus of the regular army officers and men, both of the staff and line, who so quickly equipped and trained the vast number of eager and patriotic men and officers forming the volunteers.

On the merits of this work the War Investigation Commission has said:

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“ After thirty-three years of peace, during a great part of which the army did not exceed 26,000 men, it suddenly became necessary to arm, clothe, feed, and equip more than a quarter of a million.

“ The sudden emergency which called our people to arms after an interval of half a century of peace with all foreign powers was met by the War Department with earnestness and energy. The situation found the country unprepared with any large stock of arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, and equipments. That they were duly provided and that the numerous demands on the industries of our people were met so promptly will remain one of the marvels of history.”

This statement refers alone to the concentration, accoutrement, and movement of troops in the United States. The record of the army in the field is even more creditable.

Shafter's expedition to Cuba was at one and the same time the most successful in its purpose and the most free from loss of any expedition to the tropics ever made by this or any other country. Because of the minimum deaths from disease and bullets and the magnitude of its victories, the achievements of the 5th Corps are without a parallel.

It may be interesting, in this connection, to briefly mention the other campaigns to territories on the Caribbean Sea during the last century and a half.

In 1741 the English sent an expedition against Santiago under Admiral Vernon. A landing was made at Guantanamo, July 13th, with a military force estimated to be between four and five thousand men under the command of General Wentworth. At no time was the resistance met of such a character that it could not have been easily overcome. On the 9th of August, however, when the army had advanced to

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within sixteen miles of Santiago, the forward movement was stopped and all further effort to take the town abandoned, owing to the fact that the army had been overcome with disease incident to the tropics. Two thousand men, or nearly fifty per cent. of the entire command, are said to have died before the remnant of the army got back to its ships.

Twenty-one years later, in 1762, Great Britain sent another expedition to Cuba. This time Havana was the objective point. The history of this army is exceedingly interesting for the reason that the troops composing it were about equal in numbers to those of Shafter's original force to Santiago, and from the additional fact that the English began their siege of Havana at the same season of the year during which the 5th Corps operated in Cuba and for the same length of time, almost to a day. The British expedition consisted of about 14,000 men, reinforced by 2,700 colonial troops sailing from New York. The expedition appeared off Havana June 16th. By the first of July the effective force of the army of nearly 17,000 had been reduced one-third by disease, and at the end of the siege, August 13th, the total losses are said to have been 2,754, of which less than 400 were deaths from bullets. Of the 2,700 colonial troops nine-tenths are reported to have died of tropical fevers in Cuba or while returning to America, although these soldiers were sent back to the colonies immediately after the siege.

In 1801 Napoleon sent an expedition of approximately 25,000 men to San Domingo under the command of his brother-in-law, General Leclerc. The expedition landed on the 20th of June, and when finally

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abandoned the losses from tropical diseases alone amounted to upwards of 20,000.

The campaign of Mexico, in 1846-48, affords another interesting comparison. General Scott's losses from disease are reported to have been 10,000 men, or thirty-three per cent. The deaths at one time amounted to 1,000 a month. There returned to the United States but 400 men of an Indiana regiment originally 1,000 strong, which had not been in action.

Contrast the losses from disease of these four expeditions with that of Shafter's army. His corps of 17,000 landed in Cuba on the 22d of June, and the last of his troops sailed from Santiago August 25th. The total deaths incurred from disease, in spite of the yellow-fever epidemic, amounted to but 416. At the same time that army drove Cervera from Santiago Harbor; forced the surrender of an intrenched enemy exceeding in numerical strength that of our own army; secured the control of the entire eastern portion of the island of Cuba; and acted as one of the most potent influences in causing the Kingdom of Spain to speedily sue for peace.

With its record in the United States, and these unequalled achievements in Cuba, the organization of the army would seem to be built upon a sure foundation. The sufficiency and efficacy of that military structure is further confirmed by recent events in China and the work that has been in progress in the Philippines for the past two years.

The Philippine campaign affords a neat demonstration of the proposition that the general principles upon which the army is now organized are sound and sufficient. This brings us to a comparison between the

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difficulties which had to be met and overcome during the first three months of the war with Spain—the entire duration in fact of that war—and the control of all departments of the army after the War Department had expanded to meet the wants of the national military force when so greatly increased and while operating on a foreign soil under new and unusual difficulties.

Violent and abusive criticism was the only reward the officers of the general staff received during those three trying months when every possible effort and personal sacrifice was made to meet an almost impossible task, while on the other hand an ungenerous silence now greets their successful operations in the Philippines.

By virtue of the acts of Congress of April and May, 1898, authorizing an increase in the regular army and the muster-in of volunteers, all these additional troops, regulars and volunteers, were entitled to release from the military service upon the declaration of peace. The unwarranted provocation of hostilities on the part of the Tagals in the Philippines after the close of the war necessitated a large increase over our regular army on a peace basis to maintain the national honor. Congress, therefore, March 2d, 1899, again authorized an increase in the regular army to 65,000 men and the recruitment at large of 35,000 volunteers. Although this involved an approximate augmentation of the army of the United States to about 72,000, the war had made it possible to have in store an accumulation of military supplies sufficient to at once equip this force. The machinery of the War Department ran smoothly in the recruitment,

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equipment, and transportation half round the world of 70,000 of these new troops. Twelve of the twenty-five volunteer regiments composing the 35,000 volunteers were mustered-in and equipped before July 31st, 1899. When I left the War Department, therefore, August 1st, 1899, the organization for enlisting and equipping the remaining thirteen volunteer regiments was already created and in operation. The enlistments at large for the remainder of the volunteer force continued with this machinery of War Department administration. The regular army had already been increased to approximately 65,000—64,729 exactly by the end of June, 1899—the maximum authorized by the act of March 2d, 1899, heretofore referred to.

Attention is invited to these facts to show how rapidly, smoothly, and successfully the army can be increased when the supplies, transports, etc., are on hand, and when there are at the control of the War Department the necessary experienced officers in the several staff departments.

The same Surgeon-General who was so maliciously charged with neglect and incompetence during the war has been and is now successfully providing for an army nearly four times the size of the regular army in 1898, operating in a tropical climate in the face of an enemy 12,000 miles from the seat of government. The same Quartermaster-General who was severely criticised and abused in 1898 has since then transported half way round the globe a force over three times the size of the regular army in 1898, and is now transporting supplies of all kinds that distance for a force of 70,000, without accident, without complaint, and without, I venture to say, one-half of the anxiety,

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annoyance, and labor it caused to send Shafter's army of 17,000 one-twelfth of that distance. The identically same kind of commissary supplies that caused such vituperation and scurrility in 1898 are now being daily furnished the troops in the Philippines and Cuba without complaint. The same kind of refrigerated beef, furnished by the same American packers who supplied the army in 1898, is still rationed our troops in large quantities; and the identically same kind of canned "roast" beef, about which so much opprobrium was cast in 1898, is now sent our troops in the Philippines at the rate of 160,000 rations a month, and no complaint whatever, I am informed, reaches the War Department because of its use. This is due to the fact that the soldiers have learned how to prepare the food palatably, for it is both a palatable and nutritious food, or the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and Japan would not be constantly supplying it to their soldiers in the field, as they are now doing.

It was upon these three supply departments—the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical bureaus—that the abuse and slander of 1898 so heavily fell. And yet, see how time and a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their efficiency have proven the injustice and unfairness of the charges of incompetence and maladministration. No army in the world is so well and so efficiently provided with commissary supplies as our force in the Philippines; the finest fleet of transports afloat is that which flies the Stars and Stripes; no soldier could be better or more generously clothed than the troops of the United States army; and the soldier who is wounded or becomes sick while

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maintaining the honor of the American Flag, no matter where he is, receives treatment equal to that, I venture to say, of any municipal hospital in the United States.

Despite the total lack of preparation; despite the failure of the militia to meet expectations in the matter of equipment; despite the natural inertia in the supply bureaus of the War Department, resulting from thirty-three years of peace; despite the necessity of embarking an expedition to tropical islands of the Atlantic and Pacific, with no provisions at the outset for doing so—notwithstanding these great and new problems, the line and staff of the regular army and the eager volunteers accomplished what it is no vain boast to claim could not have been done by any other nation on the face of the earth, under the same circumstances. All honor for the completeness and celerity of our victory over the Kingdom of Spain belongs to the people of the United States, for the American soldier and the American sailor is but the American citizen in uniform.

THE END

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